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                                              Abstract 
This thesis explores recent Scottish penal culture through the biographical narrative 
accounts of retired judges. Insights from the sociology of punishment are used to 
develop a more fully cultural approach to the judiciary and to sentencing practice. 
This entails a view of the judiciary as a complex institution whose practices reflect 
tension and compromise, and which recognises judges as bearers of penal culture 
through their sentencing practices. The aims of the research are twofold: to provide 
insight into the changing conditions of judging in Scotland and into the judicial role 
in criminal justice. Narrative research methods were used to interview retired judges 
and gain contextual accounts of judicial life and practice. This approach focuses on 
subjectivity and on individual responses to experiences and constraints. Reflecting 
the judicial role in punishment, an interpretive position based on the hermeneutics of 
faith and suspicion is used to evaluate and interpret these narrative accounts.  
This conceptual and methodological framework is used to explore aspects of judicial 
occupational culture including training and early experiences, the status of criminal 
work, judicial conduct, collegiality, the influence of criminological research on 
sentencing practice, and the relevance of the ‘master narrative’ - judicial 
independence - to sentencing. It is also used to explore the frameworks of meaning 
and vocabularies of motive which judges bring to penal practice. What emerges from 
these judicial narratives is firstly the entanglement of individual life histories and 
organisational imperatives. Secondly, a picture emerges of a judicial habitus that 
includes complex motivations, some openness to new approaches, and capacity for 
reflecting on the conditions which structure and constrain criminal justice practice. 
This suggests the reflexive judge may be an important vector of penal change and 
there are implications for judicial training, penal reform and for the dissemination of 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
When you believe…. that power in law resides in fields of practice, it is important to 
speak of places and people as well as ideas. 
                                                            John Brigham, ‘The Constitution of Interests’ 
The judicial role is inherently ambiguous, casting the judge not only as defender of 
society’s institutions but also as guarantor of their fairness (Kirchheimer, 1961). This 
role is no less complex in the criminal courts where the judge performs the role of 
professional punisher as well as guarantor of due process, rights and the rule of law.1 
Williams (1983:143-4) captures some of this complexity when he describes 
 ‘…the eternal tension in the position of the judge. He is supposed to be an impartial 
adjudicator, applying the existing law and protecting the rights and liberties of the 
subject; but he is also a State instrumentality – in the wider sense, an organ of 
government. In general it is the second concept of the judge’s role that shapes 
judicial attitudes on the issue of fault in the criminal law.’ 
Reflecting some of these tensions, the judiciary occupies an ambivalent place in 
criminology and penal scholarship - theoretically central, yet often empirically 
marginal. On the one hand, sentencing theory, policy and practice are relevant to 
many current debates such as the politicisation of crime and penal policy, the growth 
in prison populations and the transformation of traditional penal values; moreover, 
the normative framework of criminal justice processes continues to be a central focus 
of criminological and penal scholarship. These concerns ensure that the processes 
and mechanisms of sentencing receive due scholarly attention; and increasingly, 
scholarship in the field seeks to explore these processes and practices in their social 
and cultural contexts.  
However, the assumptions and stances about the judiciary which inform those 
debates appear sometimes to outrun our existing knowledge about the practices, 
motivations and dispositions of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an 
institution.  Reflecting the ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of punishment and in the 
social sciences more generally, many commentators on the broad issues identified 
above turn their attention to the changing dispositions and sensibilities of political, 





developments has also prompted interest in the occupational cultures of penal actors 
such as police, prison and probation officers, and the ways in which they have 
undergone adaptation and change.  
Yet the cultural turn has prompted less empirical interest in the dispositions of 
sentencing judges, of judging as an occupation in criminal justice or about the 
judiciary in its institutional penal setting: in short, about the judicial habitus. If 
sentencing is ‘the crux of the crisis’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007), then explanations 
for rising imprisonment levels are found by commentators in the likely susceptibility 
of judges to political, public and media pressure, and in judges’ greater punitiveness 
– though not always subjecting these claims to empirical evaluation. The doctrine of 
judicial independence, the central organising principle of the institution, may hold 
important clues about these and related issues, but is dismissed as the ‘potent myth’ 
of a hegemonic judiciary (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007: 105).2 In sentencing research, 
too, there is some received wisdom about the homogeneity of the judicial habitus - in 
terms of shared background, education and training - and its presumed influence over 
judicial outlook and practice. However, the connections between these positions are 
ambiguous and mostly unspecified.  
All this suggests some lack of curiosity about the ‘internal organisation of the 
judicial world’ (Hall et al, 1978). In the foreword of a volume of essays entitled 
‘Lawyers in their Social Setting’, MacCormick (1976: vii) argued for greater 
understanding of occupational cultures in law and recommended:  
‘…. [the] study of the relationship between men of law and their social, institutional 
and educational settings, of the influences to which they are subject in different 
times and jurisdictions, and of the way in which they go about doing the law-jobs.’  
MacCormick’s call for greater study of lawyers’ occupational lives prefigures our 
contemporary use of concepts such as habitus and culture but has some relevant 
pointers for contemporary judicial scholarship. Of particular note, MacCormick 
suggests that a rounded understanding of these dimensions of occupational lives 
requires the exploration of three domains: law’s normative structure; the means by 





historical, political and sociological contexts of these activities. The lack of research 
about judicial decision-making is, however, a source of continuing frustration for 
sentencing scholars. Warner (2006), for example, notes that interviews with judges 
are still ‘quite rare’, and Ashworth (2003; 2011) continues to call for more research 
into ‘why judges and magistrates do what they do’ and warns that the dearth of 
research into the practices of sentencers represents ‘a major handicap to proper 
development of theory’ (Ashworth, 2011:344). Although judicial resistance 
presented a significant barrier to sentencing research in recent decades (see 
Ashworth, 1995; 2003; Baldwin, 2000; Hughes, 2000), much has changed since 1980 
when Lord Lane (quoted in Warner, 2006: 257) declared that there were no areas of 
sentencing which required research. Indeed, it is now common at conferences and 
other public events to hear judges themselves call for more research (see also Kibble, 
2008).3 Even so, this bleak assessment of contemporary judicial scholarship was 
recently offered: 
 ‘… there is little domestic scholarship on how judges work in or out of the 
courtroom. Likewise, almost no empirical scholarship exists on how individual 
judges or panels of judges arrive at their published decisions. At the same time, the 
senior judiciary have maintained their distance, air of mystery and cloak of secrecy. 
Public judicial reflections on the art of judgment writing are exceptional. Domestic 
judicial biography and autobiography is poorly developed. Essential archives of 
senior members of the judiciary are more likely to be destroyed than preserved and 
opened for inspection and analysis. Last, but by no means least, the divide that 
separates legal scholars from the judiciary is rarely crossed and when crossed tends 
to be circumscribed by elaborate performances of respectable fascination and polite 
deference respectively’.  
                                                                                                       (Moran, 2012: 287) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
It is possible to take issue with some aspects of this assessment, such as the extent of 
domestic scholarship on judicial decision-making. There are also some signs that the 
judiciary is opening itself up to greater scrutiny (see, for example, the recent 
Judiciary of Scotland website). Moran’s analysis, however, does capture our limited 
knowledge about how judges work ‘out of the courtroom’ and about judicial lives 
and careers in their biographical context. Indeed, it is striking that the concept of 
‘judicial culture’ has not gained a stronger hold in the language of judicial 





as appointment, training and experience, and about canonical stances and doctrines – 
tend to focus more on their civil rather than criminal dimensions. This leaves some 
contexts of judicial work in penal practice relatively unexplored, particularly the 
relevance of the ‘master narrative’ of judicial independence to penal practice, and 
about the shaping effect of early experience on the judicial habitus – and vice versa. 
This thesis explores dimensions of judicial culture through the biographical narrative 
accounts of a group of 12 retired judges whose experience on the Scottish bench 
spans the second half of the twentieth century, and in some cases the earliest years of 
the twenty-first century.4 The aims of the research are twofold: firstly, to provide 
insight about the changing conditions of judging in Scotland and secondly, about the 
judicial role in criminal justice. These narratives provide historically specific 
understanding about these social conditions of judging and the judicial governance of 
criminal justice during this recent period of Scottish penal history. More broadly, 
these accounts also provide insight about the occupational culture of the judiciary in 
its penal context, some of its organisational practices, and about the challenges and 
demands of the judicial role. 
Summary of thesis 
I begin, in Chapter 2, by considering the ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of 
punishment, and the elusive place of culture in sentencing research. I trace some of 
the implied meanings-in-use of the concept and argue that although much work in 
this field impliedly addresses cultural dimensions of judicial work, the concept of 
judicial culture has value in designating a discrete field of inquiry in penal 
scholarship. I then set out the ways in which, thus employed, the concept 
encompasses (at least) two key dimensions of the judicial role: values, meanings and 
perceptions, and also the daily routines, institutional practices and occupational 
dynamics of judicial work. I outline the advantages of a more fully cultural approach 
which directs greater attention to the judge as a socially and historically situated 
actor, and to the judiciary as a complex institution.  
In Chapter 3 I outline the ethnographic narrative approach which I use to interview 





culture. I provide details of the empirical framework of the project, the framing and 
scope of interviews, and consider the relational dynamics of the interviews and the 
relevance of the judge-prosecutor relationship. I then discuss the principal claims and 
features of the narrative approach, provide a working definition of ‘narrative’ and an 
overview of the functions which narratives can serve for individuals and 
organisations. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the tension between the 
normative orientation of narrative research – towards the stories of the marginalised 
– and the position of the judiciary as a dominant elite. To reflect the dual role of the 
judge in penality, I offer an interpretive position based on the hermeneutics of faith 
and suspicion.  
In Chapter 4 I extend this discussion to some of the broad questions which arise 
about the judicial role – about the discourse of powerful actors, the weight to be 
placed on their subjective accounts of experience, and the objective realities of social 
life which shape that discourse and limit their practice. I consider the usefulness of 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of habitus, practice and field to explore these 
questions, against the frequently levelled charge of latent determinism which would 
militate against the exploration of change. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1999) later work 
The Weight of the World, I argue that the genesis of change in the judicial habitus 
may lie in the capacity of individual judges to reflect on the conditions which 
structure and constrain their own role in penal practice.  
I then move on to detail the analysis of my findings from interviews with retired 
judges in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In these sections I explore the judges’ stories of their 
early years as lawyers for what they suggest about the formation and shaping of the 
judicial habitus – questions about social class, diversity, the status of criminal work, 
judicial conduct and training. Recognising judges as the bearers of penal culture, I 
examine the frameworks of meaning and vocabularies of motive which the judges 
employ when discussing crime, the criminal and penal practice. If the place of the 
judiciary in criminological thought is interesting for what it indicates about judicial 
role conceptions, then the place of criminology in judicial thought carries additional 
interest. I consider here the nature of judges’ engagement with penal research and 





the final section, I introduce the ‘master narrative’ of judicial independence and 
consider its relevance to sentencing practice. I then explore several dimensions of 
sentencing practice which arise from these narratives: discretion, rationality, 
intuition, emotions, and collegiality. I consider briefly developments in neuroscience 
which have implications for the understanding of human judgement, and point to the 
scope these insights provide for extending our knowledge of sentencing practice. In 
the final section, the discussion of sentencing as a signifying practice takes us back to 
the question of judicial independence and to judicial responses to the ‘social 
question’. 
In the final chapter I draw some conclusions from these narrative accounts and 
consider the implications for judicial training, for the dissemination of criminological 




                                                 
 
1 Criminal justice scholarship, and sentencing research in particular, relies on the pragmatic 
construction of the ‘criminal’ or sentencing judge and their trial and sentencing functions. In Scotland, 
judges do not, for the most part, specialise in either civil or criminal work, and their daily work often 
involves a mix of civil, criminal and other adjudicatory functions. Some sense of this broader judicial 
role is gained in the narrative accounts presented here. This stands in some contrast to the 
conventional account which imagines the sentencing task to entail a discrete set of skills and values.   
2 More nuanced analyses consider the relevance of judicial insularity for the discussion about ways in 
which criminal justice systems respond to calls for increased penal severity (Lacey, 2008; Loader and 
Sparks, 2010). 
3 Ashworth (2003) and Baldwin (2000) describe judicial hostility and resistance to sentencing research 
in the 1970s and 80s; the abandonment of pilot projects, the curtailing of on-going research and the 
resulting froideur in relationships between social science researchers and the judiciary. Ashworth 
notes that more seems to have been achieved in Scotland during this period and suggests that although 
the climate in England began to change in the 1990s, research into Crown Court practice there is still 
not productive. 
4 I use the generic term ‘judges’ to refer to two (out of three) branches of the Scottish judiciary: 
Sheriffs, and Senators of the College of Justice. The third branch consists of the lay Justices of the 
Peace and a small number of legally qualified Stipendiary Magistrates who deal with minor criminal 
matters in the Justice of the Peace Courts.  
The post of Sheriff is held by approximately 142 practising solicitors and advocates. When dealing 





                                                                                                                                          
imprisonment and fines of up to £10, 000. They can also impose compensation in respect of alarm and 
distress, injury and financial loss. When hearing solemn (indictment) cases, the Sheriff sits with a jury 
and can impose a custodial sentence of up to 5 years.  
There are approximately 34 Senators of the College of Justice who preside over the High Court of 
Justiciary. All are solicitors or advocates. In the High Court, the judge has unlimited powers in 
relation to financial penalties and can impose a custodial sentence of any range up to, and including, 







Chapter 2 Judicial culture and sentencing 
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the concept of ‘judicial culture’ which is an anchoring 
concept for discussions throughout this thesis. This term is infrequently encountered 
in criminology and penal scholarship, although some implied meanings-in-use can be 
traced. The explicit identification of the concept in this thesis therefore calls for some 
clarification, and an indication of its intended meaning and use. In this chapter I 
consider the various implied uses and meanings of the concept of culture in penal 
scholarship for their relevance to the study of judicial work, suggest reasons for the 
relative neglect of culture and in particular of judicial sensibilities, and consider the 
relevance for contemporary debates in penal scholarship.  
Section 1 Knowledge and understanding of the judicial world 
The ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of punishment could be said largely to have 
passed the judges by. This oversight is reflected in the narrow frame of reference 
sometimes used to evaluate the judicial role, with little sense of the frameworks of 
meaning or value they bring to their work, of agency and interaction in their daily 
routines. Moreover, little is known about the personal challenges and demands of 
sentencing, of the historical or social context of the conditions of judging in recent 
years, and in relation to sentencing reform, there is a tendency to identify the 
judiciary as part of the problem but rarely part of the solution.   
The relative lack of knowledge we have about the judicial role is partly explained by 
difficulty in gaining access to the judiciary for research purposes. The justification 
for the relative inaccessibility of judges usually lies within the conventions and 
institutional arrangements which inhibit judges from speaking publicly.1 Access to 
judges may no longer be quite as problematic for researchers in the UK as it was 
during the latter part of the twentieth century, but the chequered history of relations 







The legal conventions which inhibit judges from speaking publicly about judicial 
lives and careers are taken seriously by Scottish judges; even, it appears, in 
retirement. Thus, judicial biography and autobiography provide surprisingly few 
sources of insight about judicial lives and careers in their historical and social 
contexts. As subgenres of legal biography, these literary forms share many of the 
defining features as well as some of the associated problems of that broader field. In 
the common law world, the development of legal biography in the common law 
world has been uneven and sporadic, and an intellectual school or discipline in the 
field has yet to become firmly established.3 The resulting dearth of historiography in 
the field makes categorisation difficult, and there appears to be significant diversity 
of style, method and purpose (Parry, 2010). Scholarly ambivalence towards the 
biographical enterprise in law explains much of this halting development, yet the 
lives and careers of judges continue to hold broad appeal for the general public. This 
interest generates work by a range of writers beyond the academic field which 
chronicles and interprets judicial lives with varying degrees of emphasis, insight and 
evaluation.  
Parry (2010) observes that judicial biographies tend to be a complex mix of two 
different writing traditions in legal biography. The first is the ‘empirical’ approach 
which is primarily event or fact focused and which chronicles the life of the 
individual judge. The second is the ‘intellectual history’ tradition which focuses on 
frameworks of ideas and beliefs and on the individual judge’s contribution to the 
development of law. In the common law world (except America) judicial biographies 
tend towards the empirical life-story writing tradition, typically charting the 
individual’s progression to the bench and evaluating the significance of this journey 
in the context of the individual’s life and character.4 This approach may also direct 
attention towards notable aspects or events of the judge’s career, but does not usually 
represent any comprehensive evaluation of their intellectual contribution (Parry, 





Contemporary judicial biography and autobiography is a limited field of enquiry, 
however, and in England may be a tradition which has largely ‘run out of steam’ 
(Girard, 2003:106).5 A modest increase in judicial autobiography in the twentieth 
century may be explained by the decline in serious scholarly interest in biography 
during this period, and may also reflect a changing political climate in which there is 
greater media and public interest in, and criticism of, judges. In these circumstances, 
autobiography may provide judges with an opportunity for giving their own accounts 
of events (Girard, 2003).  
Many of these features and cyclical patterns of the genre can be observed in the 
contemporary field of Scottish judicial biography. Almost all recent biographical 
work relates to 18th and 19th century Scottish judges with few, if any, studies of their 
twentieth century successors.6 Notwithstanding the absence of contemporary 
scholarly work, there is a small collection of autobiographical work by a number of 
judges whose careers spanned the mid-to-late twentieth century period of Scottish 
criminal justice history (see Stott, 1991; 1995) and Wheatley (1987). These studies 
are revealing for the strict demarcation their authors make between their early 
political careers and subsequent judicial office, suggesting not only a narrow 
interpretation of politics (as ‘party’ politics) but an assumption that immunity from 
the sway of politics, however narrowly defined, is achievable. Collectively, these 
writings reflect the common motivation towards autobiography, as observed by 
Girard: 'I have lived a satisfying and interesting life and I want to share it with a 
wider audience' (2003:101).7  
Several scholars in the field make a strong case for the value of judicial biography, 
emphasising the political and rhetorical power of judges in the common law world, 
and the potential of biography to provide important insight about the workings of the 
judiciary and the norms and values which shape their practices (Burnside, 2009; 
Girard, 2003). It is argued that biographies containing significant historical 
contextual detail – in the empirical tradition of providing a ‘window on an age’– 
have the potential to make a significant contribution to socio-legal history (Girard, 





Conceptions and representations of judging 
The very act of undertaking a judicial biography can be said to involve an implied 
acceptance of the operation and influence of personal and social values in the 
business of judging, despite the tenacity of legal doctrines emphasising judicial 
neutrality and the rule of law, rather than of men (Burnside, 2009). This realist 
approach can be contrasted with the legal formalist approach which is characterised 
by a largely asocial treatment of law: 
This philosophy portrays law as an internally coherent and self-contained logical 
system - a "seamless web" of tightly linked principles, free from class interests and 
other social influences. Separating law from society, the legal formalist perspective 
emphasizes abstract doctrines and ahistorical rights, all of which are applied in a 
uniform, rational, and consistent manner by a neutral and autonomous judiciary. 
                                                                          Suchman and Edelman (1996: 907) 
Tamanaha (2010) argues that despite the pervasive influence of the formalist and 
realist models, their polarisation represents something of a straw debate: the models 
do not represent the true nature of judging which is closer to a form of ‘balanced 
realism’.9 In criminological research, however, it is possible to trace some of the 
ways in which these conceptual models continue to shape and inform some of our 
current understandings of the judicial role in sentencing, and may have the effect of 
limiting the scope of enquiry in the field.  
Faith in judgement: the judge as ‘Sovereign Self’ 
Many of the transcendental doctrines, rituals and symbols of legal positivism centre 
on the figure of the judge and the institution of the judiciary, and represent something 
of a formal legal carapace. This is a formidable legacy and ties the figure of the judge 
closely to both the symbolic and material legitimacy of the law. The conception of 
the judge embodied here is an autonomous figure who remains largely impervious to 
values extraneous to law; the conception of judgement itself is based on a positivist, 
textual adherence to legal precedent and interpretation of law. This model largely 
denies much scope for judicial creativity and maintains a belief (or expectation) in 





The significance of this model lies in its legitimating aspect. It is the basis of 
conventional juridical and political discourse about the judicial role, and forms the 
crucible of rights and due process advocacy. In this approach, the potential of law 
and the judicial role in criminal justice is largely expressed as an assertion of liberal 
legal values: these are due process, the protection of human rights, and commitment 
to strong ‘Olympian’ versions of judicial independence (Lacey, 2008). This is the 
framework of the liberal legal paradigm which informs a significant amount of 
criminal justice and criminological analysis and is advocated as a means of 
moderation and insulation from the excesses of popular and political sentiment 
(Loader and Sparks, 2010). This model of judgement has further significance in the 
context of the increasingly connected agendas in economy, international relations 
and domestic law which, as Melossi (2008) observes, entail something of a ‘steering 
role’ for penality. Where employed as a form of domestic and international judicial 
governance, this model draws heavily on the positivist conception of judging.  
In its specific application to sentencing research, the positivist model tends to 
occlude the role of cultural influences in judging, and minimises any constitutive 
aspect or creative dimension of the judicial role in sentencing. Further, displaying 
some Kantian wariness of intrusion into rationality, this model eschews the question 
of emotion in judging and tends to imply a lack of curiosity about the ontological life 
of the judge. The interpretive orientation in this type of research is animated by faith 
in law and legal judicial values.   
Suspicion of judgement: the hegemonic legacy  
By contrast, one model still dominant in criminological scholarship is rooted in an 
attitude of suspicion towards the judiciary and is in part a response to the positivist 
conception of judgement and adjudication outlined above. Here, the conception of 
the judge has a typecast quality almost as singular as that of the positivist model, but 
there is more emphasis on judicial intransigence and protectionism, particularly in 
relation to sentencing reform. This school of thought has its origins in the Critical 
Legal School which represents a general critique of the indeterminacy of law. This 





hegemonic function of the sentencing judge - the rhetorical and legitimating aspect 
of the role, and the mythologizing concepts of judicial independence and the rule of 
law - and makes the coercive aspect of the judicial role central to its study.10  
Importantly, this model informs a set of assumptions about the judicial habitus, 
particularly those ingrained dispositions and attitudes, patterns of thought and 
behaviour which are presumed to be shaped by class, background and training. This 
conception of the judicial role is rooted in an attitude of suspicion and scepticism, 
and has some important implications for sentencing reform and research.  
In the UK, this particular understanding of the judicial role has some rich historical 
antecedents. Thompson (1975) and Hay (1975) provide accounts of 18th century 
hanging judges and corruption with plentiful examples of the manipulation of the law 
by a ruling elite, aided by the symbolism and rituals of criminal law which conveyed 
the appearance of neutrality, equality before the law and mercy. These critiques draw 
attention to an important paradox of 18th Century justice: the ‘bloody penal code’ 
existing alongside a liberal administration and interpretation of the laws. In this way, 
the law could act both as a defence against arbitrary power and perform the central 
hegemonic role of creating a spirit of consent and submission to the criminal law.11  
Landmark texts of the 1970s and 1980s provide rich ethnographic studies of the 
rituals, relationships and discourse of magistrates and other court actors which 
together form the coercive structures necessary for the speedy construction of justice 
(Carlen, 1976; McBarnet, 1981; Griffith, 1997). Griffith’s (1997) influential study of 
the judiciary in England and Wales was first published in 1977 and represents a 
powerful challenge to the political neutrality of the judiciary. This study can be 
located within the legal realist tradition which challenged the view that there was 
something distinctive about legal reasoning and questioned the extent to which 
judges were constrained in judgement.  In the same tradition, Bourdieu’s study of the 
juridical field provides the field of criminology with an influential account of the 
hegemonic function of the judiciary and of the judicial habitus (1987). 
Among contemporary analyses of the penal crisis, the critique of Cavadino and 
Dignan (2002) represents perhaps the strongest interpretation of the hegemonic 





the Criminal Justice Act (199l) fell prey to the destructive efforts of a hostile or 
unsympathetic judiciary by means of flagrant misreading of its terms and judicial 
non-cooperation. This powerful sentencing culture was motivated by a seemingly 
‘insatiable’ judicial demand for prison places (2002:105), and the judges’ collective 
behaviour amounted to betrayal of the trust placed in them to exercise discretion 
responsibly (2002: 104). For Cavadino and Dignan, this points to the need for a 
strategy of ‘coercion and persuasion’ in relation to the judiciary (2002: 349).  
 
This body of scholarship represents an important contribution to our understanding 
of the role of the judiciary in the penal field by drawing attention to some significant 
features. These include its rhetorical and legitimating aspect; the mythologizing 
aspect of concepts of judicial independence and the rule of law; the staging and 
construction of justice; the lack of diversity in the judiciary and the associated 
problems of legitimacy and representativeness. More broadly, these studies capture 
some of the real material effects of the power to punish vested in the sentencing 
judge, along with a general indictment of many of the processes of criminal justice. 
The realist model in sentencing displays scepticism towards the concept of judicial 
wisdom and intuition and emphasises the arbitrary nature of judicial decision-
making.12  
 
‘Suspicion’ in the context above can be more usefully re-cast as ‘critical’ and in this 
way performs the important task of challenging some taken for granted legal 
doctrines and precepts. This synthesis of scholarship also provides a set of 
assumptions about the judicial habitus – of ingrained dispositions and attitudes, 
patterns of thought and behaviour shaped by class, background and training - with 
some implications for the direction of research in the field and for sentencing reform.  
It may be, however, that over-reliance on the hegemonic representations of the 
judicial habitus reproduces some of the inherent limitations of its conceptual basis. 
For example, a hegemonic model of judging carries certain assumptions about the 
homogeneity of dispositions produced by the habitus. This requires careful 





questions of agency in penal practice, or of the place of contest and struggle. In the 
same way, undue reliance on the realist model may also involve a temptation to 
overstate the arbitrary nature of judicial decision-making and a tendency to display 
deep scepticism towards any concept of judicial expertise, objectivity or practical 
wisdom. 
The continuing influence of the hegemonic and legal realist model can be traced in 
the critique of discretionary sentencing, and may be reflected in distrust of judicial 
‘virtues’ of independence, reason and deliberation, and of neutrality and judgement 
itself (Simon 2007: Franko Aas 2005). It may also explain some of the ways in 
which sentencing research appears not fully to reflect the ‘cultural turn’ in the 
sociology of punishment. In this next section I trace some of the uses of the concept 
of culture in sentencing research and indicate some of the elements of a more fully 
‘cultural’ approach to the role of the judge in criminal justice.  
Section 2 Concepts of culture 
The sociology of punishment 
The new prominence given to the concept of culture in the sociology of punishment 
has contributed to the development of a substantial body of scholarship which draws 
attention to the cultural meanings and effects of penal institutions, policies and 
practices.13 Judges in their trial and sentencing functions occupy a central role in the 
exercise of penal power, representing a complex interplay of symbolic and material 
dimensions in the penal realm and in social life, but there is scope to further develop 
analyses of cultural aspects of their role with potential for greater understanding of 
sentencing processes and associated penal change.14  
A comprehensive analysis of the sociology of punishment is not within the scope of 
this discussion, but I attempt to trace here some of the more significant meanings and 
implications in order to demonstrate the potential of a more fully cultural approach to 
the judicial role in sentencing, and to lay the foundations for the concept of ‘judicial 
culture’ developed throughout this thesis. The key elements identified for their 





culture (b) the concept of penal sensibilities and (c) the place of conflict and diversity 
in penal culture.  
Foremost (for the present study) of the insights gained from the sociology of 
punishment is that the relationship between punishment and culture is both 
constitutive and generative (Garland, 1990). The constitutive aspect of the 
relationship between culture and punishment provides the understanding that social 
institutions such as law or punishment (and their various organisations and fields of 
activity) stand in a complex position in relation to the wider social field; that despite  
representations or claims of autonomy, with seemingly bounded institutional logic 
and rationality, penal institutions are nonetheless embedded in, and shaped by, the 
broad cultural patterns of the society in which they are situated. The generative 
dimension of punishment provides the insight that penal institutions and practices 
also play an active communicative role in shaping, generating and reproducing some 
of those cultural sensibilities and values.15 Penal institutions, and their practices and 
discourses, can thus be understood as shaping social and cultural norms as well as 
embodying and expressing them.  
Grounded in a Durkheimian understanding of the symbolic and expressive functions 
of penal practices, penal institutions and practices are in this way accorded a new 
cultural salience, as sites of ‘ritual performance and cultural production’, invoking 
and affirming particular conceptions of morality, social order and authority (Garland, 
2006:420). Central to this understanding is the notion of penal sensibilities: cognitive 
dispositions and ways of feeling about punishment which are culturally shaped and 
patterned.16 These psychic ‘structures of affect’ (Garland, 1990: 213) are particularly 
relevant in this area of scholarship because of the psychological ambivalence and 
associated emotional responses which tend to be generated by questions of 
wrongdoing and its punishment. The awareness that cultural change carries with it 
some ‘psychic corollary’ (Garland, ibid) – new ways in which people relate to each 
other in altered environments and which may involve a range of psychological 
processes such as the development of self-control, restraint, empathy and moderation 
but equally feelings of anger, vengeance and anxiety – is most commonly used in this 





evident, though relatively unexplored, force in relation to penal agents and other 
penal actors.   
Finally, a cultural approach to punishment favours ‘overdetermined’ interpretations 
of practices and events – a multidimensional approach which is alert to the danger of 
assuming too much ‘settled hierarchy of purposes or causal priorities’ in its working 
practices and policies (Garland, 1990: 285). In this context, penal institutions are 
understood  as complex organisations, involving a range of competing objectives and 
interests; the approach also acknowledges the ‘swarming circumstances’ and the on-
going tension, contest and compromise which characterises penal policy and 
practice. In turn, this raises important questions of agency for penal actors. 17 
Taken together, these broad ideas about the mutually constitutive dimensions of 
penality and of the sensibilities which shape its operation, contribute to an 
understanding of punishment as a ‘cultural artefact’, embodying and expressing the 
cultural patterns of society (Garland, 1990: 193). Garland’s principal antecedents in 
the conceptualisation of his cultural approach to punishment are Durkheim, Weber, 
Elias and Freud, and it is significant that these are writers in the broader shift in 
social theory towards an understanding of social action as both configuring and 
communicating meaning. This interest in the values and dispositions of penal actors 
can therefore be traced to the ‘interpretive turn’ in social sciences and humanities - 
the move away from ‘dreams of social physics’ (Geertz, 1983: 23) and ‘abstracted 
empiricism’ (Wright Mills, 1959) towards a hermeneutic or interpretive approach to 
social life: a way of giving ‘particular sense to particular things in particular places 
(Geertz, 1983: 232).18 This goes to the heart of the sociological enterprise and is 
more than mere contextualisation: it reflects the attempt to understand what is 
happening in the social world and to understand the meaning of particular social 
worlds for the participants (Valverde, 2006; Loader and Sparks, 2004; Garland, 
2009).  
This foundational understanding of the interplay between punishment and culture 
provides the basis for at least two connected general areas of inquiry in criminology. 
The idea that penal practices and institutions are culturally embedded leads quite 





the penal domain, with a view to showing the influence of broader cultural themes 
and sensibilities on the configuration of penality.19 Here, attention is drawn towards 
particular sensibilities (experienced by the individual but feeding into collective 
frameworks of ideas) which shape and limit the scope and operation of penal 
practice, and in particular, to the character and scope of changing sensibilities. 
Relatedly, the idea that penality has a generative or determinative effect in cultural 
life, shaping some core ideas about punishment, justice and morality, prompts 
interest in the ways in which penal practices and institutions communicate these 
ideas and give meaning to them in particular contexts. In this framework, the various 
discourses and criminological knowledge employed by key agents in penal practice, 
and the conceptions of crime and criminality on which they draw, are recognised as 
some of the means by which penality communicates these cultural messages.20  
The understanding of these (and other) cultural dimensions and effects of penality 
now has the status of conventional wisdom in the field of the sociology of 
punishment (Garland, 2006:420). The two strands of research identified above are 
concerned with the relationship between new penal strategies and cultural 
sensibilities, and with the use to which these knowledges and sensibilities are put by 
actors in the communication of cultural ideas about social order. These two strands 
inform a broad range of enquiry encompassing inter alia studies of penal 
transformation and governmental crime control in conditions of late modernity 
(Garland, 2001a), mass incarceration (Garland, 2001b; Simon, 2001; Gottschalk, 
2006; Western, 2006), changing representations of crime and the criminal and 
associated cyclical movements of criminological thought (Melossi, 2008), the 
changing governance of crime and political responses (Loader and Sparks, 2004), 
and the hegemony of crime control discourse and practices in political governance 
(Simon, 2007). The ‘new penology’ thesis, although appearing to signal some 
contradictory trends, is similarly culturally grounded, tracing the genesis and 
development of actuarial discourses and techniques directed towards risk 
management and control of offenders (Feely and Simon, 1992). 21 
Reflecting the cultural turn in the sociology of punishment, these accounts all make 





changing conditions, with varying emphases on explanations of change at a structural 
level. In particular, they draw attention to the ways in which the values and 
dispositions of a range of political, penal and social actors have undergone 
significant alteration as a result of those broader changes in social and economic life, 
and which in turn have contributed to the re-shaping of penal practice in a populist 
and punitive direction.22 Although no single explanatory process is suggested by 
these accounts, the interrelated shifts in penal culture are attributed, in part, to the 
waning influence of rehabilitative and individualised approaches to punishment, and 
are commonly thought to have brought about radical changes in the working 
practices and assumptions of penal actors.  
These broad aanalyses of penal transformation connect to wider debates (about the 
political governance of crime, risk and surveillance societies, and social order and 
control), but they also provide important insights about criminal justice and penal 
policy developments which appear to be grounded in some of these new cultural 
understandings about crime and punishment. Some of these themes are issues with 
which this thesis is directly concerned and will be explored in later chapters.  
However, the primary interest here in the ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of 
punishment is the corresponding place of ‘culture’ in sentencing scholarship, and the 
advantage to be gained from more fully exploring cultural dimensions of the judicial 
role in sentencing.    
Sentencing scholarship 
There are a number of broad insights about the judiciary and its role in penality 
which flow from the conceptions of culture in the sociology of punishment outlined 
above, and which carry some implications for the ways in which the judicial role is 
researched. Firstly, a cultural approach to the judiciary entails an understanding of an 
institution grounded in cultural values which shape the decision-making of its 
individual actors as well as its institutional practices; and as a complex institution 
whose policies and practices are likely to be the outcome of tension, conflict and 
compromise. Secondly, it follows from this approach that judges embody and 





important cultural meanings and effects beyond any crime control effects which they 
may also produce; and that these practices have the potential to shape and influence 
the values and dispositions of others in their immediate audiences and beyond. In this 
way, judges’ role in the transmission of penal culture becomes evident, as does the 
cultural embeddedness of their practices and dispositions. 
By drawing more explicitly on these foundational understandings from the sociology 
of punishment it is possible to highlight some broad questions about the place of the 
judiciary in penal culture which appear relatively unexplored. For example, 
extending a cultural approach to the judicial role in punishment heightens the 
significance of the observation that judicial sentence is not only an instrumental 
procedure which activates the punishment process; it also communicates ideas about 
‘authority, personhood and community’ and by its routine invocation is constitutive 
of those forms of social and cultural relations.  In this communicative system of signs 
and symbols, sentencing is thus ‘a signifying practice of some importance’ (Garland, 
1990: 256) in which judicial decisions and statements have a particular quality 
intimately bound up with their legitimacy. In this way, sentencing performs a pivotal 
role in the criminal justice process, representing the point at which the aims and 
purposes of punishment are given public expression, and providing a link between 
the rhetoric of punishment and a site for assessment of its legitimacy (Henham, 
2012:77). Sentencing decisions and accompanying judicial remarks can therefore be 
regarded as belonging to a special class of ‘acts of naming’: they are ‘model acts of 
categorization’ by public officials authorized to declare the ‘truth’ about people or 
things: 
These performative utterances, substantive – as opposed to procedural – decisions 
publicly formulated by authorized agents acting on behalf of the collectivity, are 
magical acts which succeed because they have the power to make themselves 
universally recognized.  
                                                                                                 (Bourdieu, 1987: 838) 
There are limits, therefore, to this ‘quasi-magical’ power, and the judicial power of 
naming – and punishing - has legitimacy and credibility only insofar as there is some 





material divisions of power but also to culturally understood and shared ways of 
thinking and feeling about the particular social world of which they are a part.23  
Little is known, however, about the ways in which judges mediate their much 
proclaimed autonomy with the need to achieve universal recognition for their 
judgements and decisions: the everyday task of reconciling judicial independence 
with the public interest.  
The judiciary 
As outlined above, the sociology of punishment provides a foundation for a cultural 
approach to sentencing and to the role of the judge in penality. In some important 
respects, however, the ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of punishment has generated 
surprisingly little inquiry which concerns itself directly with cultural dimensions of 
judicial work in penal practice. Moreover, the concept of culture which is implied in 
much scholarship emphasises homogeneity and settled practices in the field. By 
contrast, the ‘cache of the cultural’ is more evident in law and society scholarship, 
where cultural analysis forms a central part of the landscape (Sarat and Simon, 2003) 
and a less static concept of culture is employed. The greater contingency and promise 
of this approach is captured by Mezey (2003:39) who observes that the best way of 
thinking about ‘culture’ in law and society scholarship is ‘a set of shared signifying 
practices that are always in the making and always up for grabs’.  
Distinctions in use  
Before evaluating the particular use to which the concept of culture is put in 
sentencing research, it is useful to note some of the distinctions in common use. In 
Garland’s overview, the concept of culture can be used, firstly, to identify and isolate 
cultural factors in punishment practices and institutions: in other words, to 
distinguish certain influences in penality (such as ‘ideas, or symbols, or values, or 
meanings, or sentiments’) from other forces operating in the penal sphere (such as 
political, societal or economic), and to show that these cultural dimensions have a 
causal role in shaping penality (Garland, 2006:422). This use of the concept of 





(see for example Cavadino and Dignan, 2002; Wandall, 2008), ‘civic culture’ 
(McAra, 2005) and at the most general level, ‘penal culture’.   
In its second common usage, the concept of culture is employed to identify distinct 
groups, communities, nations or other entities in the penal world, each of which is 
understood to embody or represent a cohesive entity: a ‘more-or-less bounded, more-
or-less unified, set of customs, habits, values and beliefs’ (Garland, 2006:423). This 
is the sense in which it is possible in criminology to talk about a ‘sub-culture’ of 
delinquent gangs (Cohen, 1955) or of ‘police culture’ (Reiner, 1999).   
Each of these uses carries different conceptual difficulties, and the distinctions 
cannot always be so clearly drawn in practice. Garland (2006:425) cites the use of 
the concept of ‘subculture’ in criminology as an example of the conflation of the two 
ideas – where it is used not only to identify the cultural features of a group (such as 
their distinctive style or attitudes) but also to distinguish such a group from other 
subcultures or groups. A similar conflation occurs in relation to ‘sentencing culture’ 
where it is used, usually impliedly, to indicate both a set of characteristic values and 
dispositions understood to be widely shared among members of the judiciary and to 
distinguish this set of values attributed to a specific group of penal actors (i.e. 
judicial values), from others in the penal realm. In this way, some of the problems 
associated with each of the different usages of ‘culture’ – namely, the difficulty of 
isolating ‘cultural’ aspects from other dimensions of social life, and the tendency to 
overstate consensus and homogeneity among members of the specific group – can 
appear in sentencing scholarship to be quite entangled. 
Section 3 Culture and Sentencing research  
Sentencing is a practice which animates scholars, practitioners, politicians and the 
public alike, reflecting a broad range of motivations and interests beyond its 
instrumental purposes. In recent decades, the politicisation of crime and punishment 
has secured for sentencing its position as a site for political contest and media focus, 
reflecting the inherently political questions surrounding crime and punishment 
(Loader and Sparks, 2010) and an understanding of the contested place of sentencing 





and legitimating role – now informs much sentencing research. Indeed, it is now rare 
to encounter a sentencing or criminal justice textbook, even one oriented towards 
sentencing law, which does not place sentencing in some cultural context (see for 
example Cavadino and Dignan, 2002; Zedner, 2004; Easton and Piper, 2005; 
Ashworth, 2010; Croall et al, 2010). In an important sense, therefore, culture is the 
new nexus of sentencing and law.  
To the extent that ‘culture’ in the first definition and usage outlined above refers to 
the ‘ontological stuff’ of penality i.e. ‘meaning, perception, feeling, sentiment, value, 
belief and the various forms of their expression’ (Garland, 2006:427), much of 
sentencing scholarship can be understood as having always been oriented towards 
these cultural dimensions of the penal world. In this section I trace some of the ways 
in which the concept of culture is employed in sentencing research. Interest in the 
‘cultural’ dimensions of sentencing tends to be expressed in a fragmentary manner, 
but in ways which allow useful insight about the benefits of developing a more fully 
cultural approach to the subject.  
The insight that culture has never been very far removed from the study of judicial 
decision-making suggests a broader horizon for sentencing research than is 
sometimes envisaged today, and has an estimable lineage. The ancient school of 
jurisprudence, for example, has always been concerned with what we would 
understand today as cultural variables in relation to judicial behaviour and norm 
enforcement (Grossman and Sarat, 1971). Enquiry into the fundamental human 
quality of good judgement, the universal basis for sound governance, continues to be 
a shared concern of political theorists, philosophers, jurists and social scientists 
(Thiele, 2006).24  
Thiele (2006:5) describes practical judgement as ‘an aptitude for assessing, 
evaluating, and choosing in the absences of certainties or principles that dictate or 
generate right answers’. This presupposes the existence of some degree of discretion 
if it is to be considered a cognitive and evaluative, rather than mechanical, exercise. 
Discretion, however, is the Trojan horse of sentencing, providing scope for judicial 
bias (or ‘extra-legal influences’) and introducing the possibility of disparity and 





the tension between formal and substantive notions of justice, and about judicial 
impartiality and independence. Scholarly work is therefore directed towards the 
identification of those judicial values or biases which are assumed to play a 
determinative or shaping role in sentencing decisions. This is the search for the ‘holy 
grail’ of sentencing – a rational explanation of judicial decision-making and the 
ability to predict and control outcomes – and it continues to motivate much research, 
particularly in the US where the availability of large data sets generated by the work 
of sentencing commissions over the last two decades has fuelled the proliferation of 
regression-based studies (Ulmer, 2012). The primary focus of this work is directed 
largely towards quantitative measuring of case process outcomes with increasingly 
refined variables; in particular, towards identifying patterns of sentencing behaviour, 
testing and proving the nature and extent of disparity, and thereafter modelling 
systems such as guidelines or grids designed to ‘structure’ or limit discretion.25 In the 
US, even areas of research which are influenced by symbolic interactionism and 
labelling theory, which understand sentencing decisions as joint social acts produced 
by actors’ definitions and interpretations, and whose research is guided inductively 
from interviews with court actors, are geared towards the modelling of sentencing 
behaviour and outcomes.26   
A shared interest in judicial values and dispositions is also evident in research which 
draws on philosophies of punishment to explore the normative basis of sentencing. 
This work is perhaps inspired less by suspicion of discretion and more by the 
understanding that all judgement is inherently normative and that the exercise of 
punishment by the state requires moral justification. In this way, research explores 
the philosophical or normative basis of sentencing and is interested in those judicial 
frameworks of thought which are believed to play a determinative role in sentencing 
decisions - and normatively, in those that it is believed should guide decision-
making. The fact that judicial rationales for sentencing tend to display a certain ‘pick 
‘n mix’ quality (when set against a template of philosophies of punishment) is 
thought to indicate lack of rationality and coherence and the operation of post-hoc 
rationalisation (de Keijser, 2000; Hutton, 2006). Some critics suggest this proceeds 
on the basis of a misapprehension about the connections between penal policy and 





Ashworth, 1995; Tata, 2000). This form of critique is sometimes enjoined by distrust 
of intuition, along with assumptions of disparity, and at this juncture the interests of 
political actors, policy-makers and scholars tend to coalesce in legislative moves to 
structure discretion. 27 
As important as these two strands of research are for the proper control of judicial 
discretion, for the identification of unwarranted inconsistency, and for the 
development (and re-appraisal) of a normative framework for punishment practices, 
the interest in judicial values appears narrowly conceived, and allows only a thin 
explanation of judicial decision-making and its place in penal culture. Some hint of 
these limitations comes from this this writer in the form of a plea for mixed research 
techniques: 
We also need to collect more detailed ethnographies of the courts, and of people’s 
experiences in court, prison, and on the streets. We can then think about what the 
ethnographies tell us as we analyse our quantitative data, and vice versa, to better 
develop and assess theoretical paradigms capable of reflecting the complexities of 
people’s lives and the multiple factors that influence criminal justice decision-
making.  
                                                                                                          (Zatz, 2000: 529) 
As Ulmer notes, these calls for ethnographic studies of court processes rightly 
assume that ‘behind quantifiable sentencing outcomes lie interpretive decision 
processes involving people who interact with each other, and interact with their local 
and larger social contexts’ (2012: 33). In making his own strong case for a ‘major 
renewal of court community ethnography’, he explains the inherent limitations of the 
measurement and modelling approach to sentencing: 
Recall that almost all the theoretical frameworks applied to sentencing, such as focal 
concerns, uncertainty avoidance/causal attribution, rational choice, and racial threat 
ideas directly or indirectly rest on depictions of individual social psychological 
processes. None of these processes can be directly observed with sentencing or even 
earlier case processing outcome data. Even if we had real-time data on charging, 
conviction, and sentencing outcomes, and detailed case and defendant attributes, this 
still would not directly tell us what was going on in courtroom workgroup members’ 
heads, or the content of their interactions with each other. As a field of inquiry, our 
collective research agendas need to better recognize this fact.  





Leaving aside for the moment the idea that it is possible for any research technique to 
directly tell ‘what was going on’ in the head of any courtroom member, it is of note 
that Ulmer’s ethnographic horizons are broad: he seeks better understanding of ways 
in which court actors process sentencing information, how they interpret and 
implement sentencing policies, and ‘whether and how these are shaped by local and 
larger cultural contexts’ (2012:33). The extent to which this inquiry is aimed simply 
at advancing the positivist study of causal mechanisms of sentencing decisions (by 
supplementing and adding some contextual detail), or has its own interpretive value, 
is unclear. However, Ulmer’s own research into the dynamics of ‘court cultures’ 
suggests he has an interconnected agenda in mind (Ulmer, 1997).  
A more sceptical account of judicial decision-making and the discourses which 
accompany might raise doubts about any further pursuit of the ‘Holy Grail’ of 
sentencing. Hutton (2006) for example, noting that there are no ‘systematic guiding 
principles’ and few rules governing sentencing practice in Scotland, characterises the 
practice as ‘general, individualized, ad hoc, case-by-case’ decision making, 
displaying ‘naked[ly] expressions of value preference’ (ibid, 169; 172). Judicial 
explanations of sentencing decisions, in this context, represent post facto 
‘construction of plausible accounts’: 
Their sentencing decisions cannot be explained because there is literally no language 
to explain it other than the language they use in their judgements. 
                                                                                                      (Hutton, 2006: 171)  
In place of the search for a ‘real’ account of the practice of sentencing, Hutton 
proposes that sentencing should be conceived as a social rather than legal practice, 
and based on intuition and a range of socially constructed values and assumptions. 
We should therefore ‘let go of the idea that we can ‘know’ how sentencing decisions 
are made or that there is a consistent systematic policy waiting to be uncovered by 
painstaking systematic research’ (2006:168). He advocates the use of a wider range 
of research techniques (which includes listening to judicial explanations of 





‘we should start from what we want to do about and with sentencing (for example 
make it more rational, more accountable, or more transparent) and ask what we need 
to find out to allow us to achieve this goal’.  
                                                                                                       (Hutton, 2006:168) 
As Hutton (2006: 168) suggests, this is perhaps a debate about methodology in social 
science, since his commitment to a cultural and interpretive understanding of 
sentencing is elsewhere evident. However, these different understandings about the 
nature of judicial decision-making and ways of researching it can also be read as 
indicative analyses of the place of ‘culture’.  
Values and ‘culture’ 
Ulmer’s call for a revival of the ‘classic court ethnographies’ of past decades appears 
to be prompted by the marked decline in the US of the use of qualitative methods to 
research judicial decision-making (2012: 33) and is insightful for what it suggests 
about shifting degrees of interest in those cultural contexts of sentencing.28 Over the 
same period of time in the UK and elsewhere, sentencing research appears not to 
have been marked by the same preference for quantitative over qualitative methods 
of researching as in the US, though the extent to which interviews with judges 
formed the basis of that approach was significantly less than some sentencing 
researchers would have liked (Ashworth, 2003; Warner, 2006).29  
However, despite this overarching interest in some broad cultural dimensions of 
sentencing, and commitment to an interpretive approach (among others) to its 
inquiry, the place and meaning of judicial ‘values’ or of ‘culture’ in this body of 
research remains unclear. For example, scholarly interest in judicial values and 
frameworks of meaning suggests an interest in sentencing or judicial ‘culture’ in the 
first sense identified by Garland (2005) – as a set of ideas (judicial values) which has 
an influence in penality. It may also be taken to reflect interest in the generative 
dimension of punishment and in the communicative role of judges; the ways in 
which these values influence judicial decision-making. However, in several 
important respects, a singular understanding of the place of culture is suggested by 





The influence of culture on judicial values 
There is much insightful work in the field which explores centrally important issues 
concerning sentencing practice (for recent examples in the UK, see Millie et al, 
2003; Hutton, 2006; Tombs and Jagger, 2006; McNeill et al, 2009). More broadly, 
other studies aspects of judicial work such as ways in which judges seek to maintain 
ownership of discretion (Ashworth, 1995; Tata, 2000; Hutton, 2006); of judicial 
resistance to sentencing research (Ashworth, 1995, 2003; Baldwin, 2000; Hughes, 
2000); of strategic judicial behaviour in relation to sentencing reform or innovation 
(Ashworth, 1995; Hutton, 1995; Tata, 2000; Tata and Hutton, 2003; Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2002); and discussions about judicial diversity (Griffiths, 1997; Hale, 2005; 
Malleson, 2006; Rackley, 2007). 
In the sentencing field at large, though, interest in judicial values and their influence 
proceeds mostly one way, and is directed towards the ways in which these ideas may 
impinge directly on the sentencing process, such as in judicial bias leading to 
disparity or inconsistency, or the extent to which they may suggest greater judicial 
punitiveness. Less common is inquiry about the effect and influence of culture on 
judges by virtue of background, training or experience; of local or cultural contexts; 
or of any judicial ‘hinterland’ beyond that expressed in perspectives about penal 
issues. One consequence is that there is little sense of the judge as a historically or 
socially situated actor, and little insight about the individual judge as a penal and 
moral agent. In this way, judicial ‘structures of affect’ are narrowly conceived.  
Liebling (2001: 47) observes the lack of ‘appreciative’ research or sympathy towards 
the powerful in criminology. There is, she notes, little interest in:  
… [the]nature of agency, power and constraint, the complexity of the hierarchy, and 
the grasp that individual players at all levels have of their own room to make 
choices, hold different views, to challenge others and to make sense of their own 
position.  
 ‘Judicial culture’ as homogeneity  
Certain assumptions can be made about the hegemonic mix of values the judiciary is 





who are ‘white and privileged and male and lawyers’ (Scheppele, 1989:2084). In this 
respect, Griffith’s challenge to the political neutrality of the judiciary is likely still to 
exert a powerful hold on the imagination of the sentencing scholar.30 The following 
extracts exemplify this outlook: 
A central thesis of this book is that judges in the United Kingdom cannot be 
politically neutral because they are placed in positions where they are required to 
make political choices which are sometimes presented to them, and sometimes 
presented by them, as determinations of where the public interest lies; that their 
interpretations of what is in the public interest….is determined by the kind of people 
they are and the position they hold in our society; that this position is a part of 
established authority and so is necessarily conservative, not liberal.  
                                                                                                  (Griffith, 1997; 336) 
When people like the members of the judiciary, broadly homogenous in character, 
are faced with such situations, they act in broadly similar ways. […] behind these 
actions lies a unifying attitude of mind, a political position, which is primarily 
concerned to protect and conserve certain values and institutions.  
                                                                                                        (Griffith, 1997: 7) 
Although Griffith does not use the terms ‘culture’ or ‘habitus’, some sense of that all-
embracing use of ‘culture’ can be discerned in his characterisation of the judiciary’s 
‘unifying mind: this identifies both a set of cultural ideas believed to be widely 
shared by the judiciary as a result of class and education, and uses this homogenous 
identity to distinguish the judiciary from other groups of actors. Conflating the two 
ideas in this way, Griffith employs a strong sense of a homogenous ‘judicial 
culture’.31 
In similar fashion, and more topically in their comparative approach to penal 
systems, Cavadino and Dignan (2002) use the concept of ‘culture’ not only to denote 
a set of collective penal sentiments (defined as ‘socially determined feelings, 
emotions and attitudes’) attributed to groupings such as individual nations or judges, 
but also, in relation to judges, to signify a totalizing sense of ‘culture’. Here, the term 
‘penal culture among sentencers’ is used interchangeably with ‘sentencing culture’, 





The judiciary and occupational culture 
These examples of ways in which the concept of culture is used to signify a set of 
undifferentiated judicial attitudes throw into sharp relief the lack of research directed 
towards the judiciary as an occupational group; of the range of motivations, interests 
and attitudes which constitute their institutional life; of changes in disposition or 
outlook; or inquiry into the nature of their working relationships with each other – 
some sense of the dynamics and internal life of the organisation and of judging as an 
occupational role.  
The concept of ‘judicial culture’ lies in the shadow of the broad school of judicial (as 
distinct from sentencing) scholarship.32 Scholarship which addresses questions of 
judicial appointment and training can be read as impliedly incorporating some 
element of judicial culture in this occupational sense, as can the longer established 
field of legal scholarship oriented towards political and constitutional dimensions of 
judicial work. 33 In sentencing research, however, there is scarcely any even implied 
orientation towards this sphere of activity.  
This is surprising on two counts. At a general level, the cultural study of penal 
institutions might be expected to seek insight about how members of those 
institutions see their role in penality and the social world in which they act. 
Relatedly, it is a surprising oversight given the strong research agenda suggested by 
recent analyses of transformation in penal sensibilities and culture. Some sense of the 
centrality of this question is gained from Garland’s (2001: 4) outline of this 
development, notable for its broad sweep and for the rare sighting of judges: 
Within the brief time it takes to progress from basic training to mid-career, a whole 
generation of practitioners – probation officers, prison officials, prosecutors, judges, 
police officers, and criminological researchers - have looked on while their 
professional field was turned upside down. Hierarchies shifted precariously; settled 
routines were pulled apart; objectives and priorities were reformulated; standard 
working practices were altered; and professional expertise was subjected to 
challenge and viewed with increasing scepticism. The rapid emergence of new ways 
of thinking and acting on crime, and the concomitant discrediting of older 
assumptions and professional orientations, ensured that many penal practitioners and 
academics lived through the 1980s and 1990s with a chronic sense of crisis, and 





This unsettling of the various professional fields in which criminal justice 
practitioners operated – albeit one in which at least some of these ‘deposed experts 
and displaced discourses’ continue to exert some influence (Garland, 2005: 168) – 
has generated much scholarly interest and some ethnographic study into the 
occupational penal cultures identified above, but little in relation to judges (or 
prosecutors).34 Analyses of transformational shifts (and continuities) in penal values 
also often proceed without examination of the judicial values which play a part in 
those developments.   
It is useful here to compare the trajectory of judicial occupational research with that 
of the other institutions forming the hegemonic superstructure in Hall et al’s Policing 
The Crisis (Hall et al, 1978). Grounded in a Gramscian analysis of the relationship 
between the institutions of the ‘state apparatus’ (here, the judiciary, police and 
media), this study provides an analysis of the creation of a moral panic by the 
amplification processes of judges, newspapers and police officers – an ideological 
circuit which named and defined the problem, and reinforced the others’ 
pronouncements. Although primarily concerned with the cultural politics of race in 
Britain in the 1970s, this study provides a classical analysis of the hegemonic role of 
the judiciary as an institution and in the sentencing process. In particular, it draws 
attention to the relatively closed and anonymous nature of what Hall et al call the 
‘internal organisation of the judicial world’ – the habitus by any other name – as well 
as the rituals and conventions which help to shield it from public scrutiny, the 
judicial concepts (‘fictions’) of political neutrality and impartiality, the power of 
judicial homilies, the rituals and conventions which help shield it from public 
scrutiny, the presentation of consensus, and the important signifying function of 
sentencing remarks and other judicial pronouncements. 
The trajectory of research interest in respect of the three institutions of the state in 
this study (judiciary, police and media) in the decades since its publication merits 
closer attention. In Policing The Crisis the authors suggested that in relation to the 
judiciary it was important to study: 
...those processes peculiar to the internal organisation of the judicial 





and the informal processes by which common judicial perspectives come to be 
formed, and by which the judiciary orientates itself, in a general way, within the 
field of force provided by public opinion and official, political or administrative 
opinion….                                   
                                                                                                     (Hall et al, 1978: 33) 
It can be observed that even the limited research agenda outlined here in respect of 
the judiciary awaits full achievement. Notably, cultural aspects of policing have been 
extensively researched, with the resulting insight that police culture is not 
monolithic: that occupational cultures such as these are shaped but not determined by 
the structural pressures of their environment; and that knowledge of the norms and 
values that inform their conduct allows scope for changing aspects of culture that 
may be considered problematic or resistant to change (Reiner, 1999).35 In  
comparison, research about analogous dimensions of judicial culture seems still to be 
in its infancy, especially in relation to the judicial habitus. 
Section 4 Judicial culture 
There are insightful studies which address other aspects of the judicial role. For 
example, some conceive judging as ‘craftwork’ (Tata, 2007); understand the judge as 
part of the court community in which formal and informal rules, relationships, 
politics and constraints operate (Ulmer, 1997; Wandall, 2008); identifies the judge as 
performing a ‘social service’ function (Malleson: 1997) and the judicial role as 
involving an aspect of ‘emotional labour’ (Anleu and Mack: 2005); examines the 
judiciary as part of an institutionally located power network (Hutton, 2013); and in 
the context of changes in penal practice (McNeill et al, 2009). Studies which explore 
‘court culture’ capture some of the important dynamics of judicial life, employing a 
strong sense of ‘culture’ to explore the informal norms and understandings of 
courtroom actors, and courtroom interaction and communications between penal 
actors (Ulmer, 1997; Wandall, 2005). The focus of many of these studies is directed 
towards processes external to the judicial habitus: to its relationships with other 
agencies and institutions, and in the collaborative processes of criminal justice.  
It is suggested here that there is value in developing a more focused understanding of 





ethnographic study of lives and careers, routine practices and daily activities has the 
potential to provide greater insight about some of the social meanings and 
implications of the judicial role, and the lived experience of that role. This employs 
the concept of culture in both senses outlined by Garland (2006): to denote a range of 
values, meanings and dispositions of members of the occupational group, and also to 
distinguish ‘judicial’ culture from others in the penal realm – such as that of police 
officers, social workers, policy makers or politicians. Like the studies cited above, 
this approach is towards a sociological explanation of the judicial role in penal 
culture, and is in alignment with McNeill et al (2009) who call for the development 
of a more fully cultural penology drawing on ethnographies of penality.  
Researching judicial culture 
The attempt to research these dimensions of judicial culture encounters some of the 
‘unavoidable imprecision’ and challenges posed by the exploration of a system or 
process in penality which operates through symbols, signs and rhetoric, namely: 
…the difficulties of accurate measurement, the lack of reliable data, and the 
impossibility of isolating penal variables from other attitude-forming forces...   
                                                                                                    (Garland, 1990: 250) 
As distinct from other more tangible or more easily identifiable aspects such as those 
relating to the appointment of judges or even to more measurable aspects of judicial 
behaviour in criminal justice such as patterns of sentencing, focusing on sensibilities 
and dispositions is, as Nelken observes, to engage at the extreme end of cultural 
enquiry with the ‘more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities’ 
(2010: 49). For Geertz (1983: 6) this problem is as much about the challenge of the 
interpretive approach – what he calls the ‘practical difficulties in seeing things as 
others see them’ – as about the figurative nature of social theory: 
To turn from trying to explain social phenomena by weaving them into grand 
textures of cause and effect to trying to explain them by placing them in local frames 
of awareness is to exchange a set of well-charted difficulties for a set of largely 





In the chapter to follow I address some of the ‘practical difficulties’ in adopting an 
interpretive approach to judicial culture, but I first outline some elements and 
orientations of a cultural approach to judicial lives and work.  
An interpretive approach to judicial culture 
All interpretive approaches have an essentially anthropological orientation to their 
participants. Geertz (1983: 22) explains it this way: 
Interpretive explanation – and it is a form of explanation, not just exalted 
glossography – trains its attention on what institutions, actions images, utterances, 
events, customs, all the usual objects of social-scientific interest, mean to those 
whose institutions, actions, customs, and so on they are.  
There are several implications of this understanding for the study of judges and their 
role in criminal justice. Firstly, although judges in their sentencing role can be 
regarded as penal and moral rather than legal agents, there is some value in being 
attentive to their own frameworks of meaning and how they orient themselves in 
legal and penal space.  By virtue of legal education, training and experience, most 
judges (who by virtue of the appointment process are all senior members of the 
profession) are inclined to present themselves as lawyers as well as judges, and do 
not always distinguish their penal role from the civil dimension of their work. For 
judges, therefore, sentencing is a legal as well as a social practice. Moreover, 
although judges’ talk displays much of the ‘situational, adaptive, ‘fuzzy-logic’ of 
practice’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 226), it also tends to draw heavily on the 
legal doctrines which circumscribe and define their judicial role.  To the extent that it 
is possible to distinguish between different orientations, there is value in engaging 
with the idea of legal as well as penal sensibilities when considering the normative 
claims made by judges for the legitimacy of punishment and its various practices, 
and also to accounts of their role in punishment, to the various categories of crime 
and the criminal they deploy and to the strategies they adopt to maintain them.  
A more fully developed cultural approach to judges’ sensibilities, therefore, would 
place at the centre of enquiry the broader frameworks or structures of meanings 





Our gaze fastens on meanings, on the ways in which the Balinese (or whoever) make 
sense of what they do – practically,  morally, expressively…. juridically – by setting 
it within larger frames of signification, and how they keep those larger frames in 
place, or try to, by organizing what they do in terms of them.  
                                                                                                       (Geertz, 1983: 180) 
The term judicial sensibilities therefore captures the way in which judges orientate 
themselves to legal as well as penal frameworks and categories of thought, and the 
distinct manner in which these dispositions are sometimes articulated: 
Such sensibilities differ not only in the degree to which they are determinate; in the 
power they exercise, vis-à-vis other modes of thought and feeling, over the processes 
of social life……in their particular style and content. They differ, and markedly, in 
the means they use – the symbols they deploy, the stories they tell, the distinctions 
they draw, the visions they project – to present events in judiciable form.  
                                                                                                      (Geertz, 1983: 175) 
There is significant correspondence between some of the claims for a ‘cultural turn’ 
in the sociology of punishment and those in law and society scholarship: legal 
thought, for example, is constitutive of social reality in much the same way as penal 
discourse. There is also shared recognition of the need for historical and genealogical 
enquiry as ways of tracing patterns of thought, and for understanding the contingency 
of contemporary ideas – that law is not a neutral or objective set of ideas, though 
there is interest in the ways these claims are mediated (as Kahn notes, ‘judges cannot 
speak of a flat earth for too long after everyone else in the society understands the 
earth to be round’ (2003: 157)). The common proposition here is representation: law, 
as with all cultural forms, is ‘part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real’ 
(Geertz, 1983: 173).  
Notwithstanding these commonalities, there is value in acknowledging the 
‘determinate sense of justice’ which Geertz considers to be characteristic of legal 
sensibility usefully introduces the concept of the ‘legal imagination’, and which 
carries insight about ways of exploring it. As Kahn (2003) observes, judges (as 
lawyers) engage in a continual process of ‘reification and objectification’ of the 
doctrines and categories of legal analysis. Recognising the danger that the subject 





places itself on the line separating ‘internal’ and ‘external’ accounts of law. This 
requires the researcher to engage with the internal, self-referential discourse while at 
the same time creating some critical distance and space for self-reflexivity (2003: 
177). Lacey (2007) makes a similar point when she says there is value in taking legal 
doctrines seriously - as distinct objects of criminal justice knowledge and for what 
they can tell us about broader social and political issues. In this approach to legal 
discourse there is potential for gaining a better understanding of the tenacity of 
judicial doctrines such as independence and impartiality and the part they play in 
institutional responses to sentencing reform.  
Judicial sensibilities: the scope of enquiry 
The research agenda suggested by a cultural approach to judicial practice is broad 
and encompasses the kind of enquiry which is commonly the focus of qualitative 
sentencing research, namely the exploration of judicial attitudes and perspectives on 
a range of penal matters which might be expected to inform and shape the practice of 
sentencing. Drawing on the foundational elements of the sociology of punishment 
outlined above, there is potential for an even broader framework of enquiry. For 
example, recognising judges as ‘bearers’ of penal culture directs attention to the 
influence of their background, training and education on the development of their 
legal or penal sensibilities, and thus as a ‘key determinant of penal practice’ 
(Garland, 1990: 210). ‘Sensibilities’ can be construed in both their intellectual and 
emotional dimensions, extending beyond the articulation of perspectives on penal 
issues to include questions concerning the role of emotions in judging, and 
facilitating the exploration of subtle changes in the development of penal ‘manners’. 
It can also be attentive to the character and scope of changing judicial sensibilities, 
and also to the knowledges on which they draw and the discourses they use to 
articulate their accounts.  
Local knowledge 
Like sailing, gardening, politics, and poetry, law and ethnography are crafts of place: 
they work by the light of local knowledge.  





One of the consequences of the lack of qualitative research in relation to the judiciary 
is that there are gaps in the explanatory capacity of existing literature to document 
and provide insight about the changing political and social conditions of judging. In 
particular, we lack much sense of the judge as a socially or politically situated actor 
or as one with any emotional hinterland.  One of the aims of this project, therefore, is 
to explore the Scottish dimension of criminal justice history, and the local and 
biographical contexts of these narrative accounts aid the exploration of matters 
relating to the distinct penal trajectory of this small jurisdiction. There is some debate 
about the place of ‘local’ and ‘global’ analyses in criminology, and the extent to 
which studies in local settings and of particular institutions or practices can throw 
light on broad structural patterns and developments, or whether they add merely local 
detail - and a converse debate as to whether those general analyses adequately 
capture local contexts of thought and action (Girling et al, 1999; Garland, 2001; 
Loader and Sparks, 2004; Garland, 2005; Garland, 2006).  
Geertz (1983: 233), in his study of law in comparative perspective, points a way 
through this general debate:  
We need, in the end, something rather more than local knowledge. We need a way of 
turning its varieties into commentaries one upon another, the one lighting what the 
other darkens.  
This suggests the need for some dialectical movement between different contexts, 
and between the general and the particular, in order to fully realise the insights 
gained. The cultural approach to judicial life adopted in this project is therefore 
aimed not only at producing ‘ideas of some local depth’ but exploring them in ways 
which can also direct us towards ‘some of the defining characteristics, however 
various and ill-ordered, of what it is we want to grasp’ (Geertz, 1983:187).  
Conclusion  
Towards cultural explanation of the judicial role in criminal justice 
In this chapter I have considered some of the common conceptions and 
representations of judging in criminological scholarship, and the place of culture in 





penal actors and their occupational culture, judicial scholarship tends to employ a 
conception of judicial culture as monolithic, unchanging and with little capacity for 
change. This is a significantly under-developed area of research and I identified 
several foundational elements of the sociology of punishment which hold potential 
for the development of a more fully cultural approach to the role of the judge in 
penal practice. These features would recognise the judiciary, like all penal 
institutions, as a complex organisation grounded in cultural values which shape the 
actions of its members and whose habitus and practices are the outcome of tension, 
conflict and compromise.  
I then outlined the key features of judicial culture as a distinct field of penal inquiry. 
A more fully cultural approach would recognise not only those characteristics which 
suggest homogeneity and settled practices, but would also be alert to changes in 
judicial sensibilities and to the wider range of motivations, interests and attitudes 
which are likely to constitute the judicial habitus. As with other occupational penal 
cultures, the study of judicial culture would be interested in the unsettling of 
professional fields that has occurred alongside recent transformational shifts (and 
continuities) in penal practice. To this extent, the cultural study of the judiciary is an 
account ‘rather entranced with the diversity of things’ (Geertz, 1983: 232). 
The full ambit of this research agenda is beyond the scope of a single research 
project, but the aim of the more limited  enquiry into judicial culture here is twofold: 
firstly, to provide contextual and historical detail of judicial lives in Scottish criminal 
justice history and secondly, to provide insight about the changing sensibilities of a 
group of penal actors whose connection with broader social and political 
commitments or developments is often obscured by the ideological imperatives of 
their role. In the chapter to follow, I set out the empirical framework of the narrative 







                                                 
1 In England this was partly due to the very restrictive understanding of the public role of the judge 
expressed in the Kilmuir Rules, as well as the resistance of successive Lord Chancellors to social 
science research into sentencing processes. See Ashworth (1995; 2003); Baldwin (2000); Hughes 
(2000) for discussion but also Pierce (2002) for a different perspective in Australia. 
2 See Hughes (2000) for an account of that period, and Pierce (2002) for insight about the more recent  
Australian context.   
3 Parry (2010) notes tentative signs of ‘strategic’ academic interest in legal biography with the recent 
establishment of a ‘Legal Biography Project’ at the London School of Economics and of a ‘Women’s 
Legal History Biography Project’ at Stanford University Law School.  
4 American judicial biography is a substantial genre which contains elements of this first writing 
tradition but more generally leans closer to the second orientation. Reflecting the role of the US 
judiciary in upholding the constitution, studies in this field tend to take the form of specialised 
intellectual histories of Supreme Court judges, evaluating their individual (and occasionally 
collegiate) contribution to the development of law. This form has a definite ‘interiority’ and inward 
focus, the outside world being viewed through the framework of the subject (Girard, 2003).  
5 Girard (2003) makes no separate reference to Scottish biography in his account of contemporary 
legal biography, nor does he cite any Scottish studies. Contributory factors in the decline of legal 
biography more generally include scholarly revolt against the heroic Victorian style of judicial 
biography, employed to convey greatness and famous for its sentimental idiom (Parry, 2010: 212). 
There may be little demand now for these ‘edifying role models’, and there are possibly few judges 
considered by legal scholars to have led sufficiently interesting lives or whose contributions to the 
development of law are deemed particularly significant (Girard, 2003).  
6 See Osborne (1997) on Lord Braxfield; Bell (2005) on Lord Cockburn; Michie (1997) on Sir 
Archibald Allison.  
7 See for example, Smith (2011); Brand (1995). The autobiography of Sheriff Irvine Smith (2011) 
represents an account of his early childhood and family life, his life-long interests in music and after-
dinner speaking, his career at the Scottish Bar and finally his life as a Sheriff. It appears to be intended 
for a popular rather than scholarly or exclusively legal audience.  
8 Girard (2003) cites works which explore the lives and careers of judges in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada and provide insight about their imperial and colonial history; and English studies which 
contribute to our understanding of political and social dimensions of the Stuart age.  
9 In this account, judging entails the process of ‘cognitive framing’ through which categories of 
thought and perception are filtered; there can be no unmediated perception of thought and the process 
of judging is necessarily influenced by social categories. I return to Tamanaha’s model of judging in 
later chapters. 
10 These studies can be located as part of broader developments in law and society scholarship. See 
Berman (2003) for an overview of US studies.  
11 This was the moment of EP Thompson’s famous conversion to the rule of law. 
12 The frustration of the sentencing scholar is palpable. Decades of scholarship searching for the holy 
grail of sentencing – a rational and causal explanation of judicial behaviour – seem mostly to confirm 
(1) that judges are complex actors whose motivations and thought processes do not lend themselves to 
causal or scientific analyses aimed at predicting behaviour and (2) that they are human actors who are 
inevitably influenced, in varying degrees, by personal and social factors and by political and public 
pressures. US studies suggest that politics have much less influence than expected (Tamanaha, 2010). 
13 See Garland (2006) for an overview of the range and scope of cultural analyses in the field.  
14 The symbolic and cultural dimensions of the judicial role receive greater attention in the largely US 
body of scholarship known as legal studies/cultural studies/critical legal studies (see for example 
Kennedy (1997); Kahn (2000 ); Sarat and Simon (2003)). Reflecting the particular constitutional 





                                                                                                                                          
focuses principally on the civil (adjudicatory and appellate) functions of the judiciary with scant 
reference to their functions in criminal law.  
15 The first dimension of this constitutive interplay between punishment and culture – the notion that 
culture shapes the form of punishment practices – seems readily apparent, even ‘hopelessly self-
evident’ (Garland, 1990: 249), though the task of tracing and analysing the sources, influences and 
multiple variables of this causal process presents considerable challenges. It is the second generative 
aspect of this two-way process – the extent to which penal practices and discourses shape the pre-
dominant culture – that is given such novel and illuminating force in his earlier work (1990) yet has 
generated most debate.  
16 On this understanding, cultural sensibilities, however socially constructed, are experienced at the 
individual level but feed into culturally shared patterns of thought.  
17 In his earlier articulation of a sociological approach to the study of punishment, and especially when 
urging its cultural significance, Garland cautioned against singular interpretations of penality, insisting 
that the logic of the argument should lead to ‘multiple causality, multiple effects, and multiple 
meaning’ (1990:280) in the interpretation of penal policy and practice. His later ‘Culture of Control’ 
thesis has generated extensive debate about the extent to which the penal practices in question are 
settled, and about the role of on-going conflict and tension in the field (see O’Malley, 2000; 
Matravers, 2005; Loader and Sparks, 2004; Garland, 2005).  
18 In the post-war era, these humanist approaches increasingly took the form of biographical and 
person-centred enquiries. The affinity of an interpretive approach to penal culture with narrative 
research is discussed in the following chapter.  
19 This understanding of the cultural embeddedness of crime control strategies, criminal justice and 
political responses to questions of social order also forms the basis of much recent comparative 
criminological study (Pakes, 2004; Nelken, 2010; Melossi, Sozzo and Sparks, 2011). 
20 In the sociology of punishment, these are understood as even broader categories than the ‘shadows 
lurking behind the case’ on which Foucault believed a case was truly judged and punished: the 
‘passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity’ (1977: 
17). In this broader conception, penality communicates messages about fundamental moral and 
political values: ‘power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations’ 
(Garland, 1990: 152). As Melossi observes, the various penal processes and techniques of assessment, 
classification and rhetoric produce a kind of ‘gazette of morality’ (2008:6).  
21 Garland argues that the ‘old’ and ‘new’ penologies represent ‘two adjacent positions in a common 
field of instrumental penality’ (1997: 203, emphasis in original). See also Zedner (2002) and van 
Swaaningen for discussion of the co-existence of these trends (1997). 
22 In relation to penal sensibilities, this suggests a shift in ‘analytic gear’ from a Durkheimian and 
Eliasian understanding of the expressive function of punishment (and its boundary affirming role), to 
one placing greater emphasis on the emotional aspect of criminal justice processes and strategies 
(Hudson, 2005:54). This tendency towards the greater ‘emotionalization’ of law is manifested inter 
alia by expressions of vengeance, disgust and shame in penal discourse and practice (see Sarat (1997), 
Karstedt (2002) and De Haan and Loader (2002). For comparisons of the ways in which different 
political cultures shape national sensibilities about punishment see Downes (1988); Newburn and 
Jones (2005), Pratt (2007) and Green (2008).  
23 Bourdieu expresses it thus: ‘Symbolic acts of naming achieve their power of creative utterance to 
the extent, and only to the extent, that they propose principles of vision and division objectively 
adapted to the pre-existing divisions of which they are the products.’ (1987: 839) 
24 Abstracting the sentencing function of judges from judicial decision-making generally is a 
pragmatic division of labour in an otherwise unwieldy area of research, but re-locating it briefly 
within its broader context allows reflection on the common interest in judicial decision-making as 





                                                                                                                                          
25 This is a vast body of research, and no attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive account of 
the field. See Ulmer (2012) for a useful overview of developments in the US field.  
‘Judge characteristics’ do not constitute the sole focus of this research, and attempts to predict and 
model sentencing patterns extend not only to racial and ethnic variables, victim characteristics and 
other court processes but to socio-political factors such as local religious culture (Fearn, 2005); 
neighbourhood disadvantage (Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004); crime rates (Ulmer et al, 2007; 
Weidner et al, 2004); crime rates and political climate (Helms, 2009).  
26 See for example the ‘focal concerns perspective’ research which directs its attention to the 
‘substantive rationalities’ of criminal justice decision-making. Recent work narrows the areas of focus 
to blameworthiness, protection of the community, and practical constraints (Steffensmeier, Kramer 
and Streifel, 1993; Savelsberg, 1992; Steffensmeier, Ulmer and Kramer, 1998; Kramer and Ulmer, 
2009). 
27 In its 2006 Report, recommending a system of guidelines, the Sentencing Council proceeded on the 
basis that there was ‘plentiful anecdotal evidence’ of inconsistency, though noting that research to 
establish this was ‘virtually non-existent’ (Scottish Government (2006)). Recent US studies found 
only modest inter-judge variations, largely explained by case and defendant characteristics (Johnson, 
2006; Anderson and Spohn, 2010). There has been little research into disparities in Scottish 
sentencing. The most recent was carried out by Tata and Hutton (1998); the main finding was broad 
consistency. 
28 Judicial scholarship, as opposed to the narrower field of sentencing research, is represented by a 
very large body of inter-disciplinary literature, in which law, psychology, sociology, anthropology and 
economics are the most prominent disciplines.  
29 See endnotes (4) and (5) above. It is commonplace for legal and socio-legal scholars to note that 
there is insufficient research on the judiciary and the judicial process, and to call for further empirical 
work, particularly studies involving interviews with judges (Ashworth : 2003, Kibble: 2008, Warner: 
2006). Legal scholarship has generated extensive doctrinal work on dominant legal concepts such as 
judicial independence, rule of law and separation of powers in relation to constitutional and 
administrative law but with little insight about their relevance to criminal law and practice.  
30 Griffith’s book has a broader application beyond the overtly political aspects he cites in relation to 
civil and constitutional law. His definition of ‘political’ includes ‘cases which touch important moral 
and social issues’ (7) and in the preface to later editions he notes the increasingly contested place of 
sentencing in judicial life. 
31 In similar vein, a more recent account of the judiciary characterised it as ‘the best defended bastion 
of class privilege, restrictive practices and white, male domination.’ (Wilson and Ashton, 2001). 
Many of these issues are relevant to sentencing, raising questions about judicial impartiality, diversity 
and unrepresentativeness, but are often less than fully explored in the sentencing context, despite the 
increasing availability of data and the emergence of a body of scholarship addressing these issues (see 
for example Thomas, 2005; Judiciary of England and Wales, 2010; Boyd et al, 2010). 
32 There is occasional reference to ‘judicial culture’ in legal scholarship where it is used to explain 
specific legal doctrines such as certiorari (Lax, 2003) or in relation to specific spheres of judicial 
activity such as therapeutic jurisprudence (Popovic, 2003); mediation (van Epps, 2001); or European 
jurisprudence (Ashworth and Player, 2005).  
33 See endnote (19) above.  
34 Though see Fielding, 2011. In relation to probation officers, see Robinson, 1999; McNeill, 2000; 
Clear, 2005; Matthews and Hubbard, 2007: for prison officers see Crawley, 2002; Crewe, 2006; 
Liebling, 2011; for police officers see Chan, 1996; Reiner, 2010; and for criminological researchers 
see Loader, 2006; Loader and Sparks, 2010.  
35 The enduring legacy and significance of Policing the Crisis is reprised in a series of essays in 
Crime, Media and Culture (2008; 4) and although writers note in passing the ideological hegemony 





                                                                                                                                          
focus is quite striking. Garland, for example, notes that Policing the Crisis remains an exemplar in its 
‘range, ambition and predictive insights about Britain’s drift to a law and order society’, but in his 
commentary focuses on the activities of actors in the media, the police, the government and the public 





Chapter 3   The Narrative Project 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I considered the ‘cultural turn’ in the sociology of 
punishment and the elusive place of culture in sentencing research. Although much 
work in the sentencing field impliedly addresses cultural dimensions of judicial 
work, the concept of judicial culture has value in designating a discrete field of 
inquiry encompassing not only the ‘ontological stuff’ of values, meanings and 
perception but also the daily routines, institutional practices and occupational 
dynamics of judicial work.1 
Conventionally, sentencing research employs structured or semi-structured interview 
methods to speak to judges and enquire about their work. This is an approach often 
pragmatically aimed at gaining judicial perspectives – statements of position - on 
specific issues of penal policy and practice. However, the cultural agenda outlined 
above suggested the value of a research approach capable of orientation towards the 
exploration of sensibilities and dispositions as well as perspectives, and more likely 
to generate contextual accounts of judicial life and practice.  
Narrative research is an interpretive approach concerned with the personal stories or 
narratives which people use to communicate meaning and knowledge in the social 
world, and is aimed at eliciting reflective accounts of personal experience. Although 
there are many forms of narrative analysis, they share an interest in the close reading 
of the contexts in which narratives are (co)produced, as well as attentiveness to the 
particular frameworks of meaning employed by individuals in the telling of those 
stories. The particular value of this approach for the study of judicial culture is the 
focus on ‘human subjectivity and creativity, on the way in which individuals respond 
to constraints and experiences’ (Plummer, 2001:3). 
In order to explore some dimensions of judicial culture and habitus, I conducted a 
series of biographical narrative interviews with a group of retired Scottish Sheriffs 
and judges. The initial parts of the interviews were orientated towards the 





general discussions about their experience on the bench and about sentencing 
practice. In subsequent chapters I use narrative research methods to interpret the 
accounts given and to re-engage with some contemporary debates in the field.  
Some of the research participants were known to me through my former career in 
law. This career involved four years as a Reporter to the Children’s Panel and a 
much lengthier period as a prosecutor in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal 
Service. During this period of time I had formed long working relationships and 
friendships with a number of Sheriffs and was still in contact with several. Other 
judges were introduced to me through mutual acquaintances, and a smaller number 
responded to an invitation to participate. These shared associations raise important 
questions about their effect on the research relationship and the interpretation of 
accounts, and are considered in this chapter.  
This chapter is in three parts. Section I provides detail of the empirical framework of 
the project, about the scope and format of interviews, and discusses the interpretation 
and analysis of accounts given in interview. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
narrative research approach, a working definition of ‘narrative’ for this study, and 
discussion of the functions which narratives may serve for individuals and for 
institutions. Section 3 outlines an interpretive position for judicial narratives based 
on the hermeneutics of faith and suspicion.  
Section I The empirical framework 
In qualitative research, issues about understanding and interpreting accounts given in 
interview and about anonymity, confidentiality and ethics are part of the tensions and 
dynamics in the structure of any research relationship, but additional questions also 
emerge from the particular interaction between the researcher and participants. 
Following Bourdieu (1999), I consider these to be simultaneously practical and 
theoretical problems, and approach the discussion in that spirit: to make clear both 






The genesis of the ‘Judicial Narratives’ project 
This study of the lives and careers of judges evolved from some earlier professional 
interest in the public performance of the judicial role and the private resolution of its 
various challenges, both of which I had observed at first hand in legal practice. 
Several assignments in the course of a Master’s degree presented the opportunity to 
interview judges, and I took up the suggestion of an elderly retired sheriff with whom 
I was still in contact that I should ‘talk to the old judges’ (including himself). This 
proposal usefully circumvented what would otherwise have been a lengthy, and not 
necessarily successful, process of applying to the judicial authorities for permission 
to interview serving members of the judiciary. Moreover, the age and career stage of 
the judges in question – judge and sheriffs who were in practice and on the criminal 
bench in the second half of the twentieth century - usefully foregrounded the role of 
the judiciary in this period of Scottish criminal justice history. This was a dimension 
of penological history which seemed to lack much documentation in the 
criminological literature.  
My experience of interviewing the first two retired sheriffs proved instructive in 
several unexpected ways and was to frame the development of the much larger 
project which forms the basis of this thesis. Firstly, I was struck by the readiness of 
these individuals to participate, and their engagement with the topic. This appeared 
to be connected to their recently retired status in so far as they seemed to welcome 
the opportunity to reflect on their judicial lives and careers. Secondly, although I had 
not purposefully adopted a narrative approach to interviewing in these early 
interviews, my connection with the sheriffs and knowledge of their careers created an 
interview setting which seemed naturally to gravitate towards explorations of 
criminal justice history and practice grounded in their personal accounts of their 
careers. This embryonic interviewing approach led to a more purposeful interview 
process which drew explicitly on narrative research.  
Relatedly, my early interviews alerted me to some pitfalls in interviewing these 
retired practitioners. In these first interviews I had steered conversation to the topic 





this era. Although each had attempted to respond in these terms, my clumsy 
interviewing approach provided the insight that having theorized the topic prior to 
interview in terms which made sense to me and my study, I had made the mistake of 
giving the participants the concept and asking them to talk to it, rather than allowing 
them to narrate it in their own terms.2  
Research participants: the judges 
Although gaining access to judges for the purpose of research is often challenging, 
the selection of participants for this research project was achieved without difficulty. 
The first group of participants consisted of two retired judges who I knew from legal 
practice, and to this number were added three others who were suggested by one of 
the first group. This small participant group was significantly expanded when I 
attended the annual conference of the Scottish Association for the Study of 
Offending in 2009, and met a former senior colleague from the Crown Office, now a 
Sheriff. On hearing about my PhD research project and my plans to enlist other 
retired sheriffs and judges, he introduced me to several retired High Court judges 
attending the conference. He also offered, in his capacity as office-bearer for an 
association representing a significant proportion of Sheriffs, to ‘put out the call’ for 
more volunteer research participants. Over the next few weeks this produced a steady 
stream of emails from volunteers responding to his request for participants for my 
research project.  
Within a short period of time this series of introductions, in classic ‘snowballing’ 
fashion, placed me in the fortuitous position of having more volunteers for my 
research than I would need or be able to accommodate.3 Some selection had to be 
made in order to limit the group to a manageable geographical location and size, but 
the problems often associated with ‘snowball samples’ – that they are self-selecting 
and biased and do not allow researchers to make generalizable claims (Griffiths et al, 
1993) - did not present a challenge here because of the individual life history and 
case study nature of the project. Moreover, the demographic profile of this group of 
retired judges meant that only a very small number of female judges formed part of 





self-selection of a group of male judges presented no significant problem, there being 
few other relevant criteria for inclusion. 
However, with this embarrassment of research riches came some sense of heightened 
personal accountability or investment in my research relationship with the 
participants. It was evident, in both the face-to face introductions with judges at 
Peebles and through the email responses of the volunteer sheriffs, that this way of 
recruiting participants relied heavily on two factors: firstly, the personal 
recommendation of a senior legal figure who had worked with me over a long period 
of time – a personal vouchsafe; and secondly, on my perceived status as a legal 
insider. Additionally, I knew several of the participants well. Taken together, these 
factors might suggest a raised level of trust and potentially some conflict with my 
role as an independent researcher. I address this issue more fully below in the context 
of discussion about the relational dynamics of interviews, and in substantive 
discussions about the interviews in later chapters.  
The final group consisted of 12 participants, the majority of whom were retired 
sheriffs and a small number who were retired High Court judges. The female 
members of the group were in a small minority.4 The age range of participants was 
65 to 86 years.  
Anonymity, confidentiality and identifiability 
In my initial correspondence with each judge, and before any interviews took place, I 
explained that the details of their involvement in the research project would be kept 
confidential and that I would anonymise their details in any publications.  I discussed 
the more difficult issue of their identifiability, the possibility of which could not be 
discounted since they were members of a tight-knit legal community in a small 
jurisdiction. The most likely way in which this would occur was being identified 
through biographical details or in the narration of specific events in particular 
locations that could be tied to them as individuals.  
I explained that there were some steps I could take to minimise this possibility. For 
example, in the case of the female participants, a group which was particularly 





possible to render their accounts in the masculine pronoun. This strategy would not 
be effective where their accounts related specifically to their experience of being 
female judges, but having raised this issue prior to interviews, some care was taken 
with details which could identify them. On occasion, both male and female judges 
requested after interview that I withhold certain details which could identify them or 
their families. Although some participants declared they had no need of anonymity, I 
decided to anonymise all accounts for the sake of overall coherence; also, in view of 
the small size of the overall group, to avoid having an even smaller and thus more 
identifiable sub-group.  
Disconcertingly, I discovered from the start that participants sometimes relinquished 
their own anonymity by sharing information about their participation in the project 
with others. I became aware in the first two interviews I conducted that each 
participant had somehow ascertained the identity of the other, and was using the 
knowledge to make coded references to their very different judicial styles and 
sentencing approaches.5 As the project expanded to its current size, this was a 
problem which bedevilled the study without any real resolution.  
To an extent, the use of ‘snowballing’ as a means of gaining access to participants 
was an obvious source of identity ‘leakage’, even though I was careful not to disclose 
to the originator whether any ‘referred’ individuals had subsequently taken part in 
the project. Some participants were openly curious about the identity of the larger 
group, and (unsuccessfully) engaged in some gentle prodding and mischievous 
attempts to ascertain their identities. Nonetheless, it quickly became apparent that the 
existence of various post-retirement networks and friendship groups had facilitated 
the sharing of a certain amount of information about my research project.6 Some 
were quite direct about this; for example, informing me that my research had been 
the subject of conversation at the funeral of one of their colleagues; another telling 
me that the subject had ‘come up’ at a retirement dinner for a sheriff.7 
Despite my discomfort at some of the implications of this self-disclosure – the 
narrowing of the group by the identification of some certainly increased the chances 
of accidental disclosure of identity of others in the event of publication – I had to 





anonymity, and as the project developed it was, in any event, a matter over which I 
had little control. Moreover, this sharing of information was perhaps an inevitable 
consequence of doing research with a small community whose informal networks 
remained intact post-retirement. In future research I would consider the merits of 
addressing the issue more directly with each participant before interviews began, in 
the interests of the larger group.  
Informed consent 
As well as discussing these issues about anonymity, I provided each judge with an 
outline of the scope of the research; in general terms, that I was interested in judicial 
accounts of Scottish criminal justice history in the late twentieth century period and 
that I wanted to explore this by way of open-ended interviews, drawing on personal 
accounts of judicial careers and experiences. I also indicated that I was interested to 
explore some of the personal demands and challenges of judicial life. As far as the 
likely time commitment was concerned, I suggested that I would need to interview 
each participant twice, with intervals of one or two weeks between meetings, and that 
each interview would last several hours. I proposed to record all interviews for the 
purposes of transcription. After discussion (usually by email) with each participant 
about these and other issues arising, I asked them if they were content to proceed on 
these terms; all consented. In light of these discussions, it did not seem necessary or 
appropriate to formally record their agreement in a written document.  
However, the researcher’s satisfaction at having secured consent to relatively explicit 
terms of engagement such as these can only ever be partial if the contingent nature of 
ethnographic or interpretive research is properly acknowledged. Josselson (2007:545) 
explains the predicament in this way: 
The nature of the relationship that develops in narrative studies is emergent and 
cannot be predicted at the outset, and here lie some of the murkiest and most subtle 
of ethical matters, realities that cannot be made explicit. People can give informed 
consent to participate in the research project, but they cannot give prior consent to 







By its very nature, this is probably an unresolvable ethical dilemma, and is difficult 
to articulate or capture in any kind of consent prior to interview, whether or not in 
written form. Elsewhere, Josselson (2004:20) notes the difficulties which narrative 
researchers have in explaining to participants that they (the researchers) have the 
final ‘interpretive authority’. In particular, there is unlikely to be any resolution of 
the problem of participants feeling offended or invaded by interpretations beyond 
their own narrations or insights. Thus, while anonymity may protect confidentiality – 
though not necessarily in a small community – it cannot protect individual 
participants from any ‘narcissistic injury’ which may flow from the researcher’s 
analysis of their accounts.  
The specific dynamics of the particular research relationship will also play a part in 
this ethical dilemma, particularly the extent to which the relationship is based (or 
perceived to be based) on trust. For the researcher, Bourdieu (1999: 1) makes the 
telling observation: ‘no contract carries as many unspoken conditions as one based 
on trust’. I return to this question later in discussion about the interpretation of 
narrative accounts.  
Judicial narratives: a shared enterprise 
On the morning of my first interview I received a telephone call from my interviewee 
wanting to know if I was listening to a news item on Radio 4 about the size of the 
prison population. ‘Turn it on’, he urged: ‘this is what I want to talk to you about’. 
Another participant emailed in advance of our meeting to ask if I could direct him to 
a website with information about levels of drug offences. Several others turned up to 
interviews with hand-written notes to which they would sometimes refer, sometimes 
to introduce new topics or to follow on from previous interviews.  
While possibly indicating the controlling tendencies of powerful actors, even in 
retirement, this sense of insistence in relation to certain topics and debates was 
observed frequently enough to suggest some eagerness, post-retirement, to engage in 
public debate about penal matters. Although I had outlined my research project with 
each participant, the open-ended nature of the narrative approach resulted in many 





directional comments to me, such as ‘Now, this is really important’ or ‘What I’d like 
to say is….’ or ‘This is the most important thing I can tell you...’. The form of this 
engagement suggested not so much individuals eager to take part in an exercise 
mistakenly perceived by them to be a ‘vanity project’ (many seemed less self-assured 
when it came to situating their own experiences more centrally and did so with some 
initial diffidence) but rather, some eagerness at ‘getting things off their chest’.  
Interview framing and scope 
I conducted thirty interviews in total, having interviewed each participant at least 
twice and some three times. Conducting a series of interviews with each participant, 
with intervals of several weeks in between, allowed time for reflection on what had 
already been discussed, and provided space for review or development of these 
conversations or to identify new areas of discussion. For the purposes of recall, I was 
certainly at an advantage in having the recorded interview to listen to before our 
second meeting, but it was quite common, at the start of the second interview, for the 
participant to initiate the conversation by following up or clarifying some matter 
which had been discussed at our first meeting.  
The duration of interviews was variable and ranged from one hour to three, 
depending on the circumstances. Although there was a range of issues and ideas I 
wished to explore with each participant, all interviews were unstructured in the sense 
that I had no interview schedule and was prepared to let the conversation diverge 
from its initial orientation. I took no notes, but recorded all interviews. Several 
participants recorded the interviews themselves: one openly, at least two covertly. 
This somewhat militated against my general concern about the implied relationship 
of trust but did not entirely displace it.  
Narrative interviews 
If traditional interview formats tend to suppress rather than generate stories (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000) some thought requires to be given in advance to the particular 





According to Riessman (2008: 23) this requires significant change in interview 
practices and for researchers to give up some control: 
The model of a ‘facilitating’ interviewer who asks questions, and a vessel-like’ 
respondent’ who gives answers, is replaced by two active participants who jointly 
construct narrative and meaning.  
Although most of the ‘rules’ of everyday conversation apply – taking turns, making 
points of significance, and ‘entrance and exit’ transition talk – generating narrative 
requires longer turn-taking if brief question and answer sessions are to be avoided. 
However, in so far as the interviews could be considered joint endeavours, or the 
accounts co-constructions, it was sometimes apparent that this enterprise was 
hindered by the more structured techniques of forensic inquiry and examination 
which the participants and I were familiar with, and to which the conversation 
sometimes defaulted. Undoubtedly, I had the advantage of gaining greater 
proficiency in unstructured interviewing skills over the course of the research 
project, but it was also apparent that some participants were uncomfortable with an 
unstructured interview format.  
The first interview with each participant was aimed at exploring the biographical 
context of the judge’s life and career, and I invited them first to tell me something 
about their life and legal career up to the point when they became a judge. I 
encouraged them to frame this in their own terms by explaining that I was interested 
in all the experiences or events which were important to them. Once that area had 
been fully explored, I steered the conversation to their judicial careers and invited 
them to tell me why they had sought appointment. From there, and depending on the 
flow of conversation over the course of both interviews, I would attempt to explore 
with each participant a range of topics relating to sentencing practice, and wherever 
possible, in the context of their own experience.8 This format often produced useful 
and interesting stories and digressions. However, as will be observed in the 
substantive discussions about the interviews, a small number of judges sought to 
control the manner or extent of their narrative engagement; on occasion, therefore, a 
more semi-structured format of question and answer was used to explore those or 





Relational dynamics: judge and prosecutor  
Although I had introduced myself to the participants (i.e. those I did not already 
know) as a researcher, and attempted to maintain a research relationship with them 
on that basis, our former occupational roles exerted some presence in the interviews. 
At the very least, as Andrews (2007:33) observes, the ‘tell-ability’ of stories is highly 
influenced by the level of familiarity between speaker and listener, and the 
researcher’s biography plays a part in this process.  
The working relationships between judges and prosecutors are not only (or always) 
structural or hierarchical, and when they occur over long periods of working life are 
inevitably shaped by institutional, organisational and personal contexts. These 
contexts mitigate the extent to which the more rigid and hierarchical performance of 
court roles is mirrored beyond the courtroom.9 Other inter-professional hierarchies 
and positions – such as those relating to the separate solicitor and advocate branches 
of the profession and the corresponding rights of audience in different levels of court 
– affect spheres of influence and engagement in and out of court. Some hierarchical 
rivalries and tensions are therefore inevitable, reflecting the messy historical 
development, ‘practical interdependence’ and ‘muddled interactions of human 
agency’ which characterise systems and processes of criminal justice (Zedner, 2004; 
20).  
In a general sense, the research dynamics of these interviews support the view that 
judges are ‘alert to status’ and have a preference for being interviewed by individuals 
of similar status who are knowledgeable about legal work (Fielding, 2011). 
Additionally, some specific dynamics of the judge/prosecutor relationship could be 
observed in interviews where participants defaulted to subtle hierarchies and roles. 
One judge, for example, paused for clarification from me as he would have in court 
from the prosecutor - ‘Remind me please what the penalty is’ - before resuming his 
stream of thought. The manner of questioning by others was more in the manner of a 
joint enterprise. ‘Do we have Victim Impact Statements?’ asked one sheriff, while 
another wondered ‘What is the maximum fine level now?’ In other interviews, 





higher calling and greater independence of the advocate compared to a solicitor, and 
one later expressed the hope that no offence had been caused. In other interviews, 
several participants who were also former prosecutors made coded reference to 
individuals or events we both knew. Occasionally, this was to the detriment of the 
issues being explored since I discovered only later, on listening to the tape-recorded 
interviews, that I had failed to fully tease out the meaning of some comment for the 
benefit of readers unfamiliar with the context.  
The narrative research relationship: ‘positioning’ 
These and other dynamics of my research relationship with the participants were 
closely interwoven with each stage of the process, from the earliest point of making 
contact with possible participants, through to interviews and even beyond the project 
itself.10 These specific dynamics brought to the foreground several issues which 
neither the qualitative methods literature, nor interview-based sentencing research, 
squarely address.  
Bourdieu (1999: 607) denounces methodological writings on interview techniques on 
the grounds that they misguidedly seek to introduce signs of external scientific rigour 
into the social sciences - and in any case, do not add much to the stock of knowledge 
which most researchers have about the ‘infinitely subtle strategies that most social 
agents deploy in the ordinary conduct of their lives’. Narrative research offers no 
specific guidance for interviews, yet almost all texts on qualitative research methods, 
most narrative research writing and even much of Bourdieu’s own work 
acknowledges the relevance of ‘context’ and ‘positioning’ in interviews. Most 
interpretive approaches also extend this focus to transcription, analysis and 
interpretation of interviews.  
This is a debate about what levels of distance or engagement are suggested by the 
research relationship, and it follows that the nature of the conclusions reached – or 
the prescriptions given – depends on the epistemological position of the writer. 
Following the classical view that value-neutrality should be the social scientist’s 
goal, conventional methodological texts approach the question of positioning or 





whereby the researcher consciously positions herself outside the field in order to 
provide an objective account (Riessman, 2008). This stance represents the ‘positivist 
dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence’ (Bourdieu, 1999:608).  
Interpretive approaches challenge the pursuit of neutrality and share a number of 
assumptions about certain pre-existing, structural disparities between researcher and 
researched, employing hierarchical models of power and the language of symmetry 
(Kvale, 2006). Factors contributing to this asymmetry – most usually in the form of 
the researcher’s dominance - include the researcher’s competence in the particular 
field, their possession of greater cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1999), and the power 
which comes from instigating, framing and commanding the terms of engagement in 
the research relationship (Mishler, 1996; Bourdieu, 1999; Kvale, 2006).  
The ‘elite’ model 
The ‘elite’ interviewing model, on which much qualitative sentencing research in the 
US is based, reverses this assumption of dominance and warns of the ‘unequal power 
relations that lie in wait for researchers (Rice, 2010).11 Here, the operative theory is 
that the powerful ‘elite’ participant has dominance by virtue of being in possession of 
specialized knowledge which the researcher seeks to elicit, and the literature contains 
a range of techniques and strategies to manage the challenges of ‘studying up’.12  By 
contrast, most sentencing research in the UK and parts of Europe tends not to draw 
explicitly on any approach in relation to interviewing judges, and discussion of 
method often consists of brief descriptions of sample size, location and interview 
format.13 To some extent, the imprint of the elite model and its focus on ‘the 
influential, prominent and well-informed’ can be traced in studies of the UK 
judiciary, though many of these studies avoid the more problematic features of the 
elite model.14 
Relationship ‘structures’ 
Other ways of capturing some of the relational dynamics of an interview include 
categorisation according to the characteristics of the researcher and their relationship 





research, Reiner (2000) employs the categories inside insiders; outside insiders; 
outside insiders; and outside outsiders. Using this framework, my own position most 
closely resembles the outside insider, used to denote individuals who conduct 
research on an organisation after leaving employment in that institution and whose 
‘inside’ knowledge and experience thereby presents them with unique advantages, 
but also some problems, compared to ‘complete outsiders’. However, this 
categorisation captures only some of the nuances of my position vis a vis the 
judiciary: the insider part of the attribution, for example, would apply at the level of 
shared legal background and experience in criminal justice practice, as well as 
common occupational history with judges who were formerly prosecutors. However, 
the attribution does not apply at the level of membership of the judiciary as an 
institution; there, I would be considered an outsider, though not perhaps a complete 
outsider.  
Plato contrasted two different ways of looking at the world: that of the philosophers 
who ‘talk at their leisure in peace’, and that of the ‘rhetors’ speaking in the courts 
who ‘are always in a hurry, for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them 
on’. Bourdieu (1977) draws on this distinction to illustrate the distance between the 
scholar/philosopher and the practical agent/rhetor in the field, which is manifest in 
the research encounter – particularly in the ‘outsider-orientated discourse’ of the 
practitioner. As indicated above, it was sometimes possible in interviews to observe 
at play some of what Bourdieu (1999: 608) calls the ‘objective structures’ which 
constrain social interaction – in this case, professional hierarchies, though other 
factors may be differing amounts of social or cultural capital held by researcher and 
researched - and which are captured by Reiner’s model. However, beyond these 
structures and typologies, both Bourdieu (1999) and Reiner (2000) emphasise the 
importance of reflexivity on the part of the researcher about possible biases and 
influences in the research relationship.15   
Reflexivity in the research relationship 
Along with other interpretive approaches such as ethnomethodology and 





the assumptions about objectivity, distance, power and positioning in conventional 
qualitative and ‘elite’ literature by reflecting on some broader ‘relational dynamics’ 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2007: 85) of the research relationship. These approaches 
introduce questions about involvement, subjectivity and reflexivity, and replace some 
simple hierarchies of position and static conceptions of power with an 
acknowledgement of the different ways in which researcher and participant are 
multiply positioned. Much feminist work, in particular, is concerned with ethical 
positioning and responsibility in the research relationship (Oakley, 1981; Maynard 
and Purvis, 1994; Platt, 1981). Narrative research positions the researcher as part of 
the field and unlike ‘objectifying and aggregating’ forms of research, understands the 
relationship as a relational undertaking (Josselson, 2007). Relatedly, the narrative 
account is regarded as co-produced: 
… we are never the sole authors of our own narratives; in every conversation a 
positioning takes place […] which is accepted, rejected, or improved upon by the 
partners in the conversation.  
                                                                                                 (Czarniawska, 2004:5) 
Biography in the shadow 
Josselson (2007:11) observes that personal familiarity or knowledge of experiences 
or situations may place the researcher in a privileged or advantaged position when it 
comes to interpreting accounts.16 She suggests questions such as these are prompted: 
‘What are the shared social locations and assumptions? Where are the points of 
discordance or strangeness?  
In The Weight of the World (1999), Bourdieu advocates the formation of research 
relationships purposefully built around certain ‘homologies of position’ between the 
researcher and the participant. The aim is to reduce as far as possible the symbolic 
violence which is caused to any research relationship by virtue of its cultural 
asymmetry. In order to minimise these ‘intrusion effects’ and aiming to bring the 
relationship as close as possible to its ‘ideal limit’, he suggests that ‘social proximity 
and familiarity’ between the participant and the researcher provide two of the 





‘real affinities’ in the relationship and minimise the risk of the participant being 
‘objectified’ in the final account – or at least, indicate to the participant that the 
researcher, by virtue of these affinities, is also being objectified (1999:610).  
In the interviews forming the basis of Bourdieu’s study (1999), the researchers were 
encouraged to choose participants to whom they were ‘socially very close’ i.e. 
sharing almost all the characteristics capable of understanding and explaining their 
respondents’ ‘practices and representations’. Examples of these ‘optimal conditions’ 
include a young physicist interviewing another young physicist, or an unemployed 
person interviewing another unemployed person (1999:611). Bourdieu considered 
that these situations of close familiarity allowed the researchers to ask questions 
which emerged from their own dispositions, ‘objectively attuned to those of the 
respondent’. 17 
Bourdieu’s approach privileges research relationships constructed around very close 
‘homologies of position’ and to this extent my own insider/outsider status vis a vis 
the judiciary could be regarded as ambiguous, and the implications for the research 
relationship unclear. It may be, however, that this ambiguity introduces a useful 
amount of ‘distance’, facilitating Geertz’ (1983) aim of rendering familiar the 
unfamiliar and vice versa. In this context, knowing less about the judiciary than a 
‘complete insider’ may serve a useful purpose: 
Researchers must become sufficiently acquainted with the social and cultural world 
of their participants to be able to engage appropriately in interaction with them. This 
means knowing enough about their mores and expectations so as not to appear rude, 
insensitive, or intrusive - but knowing little enough to be able to inquire deeply 
about those aspects of the world of the participant one wishes to learn about. 
(Josselson, 2007:547) 
Section 2 Narrative Research     
One of the interpretive goals of the cultural approach to the judiciary adopted here is 
to gain greater understanding of how judges make sense of what they do, and the 
larger ‘frames of signification’ they use to communicate this: ‘the symbols they 
deploy, the stories they tell, the distinctions they draw, the visions they project’ 





‘stories’ which judges tell about judicial life and practice, as well as the ‘visions’ 
they project. Narrative research is concerned with the personal stories or narratives 
which people use to communicate meaning and knowledge in the social world, and is 
aimed at eliciting reflective accounts of personal experience.  
The narrative turn 
Contemporary narrative research is the product of a number of parallel and 
sometimes overlapping developments: post-war humanist approaches to the study of 
social life; the ‘reflexive turn’ in the social sciences; and post-structuralist, 
postmodern, psychoanalytic and deconstructionist movements (Andrews et al, 2008; 
Denzin, 1989).18 Despite these divergent theoretical antecedents, there is a shared 
normative inclination towards the narratives of ‘the ordinary, the marginalized and 
the muted’ (Langellier, 2001, quoted in Riessman, 2008:17). Relatedly, there is 
belief in the emancipatory potential of narratives as ‘modes of resistance to existing 
structures of power’ (Andrews, 2008:4).19 Reflecting some of these ambitions, 
narrative research is advocated by some as an anti-positivist and humanist approach 
to the study of human behaviour and culture (Plummer, 2001; Bruner 1991), and by 
others less categorically as an alternative to structured or semi-structured interview 
formats, and hence a useful addition to the available repertoire of methodological 
approaches in the human sciences (Riessman, 2012).  
As a result of the ‘narrative turn’ in social sciences, it is now a broad understanding 
in the human sciences that people order and make sense of their lives through 
narrative (Bruner, 1990, 2004; Freeman, 1993). Josselson explains it this way: 
 
Hopes, desires, memories, fantasies, intentions, representations of others, and time 
are all interwoven, through narrative, into a fabric that people experience – and can 
tell – as a life history. Stories are the linguistic form in which the connectedness of 
human experience as lived can be expressed. (2004:2) 
 
On this understanding, narrative is closely bound up with questions about self, 
identity and the search for meaning: ‘the implicit meaning of life is made explicit in 





is to tie narrative even more closely to self and identity through the assumption that 
people not only express their lives through narrative, but create that identity through 
a continuous autobiographical process much like creating a story (Josselson, 2004). 
In this way, biographical ‘facts’ are not so much ‘told’ as created, since new and 
later events and experiences are liable to change understandings about past events. 
This framework captures the idea of social life as an enacted narrative; an ongoing 
and open-ended process which ends only with life itself (Bruner, 1990).  
 
However, although narrative may be a ‘natural’ or instinctive form of expression, the 
telling of those stories should be understood as a process which is culturally and 
socially mediated. All narrative scholars observe that the stories people tell, and the 
stories which researchers hear, are influenced by cultural norms (Denzin, 1989; 
Riessman, 2008). For Riessman (2008: 183) this process is invariably ‘situated and 
strategic, taking place in institutional and cultural contexts with circulating 
discourses and regulatory practices, always crafted with audience in mind’. 
Consequently, narrative texts do not speak for themselves and cannot be regarded as 
‘windows into the soul’. Scholarship in the field is thus directed towards the 
interpretation of narrative texts, and is a dialectic process, moving from text to 
meaning, and offering a re-telling or reconstruction of meaning. 
The concept of narrative 
Narrative is recognised as an instinctive and ancient form of cultural and self-
representation, and most reviews of narrative research acknowledge the universality 
of the narrative form in cultural sites such as myth, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, 
painting, cinema, and conversation, and the pervasiveness of narrative in ‘every age, 
in every place, in every society’ (Barthes, cited in Sontag, 1982: 252).20  However, 
the increasing popularity of narrative research methods has led to some scholarly 
unease about the boundaries surrounding the concept of narrative. Riessman (2008: 
5), for example, observes the ‘tyranny’ of narrative in contemporary life in which the 
concept is reduced to a metaphor: everyone, it seems, has a ‘story’ which speaks for 
itself and needs little interpretation. Political actors and media commentators, alert to 





to advocate an ideological position of their own (Riessman, 2012). Also notable is 
the striking diversity of uses of narrative in popular culture, though Andrews et al 
(2008) point to some positive applications and interpretations.21 In the field of social 
science research, the extension of the concept of narrative to forms such as lists, 
objects and some visual material can also be controversial (Craib, 2004).  
 
Most narrative researchers respond to this lack of specification by drawing their own 
boundaries around some narrative meanings-in-use, and by providing working 
definitions of the concept in particular research settings and contexts. This clarity is 
important because the definition of narrative which is employed will lead to certain 
other methodological and interpretive assumptions about the narrative texts in 
question. In this section I therefore outline a working definition of the concept of 
narrative for this thesis, and consider some implications for the interpretation and 
analysis of judicial accounts. Riessman (2012) observes that the methodological 
assumptions and analytical strategies adopted by narrative researchers tend to follow 
disciplinary backgrounds. However, the limited range of narrative research in 
criminology and criminal justice scholarship makes any such pathways or 
frameworks less obvious for this project. The approach followed here is therefore 
adapted for the study of judicial narratives and framed within some of the parameters 
and debates relating to their work in penal practice.  
Definition of ‘narrative’ 
For narrative scholars, ‘all talk and text is not narrative’ (Riessman, 2008:5). The 
first generally accepted criterion of narrative is contingency: text which contains 
contingent sequences, linking ideas and events. Another related criterion is the 
ordering of the narrative sequence into some meaningful pattern or structure, most 
usually temporally and spatially though sometimes thematically or episodically 
(Andrews et al, 2008; Riessman, 2012). These features distinguish narratives from 
other texts which are merely descriptive or theoretical, such as reports, statements or 






Further, some narrative researchers draw a distinction between story and narrative. 
In this context, narrative represents the overarching, general class of discourse 
encompassing a variety of forms containing the key elements outlined above; and 
story represents one of those types of discourse in a specific sociolinguistic sense – 
passages of text held together with some minimal level of ‘plot’ i.e. an element of 
disruption to the normal or expected pattern of events followed by resolution 
(Czarniawska, 2004; Riessman, 2008, 2012). To illustrate the contingent element of a 
‘story’, Czarniawska cites Harvey Sacks’ famous use of emplotment sequences. In 
this example, the first part - ‘The baby cried. The mommy picked it up’ - requires 
completion by a third sentence - ‘The baby stopped crying’ - in order to qualify as a 
story (2004: 19).  
 
While acknowledging these distinctions between narrative and story, many narrative 
scholars use the concepts interchangeably (see for example Frank, 2000; 2002; 
Riessman, 2008). However, Frank cautions that people do not tell narratives: they tell 
stories. In this way, although narrative analysis can uncover interesting structures and 
meanings of which the storyteller was largely unaware, there is a danger that in doing 
so, narrative analysis may overlook the central importance of the story to the teller 
(Frank, 2000:354). 
 
Beyond these preliminary understandings, the concept of narrative is used in diverse 
ways. These range from the linguistic analysis of an isolated unit of discourse, such 
as a single response to one question, to the interpretation of whole life stories 
gathered from a variety of textual forms. Narrative projects based on interviews 
come within the middle range of this continuum, involving ‘long sections of talk - 
extended accounts of lives in context that develop over the course of single or 
multiple research interviews’ (Riessman, 2008:6).  
Working definition of ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ 
Within this general theoretical framework it is possible to identify three principal 
types of narrative dialogue which emerged from the interviews conducted with 





for the discussion to follow. The first type of dialogue, representing the greater part 
of most interviews, can be considered narratives or narrative accounts in the general 
sense referred to above: long sections of talk about lives and careers, linking ideas 
and concepts about the subjects under discussion.  
 
These extended responses sometimes generated a second additional type of dialogue 
in the form of stories as outlined above, namely contingent accounts illustrating the 
point the narrator seeks to make, usually rich in detail and context. On occasion these 
stories occurred unexpectedly or seemingly as a digression from the main topic under 
discussion – sometimes only later on review emerging as more central to the 
discussion. As Riessman (2008:24) observes, the attempt to generate extended 
narrative accounts in interview requires the researcher to cede control over some of 
the direction of the interview – ‘following participants down their trails’ - and 
introduces a degree of uncertainty into the process.  
 
Reflecting this unpredictable element, I identified a third type of dialogue in several 
interviews. These were responses which appeared to be purposefully abbreviated and 
truncated by the participants, rendering the exchange more akin to a formal question 
and answer discussion. Here, the impression was sometimes gained that the 
participant was closing down narrative engagement and substituting a more formal 
interview relationship. I discuss the contexts of one of these ‘avoiding accounts’ 
(Czarniawska, 2004: 54) in Chapter 7.22   
 
These three styles of narrative engagement – narratives, stories, and ‘avoiding 
accounts’ – form the interpretive framework of this project. The different forms are 
not always clearly distinguishable in the judicial accounts, though participants 
themselves sometimes indicate the boundaries with ‘entrance’ and ‘exit’ talk 
(Jefferson, 1979), especially in relation to stories. Although some overlap or blurring 
of the categories is therefore inevitable, attempting to identify the various types of 
narrative discourse is relevant in relation to interpretations which may flow from the 
content. They may also be significant because of the different purposes being served 





The functions of narrative 
The different purposes that narrative can serve merit further discussion here. In the 
early phase of social science narrative research, the primary focus of narrative 
interpretation and analysis was on narrative as text and on the content of narratives as 
straightforwardly descriptive.23  By contrast, the focus of much of the ‘second wave’ 
of analysis is ‘narrative-in-context’, particularly in relation to the discursive 
achievements of narrative (Phoenix, 2008). This broader focus on narrative as the 
object of inquiry allows exploration of some of the performative dimensions of 
narrative and the uses to which narratives are put.  
 
As Riessman (2008:8) observes, a narrative form of dialogue is employed by people 
because it achieves certain effects which other forms of communication do not: 
narratives are ‘strategic, functional, and purposeful’. However, this strategic use of 
narrative may not be a conscious act: 
 
This is not to claim that the intentionality of narratives is always conscious and 
deliberate; the ends that are being achieved may be utterly obscure to those whose 
narratives they are. Rather, the claim is simply that narratives, as sense-making 
tools, inevitably do things – for people, for social institutions, for culture, and more.  
                                                                                                        (Freeman, 2002:9) 
 
Riessman (2008) usefully identifies some of the key functions of narratives. The 
primary purpose which narratives serve is the building and on-going construction of 
identities: ‘Identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about 
who they are (and who they are not)’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006:201). The next and more 
familiar function of narrative is its role in remembering the past, where individuals 
use narrative to unearth and re-evaluate memories and personal experiences. This 
partly autobiographical narrative function is now understood as a dynamic process in 
which people revisit and reconstruct past experiences in line with present identities 
and commitments. The stories which are generated in this way must also be 
considered deeply contextual since storytelling occurs ‘at a historical moment with 





will also tend to reflect cultural conventions about forms of storytelling and their 
intended audiences.  
 
These first two functions – identity building and remembering - suggest some extra 
significance may be attached to narratives told in retirement. In broad terms, people 
are predisposed to tell stories at particular biographical and historical moments 
(Polanyi, 1983; Sandelowski, 1991), and in ways which help to create order and 
contain emotion (Riessman, 2008).24 However, when Bruner (2004:692) observes 
that the meaning-making function of narratives helps us to structure experience and 
organise memory, he also draws attention to the constructed nature of life histories 
which means that the personal account of one’s life is always ‘an interpretive feat’: 
 
When somebody tells you his life … it is always a cognitive achievement rather than 
a through-the-clear-crystal recital of something unequivocally given. 
People also use stories to argue and persuade, summoning the necessary rhetorical 
skills to do so. The positioning of the narrator themselves in these stories is of 
interest to the researcher; shifting positions even more so. Relatedly, narratives seek 
to engage an audience through ‘imaginative identification’ with their experience 
(Riessman, 2008: 9). On occasion, narratives can also be used to entertain or even to 
mislead. Finally, as Riessman (2008:8) observes, narratives can do ‘political work’, 
challenging discrimination, injustice and oppression and mobilising others to 
action.25 Elements of these different narrative functions can be recognised in some of 
the judicial accounts studied here, and where they seem relevant will form part of the 
interpretation of the accounts in later chapters.  
 
Institutional narratives 
This discussion of the functions which narratives serve can usefully be extended to 
the judiciary, and here some distinction can be drawn between individuals and 
groups, although some overlap is inevitable (Riessman, 2008). The political 
dimension of narratives may have more meaning and application for groups, for 





However, the judiciary – as an institution - can usefully be regarded as a site of 
narrative production in relation to both its individual members and collectively as an 
institution. In this way, the judge is both an individual biographical subject as well as 
a constituent member of the judicial community with a range of institutional 
commitments.  
 
This dual research focus on the judge as penal actor provides scope for insight about 
judicial culture in a number of connected ways. The first of these relates to 
institutional narratives. Andrews et al (2008: 12) note that the Latin derivation of 
narrative is knowing rather than telling, highlighting the potential of narrative 
research to play a part in the mapping of forms of local knowledge – and thus to 
connect with societal narratives in ways which allow some broader understandings to 
be gained. Schutz (quoted in Czarniawska, 2004:4) observes that in order to 
understand human conduct we need first to understand intentions, and then to 
comprehend the settings in which those intentions were intelligible. Nelken (2010:7) 
makes a convincing case for understanding this in the context of criminal justice:  
 
The social actors we are studying will not have all the answers to our problems (or 
their own). But whatever our objectives … we will not get far if we do not all that is 
possible to make sure we have a fair grasp of what they think they are doing (as well 
as what they are actually achieving) and try to find out why it makes sense to them – 
to the extent it actually does so.  
Czarniawska (2004:5) notes that every field of practice has, at any given time, a 
succession of stories in circulation. One way of gaining greater understanding about 
actors’ intentions, therefore, is to explore the ‘repertoire of legitimate stories’ of a 
particular society, group or institution. The significance of organisational or group 
narratives lies in the functions they serve for that group, such as identity building and 
maintenance, or reinforcement of institutional values; and hence for the insight they 
provide about the values and working practices of that body. Research participants 
may offer these ‘legitimate stories’ and circulating discourses to researchers in 
certain strategic ways: to the newcomer or outsider by way of introduction to (or 
explanation of) the life of the organisation, or to members of the same group in order 





here, the repertoire of stories offered in interview may represent collective judicial 
memory.    
 
Czarniawska takes issue with the suggestion that reliance on these familiar constructs 
signifies lack of meaningful insight into the participant’s subjective views. On the 
contrary, she argues, it is a necessary pre-condition: 
 
‘Meaningful insights into subjective views’ can only be expressed by ‘familiar 
narrative constructs’ (although this expression may take the form of deviating from 
or subverting these constructs), otherwise they could not be understood or even 
recognized as such. (2004: 50) 
The difference between ‘meaningful personal insights’ and ‘familiar constructs’ is 
likely to be determined by the researcher’s principal focus in the organisational 
narratives. If the primary interest is in the organisation itself, the very familiarity of 
narratives is important: 
 
Organizational stories delimit a dominant, or a legitimate, range of such 
compositions in a given time and place, and thus it is their familiarity, their 
repetitiveness, that is of interest to a student of organizing.  
                                                                                                (Czarniawska, 2004:51) 
By contrast, Czarniawska suggests, individual life histories consist of ‘unique 
compositions of materials’ made accessible through the common store of stories, and 
this uniqueness holds greater interest for the researcher of personal narratives (2004: 
50). 
 
It is noteworthy that the possibility of the researcher having a dual interest in the 
interview participant  – as both the bearer of those unique individual life histories 
and as a member of the larger group – is not directly within Czarniawska’s 
contemplation. Although Bruner makes the same distinction between personal and 
cultural narratives, he makes a useful connection between the way life histories are 





The tool kit of any culture is replete not only with a stock of canonical narratives 
(heroes, Marthas, tricksters, etc.), but with combinable formal constituents from 
which its members can construct their own life narratives: canonical stances and 
circumstances, as it were.  
                                                                                                       (Bruner, 2004: 694) 
On this understanding, an individual’s life history will be composed of several 
different forms of narratives. In the case of judges, some of these will be institutional 
stories drawing on the familiar discourses circulating in that particular cultural 
environment. Moreover, since by virtue of their legal education and experience the 
judges interviewed in this study tended to present themselves as lawyers first, then as 
judges, and only finally as sentencers, the important identity-building and 
maintenance function of narratives suggests a strong but complex relationship 
between individual judicial biographies and the master narratives of their institution. 
It also prompts some acknowledgement that other master narratives may shape 
judicial outlook.  
Canonical or ‘master narratives’ and the judiciary 
According to Czarniawska, the cultural metaphors and representations embedded in 
organisation folklore are ‘powerful carriers of social memory’ providing important 
insight about dimensions of social life often hidden from view (2004:6).26 These 
hidden dimensions include the drama of organisational power and resistance; 
institutional nostalgia; and access to the ‘emotional life’ of the organisation (Gabriel, 
2000; Czarniawska, 2004). This approach suggests narratives can offer significant 
insight about the judiciary, whose institutional arrangements mean that these and 
other dimensions of its members’ working lives are relatively unseen and unknown. 
  
The mythological character of many organisational and institutional narratives is 
commonly observed (see for example Gabriel, 1991, 2000; Munro and Huber, 2012), 
and this also has implications for judicial culture. The formalist or positivist account 
of the judicial role, outlined in Chapter 3, relies heavily on the core legal concept of 
judicial independence, and the strong ‘Olympian’ version of this concept has 





independence can therefore be regarded as having the status of a master narrative, 
and one which serves important legitimatory functions for the judiciary.  
 
The various categories and doctrines which form the basis of conventional legal and 
judicial narratives form a central part of the biographical accounts of judicial lives 
narrated in this project, and appear to be significant in the ways they make sense of 
and articulate their experience. For this reason, close attention to the master 
narratives used in their discourse may provide greater understanding about judicial 
life. The centrality of the master narrative of judicial independence to accounts of 
practice, and some of the implications for judicial culture will be discussed in 
Chapter 7. 27 
 
To an extent, this reading of organisational narratives relies on assumptions about 
shared judicial narratives, and could also suggest a static interpretation of the role of 
institutional narratives: involving merely their re-telling to a given audience. 
However, in this study I consider interviews as sites not only for the distribution of 
canonical narratives that circulate in a given area of practice, but also as ‘micro-sites’ 
for the production of new narratives – or at the very least, for the emergence of new 
understandings about those canonical narratives (Czarniawska, 2004:51).  
Judicial narratives: as method, object and product of inquiry 
As Garland (2006) observes, practical convenience leads many analysts of penal 
culture to resources such as the extended discursive texts of its actors, or to the 
ceremonial and symbolic routines of practice.28 For the narrative researcher, 
however, the discursive text carries more than methodological convenience: not only 
is it the method of inquiry, it is the product of inquiry as well as the object of analysis 
- how stories are produced (Ewick and Silbey, 1995). These are inter-related 
categories but of these three ways in which narratives enter scholarly analysis, I first 





Judicial narratives as a method of inquiry 
Most qualitative research relating to judges takes the form of the conventional 
structured or semi-structured interview. This methodological approach, caricatured 
by Johnson (1989) as the art of ‘soaking and poking’ the judiciary, is pragmatically 
geared towards the gaining of judicial perspectives – often statements of position - on 
specific issues affecting penal policy and practice.  
Bourdieu (1977: 37) observes that the interview can be one of the weakest forms of 
research methods because the interviewee is prone to providing the researcher with 
an ‘official’ account of practice: a version of what should happen rather than what 
does happen. This observation may account for the incidental finding of one 
sentencing researcher that many of the judges in her study made ‘almost identical 
comments’ (MacKenzie, 2005:11).29  Moreover, as Hollway and Jefferson (2000) 
note, question and answer exchanges tend to produce ‘reports’ rather than ‘stories’; 
indeed, these interview formats tend to suppress stories.  
Judicial narratives, whether in the context of extended talk or in storied form, are 
rarely to be found in criminological, narrative, or interdisciplinary scholarship, and it 
may be that the exploration of judicial sensibilities invokes and disrupts some 
unacknowledged tensions in each of these fields.30  The absence of the judge as a 
subject of narrative scholarship can be understood in view of the humanist emphasis 
of that approach and the emancipatory and sometimes therapeutic orientation 
towards giving a ‘voice’ to marginalised, disempowered or otherwise silenced 
individuals or groups. This is an occupational category into which judges (most 
obviously) do not fit.31 Notwithstanding the occasional observation of narrative 
scholars that the narratives of the powerful and the powerless deserve equally close 
attention (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006), the lives of judges and of other powerful 
actors have not commanded much attention from researchers in this field. 
In criminology, notwithstanding the early flowering of the Chicago School and the 
‘life history’ method it espoused (for example, see Shaw, 1930; Sutherland, 1937), 
the union of life histories and criminology has been relatively unproductive, 





abandoned’ by criminology.  Congruent with criminology’s natural affinity with the 
underdog or other excluded groups, it is notable that the few recent criminological 
forays into narrative research have focused solely on the lives of offenders (Maruna, 
1997; Presser, 2009).32   
To an extent, the absence of ethnographic judicial research in contemporary 
criminology may be a reflection of the general scarcity of qualitative research 
relating to judges in this field, and of researchers’ historic difficulties in gaining 
access to judges. However, it is also possible that research embodying Matza’s 
(1964) concept of ‘appreciative research’ presents a challenge to established ways of 
thinking about researching judicial work, particularly in its lived, experiential aspect. 
Maguire (2000: 127) notes that a key feature of the ‘appreciative’ method is:  
‘… (at least temporarily) to suspend judgement and observe and listen [to offenders] 
– in a sense, to allow them to ‘tell their own story’. 
In the same vein, it is unlikely that when Cavadino and Dignan (2007: 28) comment 
that the orthodox account of the penal crisis is ‘positivistic’ and ignores the place of 
‘subjective human experience, perception, reflection and meaningful human action’, 
they were advocating the exploration of the sentencers’ subjectivity.33 However, this 
may be an oversight, and bringing judicial narratives within an interpretive or 
appreciative framework may produce some of the insight which narrative research 
envisages: 
Most often, perhaps, we frame our research in terms of narrative because we believe 
that by doing so we are able to see different and sometimes contradictory layers of 
meaning, to bring them into useful dialogue with each other, and to understand more 
about individual and social change. By focusing on narrative, we are able to 
investigate not just how stories are structured and the ways in which they work, but 
also who produces them and by what means; the mechanisms by which they are 
consumed; and how narratives are silenced.  
                                                                                                      Andrews (2008: 1-2) 
Judicial narratives as the object of analysis 
Narrative research is marked by methodological diversity, and offers no prescriptive 





analysis of narrative texts. The common feature of this ‘methodological repertoire’ 
(Riessman, 2012: 369) is that all narratives resist ‘automatic readings’, making it 
necessary to draw on different approaches and interpretive stances as appropriate for 
the particular study. All narrative accounts require close reading but researchers 
attend to different aspects of the text – such as language, form, context, and audience 
– in highly variable ways according to the subject of study.   
Riessman (2008) identifies four principal approaches to narrative analysis: thematic, 
structural, dialogic/performance, and visual. The boundaries between these 
approaches are not always clear and many writers urge transgressing those borders. 
In this study I adopt thematic analysis as the principal method of interpretation, the 
focus being largely on the content of interviews – on the ‘told’ rather than aspects of 
the ‘telling’ (Riessman, 2008:54). Typically, in this approach, less attention is paid to 
the ‘local context’ of narrative production, such as how the story unfolded or the 
researcher’s role in generating it, and it is uncommon to explore language, form or 
interaction. Although I make empirical and theoretical connections across individual 
cases in relation to common themes, I keep ‘stories’ intact where possible to preserve 
the integrity and coherence of the account.  
Judges and the narrative quest 
Law and the narrative form, it is often observed, are inseparably linked, and many 
observe the central role of narratives in law. Amsterdam and Bruner (2002: 2), for 
example, observe that narratives, along with categories and rhetoric, are three 
‘commonplace processes of legal thought and practice without which lawyers, 
judges, and students of the law could not possibly do.’ Cover (1983:4) points to the 
way narratives give meaning to law: 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate 
it and give it meaning.  
Moreover, the various forms of official narratives which emanate from judges, such 
as written opinions and legal judgements, are quite commonly the object of analysis 
in legal scholarship, as a specific type of judicial discourse and legal argumentation. 





storied form of judgements is a familiar legal construct.  In this way, narratives are 
the means by which lawyers and the courts ‘get the world to go along with them’ 
(Bruner, 1992:182).  
Although judicial narratives have a discrete meaning in this study - as personal 
accounts of judicial life and experience – their essentially normative character 
represents the same search for the ‘golden thread of normativity’ and of rights and 
responsibilities found in all stories:  
The difference between how the world is and how it is supposed to be is almost 
invariably accounted for narratively, by telling a story about how it came about that 
the expectable failed to occur. Stories are so compelling and useful a way of 
representing deviations from expectancy in the world that cultures typically include 
a good stock of them in their tool kit of ready mades.  
                                                                                                        (Bruner, 1992:176) 
In this way, the value of judicial narratives lies beyond the historical and contextual 
insight they provide about judicial lives; they also form part of our cultural tool kit.  
The narrative quest for the ‘good society’ 
However, the place of narrative in contemporary life is contentious in an era marked 
by rejection of metanarratives (Czarniawska, 2004). In particular, the question is 
raised as to whether it is possible to build shared meanings or concepts through and 
across narrative accounts without resort to the grand narratives of modernity aimed at 
legitimation (such as universal reason, progress and emancipation). Rorty’s 
pragmatic response is that the ‘first-order’ or ‘little’ narrative account survives this 
challenge, as does any other narrative form marked by its readiness to listen to 
alternative accounts – and that the individual’s quest for a ‘good life’ is by extension 
also the search for a good society (1992:60). According to Czarniawska (2004), this 
narrative quest for the ‘good life’ is a continuing and unpredictable enterprise but 
that the sense of purpose in lived narratives allows meaningful explorations and 
explanations of lives and goals. The explanations which may emerge from this 
endeavour are of a different order from those which emanate from more positivist 





desired effect of a narrative approach is to continue, rather than conclude, the 
conversation: 
The old metanarratives sinned in their ambition to end a conversation by trying to 
predict its outcome. If a canon is already known, there is nothing left to talk about.  
                                                                                               (Czarniawska (2004: 13) 
The narrative quest for the ‘good life’ is inescapably social and normative in 
character. In much the same manner as biography and oral history, narrative research 
is case-centred, and exploration of the individual’s narrative quest, locating it in a 
particular time and place, can illuminate connections between biography, history and 
society (Mills, 1959). Making connections in this way, narratives are ‘deeply social’ 
(Riessman, 2012: 369).  
There is a very contemporary relevance to this which Brown (1992: 144) makes clear 
in his suggestion that there is a disconnection between private and public discourse in 
western society which narrative goes some way to address:  
Narrative requires a political economy and collective economy in which a sense of 
lived connection between personal character and public conduct prevails.  
Frank (2002) makes a related point when he observes that neo-liberalism actively 
conceals or denies this linkage between personal troubles and public issues. There is 
consensus in both accounts that narrative research is directed at the (re)construction 
and enrichment of a public moral discourse around Tolstoy’s question of how to live, 
and that personal stories and life histories are an important way in which people 
respond to that question.  
The judicial role and the normative quest 
The central place of the narrative quest in social life has a particular relevance for 
studying judges, a group of powerful penal actors who play a key role in the building 
and maintenance of what Cover (1983) calls our nomos – the normative universe.   
As Geertz (1983: 230) notes, the constructive role of law and adjudication becomes 





to be recognised, according to particular customs or principles, or even how ‘fact’ is 
to be decided or laws applied: 
… what is at issue, and what these specific disputes in one way or another evoke and 
symbolize, is the sort of society, what counts and what does not’   
For Geertz (1983:234), these issues represent part of a much wider, deeper struggle 
people have to ‘imagine principled lives they can practicably lead’.   
However, the part played by judges in this normative quest is contested and has some 
relevance for the sense we make of their narrative accounts. For Cover, judges are 
‘people of violence’ in two senses. Firstly, they are state officials who, through a 
‘structure of cooperation’ with other actors, are able to ‘bring physical force to bear 
in making their interpretive acts work in the world’ (Sarat and Kearns, 1995: 228). 
Secondly, judges act in a ‘jurispathic’ manner to unnecessarily circumscribe and 
repress the normative universe (Cover, 1983). In this way, it is argued, the judge’s 
role in punishment is incompatible with the narrative goal (outlined above) of 
continuing the conversation:  
It puts an end to interpretation and meaning construction: it cuts off conversation. It 
does not elicit and evolve; it concludes. Violence puts an end to the hermeneutic 
impulses that generative narrative.  
                                                                                   (Sarat and Kearns, 1995: 229) 
Sarat and Kearns (1995: 7) observe that several trends in legal scholarship tend to 
displace the subject of violence from the law: humanist movements which place 
emphasis on the ‘meaning-making, community-building’ nature of law and overlook 
its coercive dimensions; positivist studies of legal institutions and processes which 
disconnect practices from law’s coercive power; and post-modernist theories which 
overwhelm the question of violence with multiple meanings.  
To this list of discourses which obscure some of the material realities of law could be 
added the formalist account of criminal law and justice, and the philosophies of 
punishment which accompany it. This is a process of rationalisation and 
categorisation based on individual moral responsibility, and whose legitimacy is 





2002; 341). In Chapters 7 and 8 I explore more fully some of the ways judicial 
discourse can obscure the ‘social question’ and consequently, the weight to be placed 
on ‘agent-based visions’ of penality. 
Section 3 Judicial narratives: faith and suspicion 
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the benefits of using narrative research to 
explore the lives and careers of judges. In a broad sense, law and narrative 
enterprises can be regarded as closely connected through the shared normative quest 
for the ‘good society’. The narrative character of judicial discourse and rhetoric 
underscores this connection. Moreover, the status of the participants as retired 
practitioners lends itself to a biographical narrative approach, with potential for rich 
historical insight and personal reflection on lives remembered.  
However, a number of concepts and normative orientations are held in tension when 
biographical narrative interviews are used to study the judiciary. The first of these 
relates to conceptions of the judicial role. Tamanaha (2010) persuasively argues that 
the polarisation of conceptual models of judging along the lines of the formalist and 
realist models does not represent the true nature of judging - or even judges’ own 
understanding of their role – which is closer to a form of balanced realism. However, 
I have argued (in Chapter 2) that the continuing influence of these models in their 
polarised forms - the formalist model suggesting faith in judgement, the realist model 
inspiring suspicion - can be traced in criminological literature, particularly in relation 
to the penal crisis and the critique of discretionary sentencing where a strongly 
hegemonic interpretation of the judicial role tends to be employed, with strong realist 
underpinnings. To an extent, the tenacity of the polarised conceptual models in 
criminological and penal scholarship – and particularly the hegemonic model - may 
be the necessary corollary of any critical understanding of the judicial role in 
punishment. Tamanaha’s argument, it should be noted, is grounded in the civil 
(rather than criminal) judicial role and turns largely on questions of legal 
interpretation and decision-making in that quite different field of practice.34  
Although narrative analysis involves the interpretive task of moving from text to 





recognised by the participant, this normative orientation nonetheless appears to call 
for a degree of ‘faith’ on the part of the researcher towards the participant’s stories. 
This implied commitment may be strengthened where there is a biographical 
dimension to the research. A normative orientation based on faith alone therefore 
appears incongruous in its application to a dominant elite such as the judiciary.  
The epistemological axis of faith and suspicion forms the basis of Ricoeur’s (1970) 
distinction between two interpretive stances: the hermeneutics of faith and the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. Josselson (2004) applies Ricoeur’s distinction to narrative 
research to explore the contours of its interpretive field, and considers the possibility 
of combining these interpretive positions. This framework offers a more subtle 
dialectic in the reading of judicial accounts in this project, and in order to explore 
this potential I first outline Josselson’s argument, and then assess its value in 
analysing judicial narratives.  
Dualities and oppositions 
As Josselson observes, drawing sharp distinctions between concepts is a scholarly 
device destined to fail: ‘all dualities ultimately break down or merge’ (2004:4). 
Nonetheless, she offers Ricoeur’s distinction between hermeneutic stances as a way 
of illuminating the different epistemological positions which may be held by 
narrative researchers, and of showing that hermeneutics is not a ‘unitary pursuit’. 
Specifically, the distinction between the two interpretive stances allows us to 
consider the researcher’s dilemma about what can be ‘read’ into a text.  
The hermeneutics of restoration (faith) 
Ricoeur’s first interpretive position is animated by faith. Following a humanist 
tradition, the narrative researcher here considers that the participant is providing the 
best account of their experience, freely sharing knowledge, understanding and 
insights gained. On this basis, and as often implied in the broad field of qualitative 
research, the research interview provides ‘a window on the psychological and social 
realities of the participant’ (Josselson, 2004:5). Interpretation is an integral part of 





level of discourse’ (Josselson, 2004(3), and this may involve reading some implied, 
rather than directly expressed, meanings into the text. However, the interpretive 
process is ultimately aimed at the faithful restoration of the narrator’s intended 
message in the story or account given:  
The imprint of this faith is a care or concern for the object and a wish to describe and 
not reduce it.  
                                                                                                   (Ricoeur, 1970: 28) 
Josselson observes that this interpretive stance has particular relevance and value 
when the participant group is a marginalised or ‘muted’ one, and the research aim is 
to provide a ‘voice’ to that group (2004: 6). It is a stance that also has a more general 
application in other areas of narrative research, especially in anthropological and 
ethnographic work where it is considered important for the researcher first to 
immerse themselves in cultural understandings and frameworks of meanings in order 
to re-present the subjective experiences and life-worlds of the participants in 
question.  
The interpretive process of ‘taking people at their word’ is therefore the basis for a 
rich seam of narrative work. Studies which adopt this interpretive stance often 
display the following features: close attention to the relationship between researcher 
and participant, as facilitating a productive and authentic research encounter; 
emphasis on the co-construction and production of narrative texts; and some 
awareness of the potential for self-revelation and new understandings from both 
parties (Josselson, 2004).  
Reflexivity is central to the hermeneutic stance of restoration and faith, the 
researcher being considered a constitutive part of the interpretive process (Josselson, 
2004:11). Rejecting any naïve belief in the ability of the researcher to cast off or 
isolate their assumptions and biases – what Bourdieu (1999:608) calls ‘the positivist 
dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence’ - these inclinations are 
instead understood as culturally shaped positions which should be acknowledged and 
explored by the researcher as part of the relational dynamics of the interview, and 





Particularly useful here is the concept of the ‘biography in the shadow’ which is 
considered integral to narrative research (Behar, quoted in Josselson, 2004: 11). This 
approach suggests questions such as: ‘What are the shared social locations and 
assumptions? Where are the points of discordance or strangeness?’ These questions 
acknowledge that it is relevant – certainly to the participant and also to the narrative 
reader – whether or not the researcher is a member of the same group he or she is 
researching, and thus to their capacity to understand. It is also relevant to the 
researcher’s ability to render faithfully the participant’s intended meanings.  
The hermeneutics of demystification (suspicion) 
For Ricoeur, all language is inherently ambivalent and capable of many meanings. 
Drawing on the three ‘masters of suspicion’ – Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – Ricoeur 
outlines a second hermeneutic stance aimed at the demystification of meaning 
through the recognition and interpretation of a form of false consciousness on the 
part of the narrator. In contrast to an interpretive stance based on faith, accounts of 
experience or feelings are not assumed to be transparent, and the researcher will be 
alert to strategies of self-deception such as denial, evasion or hesitation. More 
simply, this could amount to acknowledgement of the presence of untold stories, 
‘negative spaces’ or silence. The researcher’s attention may be drawn to: 
… the omissions, disjunctions, inconsistencies and contradictions in an account. It is 
what is latent, hidden in an account that is of interest rather than the manifest 
narrative of the teller.  
                                                                                                  (Josselson, 2004:15) 
This interpretive stance can be regarded as inspired more by scepticism than 
suspicion, and by awareness that personal accounts can be ‘multivocal’ and layered 
in meanings. Analysis may be directed at illuminating connections between these 
voices, beyond any made or suggested by the narrator. In this case, the researcher’s 
own voice will be more clearly distinguished from the narrator’s than in an 
interpretive stance based on faith, and necessarily acknowledges that the researcher 
has different interests from the narrator. It follows from this approach that the 





linguistically, and this may suggest a performative dimension to the narrative 
interview.  
In contrast to an interpretive stance based on faith, narratives are not regarded as co-
constructions of meaning; as Josselson observes, this renders the participant more 
like the research ‘subject’ of some qualitative approaches (2004:20). Indeed, 
Ochberg (1996:97) advocates listening to narratives  
… as though they are attempts at persuasion, the rhetoric structured to present a 
certain view of events rather than another, less palatable one.  
Josselson (2004) observes that the aim of this interpretive stance (based on 
suspicion) is to offer a different reading, rather than to re-present the narrator’s own. 
Inevitably, this reading ‘between the lines’ may go beyond the narrator’s own 
intentions, and carries a greater interpretive burden on the researcher. The 
responsibility flows from the ‘claim to privilege’ the researcher is making when 
proposing meanings beyond those stated by the narrator. Here, the focus shifts from 
the voice of the narrator to that of the researcher, who must persuade the reader of 
the validity of the different reading.  This can only be achieved, Josselson believes, 
by carefully documenting the interpretive process from ‘observation (text) to 
narrative explanation at a theoretical level’, including some reflection on why 
participants may not be aware of the particular ‘hidden’ dimensions the researcher 
seeks to highlight (2004: 19).  
An interpretive stance based on demystification or suspicion is a less favoured 
position in narrative research, according to Josselson. In some cases, this may be 
because the researcher is uncomfortable assuming the right to re-interpret the 
intentions of the narrator. The lack of many recognised alternative interpretive 
frameworks may also play a part. The term ‘suspicion’ itself may even be 
unfortunate, since the main interest in this stance is not necessarily in contesting or 
refuting the narrator’s beliefs – these may be sincerely held -  but in ‘those aspects of 
self-understanding or meaning-making that operate outside of the participant’s 
awareness’ (Josselson, 2004:15). Josselson is keen to rescue the hermeneutics of 





interpretation of the stated or ostensible meanings of other people is no more than 
what we all do when negotiating our daily lives and fellow human beings (2004:18). 
Moreover, it can be observed that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud each confronted false 
consciousness with a view to achieving some better or ‘truer’ level of understanding 
rather than resorting to a form of nihilism.  
Combining ‘faith’ and ‘suspicion’ 
The careful delineation of these discrete interpretive stances serves, somewhat 
paradoxically, to highlight the fluidity of interpretation. As Gadamer notes, there is 
no single ‘valid’ interpretation of a narrative text, and it is possible to have different 
readings of the same text over time (Gadamer, cited in Josselson, 2004).35 Moreover, 
although some intellectual disciplines tend to view the hidden as more ‘true’, there is 
no good reason to assume that a latent or disguised meaning in a text is more 
authentic or ‘true’ than one more seemingly transparent.36 This fluidity persuades 
Ricoeur that the two hermeneutic positions stand in an interesting dialectic to each 
other: 
Symbols both disguise and reveal. While they conceal the aims of our instincts, they 
disclose the process of self-consciousness. Disguise, reveal; conceal, show; these 
two functions are no longer external to one another; they express the two sides of a 
single symbolic function.     
                                                                                                    (Ricoeur, 1970: 497)  
The tension between the two interpretive stances thus has the potential to produce 
new knowledge and insight. The hermeneutics of suspicion can be regarded as 
grounded in the ‘archaeology of the person’ – their hidden motivations - and can 
provide insight about ways in which the past has been structured. An interpretive 
position based on the hermeneutics of faith, on the other hand, may be oriented 
towards the ‘teleology of life’ – in hopes and beliefs – and can point to visions for 
the future. The resolution of these different temporal orientations may allow greater 
understanding of the ‘ever-shifting present’ (Josselson, 2004:21).  
Ricoeur (1970) believed that the interpretation of narrative accounts could be 





notwithstanding the potential that may lie in adopting a combined interpretive 
position, Josselson believes that most researchers have an instinctive and normative 
inclination towards one or other interpretive stance. The adoption of one over the 
other is therefore likely to be determined by the researcher’s motivation for 
examining the narrative text. A researcher who is motivated to ‘giving a voice’ to 
their participant group is less likely to be searching for evidence of hidden meanings; 
a researcher who is already interested in unearthing hidden or less visible structures 
of thought is likely to consider the participant’s account as part of the ‘puzzle’ to be 
solved (Josselson, 2004:22). A combined epistemological stance is therefore 
possible, but according to Josselson, ‘relatively rare and certainly very difficult’ 
(2004:22).  
Judicial narratives and the hermeneutics of faith and suspicion 
A combined interpretive approach has significant potential for the analysis of judicial 
narratives. To the extent that he interpretive stance adopted by a researcher in a given 
field is largely determined by the nature of the researcher’s interest in that subject, 
the present study of judicial lives and careers is motivated by interest in two distinct 
areas: firstly, a biographical dimension particularly in relation to experiences of 
judging; secondly, the meaning-making processes of judicial work in criminal 
justice. Following Josselson’s analysis of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, it is possible to 
highlight some of the different interpretive issues raised by these two discrete fields 
of inquiry for this study.  
Faith and restoration 
Without employing any conception of judges as a marginalised group, the partial 
orientation towards biographical interviews in this project can still be acknowledged 
as being in some way motivated by the opportunity to hear judicial ‘voices’ which 
are relatively unheard.37 Even without any ‘empowerment’ agenda, this biographical 
focus entails the building of a research relationship which facilitates the telling of 
personal stories. The biographical dimension of narrative research thus places the 
researcher in an intimate and personal relationship with the participant. The research 





… the researcher endeavors to obtain ‘‘data’’ from a deeply human, genuine, 
empathic, and respectful relationship to the participant about significant and 
meaningful aspects of the participant’s life … The greater the degree of rapport and 
trust, the greater the degree of self-revealing and, with this, the greater degree of 
trust that the researcher will treat the material thus obtained with respect and 
compassion. 
                                                                                                   (Josselson, 2007:539)  
Moreover, there are many features of a narrative approach which incline the 
researcher towards an interpretive stance based on faith. These include the close 
attention paid to the relationship between researcher and participant, as facilitating a 
productive and authentic research encounter; emphasis on the co-construction and 
production of narrative texts; and awareness of the potential for new understandings 
from both parties about previously held positions.  
However, it is not necessary to proceed directly to a position grounded in ‘suspicion’ 
of judicial narratives to recognise that an individual’s biographical account is a 
‘privileged but troubled narrative’ (Bruner, 2004:693). For Bruner, this is because 
the life story is inherently reflexive rather than ‘factual’:  
… a life as led is inseparable from a life as told – or more bluntly,  a life is not ‘how 
it was’ but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold.  
                                                                                                        (Bruner, 2004:708) 
For Hollway and Jefferson (2000), the narrative account always reflects the 
dynamics of the ‘interview pair’ and they situate both researcher and participant as 
‘anxious, defended subjects’ (2000: 45). Ethnomethodology regards the question of 
accountability as central to understanding social action and this may hold some 
relevance for interpreting judicial narratives. Others insist that autobiographical 
accounts should not be privileged as any special kind of representation or carrying 
any greater claim to authenticity (Atkinson, 1997). 38 
A combined approach 
The duality of the judicial role points towards the value of an interpretive approach 





judicial role has more dimensions than a simple hegemonic interpretation based on 
class interests would imply (particularly in relation to its role as guardian of 
constitutional and human rights), but the position of the judiciary as an elite social 
group has some obvious relevance to the ‘parameters of their moral thinking’ 
(Norrie, 2000: 178). Suspicion, however, is not the only interpretive stance indicated, 
and faith or empathy may also have some place in generating meaningful 
understandings about aspects of the judicial world which are occluded or shielded by 
the researcher’s own predispositions. Liebling (2001: 476) questions the way in 
which a ‘creed of sensitivity’ is extended only to the offender and not to the 
‘powerful’: 
Why is sympathy reserved for the offender and denied to those who (sometimes in 
good faith) work in criminal justice, with their own lives, stories, pains, motives and 
understandings …? 
‘Truth’ in narrative accounts 
The analysis of narrative accounts inevitably raises questions about the reliability and 
‘truth’ of accounts, and about the extent to which it is possible to generalise or draw 
conclusions beyond the particularities of the individual case history. Maguire (2000) 
points to the easiest answer, which is that the objective of this type of research is to 
gain greater understanding and insight, and that other forms of research can be used 
if the aim is to test the frequency of some phenomenon. To this could be added 
Mishler’s (1996) observation that individual case studies have been used in 
psychological and natural sciences to make significant theoretical advances, and are 
thus no less ‘scientific’ than variable-based approaches. The particularities and 
contexts of case-centred narrative studies can therefore also generate categories and 
concepts (Riessman, 2008).   
However, Maguire (2000) also points to the much less straightforward question 
about the reliability and ‘truth’ of life history accounts.39 In social sciences, 
philosophical ideas about the meaning of ‘truth’ are more pragmatically recast as 
questions about reliability, validity and trustworthiness, but it remains a ‘vexing 
question’ for narrative research (Riessman, 2008: 182). Riessman observes the 





warfare’ with unease, believing the language of fixed criteria and standards to be 
unsuited for narrative research which is characterised by fluid boundaries and 
categories: 
 
…there is no canon, clear set of rules or list of established procedures and abstract 
criteria for validation that fit all projects.  
                                                                                              (Riessman, 2008: 200) 
Moreover, Riessman observes, since all narrative research projects are situated in 
specific ways, questions of trustworthiness should be considered evaluated within 
those contexts. Considered this way, there are two levels of validity: the validity of 
the participant’s narrative account, and the validity of the researcher’s analysis.  
For certain ‘realist’ epistemologies such as history, factual truth is important, and 
consistency between narrative accounts and other sources of evidence may therefore 
be important: this is the ‘truth as correspondence’ approach. Bruner (1991: 13), 
however, observes that verification has ‘limited applicability where human 
intentional states are concerned’, such as in psychological sciences. Here, the 
‘correspondence’ of events recounted in a personal narrative with other forms of 
‘evidence’ has less significance. 
Most narrative scholars agree that a narrative is ‘not simply a factual report of events, 
but instead one articulation told from a point of view that seeks to persuade others to 
see the events in a similar way’ (Riessman, 2008: 187). In this way, ‘verifying the 
facts’ may be less important than ‘understanding their meanings for individuals and 
groups’ (2008:187).40 In relation to judicial narratives, the correspondence theory of 
truth has no obvious utility and I made no attempts to ‘verify’ the judges’ narrative 
accounts. To an extent, my own working knowledge of some of the participants 
allows some internal consistency to be applied. More apt perhaps is Riessman’s 
observation that persuasion is the most useful way to demonstrate trustworthiness: 
‘good narrative research persuades readers’ and analytical interpretations should be 
‘plausible, reasonable, and convincing’ (2008:191). In more practical terms, she also 





or excerpts, being attentive to the narrative form and language, to the contexts of (co) 
production, and being reflexive about positioning.41 Czarniawska’s conclusion looks 
beyond techniques:  
I do not think that there exists anything that must, should, or ought to be ‘done’ to 
narratives. Every reading is an interpretation, and every interpretation is an 
association: tying the text to other texts, other voices, other times and places. Much 
more important than a specific interpretative or analytical technique is the result: an 
interesting recontextualization.  
                                                                                              Czarniawska (2004: 135) 
The researcher’s interpretive authority 
With its emphasis on multiple voices, meanings and interpretations, there is a danger 
that narrative analysis, as with elements of postmodernism, could overwhelm the 
reader with the multiplicity of meanings and interpretations which could be derived 
from a single text. This highlights the limitations of a social constructivist 
interpretive orientation at one end of the epistemological spectrum, which conceives 
the world ‘as a collection of subjectively spun stories’ (Czarniawska, 2004: 5). 
Bottoms (2000) points to the dangers of epistemological relativism in criminology 
and suggests that it is always possible, and often important, to argue that one 
interpretation of a subjective account is ‘truer’ than another. As far as critiques of 
criminal justice are concerned, Norrie (2000:234) puts it more trenchantly: ‘the only 
worthwhile distinction is between better and worse understandings of criminal 
justice.’ 
In the discussion above on informed consent, I drew attention to the ethical dilemma 
concerning the ‘interpretive authority’ of the researcher. This quandary was 
highlighted to me in an acute way in relation to one of my first participants, whom I 
knew well and continued to visit when he had failing health. On one of these visits, 
he inquired about this project and confided that he had only agreed to participate 
because he trusted me to ‘tell the truth’. I regretted not asking what he meant: tell the 
truth about what? I had no doubt he trusted me to accurately transcribe and quote any 





hidden ‘meaning’ in his interviews. Or worse, had he so misconstrued the nature of 
the project that he understood my role as faithful scribe? 
In general terms, the tension arises because the interpretive problem for the 
researcher of life histories is not so much (or only) how to impart a faithful 
representation of their participant’s memories and experiences, but how to construct 
this discourse more generally or ‘scientifically’ and in a way that allows social 
explanation (Bourdieu (1999: 611). Josselson explains the dilemma more fully: 
The task of the narrative researcher is to relate the meanings of an individual’s story 
to larger, theoretically significant categories in social science, a task distinct from 
the individuals’ specific interest in their own personal story (Smythe & Murray, 
2000). While the task of the researcher in the data-gathering phase is to clarify and 
explore the personal meanings of the participant’s experience, the task in the report 
phase is to analyze the conceptual implications of these meanings to the academy. 
Thus, at the level of the report, the researcher and the participant are at cross-
purposes, and I think that even those who construe their work as ‘‘giving voice’’ and 
imagine the participants to be fully collaborative with them in the research endeavor 
are in part deluding themselves. The researchers are interested in the research 
questions (and their careers). The participants are interested in themselves. Thus, 
there is a division between the personal narrative told by the participant and the 
‘‘typal’’ narrative, a narrative that exemplifies something of theoretical interest, 
created by the researcher.  
                                                                                                   (Josselson, 2007: 549)  
Narrative research relies on some understanding of the relational dynamics of a 
narrative interview, as articulated here by Czarniawska (2004: 5): 
…….we are never the sole authors of our own narratives; in every conversation a 
positioning takes place […..] which is accepted, rejected, or improved upon by the 
partners in the conversation. 
However, it may be disingenuous for narrative researchers to describe narratives as 
co-constructed since this ‘does not imply that we have similar aims as participants or 
that we are somehow working together to produce the research results’ (Josselson, 
2011:39). The researcher’s interpretive authority is necessarily compromised by 





Reflexivity and ethics in a combined interpretive stance 
Josselson outlines several approaches which she considers central to the achievement 
of the goal of moving between the two interpretive stances – ‘giving voice’ as well as 
deciphering. Firstly, there should be reflection on the ways in which the ‘narrative 
strategies’ of both the researcher and the participant are influenced by their cultural 
and historical positions, as well as by questions of identity and community. 
Secondly, the researcher should consider his or her ‘hermeneutic allegiances’ – what 
hierarchy of faith or suspicion will prevail in particular contexts? Neither stance has 
epistemological superiority over the other, she believes, and interpreting from both 
positions is possible, but the researcher’s shifting positions should be made clear.  
The contextual position on ‘faith’ and ‘suspicion’ which Josselson adopts here 
suggests there may be no ‘ethical moat’ (Ricoeur 2000:38) between the two 
analytical stances, but a distinction which is circumstantial and contingent.  
When interpreting the narrative accounts, I was also mindful of Geertz’s (1983: 16) 
warning of the need to ‘steer between overinterpretation and underinterpretation, 
reading more into things than reason permits and less into them than it demands’ . 
For Geertz, achieving some sense of what people are ‘really like’ (he uses this term 
ironically) or actually trying to say, requires the ability to ‘construe their modes of 
expression … their ‘symbol systems’: this is more like ‘grasping a proverb, catching 
an illusion, seeing a joke….’ than achieving communion (1983: 70). 42  
It is also important to minimize any totalizing impulse in relation to the interpretation 
of narrative accounts, at the personal as well as the social level. Geertz (1983: 187) 
explains this further in relation to any broad understandings about society or culture 
that may be gleaned from personal narratives: 
I am not engaged in a deductive enterprise in which a whole structure of thought and 
practice is seen to flow, according to some implicit logic or other, from a few 
general ideas, sometimes called postulates, but in a hermeneutic one – one in which 
such ideas are used as a more or less handy way into understanding the social 
institutions and cultural formations that surround them and give them meaning. They 
are orienting notions, not foundational ones. Their usefulness does not rest on the 





In relation to the personal account, Czarniawska (2004: 61) observes that however 
well-meaning or intentioned the researcher is, the act of rendering an interpretation 
of someone else’s story is always ‘a political act of totalizing’. In the final analysis, 
therefore, interpretive responsibility lies squarely with the researcher: 
The burden of authorship cannot be evaded, however heavy it may have grown; 
there is no possibility of displacing it onto ‘method’, ‘language’, or … ’the people 
themselves’ redescribed … as co-authors.  
                                                                                                        (Geertz, 1988: 140) 
Ricoeur and the ‘rule of sincerity’ 
There is one further dimension of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics which is not mentioned in 
Josselson’s account but which offers an additional perspective on the balance to be 
achieved between ‘faith’ and ‘suspicion’ when interpreting judicial narratives. In the 
context of discussion about the recognition of the ‘other’ as the subject of rights, 
Ricoeur insists that mutual recognition of the rules of practical discourse - the 
necessary framework for interpersonal relations - makes sincerity and authentic 
dialogue possible. This requires confidence in the ‘rule of sincerity’:  
‘I expect that each will mean what he or she says’  
                                                                 (Ricoeur, 2000:6, emphasis in the original). 
While not supplanting the interpretive stance based on measures of faith and 
suspicion when it comes to the analysis of judicial narratives, Ricoeur’s 
understanding of personal authenticity provides an ethical basis for the conduct of 
the research relationship itself. The ‘rule of sincerity’ also places public discourse on 
a foundation of trust and is a useful additional framework for the discussion of 
judicial authority and public legitimacy. In particular, it is directly connected to the 







In this chapter I provided, firstly, details of the empirical framework of the project 
and addressed questions about ethics, the framing and scope of interviews, the 
relational dynamics between researcher and participants, and about reflexivity. In the 
second section I provided an overview of narrative research and drew attention to 
aspects of this approach which hold significant potential for research about judicial 
life and work. In particular, the identity-building and remembering functions of 
narratives suggest potential for insight about ‘master narratives’ such as judicial 
independence and about changing judicial sensibilities. In the final section I 
considered the interpretive axis of faith and suspicion which may be the necessary 
corollary of a critical understanding of the judicial role in punishment. After 
outlining these features, I proposed an interpretive stance which entails moving 
between the interpretive poles of faith and suspicion while also observing Ricoeur’s 
ethical ‘rule of sincerity’ (2000:6).   
This narrative study of judicial life and work in penal practice raises important 
questions about social action, individual agency and the discourse of powerful actors. 
These issues are not fully addressed in narrative research literature, and in the 
chapter to follow I consider the usefulness of Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of 
habitus, field and practice for exploring the personal accounts of judicial actors and 
for providing insight about penal change and its requisite conditions.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This approach directs greater attention to the signifying and communicative aspects of the sentencing 
role and situates the judge as a socially and historically situated actor. The values and dispositions of 
judges are of interest here not only for their immediate instrumental significance (in relation to policy 
and practice) but also for the insight they can provide about changing sensibilities and motivations in 
the penal domain. 
2 This insight was gained during a seminar I attended in Paris, 2009 led by Ruth Josselson. She 
described this error as ‘putting your template on their life’.  
3 The ‘snowball method’ of recruiting research participants, also known as chain referral sampling, 
works by identifying respondents who are prepared to refer the researcher onto others. It is considered 





                                                                                                                                          
hard to reach populations such as the deprived, the socially marginalised and elites (Biernacki & 
Waldorf, 1981).  
4 The details of the exact composition of such a small group are withheld to minimise the possibility 
of identification.  
5 These details had to be omitted in any extracts given here because of the easy identification which 
would follow.  
6 These networks also prompted a number of queries from other retired sheriffs asking if they could be 
included in the project.  
7 Two small insights were gained from these conversations. Although a number of participants were 
happy to share the fact of their involvement in the project, they were, apparently, ‘quite coy’ about 
sharing any details of their own personal reflections. Another, referring to the retirement dinner, 
observed that I had ‘got them talking about all this interesting stuff’ – presumably, the less personal 
‘stuff’.  
8 If the conversation did not naturally stray into these areas, I tried to ask each participant a range of 
questions such as: ‘Do you think your own background influenced the kind of judge you became - and 
in what way? What were the most important developments in criminal justice during your legal and 
judicial career?’  
9 Although the dramaturgical model is perhaps overworked when it comes to observations of 
courtroom practice, it does capture the sense of performance of a role which is a part of that 
occupational reality. To an extent, also, some fluidity of roles is inevitable given the system of 
appointment to the bench in Scotland whereby judges and sheriffs are appointed from the ranks of 
practitioners.  
10 Several participants remain in touch, and in one case, the spouse of a participant who died several 
years after our first interviews.  
11 Most US qualitative studies of judicial work take place within the political science tradition of 
judicial behavioural studies.  
12 Advice about interviewing ‘elites’ includes guidance on gaining access to members of elite groups, 
preparation and communication, interview formats, dress code, interview etiquette, and strategies 
geared towards the successful ‘extraction’ of data (Dexter, 1970; Richards, 1996; Odendahl and Shaw; 
Harvey, 2010). Researchers are warned that the time of elites is limited and therefore valuable; that 
elites do not suffer fools gladly; to guard against being too deferential; and that while a little flattery 
may be wise, sycophancy is not (Richards, 1996). Some of this guidance is explicitly drawn upon in 
several studies of the judiciary (see for example Baum, 2006; Johnson, 1989; Pierce, 2002). 
13 This is often to be found in a footnote or Appendix (see for example Tombs, 2006; Millie et al, 
2003; Wandall, 2008). 
14 Traces of the ‘elite’ model can be seen in assessments of the ways in which judiciaries valorise their 
independence (Malleson, 1997, 1999, 2002; Stevens, 1988, 1999, 2002); of ways in which they seek 
to maintain ownership of discretion (Ashworth, 1995; Tata, 2000; Hutton, 2006); in accounts of 
judicial resistance to sentencing research (Ashworth, 1995, 2003; Baldwin, 2000; Hughes, 2000); and 
of strategic judicial behaviour in relation to sentencing reform or innovation (Ashworth, 1995; Hutton, 
1995; Tata, 2000; Tata and Hutton, 2003; Cavadino and Dignan, 2002); and in discussions about 
judicial diversity (Griffiths, 1997; Hale, 2005; Malleson, 2006; Rackley, 2007). 
The ‘elite’ model is problematic where it does not specify the context of the attribution of ‘elite’ 
status, where it overlooks other actors who may exercise influence in a given field (Woods, 1998), or 
fails to recognise the relational aspects of power in the research relationship (Smith, 2006). A number 
of studies such as Tata (2000); Tata and Hutton (2003); McNeill et al (2009) directly address these 
issues.  
15 Although I am attempting here to identify some of the advantages and disadvantages (for the 





                                                                                                                                          
myself, however naively, in the outside outsider category (academic) rather than the outside insider 
category described above. In particular, I felt I was able to recognise, but not necessarily identify with, 
certain cultural values being expressed in interviews.  
16 It may also, she suggests, lead to problems of over-identification with the participant, and requires a 
careful delineation between the two ‘voices’ in the research relationship (Josselson, 2004).  
17 Although Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is not explicitly employed in The Weight of the World, it is 
clear that he envisages here its controlling and shared framework. 
18 Theoretical differences between these approaches are reflected in different strands of research; the 
humanist approach providing a new focus on individual case studies, biographies and life histories, 
and the postmodern approach proceeding on an understanding of ‘multiple, disunified subjectivities’ 
and on the constructed nature of accounts (Andrews, 2008). 
19 Andrews (2007) introduces an important note of caution about these emancipatory claims, raising 
questions about who benefits from the work, about reception by different audiences, and the position 
of the narrator over time. For some narrative scholars, the narrative interview itself may hold some 
transformational potential (Mishler, 1986).  
20 However, it is important to note that many authors who attempt to tame some of this complexity by 
organising the fuzzy boundaries of narrative research into scholarly categories, chapters and 
exemplars nonetheless urge narrative researchers to ‘innovate and transgress the borders’ created by 
these endeavours to tame it (Riessman, 2008:18, 73; also Andrews, 2008: 4). 
21 These positive uses include its use in promoting empathy with others in difficult circumstances, for 
example, or to gain better understanding of the connection between personal problems and social 
issues. 
22 In one example, it was possible to track the participant’s growing unease with a particular subject 
area (the social context of sentencing) over the course of several interviews, and to observe the 
strategies employed by that participant to avoid, and then finally confront the issue. I discuss this in 
Chapter 7. 
23 A tendency to celebrate lengthy autobiographical accounts was characteristic of this period (Squire, 
2008, Riessman, 2012). 
24 Recent studies in occupational therapy literature (Jonsson et al, 2000; Jonsson & Andersson, 1999; 
Kendall, 1996; Rudman, Cook, & Polatajko, 1997) suggest that retirement should be regarded as a 
complex, unfolding process rather than a single transition to a new status. 
25 In its most celebrated role, narrative research is instrumental in ‘giving a voice’ to respondents, 
underscoring its normative inclination towards the narratives of the marginalized and oppressed.  For 
examples, see Roberts (2002); Ewick and Silbey (1995); Delgado (1989). 
26 Czarniawska (2004:46) defines organisational folklore as ‘cultural practices and artefacts that are 
symbolic, spontaneous, and repetitive’.  
27 Czarniawska cautions that it is not enough merely to note the existence and use of canonical or 
master narratives in a given field of practice. She suggests that a broader agenda would ask: ‘....what 
are the consequences of [scientific] rhetoric and what are the consequences of storytelling – for those 
who tell the stories and those who study them?’ (2004:41) 
28 In the case of judges, there is strong symbolic force in the public performance of the judicial role, 
yet this domain generates surprisingly little ethnographic research (see Carlen, 1976 and Rock, 1993 
for rare examples). Nor do we know much about the private, back-stage, everyday routines of judicial 
life.  
29 The judges in this Australian research project on ‘judicial methodology’ in sentencing were each 
asked the same open-ended questions such as how they approached the task of sentencing, the 
influences upon them, the role of discretion, and the part played in sentencing by public opinion and 
the media. The researcher’s observation about their ‘almost identical’ responses was made seemingly 





                                                                                                                                          
30 Bourdieu’s inclusion of a magistrate in his accounts of social suffering in Weight of the World 
(1999) is a striking exception to this trend. Although not conceived of by Bourdieu as narrative 
research, these accounts nonetheless take the form of personal life stories.  
31 Judges’ own institutionally-imposed marginal role in public life scarcely qualifies them here. 
32 Presser’s (2009) work is notable for its attempt to build a ‘narrative criminology’ that has only the 
offender as its subject.  
33 This comment is made in light of Cavadino and Dignan’s account of the judicial role in the penal 
crisis in the same volume, which represents a strong hegemonic interpretation. 
34 Although judicial work in Scotland comprises a mix of both areas of law – and hence judges’ own 
conceptions of their role may represent a hybrid form – any analysis of the judicial role in punishment 
needs to draw distinctions of this sort. 
35 See Andrews (2007) for an account of re-visiting old narrative transcripts and finding new layers of 
meaning and understanding.  
36 Josselson re-tells the assumed apocryphal tale of Freud’s observation to an audience while puffing 
his cigar: ‘Although we all know that this is a phallic symbol, let us remember that it is also a cigar.’ 
(2004:21) 
37 Indeed, as some legal biographers argue, the political and rhetorical power of judges in the common 
law world makes ignoring their biographical accounts seem unwise (Burnside, 2009; Girard, 2003). 
38 Notwithstanding the caveats included here regarding biographical accounts, it is evident that for 
interpretive purposes no strict demarcation can be drawn between those parts of the judges’ accounts I 
describe here as ‘biographical’ and those which are conceptual or relating to experience of criminal 
justice practice. 
39 In relation to offenders, Maguire (2000) recommends seeking independent corroboration of at least 
some of what was said, along with personal judgement and tests of ‘internal consistency’. See Presser 
(2009) for further discussion of ‘truth’ in relation to offenders’ narrative accounts.   
40 Czarniawska (2004) observes that it is always possible for a researcher to ‘check the production 
certificate’ by methods such as comparing stories or checking written documents. 
41 There is an extensive debate in narrative research between those seeking to make narratives 
‘epistemically respectable’ and those who rely on criteria of ‘aesthetic quality’ (O’Dea, 1994: 161).  
42 In The Weight of The World (1999) Bourdieu reaches the striking conclusion that the personal 
history can be ‘a sort of spiritual exercise that, through forgetfulness of self, aims at a true conversion 
of the way we look at other people in the ordinary circumstances of life’. The ‘welcoming disposition’ 
which is required to achieve this state of communion is, he suggests, ‘a sort of intellectual love’ 
(1999:614, emphasis in the original). Earlier in the same text he speaks of his attempts to create a 
research relationship built on ‘active and methodological listening’, and ‘a total availability to the 





Chapter 4 The reflexive judge and the judicial habitus 
Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to extend the narrative project, thus far described, in ways 
that might usefully generate knowledge about judicial lives and practice, of their 
relations with the social world of crime and punishment, and about some of the 
dynamics and potential of the judicial role. Engaging with the narrative accounts of 
judges raises some issues central to criminal justice and punishment which were 
touched upon but not fully addressed in Chapter 2 (in relation to judicial culture) and 
Chapter 3 (in relation to narrative research).  
The first of these issues is that any study of social action needs to attend, in some 
manner, to the specific sensibilities of individual agents; these provide insight about 
the cultural values in which the practices of the institution in question are grounded. 
This narrative study directs that attention to the experience, motivations and role 
conceptions of judges and to the everyday routines of sentencing practice. These are 
essentially questions about human dispositions - their origin, structures and practical 
significance - and about the nature (its form, function and meaning) of the discourse 
about penal practice by powerful actors.1 In turn, these matters raise questions about 
the authenticity (and suspicion) of the ‘personal’ account; and about the place of the 
individual judge in relation to the wider space of culture and society and to some 
broader structures such as the judicial community and the penal field.  
Secondly, notwithstanding explanations of judicial conduct suggesting ‘virtuosic’ 
practice and agency, narrative accounts raise questions about the extent to which the 
judicial role is circumscribed by some objective realities of social life (such as 
presented in the economic, political or bureaucratic spheres) or by social structures 
such as class, gender and race.  
Finally, there are questions about the nature of judicial practice and what Bourdieu 
(1972:77) calls the ‘unconscious principles of the ethos of practice’ which operate to 





collective action. These questions about individual agency and personal choice in 
judging, and about change and its requisite conditions, are all directed towards ways 
of better apprehending, understanding and explaining the role of judges in the penal 
world. Social theory helps facilitate this task by allowing these questions to be 
framed in ways that allow the particularities of the penal environment to be seen 
more clearly (Garland and Sparks, 2000).2 
In Section 1, I consider Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of habitus, practice and 
field and his theory of practice for the insight they offer about these and other 
dynamics of judicial life and practice when exploring judges’ narrative accounts in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. In particular, and notwithstanding the sustained 
critique that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus necessarily implies a static and 
determined model of the social world, I consider the capacity of these concepts to 
capture some of the possibilities and processes of change as well as continuity, and 
of differentiation as well as homogeneity, in the judicial field of practice. As 
Wacquant (2007) observes, much of Bourdieu’s sociology represents a critique of 
inherited and taken-for-granted categories of thought. This articulates well with the 
ambition of this project to explore and question dimensions of judicial life and work 
about which there seems much received wisdom. The explanatory potential of 
habitus is usefully expressed by Reay (2004:437) in this way:3 
Habitus is a way of looking at data which renders the ‘taken-for-granted 
problematic. It suggests a whole range of questions not necessarily addressed in 
empirical research; How well adapted is the individual to the context they find 
themselves in? How does personal history shape their responses to the contemporary 
setting? What subjective vocations do they bring to the present and how are they 
manifested?  
In Section 2, I consider the question of reflexivity, the need for reflection on the 
conditions and dimensions of the researcher’s position in the social and intellectual 
fields she occupies. I extend this discussion about reflexivity to the penal agent and 
their capacity to reflect on the conditions of their own practice and dispositions, and 





from subjective accounts, descriptions and observations of practice gained through 
research, to a sociological view of how those practices are generated. 
Section 1 Habitus  
Habitus as theory and method  
Bourdieu emphasised that the concepts of habitus, practice and field emerged out of 
continuing ‘confrontations’ with the range of empirical realities he studied, and were 
not intended as a set of stand-alone theoretical constructions or as a substitute for 
research. Indeed, he suggested they were better conceived as a method: 
The main thing is that they are not to be conceptualised so much as ideas, on that 
level, but as a method. The core of my work lies in the method and a way of 
thinking. To be more precise, my method is a manner of asking questions rather than 
just ideas. This, I think, is a critical point.  
                                                                     (Bourdieu, 1985, quoted in Mahar, 1990)  
As Reay (2004:439) notes, Bourdieu is using the term ‘method’ here in a broad sense 
to emphasise his point that this framework of ideas was imagined as a ‘conceptual 
tool to be used in empirical research rather than an idea to be debated in texts’, and 
as ‘a way of understanding the world’. Bourdieu’s own conceptual work, as Reay 
shows, moves in a dialectical loop between theory, empirical work and reformulation 
of theory, using ideas as ‘open concepts designed to guide empirical work’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990b:107). This lends habitus, as theory, a certain mutable and 
indeterminate quality, with the attendant danger that it can become ‘whatever the 
data reveal[s]’ (Reay (2004:438); but this uncertainty seems less perilous when 
considered in the context of Bourdieu’s intended use of habitus as a ‘program of 
perception and of action’ and as a ‘modus operandi’ which guides and structures 
research practice (Wacquant, 1989:50).4 
Whether conceptualised as theory or method, Bourdieu did not want to limit the 
explanatory capacity of his ideas to the empirical context in which they were formed; 





while simultaneously, and without any necessary contradiction, insisting that to 
achieve this level of generalisation it was necessary to locate it within an empirical 
context: 
My entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of 
the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an 
empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of 
constructing it as a ‘special case of what is possible’. 
                                                                                                        (Bourdieu, 1998:2) 
It is in this spirit that I consider the concepts of practice (and discourse about 
practice) and habitus, field and capital: as a way of exploring some of the practical 
and theoretical problems that emerge in this research, but with a view to making 
broader and more general connections with the social world of penality from the 
empirical specificity of this project. In subsequent chapters of this thesis I draw on 
these concepts as Bourdieu intended - as methodological tools - putting them to use 
in exploring, interpreting and explaining narrative accounts.5  
In order to effect the first part of the dialectical loop between theory and empirical 
work it is necessary first to set out in this chapter the scope and logic of those 
concepts and then to examine the use to which this conceptual framework has been 
put by Bourdieu himself and by others in relation to judges and judicial work. The 
concepts of habitus, field and capital have some obvious affinity with inquiry into 
the habits, values and practices of an occupational group such as the judiciary, but 
there have been surprisingly few attempts to employ them in this way. Bourdieu’s 
own example (1987) is therefore instructive and I consider the extent to which a 
sometimes overly reductive or deterministic application or interpretation of this 
conceptual framework limits the potential of that approach.  
Greater engagement with Bourdieu’s views on practice and on reflexive sociology, 
on the other hand, may hold potential for enlarging the scope of inquiry and to 
consider processes of adaptation, change and potential rather than stasis and 
reproduction. The ways in which Bourdieu’s approach usefully articulates with this 





Bourdieu’s last expositions and exemplars of his ideas in The Weight of the World 
(1999) for this purpose. I suggest that where deployed as theory and method, and 
alongside some of Bourdieu’s insights about the nature of practice (and discourse 
about practice), the concepts of habitus and practice allow potential for greater 
understanding about some broader dimensions of judicial lives and practice through 
narrative accounts – and point towards some limitations in that enterprise, too.  
To reflect on these matters requires engagement with the concept of reflexivity 
beyond the structural and spatial dimensions of positionality, and the relational 
dynamics discussed in Chapter 2. In the context of a narrative approach to 
interviewing, I discussed reflexivity in two distinct senses. Firstly, insofar as the 
narrative accounts which emerged were the individual responses of retired 
practitioners to an invitation to reflect on their judicial careers, reflexivity was an 
ontological aspect of the research process for the judges themselves. Moreover, for 
the researcher it was a methodological stance which may provide greater 
‘ethnographic authority’ (Pillow, 2003). The strength of this stance as methodology 
lies in its potential to question and unsettle some orthodoxies of research, such as the 
authority of objectivity and the politics of representation and of power relations; but 
its weakness lies in the limited attention paid to the conditions of research production 
itself – the ‘habits of thought of the intellectual field’ – and the temptation it offers 
for some degree of ‘vanity reflexivity’ (Kenway and McLeod, 2004).  
Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology suggests a different return on this question; away 
from (simply) the researcher in her ‘biographical idiosyncrasy’ (1989:35) and 
towards the sociological field itself, and the space in that field of one’s point of 
view.6 According to this understanding of reflexivity, it is only by interrogating the 
position which the researcher adopts in the field towards the object of study and to 
the inherited dispositions and categories of the sociological field which she occupies 
(those ‘classifications, hierarchies, problematics etc. that always, in spite of 
ourselves, orient our thought’ (Bourdieu, 2000:9)) that the ‘unthought categories of 
thought which delimit the unthinkable and predetermine the thought’ can be 





of his work Bourdieu reserves to scholars alone the capacity, or inclination, to 
objectify and reflect on the conditions of their intellectual position, and on the 
‘unthought’ categories of the field. A preliminary attempt will be made in this 
chapter to draw attention to some of the ways in which academic thought towards 
judicial discourse is currently orientated; this task will be continued throughout 
subsequent chapters.  
This chapter therefore continues the discussion towards the end of Chapter 2 which 
was concerned, inter alia, with the question of what weight should be given to the 
subjective narrative accounts of judicial actors about the field of penal practice, and 
what relations of distance or engagement this suggested for the researcher at each 
stage of the project. Here I extend that discussion by drawing on social theory to aid 
the key sociological task identified by Bourdieu (echoing C. Wright Mills and his 
linking of personal troubles to public issues): how to take stories about ‘the 
apparently most subjective tensions of the social world and their contradictions’ and 
show how they frequently ‘articulate the deepest structures of the social world and 
their contradictions’ (Bourdieu,1999: 511).   
Judicial narratives: personalism and agency 
In Chapter 2, I addressed some of the methodological challenges posed by this 
biographical narrative study of the judiciary; questions of the authenticity, truth and 
validity of personal accounts, common to phenomenologically-inspired methods of 
social inquiry. In order to escape some of the individual relativism that is entailed in 
the use of first person accounts, narrative scholars reflect on the situated and strategic 
nature of these accounts: that they are given (and received and co-constructed) in 
cultural, social and institutional contexts. Some of these relational dynamics were 
explored in Chapter 2, and an interpretive position based on the hermeneutics of faith 
(restoration) and suspicion (demystification) was outlined as a partial response to 
some of these dimensions of the research. And in order to address aspects of the 
validity question relating to the interpretations produced I adopted the interpretive 





trustworthiness and coherence. These methodological interventions are important for 
the integrity of the narrative research project and allow some of the strengths of the 
narrative approach to be more apparent: that it produces rich and insightful accounts 
of the experience of judging and sentencing, embedded in the lives of individuals, 
suggesting links between the past and the present.  
It is integral to narrative research that it facilitates the external expression of some 
individual, internal representations of events and experience (Andrews, 2008); and 
within the diverse range of ways in which narrative research is conceptualised and 
exemplified, its potential to connect biography and society through individual life 
histories is also evident (Riessman, 2008). However, even with narrative researchers 
concerned with the social and cultural implications of narratives, it is unclear what 
conception of action or agency is being employed as far as the individual agent is 
concerned. As Andrews (2008:7) notes, this is one of narrative research’s ‘theoretical 
incommensurabilities’ which some narrative researchers attempt to resolve by 
‘strategic essentialism’ i.e. the ‘assumption of agentive subjects where politically 
expedient’. Narrative research is nonetheless an approach which takes individuals’ 
understandings about their own conduct, reason and agency as some basis for social 
life, though not necessarily adopting wholesale the phenomenological notion that 
social reality is ‘but the sum total of the innumerable acts of interpretation whereby 
people jointly construct meaningful lines of (inter)action’ (Wacquant, 2008:267). 
For Bourdieu (2000:132) the ‘personalism’ of the subjective account, with its belief 
in the ‘uniqueness of the person’, is a ‘condensed form of all the theoretical postures 
– mentalism, spiritualism, individualism, etc. - of the most common spontaneous 
philosophy’. There are some echoes of this in the criticism of narrativity and 
contemporary storytelling. This is the claim that our culture of reflection, and the 
seeking after identity and ‘authenticity’, promotes an ‘interview society’ in which 
everyone has a ‘story’ to tell; but which soon descends into a ‘rather facile 
relativism’ in which everyone has their own values and about which it is difficult to 
argue (Bloom, quoted in Frank, 2002; see also Atkinson, 1997). For Bauman (2000a) 





interests, and most notably negotiated common interests’ increasingly difficult. All 
this presents a problem for the ‘liberalism of neutrality’ and its reluctance to affirm 
the values of some over others – the idea that ‘some forms of life are indeed higher 
than others’ (Taylor, 1991:17, original emphasis).  
The charge that our contemporary taste for narratives produces stories that lack 
reference to ‘things that matter’ could not easily be levelled at the judges’ accounts 
found in this study, pre-occupied as they are with some of the very questions 
Bauman poses. Moreover, the act of judging – especially sentencing – necessarily 
represents a purposeful act of affirmation and signification of a particular set of 
‘higher’ values. It is, ex facie, a highly agentic function in which judgement triggers 
and sets in chain a process of state-legitimized violence: 
Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others. A 
judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his 
freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also 
constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about to 
occur.  
                                                                                                      (Cover, 1986: 1601) 
For Cover, this understanding of the coercive function of the judiciary, and of the 
cultural practices which support it, requires an attitude of suspicion towards those 
judicial actors who deal in ‘pain and death’, and leads him to a strong rejection of 
any ‘humanistic interpretation’ of the judicial role, or of its subjective representation:  
…any account which seeks to downplay the violence or elevate the interpretive 
character or meaning of the event within a community of shared values will tend to 
ignore the prisoner or defendant and focus upon the judge and the judicial 
interpretive act. Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as "blame" or 
"punishment," meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge to herself 
and to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence.  
                                                                                                       (Cover, 1986:1608) 
In his indictment of accounts of penal practice which trade in metaphors of 
community and the communication of shared norms, and which operate to deflect 





hegemonic form and function of judicial discourse. In the present study, awareness 
of this dimension of penality prompts curiosity about those institutional mechanisms 
of support for punishment, the cultural practices which sustain and defend them, and 
the moral and psychological implications for judicial actors who are implicated in 
them. The subjective accounts of the actors in question are essential to the 
exploration of these dimensions of penal practice – though not ruling out any 
‘humanistic’ interpretation - but the questions of agency, and of the representations 
of practice contained in those accounts, remain central concerns of this thesis and are 
explored further in this chapter.  
The ‘epistemological pair’: subject and object 
For Bourdieu, there are three forms of theoretical knowledge which are commonly 
brought to bear on the social world; the first is phenomenological, concerned with 
primary experience and which attends to the recovery or reconstitution of the lived 
experience. The second is objectivist and directs attention to the objective relations 
which structure and determine the dispositions of individual practitioners, their 
practice, and representations of that practice. Bourdieu is in ‘double opposition’ to 
both characterisations of social action and he expresses what he believes to be the 
necessary dialectical relationship between the two modes of knowledge in a theory of 
practice: this is his ‘third-order’ form of knowledge. 
The challenge arises from the deep-rooted opposition in social and philosophical 
theory between objectivist and subjectivist (interpretive) methods of inquiry and the 
related dialectic of agency and structure: the extent to which the actions of 
individuals are constrained by objective structures in the world, and the relative 
importance which should be attached to the mental structures and representations 
which shape those actions. Much of Bourdieu’s intellectual energy (1977; 1980; 
1998; 1990a; 1990b; 2000) was directed towards overcoming these oppositional 
readings of the social world, a dualism he regarded as theoretically flawed and 
disabling of rigorous sociological thought. Lane (2000:88) traces the development of 





his fully developed theory of practice and reflexive sociology, and notes that 
anthropological scholarship (of the colonial type) presented him with a striking 
example of the intellectual hazard awaiting the unreflective scholar. This folly 
derived from overlooking the inevitable distortions that resulted from the distance 
that separated observer from observed. The same tendency was manifest in the other 
principal current of thought which informed Bourdieu’s views, the opposition of 
Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology and Sartre’s existential phenomenology. The 
existentialist folly was to elevate the ‘drama’ of the individual subject and to attribute 
to the individual a degree of freedom and agency which was in fact contingent and 
determined by social forces; the structuralist error was to prematurely proclaim the 
‘death’ of the subject and reduce complex social practices to ‘a closed system of 
structural laws intelligible only to the impartial observer’ (Lane, 2000:89). Without 
reflecting on the ‘social, historical and material determinants’ of that relationship 
both schools then unwittingly imported their own relationship with the object, into 
their analysis of the object, as either: 
‘the mechanical execution of a model or the pure expression of free choice, this 
depending upon whether one is thinking more of oneself or of others’.  
                                                                                                    (Bourdieu, 1972:195) 
Oppositional readings of the judicial role 
These oppositional readings of the social world have implications for the ways in 
which the accounts of judicial actors can be understood and explained. 
Phenomenological or subjectivist accounts of social action tend to view society as the 
product of the ‘decisions, actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals to 
whom the world is given as immediately familiar and meaningful’; but as Wacquant 
(1992:9) notes, in so doing they may exaggerate individual agency and underplay the 
constraints on action of pre-existing social structures and relations. Thus, a 
subjectivist reading of the judicial role would be primarily concerned with the way 
judicial actors make sense of the penal world and with gaining a practical 





accounts of experience and take individual accounts as some basis for explanation of 
social action. Rejecting overly deterministic conceptions of human action, this 
perspective attaches greater significance to the possibility of individual agency in the 
judicial role. 
Although for Bourdieu, personalism or subjectivism is the basis of the ‘scientifically 
disastrous opposition between the individual and society’ (2000:132), objectivism 
falls prey to the ‘Durkheimian collectivist fallacy of reifying social structures’ 
(Farnell, 2000:408). Here, social phenomena are treated as ‘things’ and what is left 
out is ‘everything that they owe to the fact that they are objects of cognition – or of 
miscognition – in social existence’ (Bourdieu, 1987:125). An objectivist reading of 
the judicial role would draw attention to the objective material forces and conditions 
of social and economic life that together determine and delimit judicial practice and 
individual agency in the penal field, and which shape the ways in which judges 
represent that practice; class, gender and race for example. On this structuralist 
reading of the social world, then, the various representations and accounts of 
disposition, motivation and action that are offered by judges in interviews could be 
interpreted as the more or less mechanical and unconscious reactions to the social 
framework within which they function – some sort of ‘pre-established assemblies, 
‘models’ or ‘roles’’ (Bourdieu, 1977:73). 
For Bourdieu, the ‘ideological couple’ of subjectivism and objectivism represent two 
epistemological obstacles in the path of social scientific knowledge (Lane, 2000). 
Neither account, however, provides a sufficient explanation of social action in itself; 
these two dimensions of social life – the social and the mental structures – are better 
understood as related by ‘a twofold relationship of mutual constitution and 
correspondence’ (Wacquant, 2007). What Bourdieu seeks to achieve is a conceptual 
synthesis which transcends the ‘antagonism which opposes these two modes of 
knowledge, while preserving the gains of each of them’ (Bourdieu, 1980:25). Stated 
briefly here, in habitus, practice and field Bourdieu conceptualises a theory of social 
action in which agents are ‘neither free nor the mere puppets of objective social 





based on intuitions gained through past collective experience, into their ‘habitus’’ 
(Lane, 2000:25). Bourdieu’s attempted resolution is therefore a supersession of the 
‘ideological couple’ of objectivism and subjectivism so as to attain a ‘third-order’ 
level of knowledge; a theory of practice capable of properly constituting the social 
world. Importantly, practical knowledge occupies a pivotal position in this dialectical 
synthesis of practical and theoretical ways of thinking. This attempt to create an 
integrated approach, a ‘theory of practice’ which locates the blind spots of each 
perspective while saving their respective insights, (Lane, 2000) is of much interest 
here, because the tensions outlined in these dominant themes of social theory are 
reflected in existing sentencing scholarship and continue to orient some of the ways 
in which judicial practice and discourse is understood, explored and represented.  
Methodological objectivism and third-order knowledge 
‘Methodological objectivism, a necessary moment in all research, by the break with 
primary experience and the construction of objective relations which it 
accomplishes, demands its own supersession’.  
                                                                                             (Bourdieu, 1977:72) 
In his sociological critique of the juridical field, and referring to law’s universalizing 
and legitimizing effects, Bourdieu (1987:843) observes that the power of the law is 
‘special’. But importantly, as he cautions elsewhere, the social importance of a 
subject does not by itself confer any particular significance on the discussion or 
analysis that accompanies it (1987:843).7 What does matter, if that discourse is to 
have any sociological importance, is the ‘rigor of the construction of the object’ 
(Wacquant, 1989:51). This is only achievable and made fully evident after a first 
‘break’ with subjectivism and through careful empirical evidence. In relation to the 
judiciary, this ‘necessary moment’ of objectification would call attention to the 
specific features of the institutional environment of the judiciary, and to the ways in 
which judicial practices are generated and in which accounts of that practice are 
produced. The various legal conventions and institutional arrangements which inhibit 





available in the public domain, but even so, the relative novelty of the phenomenon 
does not alter the force of Bourdieu’s observation about the dangers of reification.   
By insisting on the need for a methodological ‘break’ with primary experience, 
Bourdieu does not underplay the importance of first-person accounts for gaining 
insight of social life, and his own writings indicate commitment to what he calls a 
‘sociology of the perception of the social world, that is, a sociology of the 
construction of the world-views which themselves contribute to the construction of 
this world’ (1987/1994:130).8 However, he believes that sociology cannot rest 
content with the ‘mysteries of subjectivity’ or a ‘phenomenal vision’ of the social 
world (1977:4), and the objectivist break he proposes is not with phenomenology 
itself but with the ‘pre-notions, ideologies, spontaneous sociology and ‘folk 
theories’’ that form part of subjective accounts; those ‘tacitly assumed 
presuppositions [which] give the social world its self-evident, natural character’ 
(1977:3). These ‘native accounts’, he observes, look only at how the world is 
subjectively constructed and understood, and give undue emphasis to the capacity of 
individual actors to act in the realm of practice. However, once this first break with 
primary experience has been achieved, the limits of the objectivist position itself 
require to be fully questioned, but without  rehabilitating subjectivism or that form of 
‘naïve humanism’ which pits ‘lived experience’ against objectification (1977:3). For 
Bourdieu, the contemplative or impartial position usually adopted by the sociologist 
represents a ‘scholastic fallacy’, and has a distorting effect on the production and 
interpretation of ‘native’ accounts. The source of this bias is a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the nature of practice itself, viewing it as ‘an interpretive 
puzzle to be resolved, rather than a mesh of practical tasks to be accomplished in real 
time and space’ (Wacquant, 2007:11).  
Judicial discourse: ‘native’ accounts of practice 
A key issue arises here about the nature of judicial discourse that is found in 
narrative accounts (and other forms of interview). How do judges represent their 





represented by researchers? For Bourdieu, discourse about practice embodies the 
common-sense (‘doxa’) of practitioners in the field who are ‘immersed in universes 
in which it goes without saying’; this is evident in the ‘semi-learned grammars’ and 
the ‘unthought categories of thought’ of any field of action and on which agents draw 
in their accounts of practice (2000:12). This aspect of practical knowledge, Bourdieu 
believes, presents an obstacle in the way of scholars in their attempt to construct the 
sociological object.  
Where that object of study is the sentencing judge, those ‘unthought’ ways of 
thinking and being carry extra significance. This is because of two related aspects of 
the judicial role in punishment which have relevance for how judges speak about it. 
Firstly, as sociologists of punishment have shown, punishment practices such as 
sentencing have constitutive and generative effects in the social world, and this 
understanding directs our attention to the rationalizations and justifications judicial 
agents provide for those practices, not just for their expressive significance but for 
the social and cultural commitments they suggest. And secondly, the concepts of 
judicial independence and neutrality are couched in the universalizing and 
legitimizing claims of law.  Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence thus has some 
force in its application to judicial discourse – indicating the ability of dominant 
actors such as judges to conceal the arbitrary and contingent nature of their ‘power to 
name’ in the social world, and thereby to achieve the complicity of others in their 
subjection to these categories and classifications of conduct.  
In Outline of a Theory of Practice, intended as a ‘reflection on scientific practice 
which will disconcert both those who reflect on the social sciences without practising 
them and those who practise them without reflecting on them’ (1977:vii), Bourdieu 
illustrates the pitfalls which these ‘native’ theories and representations of action 
present for the unreflective questioner. Grounded in his own early anthropological 
experience and drawing on examples from art history, cartography and linguistics, he 
draws attention to the theoretical distortions which arise from the researcher’s 
position as an ‘outsider’ who has no place in the system he is observing. He notes, 





quite different from the form it takes in a foreign language (the difference between a 
listening subject and the speaking subject); and observes the way in which 
sociologists often compensate for their lack of innate knowledge of a social world by 
constructing cultural ‘maps’ which they use to orient themselves around this 
unfamiliar landscape. For Bourdieu, the ‘intellectualist tendency’ to adopt the 
position of impartial observer introduces a significant source of bias: 
So long as he remains unaware of the limits inherent in his point of view on the 
object, the anthropologist is condemned to adopt unwittingly for his own use the 
representation of action which is forced on agents or groups when they lack practical 
mastery of a highly valued competence and have to provide themselves with an 
explicit and at least semi-formalized substitute for it in the form of a repertoire of 
rules, or what sociologists consider at best, as a ‘rôle’, i.e. a predetermined set of 
discourses and actions appropriate to a particular ‘stage-part’.  
                                                                                                        (Bourdieu, 1977:2) 
As Bourdieu describes it, this is almost a comedy of errors; a performative event in 
which the process of research and inquiry induces in each party a series of 
performances, responses and misunderstanding while each remains ignorant of the 
true nature and implications of their respective positions. The research dialogue 
typically proceeds in this way: the agent is prompted, by questions about his practice, 
to effect a ‘reflexive and quasi-theoretical return’ onto his own practice, drawing 
attention to his most remarkable ‘moves’. This response, being necessarily an 
‘outsider-orientated discourse’, tends to ‘leave unsaid all that goes without saying’ 
and excludes direct reference to specific cases.9 A ‘distance’ has now emerged 
between agent and researcher which is that between the ‘learned reconstruction of 
the native world and the native experience of that world’. The process of questioning 
has produced from the agent a standpoint or perspective – no longer action, not quite 
science – which consists of a post-hoc rationalization of the ‘unconscious schemes’ 
of his practice:  
Because his actions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is 
not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an ‘objective 
intention’…..which always outruns his conscious intentions. The schemes of thought 
and expression he has acquired are the basis of the intentionless invention of 





maintains a relation of ‘carry and be carried’….the virtuoso finds in the opus 
operatum new triggers and new supports for the modus operandi from which they 
arise, so that his discourse continuously feeds off itself like a train bringing along its 
own rails…… witticisms surprise their author no less than their audience, and 
impress as much by their retrospective necessity as by their novelty.  
                                                                                                      (Bourdieu, 1977:79)  
The research relationship thus outlined by Bourdieu has a pedagogical dimension 
insofar as the agent is attempting to make explicit for the outsider (a non-player) the 
rules of a game which are largely unconscious and unknown to the player. In trying 
to create the appearance of mastery of his practice (based on an illusory set of rules) 
the agent produces a ‘semi-formalized substitute’ for action; this discourse draws on 
the language of rules, the language of ‘grammar, morality and law’. For Bourdieu, it 
is quite misleading for the language of rules to be invoked in this way (though the 
agent does this unwittingly): the true nature of any social practice is that it follows 
quite different principles. This is the operation of the habitus which generates 
practices through a set of socialized dispositions; I return to this shortly. 
Here it becomes apparent that both agent and researcher are in a state of ignorance. 
Despite all appearance of purposeful action and intention, the agent is simply 
displaying ‘the practical mastery which makes possible both an objectively 
intelligible practice and also an objectively enchanted experience of that practice’ 
(1977:4). The agent is unaware of the true principles of his practice – that it amounts 
to learned ignorance of these principles. And the sociologist, having adopted the 
objectivist position of the impartial spectator, but having no innate knowledge of the 
practice, labours under the same fundamental misapprehension about the true nature 
of practice, assuming that its generative principle must be a set of ‘independent and 
coherent axioms’ or rules (1980, ibid: 12). This ‘scholastic fallacy’ leads the 
sociologist to misunderstand, and thereby misrepresent, the social world as ‘an 
interpretive puzzle to be resolved, rather than a mesh of practical tasks to be 
accomplished in real space and time’; this distorts the ‘situational, adaptive ‘fuzzy 
logic’ of practice by confounding it with the abstract logic of intellectual 





(1977:79) rather than individualistic rule followers, and have no need of rules and 
principles to guide them around their world. They rely instead on a ‘sense of the 
game’ and practical flexibility. As King (2000:419) observes, this intuitive ‘sense of 
the game’ refers to ‘a sense of one’s relations with other individuals’; it is an 
intersubjective quality requiring a finely-tuned understanding of the norms and 
values of other individuals in the group.   
These insights on the nature of practice, and Bourdieu’s insistence on reflexivity as a 
remedy for the bias unwittingly introduced by the sociologist’s position in the field, 
are of considerable interest and relevance to the study of sentencing as a social 
practice. In particular, they invite reflection on the way sentencing practice is 
represented by judges in interview and the extent to which it captures the ‘true’ 
situational ‘fuzziness’ of practice. 
Section 2 Reflexivity 
One of the most distinctive aspects of Bourdieu’s work is his insistence on 
reflexivity, the need to continuously reflect on the conditions and dimensions of the 
researcher’s position in the social and intellectual fields she occupies (Wacquant, 
2007). Bourdieu identifies three possible sources of bias in a scholar’s work; firstly, 
there are personal factors such as gender, ethnicity, and class which may be relevant, 
and as discussed in Chapter 2, the narrative researcher would be encouraged to 
reflect on these aspects insofar as they allow insight of the situated character of 
parties to the research. Second, the sociologist should reflect on the inherited 
categories of thought and perception in a particular intellectual field and carry out a 
‘critical dissection of the concepts, methods and problematics she inherits’ 
(Wacquant, 2007:273). Finally, reflection by the scholar on their own position in the 
field is necessary if distortions in the production of accounts are to be avoided. These 
distortions tend to arise from the ‘intellectualist tendency’ to assume a 
‘contemplative or scholastic stance’ (Wacquant, ibid: 273) and which lead to 





For Bourdieu, this reflexivity is the pre-condition for the supersession of both 
primary experience and of objectification which will allow the researcher to achieve 
‘third-order’ knowledge: this is a ‘higher objectivity’ which conserves and integrates 
the gains of both practice and theory (1980:17). This involves some return to the 
common-sense world of practice which is an integral part of the social world, but in a 
manner which acknowledges that objects of knowledge are ‘constructed, and not 
passively recorded’; the purpose is to ‘sidestep objectivism without relapsing into 
subjectivism’ (Wacquant, 1989:42). 
Judicial reflexivity 
I address here some of the implications of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and 
reflexivity for this study; first judicial reflexivity, secondly reflection on some 
‘inherited’ categories of thought in the field, and finally reflection on the researcher’s 
position in the field. The first dimension that bears further consideration is the 
capacity of judges, as practical agents, to reflect on the conditions of their own 
practice and dispositions, and of the position they occupy in the penal field. As I 
have shown, it is integral to Bourdieu’s theory of practice that in order to achieve a 
‘rigorous science of practices’ (1977:4) the sociologist should make a double 
movement of thought; first, a break with subjectivism and the ‘lived experience’ of 
agents in order to question and challenge the ‘tacitly assumed presuppositions which 
give the social world its self-evident, natural character’ (1977:3). For Bourdieu, a 
lack of reflexivity on the part of the agent is one defining element of the practical 
world. It represents: 
‘all that is inscribed in the relationship of familiarity with the familiar environment, 
the unquestioning apprehension of the social world which, by definition, does not 
reflect on itself and excludes the question of the conditions of its own possibility’. 
                                                                                                        (Bourdieu, 1977:3) 
Put more forcefully, the objective truth of the doxic world of the agent is that it 
represents ‘experience denied explicit knowledge’ of the structures of the social 





would be to run the danger of producing some sort of ‘half-science which 
unknowingly accepts categories of perception directly borrowed from the social 
world’ (Bourdieu, 1996:224). Or worse: 
‘…..it can reduce the social world to the representations that agents make of it, the 
task of social science then consisting in producing ‘accounts of the accounts’ 
produced by social subjects’.  
                                                                                                      (Bourdieu, 1987/94:12) 
This is certainly an epistemological fate to avoid, and wariness of it forms some basis 
for the interpretive position based on faith and suspicion which is set out in Chapter 
3. The principal aim of Bourdieu’s process of objectification is, in similar vein, to 
enable the sociologist to question these taken-for-granted categories of thought and 
to lay bare some of the logic of social processes which are less visible in the 
subjective accounts, and to the agents themselves. Indeed, for Bourdieu (1977:79), the 
agent’s understanding of the practical world is at a ‘pre-conscious’ level: 
‘It is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing, that what 
they do has more meaning than they know’.  
The essence of practical knowledge, it seems, is ‘blindness to its own truth’ and is 
reflected in an outlook which ‘excludes any reflexive return’ by the agent (1980:91). 
Taking seriously the need for reflection on the categories of thought and perception 
that we inherit from our intellectual field, I consider the possibility that Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the agent’s incapacity for any serious epistemic reflection– or, to 
put it another way, that only the sociologist has access to objective truth about the 
social world - has become one of those ‘unthought’ categories of thought in 
sentencing research with some important consequences. Some of the influence of this 
thought will be traced in the discussion of habitus to follow, and I will draw on 
narrative interviews in subsequent chapters to explore this question in relation to a 
number of emergent themes. I raise here, however, the general question which 






Tomlin’s (2000) typology of socio-legal scholarship provides a useful framework for 
this discussion. He argues that in the inter-disciplinary school, there are two ‘fields of 
encounter’. The first field is characterized by a ‘modality of rule’ in which law and 
legal actors such as judges are perceived to operate autonomously. This perspective 
takes dominant legal ideologies ‘at their own estimation’ and tends to produce a form 
of self-referential legal discourse which restricts its own usefulness to enabling legal 
scholars to communicate with judges and other legal practitioners. By its nature it 
inhibits engagement with broader audiences or topics. It is the second ‘field of 
encounter’ which produces scholarship concerned with questions about the form and 
expression of juridical order, typically drawing on analyses situated in politics, 
society and the economy (and here criminology would be the exemplar field of 
scholarship). For the present study, Tomlin’s typology of fields of encounter and 
Bourdieu’s methodological process of objectification and reflexivity both usefully 
point to the dialectical relationship to the field that the researcher must adopt: that is, 
the exploration of the first field, the realm of practice with its self-referential 
discourse, habits and ‘routine categories’ of thought, from the perspective of the 
second, which objectifies and interrogates these categories. And importantly, one of 
the tasks of criminological scholarship which has as its object of study an institution 
such as the judiciary is to question the ‘conditions of its own possibility’ in a way 
which practitioners may not. 
All this may simply suggest a division of labour in the field which more or less 
corresponds to accepted conventions. Both frameworks nonetheless carry 
understandings of the nature of judicial discourse, along with some broader 
implications about the judicial role and how we study it. There is much in Bourdieu’s 
account of agents’ discourse about practice that resonates with my experience in this 
study of the way judges talk about and represent their practice and experience of 
judging. However, the corralling of judicial thought into a ‘pre-conscious’ and 
unreflexive category, from which confines only the researcher can raise 
consciousness (to a higher level of thought), strikes a discordant note. Certainly, in 





and rhetoric which characterises much talk in the penal field – the ‘utilization of 
different idioms, and its tendency to project contradictory and ambivalent messages’ 
(Garland, 1990:275) - and Tomlin’s characterisation of ‘self-referential’ discourse 
captures well the flavour of much discussion about concepts such as judicial 
independence and impartiality.  
To an extent, this reflects the manner in which legal discourse is conventionally 
constructed; around a reified conception of law as autonomous, and which draws on 
a set of taken-for-granted concepts and doctrines (such as the rule of law and judicial 
independence) and binary oppositions such as free will versus determinism, and 
positivism versus realism. As Norrie (2002: ix) puts it, these legal concepts tend to 
be ‘troubled and oppositional and generally hunt in pairs’; and by their emphasis on 
individual responsibility, they also tend to exclude or minimise questions of social 
justice.11 Bourdieu describes precepts such as these - the ‘semi-learned grammars of 
practice – sayings, proverbs, gnomic poems, spontaneous ‘theories’’– as ‘secondary 
explanations’ which merely serve to reinforce existing structures and practices by 
providing them with rationalizations (1977:20). In the field of practice, and by virtue 
of their perceived status as prominent spokespeople for these and other notions, the 
judge’s position may be thought to entail a continuous process of reification and 
objectification of law and its legal categories (Kahn, 2003). Moreover, the 
biographical orientation of these narrative accounts also lends itself to self-referential 
discourse of the type encapsulated by Tomlin. 
As Valverde (2006) observes, law and society scholars are often critical of this 
dimension of judicial speech, noting the seeming contradiction between the judges’ 
views and their official positions, and decrying the use of both popular and expert 
knowledge in judicial discourse.12 Valverde has a useful perspective on this sort of 
‘creative mixing and matching’ that is evident in judges’ speech. She argues that 
legal actors such as judges are required, by their institutional position, to ‘reduce’ to 
a manageable pile the diverse knowledges which are derived from law and social 
science. The common-sense notions and legal concepts that emerge are thus 





knowledge claims (as cooks reduce sauces)’ (2006:593). We can accept that law acts 
like an ‘epistemological meat grinder’, Valverde says, without reifying law and not 
being diverted from the task of exploring ‘actually existing’ knowledge networks, 
debates and conflicts where they occur.  
Section 3 Habitus, field and capital 
The ‘conceptual arsenal’ 
I turn now to a question which arises in the present study: how to move from 
subjective accounts, descriptions and observations of practice gained through 
research, to a sociological view of how those practices are generated. This is a 
question to which Bourdieu’s theory of practice is generally directed; and through 
the conceptual framework of habitus, field and capital Bourdieu attempts to effect a 
synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism (and the related dualism of agency and 
structure) to address it. This represents an attempt to overcome the obstacles 
presented by approaches rooted in one to the exclusion of the other. In particular, 
habitus was intended by Bourdieu to provide a method for analysing both ‘the 
experience of social agents and….the objective structures which make this 
experience possible’ (Reay, 1988; 782).  
These concepts have an immediate and apparent usefulness for this narrative study 
which has subjective and objective dimensions in various degrees of tension.  
Narrative accounts are necessarily grounded in a subjective and interpretive view of 
the world, but the judiciary (and the practice of punishment) is an institution which 
requires some measure of objectivist inquiry about the social structures and forces 
which determine the conduct of its agents and shape their individual and collective 
representations. It also requires critical evaluation of the established and taken-for-
granted categories of thought and perception which pervade the judicial world. 
Bourdieu’s framework offers the potential of a more integrated sociological 
explanation which incorporates three elements of social life: the level of structure, 





Habitus is a multi-layered concept which along with field and capital and his theory 
of practice constitutes the central organizing principle of Bourdieu’s work. Reay 
(2004) has usefully identified four related dimensions of its use. Firstly, habitus as 
embodiment can be used to explain the ways in which the experience of being in the 
social world, particularly in a given field, or through family and education, inscribes 
in the individual a set of durable and transposable dispositions. These largely 
unconscious attitudes and perceptions - ways of thinking and feeling – are thus 
shaped by the socioeconomic or structural positions in which people are situated, and 
which in turn shape and determine our conduct and the representations of that world.  
For Bourdieu, this understanding avoids the fallacious notion of the ‘active subject 
confronting society as if that society were an object constituted externally’ 
(1990:190).  
Secondly, habitus can operate at the level of both the individual and of society. Thus, 
although Bourdieu acknowledges the history of each individual (‘just as no two 
individual histories are identical so no two individual habituses are identical’: 
1990:460) he also observes that the shared histories of groups of individuals produce 
a collective habitus. Here, shared dispositions are the emergent product of 
homogeneity of experience in a given field.  
Thirdly, habitus is a complex interplay between past influences and present stimuli 
(Reay, 2004: 434); it is both structured by past influences and conditions, and in turn 
structures those dispositions and practices subsequent to it. Habitus therefore carries 
within it the ‘genesis of new creative responses’ that can transcend its own social 
conditions (Reay, 2004:435) and can stimulate new and adaptive responses.  
Finally, habitus implies a concept of agency which is at once constraining and 
transformative. It is constraining because individuals are predisposed to ways of 
thinking and acting in predictable and regular ways:  
The habitus, as a system of dispositions to a certain practice, is an objective basis for 
regular modes of behaviour, and thus for the regularity of modes of practice, and if 
practices can be predicted….this is because the effect of the habitus is that agents 





                                                                                                      (Bourdieu, 1990:77) 
However, an important dynamic of the habitus is its generative capacity and the 
ability of actors to remain inventive, to improvise and adapt to new circumstances; 
yet the range of dispositions and practices possible in any given field are pre-limited 
by the ‘possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and 
prohibitions inscribed in the objective conditions’ (1990: 54). Bourdieu insists that 
this should invite no mechanistic or deterministic understanding of the operation and 
logic of practice - this is still marked by ‘vagueness and indeterminacy’ (1990:77).   
Used by Bourdieu in a technical sense, a field is defined as a network or 
configuration of relations; a formation of positions held by individuals that are 
objectively determined by their acquisition of power and capital. The position 
occupied by an individual, a group or an institution in a particular field is determined 
by the capital (social, economic and cultural) they have acquired. Importantly, field is 
an agonistic concept, being a ‘space of conflict and competition’ over power and 
resources; entry to the field is itself a source of struggle and new entrants bring 
tension and challenge. The limits of the field themselves are ‘always at stake’ 
(1989:39). A critical property of any field is its autonomy from external influences 
and its capacity to assert its own ‘criteria of evaluation’ over those of contiguous or 
encroaching fields (Wacquant, 2007).  
It is the interaction of habitus, capital and field through which practices are 
generated and structured, and which determines the logic and the representation of 
those practices. For Nash (2003:188) it is ‘almost as simple’ as this: ‘social 
structures, or social positions, generate socialized dispositions, and socialized 
dispositions generate practices’. A predisposition towards stability and reproduction 
is necessarily implied in Bourdieu’s account of the functioning of the habitus; an 
‘immediate fit’ between habitus and field, he says, is the ‘most prevalent one’ 
(Bourdieu, 1989:45). Indeed, the regulation and ordering of practices is often 
accomplished without the necessity of rules, practices being ‘objectively adapted to 





the operations necessary to attain them’. So much so, practices thus produced can 
appear to be ‘collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating 
action of a conductor’ (Bourdieu, 1977:72).  
Habitus is therefore the pivotal concept, linking the past and the present through 
dispositions already acquired, but carrying the genesis of change and transformation 
through dispositional responses to new encounters in the field; necessarily limiting 
the scope of agents but simultaneously providing scope for rational choice, agency 
and resistance. As Wacquant (2007) observes, the relationship between habitus and 
field is the key element of the concept, representing the meeting of disposition and 
position, but refusing to give primacy to either. Through his extensive writings and 
responses to critique, it seems incontrovertible that this form of soft determinism is 
what Bourdieu intended (Nash, 2003; Sweetman, 2003). However, the concept of 
habitus has been subject to the sustained criticism that it is reductive and 
deterministic, and I examine here the implications of this critique for the study of 
judicial culture.   
Sentencing research: the lost or forgotten habitus? 
The concept of habitus appears under-employed in judicial scholarship, considering 
its apparent potential for enriching our understanding of practice. The criticism that 
there is a tendency for habitus to be sprayed through academic texts like ‘intellectual 
hair-spray’, or ‘bestowing gravitas without doing any theoretical work’ (Reay, 
2004:432) does not have any obvious application to the field of sentencing research. 
However, it is notable that Bourdieu’s own influential examination of the juridical 
world (1987) suggests little of the dynamic relations in this field that can be read into 
the full scheme of his conceptual work, and may even invite the charge of latent 
determinism against which Bourdieu argued so forcibly. On the other hand, 
Bourdieu’s later work ‘The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary 
Society’ (1999), which includes interviews of magistrates among the accounts of 
those bearing witness to the suffering of others, explores some broader dimensions of 





study goes unremarked in sentencing scholarship. I consider here Bourdieu’s 
examination of the juridical field in these two studies in order to gain greater clarity 
about those dimensions of Bourdieu’s work which offer the greatest guidance for this 
study.  
‘The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) is a study of 
the juridical field which contains, inter alia, a classic account of the hegemonic 
function of the judiciary in the legal order. Advocating a ‘rigorous science of the 
law’ to overcome the dominant jurisprudential debate between formalism (the 
‘rigidified’ doctrine of legal scholars in which law is conceived as an autonomous 
and closed system) and instrumentalism (in which law is understood as an instrument 
of domination), Bourdieu calls into service the framework of habitus, field and 
capital to construct the ‘entire social universe’ neglected by these accounts: the 
juridical field. From the outset, the operation of this field is closely circumscribed by 
Bourdieu: 
‘[the] specific logic is determined by two factors: on the one hand, by the specific 
power relations which give it its structure and which order the competitive 
struggles…..that occur within it; and on the other hand, by the internal logic of 
juridical functioning which constantly constrains the range of possible actions and, 
thereby, limits the realm of specifically juridical solutions’.  
                                                                                                    (Bourdieu, 1987:816) 
As a social space, the juridical field is structured by a set of historical and objective 
relations between actors and is the site of competition over control of access to legal 
resources, technical competence, and over the right to ‘name’ or determine the law 
through legal interpretation; these are all forms of juridical capital. However, the 
struggle over power does not preclude the complementary exercise of the respective 
functions of legal actors; indeed, it serves as the basis of a ‘division of the labour of 
symbolic domination’ in which there is complicitous fulfilment of mutual needs by 
those actors. The ‘universalizing claims’ of law confer a transcendental appearance 
on juridical forms of discourse, and contribute to the production of an ‘ordered vision 





serves to heighten the effect of symbolic violence. Further, reflecting the influence of 
legal realism, Bourdieu notes the ‘extraordinary elasticity’ of legal forms (texts and 
judgements) which sometimes amounts to complete indeterminacy. This, he believes, 
enables judges to orient practice towards ‘a sort of casuistry of concrete situations’ in 
which the law presents itself as ‘ex post facto rationalization of decisions in which it 
had no part’ (1987:827). In this way, the arbitrary decision of the judge – which 
‘owes more to the ethical dispositions of the actors than to the pure norms of the law’ 
– contributes to the ‘collective work of sublimation’. This is the process whereby the 
decision is legitimated as the will of the law rather than the expression of the world-
view of the judge (1987:828). 
There is much in Bourdieu’s explanatory account of the juridical field that enriches 
and enlarges the study of the judiciary in the penal realm, and which can usefully be 
employed to frame some dimensions of the penal field and judicial practice. In 
particular, this account usefully captures and explains the competition for monopoly 
and the division of juridical (and judicial) labour, the power of ‘naming’ and its 
relevance to sentencing, the concept of ‘symbolic violence’, the nature of juridical 
capital, and the indeterminacy of judgement. And importantly, it captures the sense 
of judges’ broader commitments as part of an interpretive community committed to 
the legal project of coherence and legitimacy (see Kennedy, 1997; Halliday and 
Karpik, 1997). There are, however, two striking aspects of Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of the juridical field; firstly, the limited operation of the 
psychological or dispositional level of the habitus and the predominance of field and 
capital as the structuring forces of practice. Relatedly, there is very little sense of the 
agency of individual actors. These issues point to some limitations in the use of these 
concepts for this study.  
As Nash (2003) observes, concepts perform work; and if, as Bourdieu insists they 
should, actors can escape the structural determinist fate, then the work of the habitus 
– as an embodied set of dispositions - is to provide the grounds for agency and 
transformation through adaptive responses to new experiences, however limited 





cultural and structural features of society seem only to produce homogeneity of 
disposition among actors in the field, which neatly complements those dispositions 
of the holders of ‘worldly power in general’, habitus cannot do its work of providing 
the genesis of agency and change. As Bourdieu observes, the ‘parallelism of habitus’ 
which is quite evident among legal actors, tends to foster ‘kindred world-views’; it 
therefore ensures that the choices made by legal actors between competing interests 
and values are ‘unlikely to disadvantage the dominant forces’ (1987:842). Among 
the dominant legal actors in the field, he singles out judges whose membership of the 
dominant class is ‘universally noted’ and whose professional corps is largely united 
by ‘a universally accepted hierarchy and consensus concerning its role’. Although 
Bourdieu does insist elsewhere that the concept of habitus implies a predisposition 
towards stability and reproduction, there is, in this overly determined juridical field 
in which dispositions appear not so much embedded as cemented by social 
structures, little sense of the mechanisms by which the habitus could facilitate 
invention or adaptation, never mind resistance; there is no development of his early 
proposition that the juridical field ‘contains the principle of its own transformation’ 
(1987:817). In Bourdieu’s account, all action is directed towards competition and 
struggle over monopolies and the accumulation of capital through legal training and 
knowledge. The dynamics of the social field – such as processes or mechanisms of 
collaboration, consensus or disagreement - are nowhere discussed, and judges appear 
to operate with little reflexivity. Judicial independence, for example, is described as 
‘a kind of functional imperative’ which they employ ‘without even willing or 
realizing it’ (1987:830).13  
The static and deterministic model of agency employed in ‘The Force of Law’ leads 
others to minimise its usefulness for gaining insight about social relations in the legal 
field. As Valverde (2006) observes, Bourdieu’s model appears to have more to say 
about law as a field of capital accumulation and reproduction than about social 
relations in the law more broadly, or even about the specific form and mode of the 
reproduction of legal capital as opposed to any other sort; and it tells us little about 





generative effect beyond the field. It can be generally observed, however, that some 
broad concept of habitus, in the sense of a set of values and dispositions which 
incline judgement in a particular way, underpins much work in sentencing research, 
albeit mostly impliedly and not necessarily derived from Bourdieu’s conceptual 
framework.14 So, for example, the (largely US) tradition of judicial behavioural 
studies, geared towards the prediction of judgements and elimination of disparity, is 
premised on the idea that there is a rational and causal explanation of sentencing 
behaviour – derived from personal and political judicial preferences - which can be 
scientifically observed and measured. This seems impliedly to draw on an 
understanding of a shared set of dispositions and values. In similar fashion, but 
directly focused on the political dimension of judicial preferences and the 
implications for judicial neutrality, Griffith’s (1997) study of the English senior 
judiciary is underscored by explicit assumptions about the homogeneity of judicial 
dispositions according to class distinctions, and their determinative effect on 
judgement and neutrality. More generally, habitus is used to explain a certain level of 
sentencing consistency which arises from the shared social worlds of background, 
education and training (Hutton, 2003, 2006; Franko Aas, 2004; Beyens and Scheirs, 
2010) and to explain the slow adaptation of penal actors to change in the field 
(McNeill et al, 2009).  
Perhaps the most complete application of Bourdieu’s work to sentencing is that of 
Hutton (2003; 2006) who adopts the conceptual framework of habitus, field and 
capital to explore the ‘sociological distinctiveness’ of sentencing as a form of legal 
decision-making. In this account, the judicial habitus is constituted by a set of 
embedded, pre-conscious attitudes; this produces a shared judicial outlook which is 
‘unthinking and unreflective’, and is slow to adapt to new or altered circumstances. 
The largely patterned nature of sentencing is explained by homogeneity of 
background and training, along with a distinctive legal and court culture which 
reinforces these shared values; in fact, judges can conceive of no other way of acting, 
being ‘unaware that their motives, goals and aspirations are not spontaneous or 





accounts of their sentencing practice are mere post-hoc rationalizations of the 
‘unthinking common sense approach that becomes second nature to experienced 
judges’ (2006:163).15 Hutton also draws on the idea of cultural capital to explain 
judicial resistance to sentencing reform, particularly where it takes the form of 
attempts to limit discretion, and is understood as an attempt to retain cultural and 
symbolic power through ownership of legal knowledge in sentencing.  
Hutton’s account of the judicial habitus and of sentencing practice is grounded in 
Bourdieu’s broad conceptual framework and consistent with readings of Bourdieu’s 
work in which actors appear to have ‘no conscious mastery’ over their practice. In 
this way, judges are ‘influenced and almost driven by the values and expectations 
they get from the habitus’, and unable logically to explain their decision-making 
without resorting to taken-for-granted ideas and values (2006:163). Hutton 
acknowledges the limitations of Bourdieu’s approach, particularly its deterministic 
tendency, and notes the contingent nature of the habitus; that it can change but would 
be slow to do so.  
To take Hutton’s broad argument, it seems unassailable to observe that judges 
acquire habits of thought and ways of acting through socialization processes in 
practice, and that this tends towards homogeneity of disposition. This is, nonetheless, 
a static model of judicial action in relation to practice, which focuses on the 
homogeneity of judges and on the constraining and inhibiting effect of the habitus. 
There is little sense, for example, of any tension between the sanctioned ways of 
thinking and acting (as prescribed by the habitus) and the disposition of individuals 
to conform, or not. Moreover, it is unclear how historical change could be accounted 
for – or equally, how significant change could occur at any point in the future. 
Questions of agency are raised; are the processes of the habitus as deeply embedded 
and inevitable as suggested? If they are not so entrenched, under what conditions are 
judicial dispositions amenable to change and adaptation?  
King observes the irony that the reductiveness of the habitus is most evident in 





and as suggested here, the same observation could be made of its use in Force of Law 
(1987). If correct, the usefulness of habitus is limited; it is a concept which 
effectively captures and accounts for some processes of reproduction and stability in 
judicial practices, as a result of an inherent predisposition towards stability and 
reproduction. As Lane (2000) observes, if Bourdieu’s work is unable properly to 
account or even allow for the possibility of change, this would be a serious limitation 
indeed.16  
It was a source of frustration for Bourdieu’s that the concept of habitus was criticized 
for implying the very determinism that it was intended to overcome, and this 
criticism has certainly been sustained (see Brubaker, 1985; Jenkins, 1982; DiMaggio, 
1979; but for some defence see Harker, 2000; Calhoun, 1993; Ostrow, 2000). As 
Farnell (2000:401) notes, Bourdieu attempts to avoid determinism by suggesting that 
the habitus does not determine an individual’s conduct; it merely pre-disposes them 
to act in a certain way. And he continued to insist, particularly in his later work, that 
the concept of habitus could be used to show the ‘generative capacities of 
dispositions’ (1990b:55): 
…the habitus, like every ‘art of inventing’ is what makes it possible to produce an 
infinite number of practices that are relatively unpredictable (1990a:55) 
As Sweetman notes, the limits on this capacity for invention are set by the conditions 
and structure of the field in which the agent is operating, and by that individual’s 
history and prior experience (2003); in this way, the habitus is unlikely to produce 
either ‘unpredictable novelty’ or ‘simple mechanistical reproduction’ (1990a:55). 
The sense of adaptation and pragmatism that Bourdieu clearly intended for habitus is 
perhaps most evident in his use of the game metaphor. In this use, as a ‘feel for the 
game’ (1990b:61) Bourdieu conveys the sense of improvisation and adaptation 
within bounds - i.e. within the rules of the game - and the inter-relational dimension 
of practice that requires actors to respond to the state of play and adapt their 





 ‘The good player ….does at every moment what the game requires’ and this 
presupposes a ‘permanent capacity for invention [which is] indispensable if one is to 
be able to adapt to infinitely varied and never completely identical situation’. 
                                                                                                   (Bourdieu, 1990b:63)  
However, this objective is compounded by Bourdieu’s own logic of practice in which 
the dispositions instilled by the habitus are durable because they are habitual and 
unreflexive and ‘cannot even be made explicit’ (Bourdieu, 1977:94). This suggests 
serious limitations to the usefulness of habitus in explaining social change, as this 
writer, summarizing the broad basis of criticism, explains:17 
If the habitus were determined by objective conditions, ensuring appropriate action 
for the social position in which any individual was situated, and the habitus were 
unconsciously internalized dispositions and categories, then social change would be 
impossible. Individuals would act according to the objective structural conditions in 
which they found themselves, and they would consequently simply reproduce those 
objective conditions by repeating the same practices. 
                                                                                                          (King, 2000:427) 
The reflexive judge revisited 
One way through this impasse is to recognize the ambivalence of the concept of 
habitus as theory but take seriously Bourdieu’s injunction to employ this conceptual 
framework additionally as method; here, its usefulness for empirical work which has 
as one focus of its enquiry the capacity of institutions for change becomes more 
evident. Bourdieu’s sociological ambition for The Weight of the World: Social 
Suffering in Contemporary Society (1999) is to take personal stories about ‘the 
apparently most subjective tensions of the social world and their contradictions’ and 
show how they frequently ‘articulate the deepest structures of the social world and 
their contradictions’ (1999:511). Bourdieu et al realise this aim by drawing on 
narrative accounts from a diverse range of individuals to demonstrate and explain the 
human impact of the neoliberal restructuring of the economy.18 Within the volume of 
forty-eight interviews there are two narrative accounts of magistrates, providing 





Couldry (2005) notes that Bourdieu’s work prior to The Weight of the World has 
drawn criticism for neglecting the voice of the individual; this makes the emphasis he 
places here on the ‘evidential value’ of the narrative accounts more remarkable. 
Earlier in this chapter I drew attention to Bourdieu’s theory of practice which 
reserved to the researcher alone the capacity to reflect on social structures and 
conditions of possibility in the social world. Here in The Weight of the World is the 
first indication of a revision in Bourdieu’s account of the reflexive capacity of 
individuals: 
…..situated at points where social structures ‘work’, and therefore worked over by 
the contradictions of these structures, these individuals are constrained, in order to 
live or to survive, to practice a kind of self-analysis, which often gives them access to 
the objective contradictions which have them in their grasp, and to the objective 
structures expressed in and by these contradictions.  
                                                                          (Bourdieu, 1999:511, my emphasis) 
He continues later: 
Certain interviews bear numerous traces of the respondents’ attempts to master the 
constraints contained within the situation by showing that they are capable of taking 
in hand their own objectification and of adopting towards themselves the reflexive 
point of view that is inherent in the very conception of the research.  
                                                                                            (1999:616, my emphasis)  
Bourdieu observes that not all individuals have this capacity of insight about, or 
access to, the ‘core principles of their discontent or their malaise’. Moreover, without 
intending to mislead, their ‘spontaneous declarations’ may be capable of different 
interpretations (1999: 620). Bourdieu has not thrown too much reflexive caution to 
the wind here, despite some claims to the contrary. Although he develops a 
methodological position - ‘participant objectification’ - which involves balancing 
objectivity with close identification of the participant’s perspective, he continues to 
insist on objective rigour.19 
As with Bourdieu’s discussion about the research benefits which accrue from 
‘homologies of position’, the significance of this revision goes surprisingly 





for this study of judicial culture and sensibilities.20 Although, as Nash (2003) notes, 
the formal concept of habitus is almost invisible in The Weight of the World, its place 
as the generative site of dispositions appears unchanged.  
If we consider again Bourdieu’s earlier statement that the dispositions instilled in the 
individual by the habitus are durable because they are habitual and unreflexive and 
‘cannot even be made explicit’ (Bourdieu, 1977:94), some implications of this new 
position become clearer. In this earlier reading of practice, the common-sense 
notions of practice and of social reality on which agents tend to rely amount to a 
form of false consciousness. However, if agents (such as judges) in fact have the 
capacity to reflect on some of the ‘objective contradictions’ they face, and are 
capable of ‘taking in hand their own objectification’ – recalling here that this task, 
usually the preserve of the scholar, entails reflecting on the conditions of their own 
possibility and on the taken for granted categories of thought and perception - then 
reflexivity of this sort could be the genesis of change and transformation of the 
judicial habitus. 21 
Conclusion 
The usefulness of the conceptual framework of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and 
habitus, field and capital for studying judicial culture and sensibilities can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, it provides a ‘middle ground’ between subjectivism 
and objectivism for exploring the personal accounts of judicial actors. By insisting 
that the structures and causes of social phenomena – such as the punishment practice 
of sentencing - are located in objective relations in which neither mental nor social 
structures alone determine action or practice (i.e. neither agency nor structure), 
habitus facilitates two important dimensions of this study of judicial culture. Firstly, 
it brings to the fore the question of how and where an individual’s dispositions are 
formed (Couldry, 2005) but also addresses some questions of power and structures 
which narrative research sometimes overlooks. In addition, it provides a flexible 
framework for exploring judges’ accounts of experience and practice, encompassing 





consideration of both limitations and possibilities of the judicial role, particularly in 
relation to some of the parameters of judicial discretion.  
Secondly, in accordance with Bourdieu’s broad challenge to inherited categories of 
thought, it renders the ‘taken-for-granted’ problematic’ (Reay, 2004:437) and 
challenges certain reified accounts of the judicial role – ‘master narratives’ such as 
judicial independence - in which practices have some external meaning and reality 
beyond the actings of agents. Further, in the concept of symbolic violence – the 
subtle process by which dominant groups mask the arbitrary and conditional nature 
of their power through the ‘subtle imposition of systems of meaning’ (Wacquant, 
2007) – there is a profound challenge to the forms, functions and meanings of 
judicial discourse, with some obvious application to the idea of sentencing as a 
signifying process. Judge’s narrative accounts of judicial life cannot be exempted 
from this process.  
Moreover, awareness of the embedded nature of dispositions – acquired through an 
individual’s history in the field and the product of both early and subsequent 
influences – directs our attention to those institutional features of the judiciary which 
produce and reinforce homogeneity of disposition. Importantly, it also alerts us to 
those accounts which tell a different story, and prompts curiosity about the meanings 
and effects of some different individual histories and career trajectories; this 
dimension is central to the biographical narrative accounts of judicial careers 
explored here. Indeed, the concept of habitus promotes the historicity of accounts, as 
integral to how they shape the present and the future ‘habits’ of actors. Bourdieu 
explains it thus: 
Why did I revive that old word? Because with the notion of habitus you can refer to 
something that is close to what is suggested by the idea of habit, while differing 
from it in one important respect. The habitus, as the word implies, is that which one 
has acquired, but which has become durably incorporated in the body in the form of 
permanent dispositions. So the term constantly reminds us that it refers to something 
historical, linked to individual history, and that it belongs to a genetic mode of 
thought, as opposed to essentialist modes of thought…. 





Finally, habitus provides a valuable framework for the exploration of the ‘immediate 
fit’ between judicial culture and the penal field in routine, everyday practice, and of 
the circumstances in which that fit may not be so settled. Herein lie valuable insights 
about the conditions and processes of penal change – as well as continuity and 
reproduction – with implications for sentencing reform.  
In the next chapter, I explore the judges’ accounts of their early years as lawyers and 
judges for what they suggest about the formation and shaping of the judicial habitus 
and individual sensibilities. These narratives provide insight about social class, 
judicial diversity, the status of criminal legal work, judicial conduct and training.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The concept of judicial dispositions or sensibilities about crime and punishment is an artificial 
though necessary abstraction: the range of human dispositions cannot easily be cabined within a 
‘punishment’ frame of reference, however broadly defined, nor can the term ‘judicial’ adequately 
contain only those sensibilities arising in the course of judicial work. 
2 In an insightful yet curious aside, Bourdieu explains his ‘pragmatic’ relationship with texts and 
authors; he describes turning to them as ‘people you can ask to give you a hand in difficult times’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987:28). This possibly overlooks the combative relationship also much in evidence.  
3 Reay (2004) uses the concept of habitus to explore educational issues and in particular to examine 
‘small’ research contexts such as classrooms, staffrooms and playgrounds. This is entirely consistent 
with Bourdieu’s own conception and intended use of the idea: 
‘The summum of the art, in social science, is, in my eyes, to be capable of engaging very high ‘theoretical’ stakes 
by means of very precise and often very mundane empirical objects……..in [the] capacity to constitute socially 
insignificant objects into scientific objects…or what amounts to the same thing, to approach a major socially 
significant object in an unexpected manner’. (Bourdieu, 1989:51) 
As Nash (2003) observes, the school is an important object of attention as a site of social reproduction 
and for the transfer of cultural and social capital.  
4 For Bourdieu, ‘research without theory is blind and theory without research is empty’ (Wacquant, 
1989:5). His aversion to theory for its own sake is well documented: 
I need not give examples of these endless and unassailable ‘conceptual melting pots’ of neologisms, refurbished 
categories, and pseudo-theorems, generally closed by a call for future research and empirical application, 
preferably by others… (Wacquant, 1989:50). 
5 Continuing this metaphor, Nash (2003:188) regards habitus as the ‘Swiss army knife’ of the 
sociological toolkit.  
6 Bourdieu develops this approach in trenchant opposition to simplistic positivistic methods. For 
Kenway and McLeod (2004) his failure to acknowledge the extensive challenge already posed to 
those methods by sociology and post-structural scholarship, particularly by feminist and post-colonial 





                                                                                                                                          
7 Bourdieu has in mind here scholarly discourse about particular topics – with clear relevance to the 
judiciary - but his observation is correspondingly apt in relation to judicial accounts of practice. 
8 He expresses this outlook less mechanistically in his later work The Weight of the World (1999) as 
the task of understanding i.e. ‘seeing’, and explaining points of view. 
9 This omission is significant because proper names and cases tend to evoke and summarize a ‘whole 
system of previous information’; what is thereby excluded from the account is the agent’s entire 
‘universe of reference’ (Bourdieu, 1977:18). 
10 In his study of the academic and education world in Distinction (1979) and of the art world in The 
Logic of Practice (1990), Bourdieu shows that the theoretical distortions which arise from this 
‘intellectualist tendency’ are not the sole preserve of anthropology.  
11 These concepts are ‘troubled’ because of the structural contradictions and tensions which form the 
context of liberalism in western societies. I consider this more fully in Chapter 7 in relation to 
Norrie’s concept of the ‘penal equation’. 
12 In sentencing scholarship, this is usually part of the broad critique of indeterminacy in sentencing. 
Duff and Garland (1994:17) for example describe the reasoning process of judicial sentencing as 
‘homespun compromises between different goals which would not stand up to close philosophical 
scrutiny’. Some writers acknowledge the compromises of principle involved in criminal justice 
practice (see Duff and Garland, 1994; Duff, 2005; Tata 1997) 
13 It may be, as Villegas (2004) argues, that Bourdieu’s account of the juridical field should be 
understood as reflecting the particular disciplinary debates between lawyers and sociologists that exist 
in France, and which are grounded in a specific form of political domination through law that is 
characteristic in France; he argues that the limitations of Bourdieu’s model should be read in this light. 
Wacquant (1989:30) is critical of this sort of ‘intellectual ethnocentrism – the inclination to refract 
Bourdieu through the prism of native sociological lenses’. The force of this criticism presumably still 
applies to its use in a French context.  
14 Lane (2000:41) traces the etymological derivation of habitus to Aristotle who used it in its original 
form of hexis to denote simply ‘habit’. Bourdieu, however, borrowed the term from Mauss who used 
it to describe the ways social conventions became incorporated into people’s deportment and 
dispositions. 
15 Hutton (2006) usefully draws attention to the malign effect that these ‘common-sense’ notions can 
have when used uncritically to inform judgements about lifestyles and social conditions of offenders; 
these ideas, he observes, are no more than socially constructed values and classifications. 
16 Even favourable critics such as Couldry (2005) and Fowler (1996) concede that there is a tendency 
in Bourdieu’s work to focus on the natural ‘fit’ of the habitus rather than search for ‘the norm that 
might provoke us into developing an alternative theory’ (Couldry, 2005:357).  
17 This is endlessly recursive and as King (2000:427) notes, represents something of a reduction ab 
absurdum: individuals are unaware of their own habitus and so cannot reflect or re-interpret their 
practice in response to new circumstances; but new situations would not occur because everyone else 
is unknowingly reproducing their own practices. 
18 In so doing they achieve the linkage of the personal and the public which neo-liberalism often 
obscures (Frank, 2002).     
19 As Couldry notes, Bourdieu is at pains to distinguish journalistic or popular accounts – which 
include individual’s own ‘de-contextualised’ accounts - from fully sociological treatment of individual 
narratives. The former are still ‘doxic’ accounts which the researcher requires to objectify (2005:362). 
The researcher is not quite yet redundant. 
20 It is surprising the number of scholarly articles about habitus which do not consider this major text 





                                                                                                                                          
21 There is a danger in making the habitus carry the explanatory load of any social phenomena (Nash, 






Chapter 5 Twentieth Century Judging 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 I drew on some of the key insights about the judiciary which are 
suggested by the sociology of punishment. In particular, the mutually constitutive 
relationship between culture and punishment prompts interest in the judge as both the 
receiver and the bearer of cultural values about justice and morality, carrying some 
visions of the ‘good society’. In this chapter, I explore the judges’ accounts of early 
experiences in the criminal court. We gain insight about the place of crime in that 
society, and begin to trace the emergent push and pull of the habitus on the fledgling 
judges. 
Section 1 The early years: judicial ‘influences 
The historical context 
Most of the judges interviewed for this project qualified as lawyers and gained their 
pre-judicial experience in the middle years of the century, before some of the key 
political and constitutional developments of the 1970s and later years. In terms of 
criminal justice and legal reform, these middle years represent the period before the 
introduction of legal aid for persons accused of crime – hence references to the 
‘Poor’s Law’ – and before the abolition of the death penalty. It is tempting, in 
criminological terms, also to locate this period of criminal justice history as the calm 
before the (assumed) penological storm of the 1970s and beyond. However, I avoid 
constructing this period in advance solely as a point of comparison or foil in relation 
to the better documented period of penal policy which follows it (Loader and Sparks, 
2004). In any event, having learned in my earlier interviews about the futility of 
presenting to practitioners neatly theorized notions about some (presumed) dominant 
ethos or concept such as ‘penal populism’, I hoped to keep open some of the 
empirical questions about continuity and change. This was made easier by the fact 
that all of the judges I interviewed were practitioners across these periods of time 





A story has no beginning or end: arbitrarily one chooses that moment of experience 
from which to look back or from which to look ahead.         
                                                                     (Graham Greene, The End of the Affair) 
When invited to reflect on his life and legal career up to the point when he was 
appointed to the bench, Judge A began at the very beginning: 
I was born on [date of birth] in [x town] in the kitchen. And I was an only child, and 
as I’ve told you, my mother was a [names occupation] and my father was a [names 
occupation]. And I had a very happy childhood, went to […] Academy, got into 
Glasgow University without any great difficulty, but without any great genius … 
My question was aimed at the exploration of influences or formative experiences 
which the judges perceived to be important to the development of their later judicial 
‘personality’, but the more common ‘beginning’ from which most participants started 
was the period of their early legal training and experience in one of the two branches 
of the profession (solicitor or advocate). To the extent that my question to this 
participant contained any underlying assumption of some direct correspondence 
between personal background and judicial ‘values’, this may have been ill-
conceived.   
Decades of scholarship searching for the holy grail of sentencing – a causal 
explanation of judicial behaviour that can predict outcomes – seem mostly to confirm 
that the range of personal and social factors, as well as the political and public 
pressures, that influence judicial behaviour is complex and not reducible to simple 
assumptions. Research on the influence of social background variables on judicial 
decision-making finds few direct relationships (Sisk et al, 1998). Moreover, there is 
little evidence that the decision-making of female judges differs significantly from 
men (Davis et al, 1993; Boyd et al, 2010)1. Recent studies in the US also suggest that 
political orientation has much less influence than expected (Tamanaha, 2010).  
The judicial habitus 
The operation of the judicial habitus is central to criminological discourse and 
understandings about the judicial role in sentencing in ways that I outlined in 





leads to assumptions that vested interests or ingrained ways of thinking influence 
sentencing practice. This understanding informs many historical and contemporary 
accounts of penality, and is also reflected in sentencing research. Of some 
significance, then, is the suggestion that the sentencing practices of judges are 
‘governed more by their legal training and legal socialization than by their socially 
structured personal experiences’ (Steffensmier and Hebert, 1999:1187). This directs 
us to the operation of the judicial habitus and to the ways in which the individual’s 
history in the field of practice – their training and socialization - is central to the 
formation of ‘durable dispositions’. How do judges acquire the ‘feel for the game’, 
particularly in relation to judicial conduct and sentencing practice? How are the 
norms and values of the group communicated between individual members? What 
are the processes of collaboration and the ways of achieving consensus or handling 
disagreement? 
Becoming an advocate: ‘What you bring to the Bar’ 
In relation to my possibly ill-conceived question to Judge A about the influence of 
background on judging, it nonetheless appeared that family background was to play a 
significant role in which branch of the profession an individual entered, and which 
therefore directed the form of legal training they gained. Judge A, for example, did 
not have the independent income necessary to pursue his preferred career at the 
Scottish Bar so instead qualified as a solicitor and obtained a position in civil 
practice where he remained until his appointment as a Sheriff. 2  
Judge B, by contrast, become an advocate in 1955 and in the course of his career at 
the Bar gained extensive experience in criminal law. He served as an Advocate 
Depute for seven years and as Solicitor-General for 5 years. In the early years, 
however, having sufficient means but an ‘absence of background’ meant he received 
more instructions in what he called the ‘sewer’s end’ of an advocate’s range of 
briefs: criminal work. Prior to the account which follows about his early career 
experiences at the Bar, I had asked him what kind of influences had led him to 
orientate his legal career in the direction of criminal work rather than the civil work 





Well, … it’s not so much that, it’s just that it depends on what…what you bring to 
the Bar. When you come to the Bar, if your father was …an advocate, a judge, a 
sheriff, or a solicitor, in Edinburgh that tends to be so […]. And so you come along 
and on the first day you’re bombarded with briefs, you see, from your father’s or 
grandfather’s old chums. Or there’s an old school tie kind of thing. Those of us who 
didn’t come with advantages of that particular kind……you got a different kind of 
start to life, and so the highly, highly paid work, for example, was work like 
planning, trust work and working for the defenders in reparation cases-insurance 
companies, and the other work was less well paid, it was legal aid work […………..] 
So, you tended to work with people who were doing that end of the thing, the 
sewer’s end, the criminal end, that’s what happened, that was why you went into that 
particular thing. Whereas someone, say a chap like say [Lord X] I’m just taking him 
as a good example, an excellent man […]. I had a great admiration for him, but I 
don’t think he ever appeared in a criminal court at all until he was a judge. And of 
course his father was a member of the House of Lords and a well-known judge, and 
that was a good example. And he was also a very able bloke, so he did valuation for 
rating, he did trust busting, he did this that and the next thing. So … but the idea of 
him appearing for the pursuer in a case of a man falling of a ladder, it just couldn’t 
enter his consciousness. 
He explained that what led him into criminal work was an ‘absence of background’: 
So I guess it gave you a very different feel for the thing. You see, if you started life 
with a silver spoon in the sense - and I’m not trying to say that we had enormous 
disadvantages - but if you came as the son and grandson and great-grandson, like the 
Hopes, for example, or the Camerons, or the Johnsons etc. etc., then you almost 
inevitably went into that side of the thing. Whereas if you started life…….. I mean, I 
was called to the bar on Friday and appeared in the High Court on behalf of a man 
charged with a bank robbery on Monday. That was not something that happened to 
somebody whose great grandfather was a well-known WS [Writer to the Signet – a 
private lawyer’s society] in the 18th, 19th century.[…]… Part of my background 
was an absence of background, because I didn’t have the tradition of coming from a 
family that was deeply immersed in the work of the Court of Session. 
Notwithstanding these apparently entrenched social factors, Judge B also drew 
attention to some of the social changes which changed the character of the Bar after 
the Second World War: 
Until the Second World War, the catchment area from which the Bar drew its new 
members was again very limited. It was rather like the English Bar system tended to 
be from a much longer period. It drew people in who went to public schools and to, 
in my time and before that, it was a tradition to send [….].. for a lawyer to send his 
son to an English public school, and then to Oxford or Cambridge and then to 
Edinburgh or Glasgow; one of them. So, a lot of people came up through that 
particular route. It was quite different to mine. So there was that - if you didn’t come 
from that particular background then you came up with different people. Now, until 
the war, that was the way it was. But when the war came to an end there were two 
features; one was financial, one was social. First of all, a lot of people who would 





people who went to the public schools and universities like Oxford and Cambridge 
and were going to go to the Bar and so on, and they said well if he can do it, I can. 
And secondly, when you were discharged from the army, after you’d been in for five 
or six years, people like [x and y] etc. etc.; these people got what was in those days a 
substantial grant. […….] Plus, you didn’t earn very much at the beginning, 
particularly if you were one of the - one of my friends called them the shirtless ones 
- you arrived without this kind of strong backing. It took a long time to make money. 
There was no civil legal aid at all until 1949, there was no legal aid in criminal cases 
until 1966 [……], so if you came to the Bar without substantial background of the 
kind I’ve been figuring, then it was going to be tough. But these - the people who 
came after the war -1947, ’48 onwards – we had quite a lot of them in without that 
kind of background, and it changed the whole character of the bar. 
According to this account, these social changes brought changes in outlook: 
The character of the judiciary is much changed. They’re much younger. It’s less 
hidebound. Again, there’s a tendency, it’s nothing to do with the law itself, but there 
was a kind of colonial attitude. A lot of the people who were judges when I was 
young or were senior counsel when I started, they were people who came from legal 
families, professional families from Edinburgh, who had gone to English public 
schools and later to Oxford […….] a great many of them, so there was a kind of 
colonial boy attitude to the Scots middle classes. To be properly educated you had to 
go to an English public school and an English University. That was very much a 
class attitude. 
Judge D also pointed to changes in the social composition of the Bar which he 
thought had occurred since his own early days as an advocate. He believed there was 
now ‘a great mix’: 
One thing that I can say I have noticed …I don’t want to point at any particular 
individuals but, over the last thirteen years the….the bits of society, shall we put it, 
from which judges are drawn has changed quite significantly. I suppose in the past 
there was a mixture of people who went to…well, I think they were called public 
schools, and there were some grammar school pupils like myself, but…I’m talking 
not about the schools, but about the… the background of the individual. And when 
you think of it, that James MacKay’s [former Scottish judge and Lord Chancellor] 
father was a……was he not a signalman? I think he was. And I can think of one 
Senator [High Court judge] who says - and this is correct – that he was born and 
brought up in a Glasgow tenement, and there’s one who says that he lives in the New 
Town, but it’s the new town of East Kilbride. I mean, there’s a great mix now, which 
is completely different in feel from the mix there was at the time when I was called 
to the bar. I’ve tried not to be…I’m not wanting to be snobby when I’m talking 
about this…..but the background of people is so very different.  
I asked Judge D what impact he thought this would have on the judiciary over time. 
His reply seemed to be unequivocal about the benefits of diversity, but left some 





Well, I think it’s all…it’s all for the good. I think it’s all to the good. And…it’s 
inevitable, I think, and even – for a small group like the judiciary - that people tend 
to home in and be friendly with people who have similar tastes, similar backgrounds 
to themselves. That’s fine. I don’t think it develops into any sort of…difficulty, 
ostracism, anything like that, but it’s inevitable people will tend to go towards 
people that they feel they’ve got most in common with.’ 
Diversity 
There is limited evidence of any direct correspondence between the background of 
individuals and judicial decision-making – at least, any which is capable of empirical 
evaluation. However, the demographic composition of the judiciary, whether 
conceived in terms of gender, race, religion and education or less tangentially in 
terms of social and political attitudes, raises a number of central issues about the 
nature of judicial authority in a democracy. There is an important tension between 
the argument for judicial diversity and the principle of judicial impartiality and 
neutrality, if the argument for diversity is premised on the argument that female 
judges, those from ethnic minorities, or judges with particular religious beliefs would 
or should decide differently in ways which reflect any partisan interests they may 
feel they represent. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the ‘social legitimacy’ argument most commonly 
employed by those promoting greater diversity is carefully argued on several levels 
which make no such assumptions. This is the argument that there should be equality 
of opportunity for those eligible to apply for judicial appointment; that greater 
judicial diversity allows a wider range of voices and attitudes to be heard in relation 
to critical legal and moral issues; and that the public may lose confidence in a 
judiciary which is not seen to reflect society (Report of the Advisory Panel, 2010). 
The demographic features of the group of judges interviewed here meant that there 
was an insufficient pool of retired female judges from which to gain insight of their 
experiences. Moreover, their very limited number meant that they could be readily 
identified and thus could not be offered anonymity. Several judges, however, sought 
to emphasise that in the course of their careers the judiciary had become more 
diverse and offered examples in relation to social background, education and gender. 





means they must also deny that these more diverse backgrounds could imply a 
‘different’ kind of judging. As Berns (1999) notes, it is ‘deeply radical and 
subversive to wish for a voice for otherness in adjudication’: this represents ‘a 
profoundly dangerous game (1999: 33). 
In this way, all judges expressed the view that greater diversity shouldn’t make a 
difference to the nature of judging. Judge J expressed the view of most of his 
colleagues when asked what might be the impact of greater diversity on the bench: 
I would hope none at all. They obey the law whatever it is, whatever their 
background. From time to time they say ‘Wouldn’t it be good if we had more of this 
type of judge?’ What do they anticipate? That they would decide differently? I don’t 
think that can be right. There perhaps was a tendency in the early days to give 
women more family cases. That was my impression, in the early days, but by and 
large they’re just exactly the same.  
 Judge D’s account is also typical, detailing the benefits for the judiciary of greater 
diversity but treading carefully through the tensions outlined above: making the 
broad ‘social legitimacy’ case for diversity but rejecting a connection with any 
particular set of values.  
I think it’s partly the presentation of the judiciary as a whole, whether it’s females or 
whether it’s people from other backgrounds, and also it’s the effect of the ideas that 
each of them may have will tend to become…. it’s cross fertilisation. But I’m not in 
favour of giving particular preference to particular groups, let alone saying that for a 
particular case we must have somebody who is black on the bench for this particular 
case or…I think it’s quite, quite wrong, because that is an insult to the judicial 
qualities of the members of the judiciary, that they cannot cope without being from a 
particular background. But the fact is …the rest of the background is good for us all. 
The approach of Judge B reflected the ‘strict equality’ approach to greater diversity: 
We shouldn’t go out looking for diversity. We certainly shouldn’t place any barriers 
in their way by virtue of their background and if people can cross the moats and 
jump the hurdles, they should be allowed in, by all means. 
This was echoed by Judge D in relation to female judges: 
I think it’s a jolly good idea. Totally in favour of it. I think it’s probably been good, 
good for all concerned. […………………] There’s absolutely no reason why it 
shouldn’t become 50:50 or even the other way round in the course of time, but you 





Judge C was more open to other ways of encouraging wider membership: 
I’m very pleased to see the average age of the judiciary is much lower, and more 
women, especially. Not enough, but many more ladies. It hasn’t worked out as it 
should have. There was the whole thing about letting people go part-time, to 
encourage ladies with children of school age. And that has happened with some, but 
not nearly enough. 
He also pointed to the more rapid inclusion of female judges which had happened 
elsewhere in the world: 
For public confidence in the justice system, there’s got to be a much wider and more 
diverse view. And it’s happened throughout the world, and in the United States, 
France and places like that which are nothing like our system. Their system is 
through the meritocracy of university performance, the European system. But the 
American system is similar to our system, but it just developed in a different way 
because of the attitudes to women at a much earlier stage than here.  But I think it’s 
very important. 
The optimism of these accounts - of perceived changes in the social composition and 
‘character’ of the Bar and of the judiciary over the course of their lifetimes, and the 
natural evolution argument - is not borne out by the evidence in the UK. There is a 
lack of systematic or substantial study of judicial diversity, but the evidence which 
exists suggests that senior judges are still overwhelmingly privately educated, white 
men from a select number of universities, and points to the ongoing structural 
discrimination and exclusion of women and ethnic minorities and other social groups 
(Thomas, 2005; Rackley, 2007; Feenan, 2008). The lack of data relating to the 
judiciary in Scotland is striking, though a brief reading of the profiles of Senators of 
the College of Justice on the Judiciary of Scotland website (Judiciary of Scotland) 
suggests the same pattern observed elsewhere.  
More recently, some of the calls for a more representative judiciary draw attention to 
ways in which symbolically masculine images of judges, judging and judicial 
authority are embedded in our collective imagination, and may contribute to the 
exclusion of women (Rackley, 2007; Feenan, 2008).3 This is reflected in the recent 
tentative admission from Lord Neuberger, formerly Master of the Rolls in England 
and Wales (head of the civil courts) that there might be a subconscious expectation 





… having an image of a judge with … male-type qualities and a male appearance. 
I'm not saying we do have that but there's a risk that we do and it’s difficult to know 
how to cater for it. (Guardian, 2013) 
Kennedy (1997) observed that masculinity is symbolically embodied in the mythical 
role models of the judge – God, the King, Solomon - and Berns (1999) notes our 
continuing infatuation with the superhero judge such as Dworkin’s Hercules`. The 
extent to which this myth is gendered is evident when semiotically contrasted with 
models of female virtue or power such as Mother or the Greek Sybil. Increasingly, 
the concept of ‘difference’ in relation to female judges is regarded as grounded in 
‘dangerous and unanswerable myths’ (Rackley, 2009:15) and commentators draw 
attention to the dangers of gender essentialism, such as the idea that female judges 
might bring qualities of greater care to the work. Berns (1999) turns the question of 
female ‘difference’ on its head and wonders aloud: perhaps male judges are the 
problem, persuading us they speak of universal values and objective rationality – but 
all along, they have simply been speaking as men? There is also the recent challenge 
to conventional assumptions of the gender neutrality of written judgements and the 
construction of ‘facts’ around which they are framed (Hunter et al, 2010). 
The social legitimacy argument expressed in the accounts here is the basis for the 
continuing, and increasingly mainstream calls for greater judicial diversity. However, 
the lack of systematic research about the composition of the Scottish judiciary is 
exacerbated by the lack of dissemination of such information as is available. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that these somewhat rose-tinted accounts of judicial 
diversity, even when seemingly well-disposed towards greater diversity, do not 
reflect the empirical evidence. Moreover, there is a sense in which these explanations 
represent ‘attempts at persuasion’ (Ochberg, 1996:97) by advancing the ‘social 
legitimacy’ argument outlined above. This institutional narrative is also the basis of 
judicial legitimacy – that judges should reflect but not represent particular groups in 
society. However, if this debate is to be informed by evidence about the current 
composition of the judiciary, there is an urgent need for systematic evaluation and 





Rights of audience 
To an extent, the hierarchies of power already suggested in the accounts above are 
also reflected in the profession’s arrangements for the governance of conflicts by 
selected agents. Bourdieu (1987:835) explains the operation of the legal monopoly: 
Legal qualifications comprise a specific power that allows control of entry into the 
juridical field by deciding which conflicts deserve entry, and determining the 
specific form in which they must be clothed to be constituted as properly legal 
arguments. Such qualifications alone can provide the necessary resources to 
accomplish the work of construction which, through selection of the pertinent 
categories, allows reality to be reduced to the useful fiction we term its juridical 
definition.  
In this way, the rights of audience held by sections of the profession, and the 
sentencing powers of the various levels of courts help to construct and define the 
conflict in ways which reinforce divisions of power. Thus, until 1991 advocates in 
Scotland held a monopoly over rights of audience in the High Court of Justiciary 
(and in civil cases, the Court of Session). These hierarchies of power in relation to 
higher and lower courts may also contribute to shared meanings in which disputes in 
‘lower’ courts are deemed petty and professionally less challenging, and the ‘higher’ 
courts are considered the sites of real power and of ‘real’ crime (Harrington and 
Yngvesson, 1990).  
It is relevant to note that these distinctions between higher and lower levels of court 
have an inverse relationship to their operational and statistical dimensions in 
Scotland, the higher courts dealing with (proportionally) a very small number of 
cases and the lower courts handling the vast majority of all criminal cases. 
Commentators also note the increasingly ‘social services’ function of judges in the 
lower courts, and the increasing division between the levels of judicial functions 
between this ‘social services’ function and the increasingly constitutional role of 
judges in the higher courts in the checking and balancing of executive and 
parliamentary power (Malleson, 1997). Judge H recalled another significant change 
in the appointment of judges to the High Court in the course of his career: 
There is one good thing. It is less political now who becomes a judge. At all levels, I 
suppose, but I was thinking really of the top boys. They used to be really political 





political figure and they had been Advocate Deputes as a result of their political 
leanings. That was very unhelpful, I think. You got slightly lower value people. It’s 
much more of a meritocracy now which is a very good thing. The people who went 
into politics used to be the people who weren’t making it at the Bar.  
Section 2 The emerging habitus 
Criminal Advocacy and The ‘Poor’s Roll’ 
The tradition of providing free legal assistance in Scotland can be traced as far back 
as 1424 when it was formally instituted via the ‘Poor’s Roll’. This was a scheme 
under which solicitors and advocates gave free legal assistance and representation in 
court to people of limited means who were admitted to the ‘Poor’s Roll’. This 
arrangement subsisted until 1964 when criminal legal aid was introduced.4 The 
‘Poor’s Roll’ featured in many of the judges’ accounts of their early experience in 
criminal law, before the introduction of legal aid.  
Judge F became an advocate in 1960 and practised at the Bar for 12 years before 
appointment as a Sheriff. His practice involved almost exclusively civil work. To 
gain criminal experience he did some High Court jury trials on an unpaid basis, ‘as a 
matter of public duty’. Here he recalls the ad hoc nature of criminal work at that time 
before the introduction of legal aid: 
When I started, when I joined the Bar, if I had nothing in my diary – and there was 
nothing in the diary most days - I might go through to Glasgow just to hang around 
the High Court to see if anyone needed a defence advocate. That was the normal 
thing to do if you had no work here and if you wanted experience – I had no 
experience – if you wanted experience, you would go to Glasgow and do your best 
to represent someone.[…] Solicitors would be around to see who was there, or you 
would do it through your clerk in Edinburgh – just arrange that so and so in Glasgow 
was probably looking for an advocate. Or you could go through by prior 
arrangement but it was all really informal, because there was no legal aid. 
Detecting some ambivalence about this area of work, I asked him if criminal work 
interested him. His answer suggested the distinctions sometimes drawn between civil 
and criminal work – the former regarded as more intellectually demanding and hence 
more prestigious:  
Not particularly, no. No. […….] With civil work, you had to do a tremendous 
amount of research – I don’t think they do so much nowadays. But you had to do a 





especially in conveyancing. Crime, trials, jury trials? Well, I suppose there was a 
challenge to try and influence the jury, but………ah, the sorts of cases that a young 
advocate would get are the ones where there really is very little defence. 
And….well, I would say... no, it was … em … an experience rather than a matter of 
interest. 
Judge E qualified as a solicitor in private practice in 1959 and initially undertook 
civil work. However, unlike most of his peers he was interested in criminal work and 
the Poor’s Roll thus offered some opportunity to gain experience: 
[…] and then I was asked to go on to the Poor’s Roll in Edinburgh. […] What it was: 
there were 7 of us, duty solicitors, doing it, and somebody dropped out of it, and 
there was a meeting to sort it out and I was the only one who turned up at it because 
there was little interest in crime. 
Judge E’s interest in crime led to a lengthy career as a prosecutor before eventually 
becoming a Sheriff. What had been a vice for Sheriff F [in relation to the perceived 
lack of complexity in criminal work] was for Sheriff E a virtue: 
I enjoyed the civil work but I don’t know…..I always felt crime….it didn’t take so 
long and it was neatly wrapped up each time. 
Judge D became an advocate in the early 1960s and practiced almost exclusively in 
civil law. He served three years as an Advocate Depute in the Crown Office 
[prosecuting counsel in the High Court]. When I asked him how much criminal work 
he had done before taking up this appointment, his answer suggested the influence of 
his Clerk over his range of work:   
Practically none. I remember as a very new junior person called to the bar, only a 
matter of weeks old, I was thrown into Glasgow High Court. And I did occasionally 
appear for the Poor’s Roll, pre-legal aid, and after a number of years I did a very, 
very few summary cases – road traffic cases, very few. My clerk disapproved of that 
sort of work, didn’t think it was the kind of work I should be involved with. 
Like many of his colleagues, Judge F thought that his lack of experience in criminal 
law amounted to some unfairness to the accused, which the introduction of legal aid 
remedied: 
… the solicitor for the accused could [now] choose as counsel someone who had 
true experience, and that was much fairer to the accused. The first time I appeared in 





By contrast with the other judges, Sheriff M had no personal experience of the Poor’s 
Roll, having qualified as an advocate in the late 1960s after the introduction of 
criminal legal aid. However, at our second meeting he made the following prescient 
comments about changes to legal aid in times of financial constraint:5   
I was thinking, since I last saw you, that if there’s going to be these dreadful 
economic cutbacks that it looks like we’re going to have, it looks like justice is 
going to be under very, very severe financial pressure. […………] I honestly don’t 
know what’s going to happen. I suspect what’ll happen is legal aid will be cut, as a 
first step. Now, criminal legal aid came in in the 50s, was it? But we’ve had it for 
about 50 years. Some may say that silence [the right to silence] is a luxury that we 
can’t afford everyone. [………] We might go back to having a Poor Roll’s solicitor. 
 Judge B’s attitude to criminal work differed from many of his peers at the Bar, in so 
far as he enjoyed it and found it much more interesting than civil work (though he 
was pre-occupied with the extent to which it was ‘a financial disaster’ to become a 
Law Officer - as Solicitor-General). His earlier reference to the ‘sewer’s end’ of an 
advocate’s work – criminal law - turned out to be a barbed reference to the attitudes 
of others towards criminal legal work, and was an attitude which he himself strongly 
disparaged. He told another story to explain this ‘attitude’, this time about a former 
High Court judge, now deceased, who in his later years on the bench had struggled 
with the work (‘he just couldn’t do the work, couldn’t make up his mind’) and 
therefore presented an management problem for the judiciary:  
The system for dealing with judges was very informal but it illustrated the deep 
attitude. Because [High Court judge X, now deceased] was so slow, and so 
unreliable, and so poor, he was moved from civil work to criminal work! Now, that 
was a judgement that criminal work is unimportant: just totally the wrong way 
round.  
He then told the story of an escorted visit of foreign guests to the Faculty of 
Advocates which he thought was revealing of this same ‘deep social attitude’ 
towards criminal practice: 
And I remember, years and years ago, I was devilling 6 at the time, I was sitting in 
the corridor [of Parliament House in Edinburgh, the home of the Faculty of 
Advocates] and Lord Clyde, Lord President Clyde, was showing some foreign 
visitors around, and, you know, walking up and down, taking no more notice of us - 
we were like the carpet, just sitting there writing away and stuff - showing them this 
picture and that notice and so forth. And I remember him saying, I can’t remember 





do, but we’ve got the absolute rubbish as well, the criminal work. You do have to do 
that, but fortunately you can usually dispose of that quite quickly’. That’s what he 
was saying: it was rubbish. And that kind of work was regarded as rubbish, and all 
those who practised in the criminal courts were regarded as rubbish, as the lowest of 
the low, really. So, there was a deep social attitude that’s still there, which I deplore. 
I remember the late [advocate x] saying to me that he’d read somewhere that the 
index of a civilisation is how it conducts its criminal justice. You don’t look at South 
Africa under apartheid, or the Soviet Union, and ask ‘What are their conveyancing 
laws like, what are their laws of succession like?’ You ask how they treat people 
accused of crime. So that’s the true index of civilisation: how you treat crime. But 
that’s not how we regard crime. We regard it as tatty, some necessary relation, 
somebody born on the wrong side of the blanket and not behaving very well.  
At the time most of these individuals were qualifying in their respective fields of 
legal practice, and before the introduction of legal aid in 1964 which provided state 
subsidy of legal services, the stratification of the legal profession remained along 
traditional lines.7 Notwithstanding some post-war changes to the social composition 
of the Bar which were noted by Judge B above, entry to the Faculty of Advocates 
continued to require significant amounts of economic and social capital (Wilson, 
1965).8  
In his discussion of the symbolic power of law and the structural mechanisms which 
frame its operation, Bourdieu (1987) draws attention to the supply and demand of 
legal services. He makes the general observation that the field of law transforms into 
social capital the professional qualifications that ‘guarantee the mastery of the 
juridical resources required by the field’s own logic’ (1987:834). He also makes 
connections between the different classes of the producers and/or sellers of legal 
services and of the clients of those services, relating the lawyers’ positions in the 
legal hierarchy to the social positions of their clients. Thus he observes: 
Those who occupy inferior positions in the field (as for example in social welfare 
law) tend to work with a clientele composed of social inferiors who thereby increase 
the inferiority of these positions. (Bourdieu , 1987:850) 
For Bourdieu, therefore, the hierarchy in this ‘division of juridical labour’ is reflected 
in a hierarchy of specialisms and depends on variations in the power relations. 
Improvements in the status or power of less advantaged groups will be reflected in 
the power of their representatives (such as political parties or unions) and lead to 





the ‘unchanging prestige’ of civil law is testament to the relative stability, over time, 
of these variables – and the observations of some practitioners might suggest these 
hierarchies remain today.  
It is not within the scope of this project to map the objective structures of the legal 
field, as the logic of Bourdieu’s argument dictates. Nor is it possible, on the basis of 
such a small sample group, to draw any such broad findings. However, some flavour 
of social attitudes to crime – and its reflection in the structures and specialisms of the 
legal profession - can be discerned in the accounts given here, such as the ‘deep 
attitude’ to criminal work which Judge B deplored and believes still exists. The same 
attitude can be traced in the disdain of Judge D’s clerk towards it, and in the 
preference of some advocates for civil rather than criminal work. As to whether 
social background or prior experience of criminal law influenced the type of judge 
they became, there appeared to be some consensus that no firm conclusions could be 
drawn about the issue. Judge B was typical in his ambivalence: 
You should come to the bench with an experience of what it’s like at the chalk face; 
what it’s like down there. And as I say, there is a congruence between those who 
come with a kind of silver spoon and those who come with knowledge of what it is 
like down there. But you can still have an outstandingly good judge who has very 
little criminal experience [….]. So there’s no absolute rule that says if you’re born 
with a silver spoon therefore you’re a bad judge. On the contrary ... look at [Lord X] 
… he came from that kind of background, but he did a lot of criminal work and so 
on and he enjoyed it and so on, so forth. Mind you, my cynical friend said [Lord X] 
secured a tremendous number of convictions and a tremendous number of acquittals. 
Unfortunately, the acquittals were when he was acting for the prosecution and the 
convictions were when he was acting for the [laughter]…..defence. 
Judicial role models 
The motivation for seeking judicial appointment was, for the most part, a pragmatic 
one for these judges. Judge C had qualified as both an advocate and solicitor, but 
went into practice as a solicitor. He thought becoming a sheriff was not only ‘an 
ideal way of planning a future’ but also a job ‘very worthwhile doing’. Judge A 
thought his personality was ‘as much suited to deciding cases as to presenting them’. 
For Judge M, an advocate, the motivation was rooted in the negative aspects of his 





I was a bit tired of working nights and weekends and things. And in all modesty, I 
was conscious that there were cleverer people than me around, doing that kind of 
work. I also thought it would be nice not to have clients anymore and I also very 
much enjoyed the part-time Sheriffing that I’d done. And after I’d got over the initial 
trepidation, I found everything much more pleasant, to put it that way, in terms of 
what happened in court, in terms of job satisfaction.  
Judge H qualified as an advocate in the late 1960s and became a Sheriff in the late 
1970s. He acknowledged a mix of motivations for seeking appointment but among 
the more important was his early formative experience in the High Court that made 
him want to be ‘a different kind of judge’ and provide ‘a fair forum: 
I would say I was basically a moderate person…..so I was fairly horrified by what 
went on in the High Court. They were all so antagonistic. If you were fighting for 
somebody in the court, you were also fighting the prosecutor – so that’s alright. But 
you were also fighting the judge, almost always. They were clever about it.  
Judge H qualified his account in this way: ‘You must realise that probably nobody 
thinks the same as I do about it all.’ However, his account received some 
confirmation from several of his colleagues. Judge C, for example, observed that he 
although he came across many excellent judges, the conduct of some fell far short: 
But there were others there who were hard, you know, and to me seemed very biased 
and unfair towards accused persons at that time. We had some fiends, you know. 
That’s why I didn’t go to the Bar, because of Lord ‘what’s-his-name’. He was an 
absolute fiend. Frightened the life out of me.  
Another High Court judge he described as ‘absolutely vicious’: 
He was abrupt, he was discourteous, he would lose his temper, not only with counsel 
but with solicitors who got on his nerves, such as not having the appropriate stuff, 
papers, there. And he wouldn’t hesitate to make the point and to use your name. And 
also with accused people. Generally, the attitude to them seemed to me to be ‘You’re 
a crowd of ruffians’. Not all of them, there were some who were otherwise. But 
when I got there, I thought, I’m not going to be like that. And in the High Court, and 
the Appeal Court, I remember some judges barking at accused, barking at counsel 
and absolutely ridiculing people because of their inability to understand, or their 
accent or something like that. Not a lot, but there were a few, who shall be nameless, 
who were completely unfair. 
Judge D, similarly, had in mind the kind of judge he did not want to be: 
The thing I did not want to do was to indulge in the sort of behaviour that one or two 





counsel, or a witness, has been close to being humiliated by a judge and that is not a 
proper course of action to take at all. 
Judge M, on our second meeting, returned to this question of role models which we 
had touched on briefly in our first meeting. Being good-natured and kind emerged as 
important qualities for this Sheriff: 
 
One of the other things I thought of when you asked me [last time] if there were any 
Sheriffs I modelled myself on when I started… and it occurred to me later, this may 
sound awful, but there were a lot I didn’t model myself on because they used to go 
round the country to different Sheriff Courts, and it wasn’t that they were 
particularly bad Sheriffs that I came across but I’ve not forgotten that there was a 
great difficulty in persuading them to do anything…to take a decision that struck you 
as in some way bold or something like that.[…] The other thing about that is that 
there was a Sheriff that I liked very much, but didn’t particularly admire his law 
because he took ages to make decisions. But the atmosphere in his court I thought 
was admirable because there was a kind of notion of enjoyment about what was 
going on. He was a very humorous man, but he didn’t make jokes at people’s 
expense, but there was always, mixed up with the serious stuff, there was a 
possibility of it being good natured and kind …I liked him an awful lot for it, it was 
a pleasure to see it.  
 
The idea of ‘a kind of notion of enjoyment’ in the ‘serious stuff’ of the criminal court 
could suggest an egregious lack of sensitivity on the part of judges to the material 
reality and harshness of punishment. Alternatively, it could suggest the existence of 
coping mechanisms which some occupational groups employ to manage difficult 
working environments (see Obrdlik, 1942; Kane, 1997; Sullivan, 2000; Innes, 2002). 
The characterisation of the judge’s demeanour as ‘good natured and kind’ also 
militates against this negative reading. For Judge C, it was important to have had 
positive judicial role models in the form of what he considered to be fellow ‘do-
gooders’: 
I’d been influenced by all these people and I just knew there was a body of people 
who felt the same way as I do. That you don’t just chuck people into prison, you 
don’t just throw away the key. And gradually the community orders became more 
important and the fact that one had to, you couldn’t impose a prison sentence for 
first offenders, or for people under 21, you had to get a SER [social enquiry report]. 
And that was regarded as being namby-pamby, the ‘do-gooders’, you know, this sort 
of stuff. And I was so pleased about that, I couldn’t have been more satisfied. Even 
though, as a hoary old sheriff eventually, I thought, these 5 page reports, they’re all 





Change in judicial behaviour: ‘no room for the eccentrics’ 
Not all judicial role models were negative, therefore, and many judges recalled 
individuals whose conduct they admired. Judge A remembered one ‘immensely 
courteous, careful, deliberate sheriff’ and in his own later practice, tried to emulate some of 
his qualities: 
… the obvious fairness, remembering to listen to both sides, remembering never to 
be funny at someone’s expense, or be rude to anyone. 
Judge M attached less importance to the quality of courtesy from the bench than 
some of his colleagues: 
When you make somebody a judge, [you’re] trusting them to do the job properly, to 
be fair, and to be up to date and to be… I’m not so bothered about things like being 
courteous. I mean, I know it’s important to be courteous, but …I’ve appeared before 
good judges who were far from courteous and I didn’t really think any the less of 
them for that, particularly. I think, sometimes, when I read descriptions of what 
judges should be, I think, what?…Is this actually a judge I’m reading a description 
of, or is it a manager of a five star hotel that we’re talking about here? But within 
these constraints I think judges pretty much think constantly about what they’re 
doing. 
Taking a longer view, Judge D believed that judicial conduct had improved as a 
result of greater scrutiny. As a result, there was now ‘no room for the eccentrics’: 
Judges became much more receptive, much more sensitive to things: for example, 
such as the effect of conduct on victims, something of that sort. And I think also that 
judicial behaviour has become much more stabilised: there’s no room for the 
eccentrics. I think that is an influence of outside perception that people [judges] 
realise that they’re being – quite properly, understand – that they’re being watched 
for their performance. They’re on trial themselves, sometimes. 
Judge C identified other features of the changes in judicial conduct, which included a 
willingness to understand the lives – and dialects - of others: 
I think they’re more willing to......how can I put it? To understand the life that many 
people live in this world, and to have a different, or broader approach to such matters 
as reliability and credibility of people. I think it has to be. I saw in my time, in the 
60s, in the Court of Session, certain judges who prisoners couldn’t understand. That 
was the great joke in Glasgow – ‘Oh, they’re from Edinburgh, they speak a different 
language’. And I saw it, you know. You know the famous trial story: 





Witness: ‘I just went out to get ginger and crisps’ 
Counsel (in plummy accent): ‘And were you still with your friends Ginger and 
Chris......’ 
And you know, these were jokes, but they were real, you know. They were 
illustrative of a certain attitude. [………] The changes from the old attitude of 
judges in the 50s and 60s to now is marked. 
Early experiences of judging 
The judges interviewed here were appointed to various judicial posts – as Sheriffs 
and Senators of the Royal College of Justice – in an era when formal judicial training 
either did not exist or was provided quite some time after appointment, and even then 
in a somewhat sporadic and ad hoc manner. Coupled with the inexperience in 
criminal law which was a feature of many judges’ early legal careers, the lack of 
judicial training meant most felt significantly unprepared for criminal justice 
practice. Here, Judge G provided this story of his first day on the bench as a Sheriff: 
I was petrified, absolutely petrified, and I’d been in courts for all my life. But going 
up there….I can remember my first trial, it was theft of some sort of power engine. I 
had no idea what that even was and it was awful. I felt very nervous. Before I went 
on that morning, one of the other Sheriffs came to speak to me and said ‘Here’s a 
note. Give it to your Bar Officer [court official] if you’re stuck and he’ll take you off 
the bench.’ It said ‘HELP’.  
By virtue of his own prior criminal experience, Judge B did not find his own early 
days as a High Court judge so difficult, but in this story he recalls helping out a new 
colleague with the ‘14 steps’ to getting it right:  
I remember one particular judge, now nameless - I won’t name him, I won’t name 
him- but when he was going on the bench [on his first day as a judge] he came to me 
and he said to me ‘You know, what do I do? I’m going to a criminal court’. He 
hadn’t been before - well, he’d been in a criminal court once, some years before. 
And he didn’t know. So I said to him, ‘Well, you just go on the bench and you do 
this and that’. So the next time I was on the bench - before he went on for the first 
time - the next time I went on to the bench, I thought what do I do? And I actually 
realised there were fourteen steps - I think it was fourteen steps- you took. First of all 
you make sure you had your wig on the right way round, that kind of stuff, you see, 
and then you follow them in, and then you bowed, and then you administered the 
oath to the shorthand writers - you used to do in those days - and you bowed to this 
and you sort of - and by the time I’d put it all down, it was 14 steps. And I said to 
him, there you are- I’ll call him Charlie- he wasn’t Charlie - but I said ‘There you 





was useful. And you know, he didn’t want to do the wrong thing- bow in the wrong 
direction, or fail to administer the oath, or whatever it may be. 
Judge B then went on to tell another story ostensibly about lawyers’ collective 
inexperience in criminal practice, but also about the misleading impressions of 
competence which are sometimes conferred by status: 
I remember the first murder that Lord […] did. It’s rather interesting because by that 
time I had… had a good reputation. I hope you’re not going to think of me as being 
immodest, I don’t want that. But I had a good reputation as a prosecutor and - it’s a 
funny story - the Deputy Crown Agent, who was […] came to me and said look, 
would you mind going to Aberdeen to prosecute in this murder trial? I said not at all, 
why not. And actually I’d never done one, but to my mind prosecuting a murder is 
like prosecuting any other assault. And he said ‘but the problem is, you see, that 
Lord […] is going to be the judge, and he’s never done a murder trial’. And I didn’t 
let on that I’d never done a murder trial either. I then went up to Aberdeen, and the 
Fiscal […] came up to me and said he was desperately sorry but a death had 
occurred of some sort or other and he really had to attend the funeral, and would I 
mind if one of his assistants sat beside me [to assist] during this murder trial before 
Lord […]? And he said ‘it’s his first big case, first murder trial, this lawyer’. So the 
chap that he brought, he was sat beside me in the Scots Law classes [at university]. 
So, you know, perspectives and the wearing of wigs and titles, and so on, all these 
things make a difference to how people conceive of themselves, and have 
perspectives upon others. 
Judge F recalled that the first time he appeared in a summary criminal court in any 
capacity was after his appointment as an Honorary Sheriff, a post for which he 
received no training whatsoever: 
The first time I went to this particular court […] was the first time that I had ever, 
ever, been in a summary criminal court. I’d been in a court taking solemn criminal 
trials as a defence advocate but I’d never been in the summary criminal court. I had 
no idea what was going to happen, to the extent that I had to ask the Sheriff Clerk - 
do I stay in to sign anything? And I had nothing to sign so he said I could just depart. 
But I had no training of any kind. When I became a sheriff, a short time after, I went 
to a training course. 
Although Judge C had some familiarity with the criminal court, he had a similar tale 
to tell about training: 
I had done a bit [of criminal law] because I had an assistant who did the criminal 
duty stuff and I’d been on the criminal as well as the civil legal aid committees. And 
I’d even done a jury trial just to get a bit under the belt, you know. But I didn’t know 
a lot about crime, certainly. And the first thing I found myself in was a trial up in 
Aberdeen Sheriff Court: a Freshwater Salmon Fisheries thing, ridiculous. And 





do I decide about credibility and reliability?’ and he said ‘Just go for it, you know’. 
Oh, you got used to it pretty quickly. But I got no training. I think I got training 
about 18 months after sitting. […] But no training, that was the situation at that time.  
The provision of judicial training, however, could lead to unexpected outcomes. 
Judge B told this story about judicial training which suggested there could be an 
inflationary effect on sentencing tariffs: 
See, in the old days, when I was appointed, judges had no training. If you read Lord 
Devlin’s book, he says judges should not be trained; the whole period at the bar 
should be the training. But nowadays judges have CPD [continuous professional 
devlopment] in a sense, and training. So one of the exercises we did latterly- when I 
say latterly, from my point of view in the early 2000s- was to go to a hotel for the 
weekend and have seven hours and exercises. And one of the things I would have to 
write down were things which aggravated the crime [increased the sentence]. Let’s 
take a sexual crime: you know, were there previous convictions? Was there a 
relationship between the person committing the crime and the victim? The age etc. 
etc.? And almost everything you could think of made it worse. So, the teacher - dear, 
dear, dear! Or the parent - oh! Or the uncle - goodness, the age, heavens! So 
everything made it longer and longer. And I could remember; you know, we would 
discuss all these things, and then someone would say ‘OK well, here’s the case: this 
is a case of a 27 year old teacher and a fifteen year old girl and this happened and 
that happened, so on and so forth’. And you put a few of these factors in; well, then 
you went round and you say ‘Well what’s the sentence then? […]- so then you find 
someone says six years, and the rest of them say seven years, eight years, nine years 
and so on, and it goes up and up and up.  
Judge H’s experience of the same kind of sentencing exercise suggested that some 
degree of reputation management operated in front of peers: 
You would go into little groups and discuss how you would deal with it [the 
sentencing exercise]. It was quite funny. All the people who would beat people 
[accused] down in the courts – the really ghastly people - were sweet and charming, 
and all the ones who were wet, like me, were fierce because they were ashamed, 
basically, of what they’d do. So they’d change it for the moment, you know. You’d 
get very weak sentences from people who you knew were very fierce sentencers – 
and vice versa. The weak people thought they had to beef it up a bit because they 
knew they were a bit weak.  
 
The creation of a Judicial Studies Board in England in 1979 was regarded with 
suspicion by the judiciary who regarded it to be a radical change which threatened 
their independence (Malleson, 1997). Formal judicial training has now existed in 
Scotland since 1997, when the Judicial Studies Committee was formed. Its successor, 





perception that judicial training was ‘at best unnecessary and at worst a dangerous 
interference’ was recently admitted to have been misconceived (Lord President 
Hamilton, 2012). Indeed, in something of a sea-change in attitude, training is now 
considered by the judiciary to reinforce judicial independence, though with the 
proviso that all training is ‘judge-devised, judge-led and judge-delivered’: 
… judicial training and education improves judicial confidence, strengthens the 
independence of the judiciary and thus increases the public’ confidence in us. 
Judging is changing. It is no longer acceptable, if it ever was, for judges to see the 
business of being a judge as necessarily separate or isolated or insular. It is not. 
Judges have responsibilities towards the public which they serve. They must be 
equipped to discharge these responsibilities and be seen to be so equipped.  
                                                                             (Lord President Hamilton, 2012: 3) 
What can be discerned in this endorsement of judicial training is a new consumer 
orientated approach towards criminal justice services, and acknowledgement of the 
legitimate expectations of the public to ‘a degree of consistency in the standards of 
legal knowledge, courtesy, patience and judicial skills from any judge they appear 
before’ (Malleson, 1997: 664). As Malleson (1997) observes, these changes are 
congruent with wider political changes in relation to citizens’ rights and greater 
accessibility to services. However, the use of judicial training to achieve greater 
judicial conformity by minimising differences in approach is not without some 
controversy. In particular, it raises questions as to whether a ‘more standardised and 
social service orientated judiciary with a weakened culture of individualism’ is a 
change for the better (Malleson, 1997: 667). 
Judge D, who had earlier spoken of the benefits of the ‘cross-fertilisation’ of ideas in 
a more diverse judiciary, provides some insight about the tensions between 
consistency and individualism, and the pull of the habitus towards conformity and 
homogeneity: 
…..judges are not free to get on the bench and do exactly what they think fit. Even a 
judge who passes a sentence…it is his, his sentence, but he doesn’t do it in a sort of 
vacuum influenced by his ideas of what he thinks about…women, or that sort of 
thing, because he would quickly find that that was completely unacceptable. He’s 
part of a system and therefore what he does must reflect the attitudes of that system. 
But I should point out…the fact that he is not a man but a woman might have some 





have judges who are…too much influenced by their own feelings and attitude, 
because if that was the case, then, what would you do? You’d have a sort of 
heterogeneous mass of judges who would all have different personalities, each, in 
each case influencing what they were doing. You want consistency. And if you’ve 
got to get consistency, then you’ve got to have something that bears some 
relationship to what the system as a whole is delivering. So I’m not attracted by that 
other idea. All in favour of…the influencing of ideas between people of different 
backgrounds, and ethnic connections. But I don’t see the case for judges who are 
appointed because they bring particular backgrounds to it. They just happen to 
be…happening to be is good, for the appearance and the functioning of the system as 
a whole. But we are not, in that sense - we are not individual, we’re part of a team. 
 
Conclusion 
In the accounts given here, it is possible to observe the tension which exists between 
the two oppositional readings of the judicial role which are outlined in Chapter 4. 
Judicial narratives of careers and experience are examples of subjectivist accounts of 
practice: explanations of how judges make sense of their lives and work, and their 
practical understanding of the penal world. These accounts may overplay individual 
agency yet also underplay the extent to which their actions are constrained by the 
‘objective structures’ of a given field of practice. By contrast, objectivist readings of 
the judicial role draw attention to the ‘invisible relational patterns operating behind 
the backs of agents’ (Wacquant, 2007: 267), such as the hierarchies or divisions of 
power along class or gender lines suggested in the discussion above. On this reading, 
judicial accounts which obscure or even deny these ‘objective structures’ can be 
regarded as a form of false consciousness, with judges acting more or less 
unconsciously and following pre-ordained patterns of thought.  
 
The issues raised in this chapter about diversity, conduct and training therefore raise 
additional important questions about the role of the judicial habitus in promoting 
both conformity and individualism and about the capacity for reflexivity. The 
judges’ social background can be regarded as influential though not necessarily 
determinative as far as future judicial disposition is concerned, though it appeared to 
play a more direct role in the kind of legal work available to the judges in their early 
legal careers. The centrality of the institutional narrative about judicial diversity - in 





observed in these accounts, though the lack of research to properly inform this debate 
must be a matter of concern. The importance of judicial training is reinforced by 
these judges’ early experiences, and there are some implications for the form of that 
training: providing new judges with on-going opportunities to see other judges at 
work, for example.  
 
With reflexivity comes the potential for change, within the bounds of agency 
provided for the role. In these accounts there is awareness of some of the ‘invisible’ 
relational patterns which shape the judicial habitus and about patterns of behaviour 
and disposition. In this way, for example, attitudes about proper judicial conduct and 
demeanour were shaped by the young lawyers’ observations of a number of judges 
variously described as ‘fiends’, ‘absolutely vicious’ or ‘completely unfair’, and 
change in the judicial habitus, over time, is made possible by the resolve of 
individuals not to follow this pattern of conduct. In Chapter 6, I return to this issue of 
the judicial habitus and the potential for change in the context of judicial sensibilities 





                                                 
1 Although there is some indication that greater diversity enhances the fairness and quality of judging 
(Thomas, 2005) and that the presence of a female judge on a collegiate bench (in the US) can alter the 
decision-making of male judges (Boyd et al, 2010). 
2 The Scottish Bar is also known as the Faculty of Advocates. At that time, becoming an Advocate 
was the only route to becoming a High Court judge. 
3 Feenan (2008:450) extends this deeply entrenched image of judge, judging and judicial authority as 
‘white, male, masculine, heterosexual, able-bodied and class-privileged’. 
4 The introduction of legal aid in 1964 was one of a number of citizenship-based schemes providing 
access to justice, health, education, social welfare, and housing. The expansion of legal aid meant that 
by 1970 the legal profession was subsidised by the state to a significant extent, and played a more 
direct role in the maintenance of social democracy and the welfare state (Hanlon et al, 1999).   
5 In January 2013 the Scottish Government announced changes to the income threshold for legal aid 
eligibility.  
6 ‘Devilling’ is the term used for the period of apprenticeship at the Scottish Bar.  
7 The legal profession in Scotland consists of two branches: solicitors, whose origins were in 
groupings around local courts and whose early functions related to property and land transactions; and 





                                                                                                                                          
However, solicitors in Scotland have always undertaken most of the advocacy in the lower courts, and 
unusually (compared to England and Wales) have the right of audience in solemn cases, heard before 
a jury. Until 1991, advocates held a monopoly on rights of audience in the highest civil and criminal 
courts; solicitors can now acquire rights of audience as solicitor-advocates. See Paterson (1997) for 
further discussion. 
8 Wilson (1965) suggests that during this period advocates needed sufficient personal wealth to carry 
them through the nine month devilling period when fees could not be collected. Entrants also needed 
time to build a client base and faced a significant period of delay before fees were paid. Melville and 
Stephens (2011) suggest that sufficient amounts of economic and social capital are still required 
today, though in changing forms, and that stratification based on class and gender remains strongly 
ingrained within the Faculty of Advocates. See also Menkel-Meadow (1989) for discussion of gender-
based stratification in the legal profession. 
9 The new arrangements provide for compulsory induction training for all newly appointed judicial 
office holders within one year of their appointment. The Judicial Studies Committee is responsible for 
the delivery of this training which includes, inter alia, the following topics: judicial ethics and 





Chapter 6 Judicial Sensibilities: Crime, the Criminal and 
Criminal Justice 
Introduction 
Locating the judge as the subject of cultural inquiry entails an understanding of that 
individual as a penal actor whose dispositions are shaped by the culture in which he 
or she acts. This represents a useful interpretive exercise on its own, but the 
frameworks of meanings and understandings which the judge brings to penal practice 
carry additional interest, the judge being an actor whose sentencing practices have 
some generative potential in relation to cultural values. 
 In this chapter, I explore some of the meanings and categories about crime and 
offenders on which judges draw when talking about their work. This serves several 
useful purposes. First, it allows insight about the ‘larger frames of signification’ 
which judges use to make sense of the world (Geertz, 1983: 180) – and how those 
larger world-views are organised and kept in place. Secondly, the specific 
representations of crime, the criminal and criminal justice are of interest for their 
general contribution to the ‘gazette of morality’ (Melossi, 1993) which the penal 
system transmits to society through its various practices and institutions; these 
representations, in the order of things, are themselves subject to oscillations and 
cycles (Melossi, 2008).1 In this way, judicial discourse allows focus on the character 
and scope of judicial sensibilities and to changes in disposition that may occur over 
time.   
Section 1 Criminological categories of thought 
In some of these accounts of criminal justice, crime and the criminal it is possible to 
detect certain strands of criminological thought and discourse. These are sometimes 
explicit; at other times, visible only as fragments of ideas or concepts. The attempt to 
identify the scope, range or extent of criminological influences on judicial decision-
making is necessarily speculative, and almost certainly illusory if expected to show 
clear lines of impact or effect. I seek here to tread some middle ground between any 





and the grander ambition of mapping multiple and contradictory lines of influence 
between criminological research and criminal justice practice or policy (Loader and 
Sparks, 2004). In some modest way, therefore, I trace some of this influence in the 
judges’ attempts to frame the normative questions intrinsic to their role.2  
Several individuals drew on criminological issues and ideas in a purposeful way. 
Judge A, for example, drew on an understanding about the process of attrition in 
criminal justice when reflecting on the effectiveness of criminal justice as a means of 
crime control: 
Criminologists tell us that only about 5% of crime gets to the courts. So, if we’re 
only dealing with about 5% of crime then we’re not going to be able to deal with it 
very well. 
And here, talking about the manipulation of public opinion in a punitive direction, 
Judge H makes a passing but specific reference to anomie:  
One of the reasons why the rest of the people want all the others locked up is 
because they see these people who apparently are doing it for greed, and they’re told 
it’s for greed. They don’t know about anomie.  
 Judge M, talking about the limitations of criminal justice, introduced the question of 
economic determinism this way: 
At one stage I had a notion – this is partly from talking to another sheriff and partly 
from something I was reading - that our economic setup has a built in understanding 
that a certain amount of people will live in poverty, and poverty is the principal 
cause of crime. If it is, then we’ve designed a system that makes crime either 
necessary or inevitable, and if that’s the case then I’m thinking there’s not much we 
can do much about it. I can’t remember where I read that now. I think I read it in the 
Guardian actually - somebody had written a book about it - because I did try to read 
a bit of criminology occasionally. 
And in the course of conversation with Judge B about the influence of the media on 
sentencing policy and practice, he showed a significant degree of engagement with 
criminological topics: 
There was a study done in the United States-- a very careful study indeed - which 
showed that as the murder rate in California fell, so the press increased their 
reporting of the murders, the more dramatic reporting. And of course, the public 
wanted more and more hangings and floggings and what have you, but it was largely 





and their incomes by creating the public mood for more and more severe 
punishments.[…] I don’t remember who the story was by - because I used to be a 
member of a group in California -unfortunately I changed my email address and lost 
my contact with them -  a group in California, or San Francisco,[…]. Anyway, they 
looked at all these things, yes.3 
Moreover, some of the ‘metaphors, narratives and vocabularies’ of criminological 
thought (Loader and Sparks, 2004) can be heard in judicial accounts in passing, and 
in less self-conscious ways. In a general way, Melossi (2008:6) identifies two broad 
representations of the criminal offender in the ‘gazette of morality’ displayed in the 
penal sphere. The first descriptive portrayal is characterized by a tendency to 
exclusion, and manifests itself in an attitude of distance or antipathy toward the 
criminal, sometimes falling within conceptions of monstrosity and thus beyond any 
human empathy. This approach conceives of social order as a given, to be simply 
established or re-established. The second portrayal is characterised by an impulse to 
include and displays an attitude of empathy towards the offender. In this conception, 
social order is considered to be ‘justly or at least reasonably contested’ and the 
offender is regarded as either the victim of fate or of social circumstances. With 
echoes of Merton, the representations of the offender may also come within some 
conception of ‘innovation’ (2008:7).  
Some elements of these frameworks of inclusion and exclusion can be read into the 
accounts drawn on here and in other chapters relating to sentencing practice. Some of 
these readings and representations are clear, as with Judge C’s explicit statement of 
empathy with offenders: 
The fact of the matter is that for the vast majority of these people who do appear 
before us, the facts are straightforward. They have a horrible childhood, they have 
inadequate parents, usually family circumstances which are disjointed from a very 
early stage if they’ve not already separated - you know what I mean. 
Judge L, who said he had no time for people who regard offenders as ‘untermensch’, 
gave more of a mixed message:  
You can’t put people in a box – apart from people like the Yorkshire Ripper, they’re 






Through these accounts, however limited in scope, we gain some sense of the range 
of representations of crime, the criminal, and criminal justice which form the basis of 
judicial discourse, if not practice. As Melossi (2008) observes, these collective 
representations orient the activities of those social institutions whose task it is to 
‘frame’ questions about crime and punishment; and notwithstanding the often 
‘oblique relationship’ between what people say about criminal justice and what they 
do (Cohen, 1985) some shaping effect on the sentencing practices of individual 
judges is likely. As the logic of the cultural approach suggests, these representations 
also reflect the values and pre-occupations of their times in ways that allow us to 
observe cyclical change and perhaps some glimpse of the contingency of the present.  
Criminal justice: normative theories and justifications 
In this section I consider some of the ideas and meanings about the general concept 
of ‘criminal justice’ which are suggested by the judges’ accounts. These are 
understandings about criminal justice as a form of governance, of its various 
functions, its systemic features and its normative framework. These ideas are 
important because they play a central role in structuring and legitimating the 
activities of penal agents (Zedner, 2004).  For Bourdieu (1987:831), the ‘entry ticket’ 
into the juridical field requires the acceptance of an essential tautology: the 
‘universalizing attitude’ that conflicts can only be resolved juridically, according to 
the rules and conventions of the game. These rules and conventions include the re-
construction (or ‘retranslation’) of the conflict in legal terms, the determination of 
‘facts’ in ‘black and white’ manner, and the rendering of judgements according to 
legal concepts and doctrines; these are some of the ‘unthought’ categories and 
precepts which prevent practitioners from reflecting on contingencies in the field, 
and may thus act to inhibit change.  
Conversation with these judges about criminal justice in a broad sense quickly drew 
us into normative theories about crime and punishment; this is unsurprising in view 
of the central issues of moral legitimacy and justification which punishment raises 





theory, and a story from practice, as the basis for the legitimacy of criminal justice as 
well as justification of the judicial role: 
Somebody said that the whole system of law is to protect the citizens from the state 
and the state from the citizen. If you don’t have a formal way of dealing with 
unacceptable conduct, you will have an informal way of dealing with it – people will 
duff each other up….informally. And therefore there must be a perception that 
unacceptable conduct will be dealt with in a formal and fair way. I had an example 
of that – must have been pre-1986 - where I had a causing death by dangerous 
driving [case]. And that was in the days before it became fashionable to impose 4, 5, 
6, 7 years for that. And I thought that a custodial sentence was inevitable…and it 
was then on what I thought was the low side, as most of my sentences were. And I 
imposed 8 months.  Nowadays it would be about 5 years, because I think we’ve 
become very much more punitive. […] But the point was that I was told, as the 
accused was being taken off the cells, that it was just as well he was being taken off 
to the cells because relatives of the deceased were outside the court, ready to do him 
in. So, if you don’t have a system which is perceived to be fair then you will run the 
risk of…. they say revenge is a kind of wild justice. You will have vigilantes, you 
will have self-help, and that’s something I would very much react against, people 
taking justice into their own hands. That kind of reflects the fact that judges are an 
essential part of civilization. It sounds awfully pompous but, I mean, you’ve got to 
believe in what you do and I did believe that I was doing something that was 
worthwhile. 
Judge E drew on similar notions of order and disorder to explain the function of 
criminal justice: 
I think it’s important for people to know that they’re living under the law: they’re 
obeying the law and the law is there to support them as well as for them to support it. 
Unless we live that way - and it’s not a question of religion or morality, it’s just a 
question of practicality really - unless we live that way, you’ve got chaos. 
The particular logic and intrinsic limitations of adversarial trial processes are 
extensively documented in criminal justice literature, and while most judges’ 
accounts conceived of criminal justice as a mechanism of dispute resolution, these 
conceptions were peppered with practitioners’ scepticism of the adversarial process. 
Judge B, for example, scorned the idea that it was a means of reaching the ‘truth’: 
It’s a mistake to suppose that having arrived at the end of the trial, you’ve somehow 
arrived at the truth. You haven’t arrived at the truth: you’ve arrived at a proof 
beyond reasonable doubt of a certain limited number of facts. That’s not the truth; 





Savelsberg (2010:106) describes the ‘binary logic’ of criminal law as ‘a gross 
simplification by psychological standards’. Sheriff H’s comment about the public’s 
misunderstanding about questions of guilt and innocence captures some sense of this: 
They [the public] think it’s like TV and that somebody is a bastard and somebody 
isn’t. Well, usually both sides are bastards, actually, and sometimes they’re fighting 
out something which isn’t on the paper. They’re trying to achieve some particular 
objective which you have to try and suss out and perhaps never say that you’ve 
realised.  
Criminal justice as a ‘system’ 
When my conversation with Judge M, a retired Sheriff, strayed into broad questions 
about the purposes of criminal justice, he picked me up on my use of the phrase 
criminal justice ‘system’:  
I don’t think there’s a criminal justice system; I think it’s just a series of collisions. I 
was attracted by the idea that if there was such a system, what were the different 
parts to play in the role, and what proportions and what different ways of thinking? 
I asked what he meant by ‘collisions’: 
Ideals, ideas, political beliefs, moral beliefs, ideas of fairness…. Now, a most 
common thing [in the courtroom] is an accused sitting between two policemen - is 
that fair? Some people think that’s terribly unfair; some people think there’s nothing 
wrong with it - there’s a presumption of innocence. I remember someone saying: 
‘Does that mean the court presumes the police have got the wrong bloke?’[laughs] 
At our second meeting, the same judge returned to the question about whether 
criminal justice was a ‘system’, and provided this extended account in which he 
detailed each of the different roles, interests and ‘ways of thinking’ which he 
believed ‘collided’ in daily and routine criminal justice processes: 
[…] people talk about the criminal justice system and …I was just thinking that it’s 
not a system that’s designed as a system, it’s something that’s developed 
organically, I suppose, with different people having different ways [… ] at different 
times. But…start with the police. Now, I don’t think it’s any secret that the police 
don’t regard giving evidence as the most important part of their job. I see a wink is 
as good as a nod when it comes to that, but that is a difficulty. I think they regard the 
solving of the crime – apprehending somebody – as their job, and often, almost, 
sometimes a level of resentment in having to come and explain what they’ve done. 
It’s not all that uncommon. More common I think is to find that an officer’s never 
actually given evidence before, and they’re not always terribly good at it, even if 





The other…the  next person who can shock you is the Fiscal, and you don’t really 
know what they’re doing, why they’ve passed on their cases, why they charge 
people with 20 things and accept a plea to one? Is it because they’re busy, is it 
because the witnesses aren’t there, is it because something – not more sinister – but 
have they bunged in everything so they can take something out?  
The defence: I would say roughly speaking that you’ve got two sorts of defence 
agents. One that does what their guy tells them and one that doesn’t. And so there’s 
two differences of approach there, obviously.  
And the Sheriff I won’t say anything about because, it’s obvious if you think about 
it, but you never know what another Sheriff does – you’re never in another Sheriff’s 
court, to see what they do. So, we’ll go as far as that. We then have, assuming 
there’s some kind of guilt, a whole lot of other people coming in offering their 
services: social workers, psychiatrists, so on. […]  
And then you’ve got a disposal to make. Once…people are giving advice about 
which disposal should be made, they will have different considerations and it used to 
be notorious that in social inquiry reports there would be sympathy for the accused 
which didn’t appear to take account of what he had actually, or she had actually 
done. […] But the psychiatric report, people seemed to have found them pretty 
helpful. They’re dealing with a different kind of problem and increasingly […] 
they’re helpful in the sense that the system didn’t want anything to do with it. […] 
And then of course there’s the community service people and other people.  
So, in that sense I think people have different kind of objectives. But if you include 
victims or complainers, whatever you want to call them, they’ve got interests. I see 
the press as being how people learn about what’s happening in court, who are part of 
the system if you call it a system as well. And I once went to a conference where the 
news editor of the Sun spoke and he began by saying ‘I’d like you to understand the 
purpose of my newspaper is to make money and I have no other consideration’, and 
people were talking about the duty of the free press and stuff like that and he said 
that was humbug, which was very refreshing. So there’s a number of different 
interests operating […]. 
With these thoughts, he invokes a strong image of a ‘system’ which is characterised 
less by its systemic qualities than by a haphazard mix of (sometimes competing) 
objectives, interests and practices: ‘it’s not a tidy business’ he remarked.  
As Zedner (2004) observes, there is a presumption today that coherence and co-
ordination in criminal justice is a quality to which governments and agencies should 
aspire, and much effort goes into advancing these objectives through inter-agency 
co-operation and co-ordination of activities. An alternative view is that the 
‘collisions’ of values and interests described by the Sheriff above are likely to better 





2004). This alternative understanding was reflected in Judge M’s answer when I 
asked if he thought criminal justice should be more coherent: he thought it was better 
that different people should bring ‘different perspectives to it and different values.’ 
The limits of criminal justice 
No doubt influenced by long years in practice, most judges had strong views about 
the limits of what any system of criminal justice or penal policy could achieve. Judge 
A, for example, stated wryly: ‘I don’t know if very much of the criminal justice 
system has much to do with reducing crime.’ Judge C drew on some colourful 
examples of social liberalisation to make a related point: 
I do still believe that there’s a lot more we can do in this country to avoid bunging 
our people into prison. As I say, lots of people would say that’s a softly, softly 
approach. […]We’ve got to try to avoid sending people to prison and get to the roots 
of what’s causing the person to offend. Now, that is easy to say, but it’s a huge 
cultural thing. Can the criminal justice system address those concerns, those social 
issues? Ah, it can to an extent, but I think it’s much wider than that. It’s going back 
to basic education, going back to family life. The one parent family is a disaster in 
the way it has come about. One understands why that happened, though, and how 
that happened. […] Although I have views about the adverse effects of religion, I 
think there was a very good aspect to that, and I’m not just restricting it to Catholics 
- Christians, Muslims, and Hindus etc. as well. You can see, in the Muslim 
community, there’s a much better family life existing, and they send their kids to 
Catholic schools because they think the discipline is better. And I think that’s all 
contributed to it since certainly the late 60s and early 70s, you know. Swinging 
London and the liberalisation and stuff that I certainly remember, has just gone to an 
extent which is outrageous, you know. I mean, youngsters drinking from the age of 
10, 11, taking cannabis, cannabis being flogged at schools. Aw, it’s....it’s gross, you 
know. I think it’s important to turn that around. And the criminal justice system 
can’t do that. The criminal justice system’s coming in at a time when the seeds are 
well sown and growing. 
Judge L thought talk about ‘progress’ in criminal justice could be disingenuous: ‘It’s 
all progress; the question is whether it’s uphill or downhill.’ But in any case, he said, 
progress could only be defined in relation the question: what is the overall goal? 
If the goal is to have some utopian society where no-one would commit crime – if 
that’s the goal, you need to come to some clever decision about how to stop people 
committing crime. There are some people who will always commit crime because of 
their circumstances or because people can just be downright evil. There will always 
be people like that, such as Harold Shipman and Frederick West. These people need 
to be detected asap and locked away for as long as thought necessary if they’re a 
danger to society. But that category is a very small category indeed. What about the 





you want to use the criminal law as a means of regulating society as a whole. The 
problem is that the criminal law is a very blunt weapon. Over the last 40 years, the 
state has intervened more and more, and now a lot of the matters that appear before 
the criminal court as contraventions of the criminal law are not what the man in the 
street would call crime. There’s certainly very little in the way of moral implications 
about it. Although a lot of minor crimes are now dealt with by way of expanded 
fixed penalties, there’s still a whole range of behaviour which is dubbed criminal 
because it’s dealt with in the criminal courts but could be dealt with in other ways. 
There’s something to be said for removing administrative matters from the courts 
according to the principle of de minimis.  
In similar vein, Sheriff M drew on the Hippocratic Oath model to argue for a minimal 
role for the criminal court in relation to the victim: 
It used to be, I think, that the person who was aggrieved came along and they gave 
their story. And I think at that time they understood they were a witness, like 
everybody else. […] Somehow or other, a philosophy came in, and I don’t know 
where it came from, that somehow or other the court could put matters back to what 
it was like before things went wrong.[…] the idea that the court in deciding sentence 
– that the court could make matters better. And of course you can’t do that. The first 
thing doctors try not to do is not make it any worse.  
Developing this point, he drew attention to what he called the ‘slippage’ in 
understanding about roles in criminal justice, particularly relating to the victim. He 
believed the fatal misunderstanding was to think that the court could ‘put things 
back’ to how they were before the crime, or impose some penalty which reflected the 
loss or harm done: 
The second thing: you see, the obvious example, and I’m sure you’ve thought of this 
before yourself, if you’ve got death by careless driving […] you’ve got a careless act 
with dreadful consequences and the bereaved people will understandably somehow 
be looking for a disposal that equiperates with their loss, as to the fault. Now, this 
has been encouraged, whether by newspapers, or by victim support 
organisations.[…] Now, I know a lot of people look at it in different ways, but I 
don’t think victims understood that when the state prosecuted they weren’t doing it 
on their behalf, that they were doing it for other reasons. 
But there’s been a sort of slippage in understanding what people’s roles are. 
Now…that sort of slide could lead to the wrong person being convicted, if you’re 
trying to help victims but you’re doing it the wrong way; it’s not really helping them 
at all. Obviously, if you’re a witness in a serious criminal case, you’re going to be 
asked questions that suggest either that you’re not telling the truth or you’re leading 
an immoral life, or some other reason why you shouldn’t be believed; and within 
limits this is justifiable. But looking at it from the other point of view: if something 
horrible has happened to you, then here’s another. No wonder people don’t bother 
coming to court. So you then begin to wonder if we’re using a 19th century model we 





and all these kind of things. […] All in all, everybody’s got a view of the courts… 
otherwise it’s not really doing a very good job in society, I don’t think. But that 
begins with understanding that things can never be put back as they were before the 
event. 
Most of the judges wanted to see a narrower role for the criminal court in some 
areas: the removal of ‘administrative’ (minor) offences, the diversion to health 
services of persons addicted to drugs; the expansion of restorative justice and the 
Children’s Hearings Service. As well as endorsing restorative justice, Judge L 
thought that there was a place for mediation of some criminal cases along the lines of 
civil law, using the ‘Oh, to hell with it’ rule: 
In civil courts, one party feels he has been dreadfully wronged by the other and so 
raises an action. But the party being sued doesn’t think he has wronged to the extent 
being claimed. So, rather than a whole civil proof, parties will often agree a 
compromise: ‘Oh, to hell with it, we’ll settle for £xxx’. This could work for minor 
crimes. The accused might say ‘Ok, I did call you an A, B and C but I didn’t call you 
a D’. And the victim might just say ‘Oh, to hell with it. I’ll accept your apology and 
£100’.  
It was apparent from many of these accounts of penal practice that judges were 
acutely aware of punishment’s ‘tragic’ element - that the most effective means of 
promoting social control and responsible conduct in the individual lay in mainstream 
processes of socialisation, and that mechanisms such as criminal justice could only 
ever be a ‘coercive back-up’ (Garland, 1990). Judge C expressed similar views about 
the realistic scope of criminal justice, but his lengthy experience in the Drug Courts 
meant that he retained some optimism: 
But there’s still stuff we can try to do, because otherwise it’s a doctrine of despair. 
We can’t just say there’s nothing we can do about it except jail, we’ve got to try. 
And I think it does work. I saw that working in the Drug Courts, people desperate to 
be helped. 
While otherwise holding views about the limits of criminal justice processes to 
correct social failings, Judge M did draw attention to what he considered the broader 
communicative and educative role of criminal justice through the enforcement of 
new laws designed to change attitudes: 
I think to an extent you can alter public views about things. I think the seatbelt law 
did, I think drink driving did, and obviously smoking has done. So you can’t just 





There is an argument that by legislating about something you can change the 
public’s mindset. It seems to have worked with smoking, it seemed to work with 
seatbelts, seemed to work with drink driving. But these were all things where it was 
demonstrable that it was better to do it: always better to have a seatbelt, obviously 
better not smoking inside…so I think there you can see a cogent reason for doing it, 
as well as the fact that people would be in favour of it.  
Against these positive changes, however, he cited less welcome legislative changes 
which the courts had to enforce: 
… three bad things I can think of: racial aggravation, victim statements and the death 
by careless driving [legislation], I think these [changes] are all the result of pressure 
groups. 
Criminal Justice as a ‘gateway’ to services 
Most of the views expressed by judges about the limitations of criminal justice were 
variations of the conventional understanding in penal literature that criminal justice 
services and programmes, by themselves, cannot protect the public and control 
crime. However, most judges also insisted that some positive effects could be 
achieved for some of the most vulnerable or needy offenders who came before them. 
This is the argument that the criminal justice system can act as a ‘gateway’ to 
services which would otherwise not be accessed. Judge M expressed a commonly 
held view: 
This question of the social services function of courts is a very interesting one. I’m 
sure it is [a social service]. Because for many people, committing a crime is a 
gateway for getting some kind of help. Dreadful situation, but it’s true. You can get 
fast-tracked into help with drug problems, which you won’t get otherwise, get expert 
help, so on and so on. That’s a criticism of society I suppose. 
A notable feature of this narrative study is that in their various representations of 
crime and the offender, and through their stories of practice, the disposition most 
commonly displayed by these judges was strongly characterised by an attitude of 
empathy towards the offender and an impulse to include. I address this question more 
fully in the discussion about rehabilitation in Chapter 7, but note here that this 
disposition was the basis for many approbations of the use of criminal justice to 
access services. Judge M, for example, while otherwise in favour of the removal of 





of the ‘social service’ or ‘gateway’ functions of criminal justice for people who were 
‘teetering’ at the edge may thereby be lost: 
Well, people that are repeatedly offending, that are in debt, that can’t find a house to 
live in, their children don’t go to school - all the things you wouldn’t want to have in 
your own life. It may be - though it shouldn’t be - that just coming to court when 
they’re in the grip of something else may make a difference. Now…because some of 
them do want help at that stage, some are pathetically grateful for anything you do. 
Others of course are very thrawn; just want out the door as quickly as possible. And 
I think, although this is pure suspicion, I think a lot of that depends on their lawyer, 
actually. If they’re lucky enough to get a decent solicitor, they’ll try and turn the 
court to their genuine advantage. If they get someone that just wants to get them off, 
then very much it depends on the solicitor giving you a chance to do it. If they [the 
defence lawyers] say next to nothing and they say something like ‘He just wants it 
all to be over with’ and stuff like that. But…you know, we’re talking down at the 
minor crime end of things, but there’s such a lot of it in court and if that’s going to 
be dealt with by Fiscal Fines [alternative to prosecution] then any kind of pastoral 
role of the court being developed will disappear. 
If the person was kind of teetering ... all sorts of things going wrong then you might 
try and step in. Now maybe you shouldn’t, because we used to discuss, those of us 
who were interested in this, quite often why offending should be a gateway to getting 
any kind of help - it’s very odd, as it should be. 
Judge C told the following story about the implementation of Supervised Attendance 
Orders (SAOs) when they were taken over by Apex4 in order to show the existence 
of criminal justice programmes which he believed actually worked: 
And I got to know the people in Apex Scotland and there were several wifies, but 
one in particular called Betty, who was the salt of the earth. We [the Sheriffs] used 
to get really fed up with people saying they didn’t turn up (for SAOs) so we wrote a 
letter to them - but half of them couldn’t read, of course. So we asked [the SASO5 
people] ‘Well, what did they do when they got your letter?’ and we were told they 
didn’t get a reply and so we asked ‘Well, did you find out if they could read?’ 
Anyway, Betty would say ‘Well, I wouldn’t have that, Sheriff [x], I did a wrap-
around thing. I’d get in my car, I’d get round to their house and up the stairs to their 
bedroom and haul them out of bed and say ‘What are you up to?’ And then she said 
‘I would take them for their breakfast, then I would take them to the supermarket, 
and taught them’. She taught them. How to buy things. They didn’t have the basic 
idea how to make a meal, how to budget, how to spend their money, how to check 
bills, and stuff like that. She was just great. And I said ‘If we had people like you, 
these orders would work’. 
Keen to make these schemes work, this Sheriff was galvanized into further action, 





And I still see reports now [about Apex], it wasn’t just [x region] that got the 
contracts, they’ve got them in [other regions] and they work. Because they have the 
people there who are interested and will make them work. And it’s not just having 
them do things in the community. They also have modules where they teach them a 
whole lot of stuff. And there’s a Fast Board or something, like a big television screen 
where they can touch things[…]. And they got that through support from local 
communities. And I also went round with one of the social workers. I got hold of 
him and said we’ve got to make these CSOs work and we went to various local 
companies and said I was really keen to have them take people on. And we got 
various plumbers, joiners to take people on. I got a phone call from Tom 
….KwikFit…saying would you come to a breakfast meeting at Stirling Castle. He 
said he’d heard about the Drug Court and was interested in helping, which we 
needed with the drug people when they got to the end of it because we couldn’t 
abandon them. I used to be dead keen to make sure they weren’t getting into trouble.  
These accounts of the court’s ‘pastoral role’ are qualified by some awareness of the 
negative aspects of the ‘gateway’ approach, and it is evident that it is not regarded by 
all judges as an unqualified good. The positive (and negative) uses of criminal justice 
as a gateway to services for homeless people and those suffering mental disorders is 
well documented (see for example Liska et al, 1999; Zapf et al, 1996), and the 
consequences of ‘coerced’ treatment are also observed (Barton, 1999). Criminal 
justice has now become the principal gateway for drug treatment (Hughes and 
Anthony, 2006) and there is some evidence that this may have net-widening effects 
(Malloch and McIvor, 2012). More broadly, Drakeford and Vanstone (2000) draw 
attention to the routinized compulsion in treatment programmes which is implied by 
this form of intervention.6  
Many of these troubling features coalesce around the use of imprisonment for female 
offenders as a gateway to services, and several recent studies show that sentencers 
send women (and other offenders) to prison, even for relatively minor crimes, 
because they believe that prison programmes (particularly psychological 
reprogramming) can more effectively address their ‘needs’ (Tombs, 2004; Carlen 
and Tombs, 2006). Similarly, in their study of Scottish judges’ decisions to imprison 
in borderline cases, Tombs and Jagger (2006: 809) suggest that judges employ 
strategies, such as ‘role distancing’, to normalize and justify their decisions in ways 
that allow them to ‘deny final responsibility for their own decisions’.  
Judges’ accounts of these difficult sentencing decisions and of new, intrusive and 





even the Sartrean concept of ‘half-consciousness’ which Kennedy (1997) calls 
judicial ‘bad faith’. An alternative reading is that these studies underscore the need 
for judicial practice to be fully informed by research and training. The observations 
of Judge D provide hints of this more progressive influence: 
I suppose one has inclinations about cases. For example, we’ve heard so much about 
women being put in prison in Cornton Vale when they’re really more to be pitied 
than punished. So, there might be an inclination to take a strong view – you wouldn’t 
do that unless there was really absolutely no alternative. Sometimes even for the 
woman’s own protection. 
Section 2 The Drug Court 
There is, of course, no linear or straightforward relationship between penal practice 
and research, and these accounts can do no more than hint at the capacity and 
willingness of criminal justice actors to reflect on criminological and other social 
science research. Moreover, the accounts can be interpreted as indicating a range of 
complex motivations rather than unthinking complicity in routinized coercive 
treatment. They also suggested attempts to reconcile piecemeal knowledge gleaned 
from training or other sources with the ‘situational, adaptive ‘fuzzy logic’ 
(Wacquant, 2007: 273) of daily practice. Some sense of these tensions is gained from 
Judge C, whose earlier conversation suggested that, like Judge D, he was aware of 
the research concerning the damaging effects of imprisonment on women. Here he 
recalls a case from the Drug Court which led him to imposing a custodial sentence on 
a female offender ‘for her own good’: 
Yes, [I remember] one woman in particular. She was going to lose an arm 
because…well, she was very good but she was living with an absolute bastard who 
was making her prostitute herself, and then when we got the truth out of her, her 14 
year old son, who she’d been telling me had been doing well at school, turned out 
he’d been forcing her into prostituting herself, too. And when he came to court….big 
guy for 14…I gave him hell. I said ‘How dare you. If I ever hear of this happening 
again, I’ll report you to the Children’s Hearings System’.  When this woman came 
in, she knew what I was going to do because I had warned her – if you miss another 
appointment, or produce another positive test, I’m going to lock you up. For your 
own sake I want to put you into this system run by a nurse in Glasgow. It [the 218 
Centre programme 7] was fantastic, but they would only take you if you were clean. 
But this woman, I was told by the medics that her arm was useless, and it was going 
to be amputated, because she kept on puncturing it. She was like a skeleton. And she 
was subject to this abuse at home. So I said, ‘Right, enough ‘care at home’ from 





you come out, I’m going to have someone meet you and take you to this place in 
Glasgow where I want you to stay for 3 or 4 weeks.’  
It was evident that Judge C’s experience in the Drug Court was a powerful one, and 
it permeated his accounts of his judicial career. The complexity of the history and 
operation of the Drug Courts in Scotland is such that a review is beyond the scope of 
this discussion, but of particular interest here is the extent to which the involvement 
of the judiciary is regarded as a critical component of the success of the scheme. In 
particular, the Drug Court requires a very different kind of dialogue between the 
judge and the offender from that typically encountered in the courts.8 Judge C spoke 
enthusiastically about the programme and described its operation in some detail: 
We had so much more involvement, me and my drug team. It was a wrap-around 
service. Two of my colleagues could be back-ups if necessary but I did it all. […]. I 
was in charge and would preside over all the meetings. We would have the social 
workers, counselors from this and counsellors from that, and specialists who did all 
sorts of stuff. It was evaluated by Professor Gill McIvor from Stirling University. 
There was a 3 year pilot and she did a great report after that, very supportive. But 
Cathy Jamieson [Minister for Justice, Scottish Government] at the time wanted to 
roll it out for the whole of Scotland and they took about 18 months and she couldn’t 
get the support from fellow ministers because medicine and health, education etc. 
were seeking the money as well and there was only a certain amount to go round. So 
what could she do? All she could was to roll out the DTTOs [Drug Treatment and 
Testing Orders].But DTTOs were a minor fraction of what we were doing. We did 
everything, it was holistic. We looked at everything in their lives. They had benefit 
problems, family problems, not just their drug and methadone problems and sub-
optimum problems. Every part of their lives was looked at because, you know, if you 
didn’t, the slightest little upset…. Even in Glasgow they only did them for people 
over 21 but in […] Sheriff Court I did them for 17, 18 year olds. Because you know, 
they would start off taking drugs and then alcohol at age 10 or 11 and by the time 
they were 17, 18 they were hard-blown addicts. So in appropriate cases I would say 
‘he’s maybe immature but we’re going to try’. And it worked with some. […]  
The Drug Court costs a lot of dough, though. I had a complete meeting every 
morning between me and the solicitor for the accused, the senior social worker, the 
various counselors, the Fiscal, and the police. They were all involved. It’s not just 
reading the report, you have to say to the social worker or to the counselor, why has 
this not happened, and for relapses etc., what happened there? And in reports, 
sometimes there are things missing, and in court [the non-Drug Court] you can say 
to the social worker, do you know what happened here but of course she doesn’t, she 
wasn’t the one who wrote the report. Whereas I had this team of people on the 
ground, and they would give me the complete background as to what went wrong. 
But they would also say ‘This guy’s been brilliant, or this girl’s been brilliant’ and 
give you examples, and the person wasn’t there. So when the drug court sat in the 





I asked him what he thought was the main benefit of this approach and he answered 
that it was the depth of attention paid to the social problems in the lives of offenders: 
It was the way that it got right into the complete lives, going back to what caused 
their problems in their lives in the first place, and looking at ways of ensuring that 
these were dealt with by one member of the team, or several members of the team: if 
it was drug addiction, or if it was sexual abuse in the past, or if it was money 
problems, or partner problems, or mental health problems, or literacy problems. I 
mean, the numbers of times that people wouldn’t tell their social worker or any of 
their counselors, that they couldn’t read their timetable. I would say ‘Did you get 
your timetable?’ ‘Oh, yes, Sheriff..’ ‘Why didn’t you turn up?’ But I didn’t want to 
embarrass them, I’d spoken to them in the morning. So I’d say, ok, we know the 
answer – this guy couldn’t read. And he had no-one to ask. We dealt with people 
between the ages of 16 and 25, 26 because you start seeing the very serious changes 
as they mature. But by that time, the numbers of kids who are either rat-arsed every 
weekend or they’re up to their eyes in heroin and a cocktail of drugs…. 
Dzur and Murchandani (2007) argue that the inception, development and operation 
of problem-solving courts such as the Drug Court - with their emphasis on rational, 
open and ongoing debate and on the inclusive participation of a broad spectrum of 
actors, agencies and community groups – point to the potential for a procedural 
theory of punishment. This approach involves the recognition of value pluralism – in 
particular, sensitivity to the ‘different values, experiences and interests caught up in 
the practice of punishment’ (2007:169). Dzur and Murchandani (2007) point to the 
additional role the judiciary could play in fostering and being responsive to debates 
of this kind, though they question whether current configurations of the judicial role 
were capable of this involvement.  
In my earlier discussion of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus, I drew attention to his 
conception of practice which entails a form of ‘learned ignorance’ on the part of the 
practitioner and an inability to question the ‘taken-for-granted’ categories of thought 
which are characteristic of the field. On one reading, this lack of reflexivity about 
social processes would inhibit the sort of change in the judicial habitus which would 
be necessary for judges to participate effectively in new innovations such as the Drug 
Court; yet the involvement of the judiciary in this scheme suggests otherwise. In 
Chapter 7 I draw on other accounts of practice to suggest that the capacity for 
judicial reflexivity can be traced in additional ways, but I consider first other sources 





Section 3 Influences on the Judicial Habitus: Having a ‘dimension’ 
In one of the few textbooks relating to sentencing law and practice in Scotland, 
Nicholson (1981:2) acknowledges the competing considerations facing the sentencer. 
As a source of information to help the sentencer declares that criminology ‘has now 
attained a respectability and an authority where its findings must be taken note of’.9 
As discussed above, the lines of influence on the judiciary from judicial training, 
research or other source are not capable of easy determination, but the nature and 
scope of the range of influences have important implications not only for criminal 
justice practice but also for the potential of change in the penal field.  
Judge F adopted a cautious approach, preferring to get his information from ‘sources 
he could trust’ such as appeal cases, training and colleagues rather than newspapers 
or the television. More broadly, the importance attached to the impartiality and 
independence of the judiciary prevents judges from actively participating in politics 
though several judges spoke of their involvement in criminal justice reform 
organisations, charities and other forums for penal debate.10 Judge D usefully 
outlined some of the practical distinctions involved: 
The judge shouldn’t become involved in matters of public controversy. So, for 
example, when Sheriff Peter Thomson had a placard in Princes Street: that led to his 
removal. And there are other examples in England of the same sort. No, it’s perfectly 
clear that one should not become involved in public controversy, full stop. If you 
have an interest in a particular body, then you need to be quite careful about what 
kind of body it is. If it’s a campaigning body, then you may think, as a judge, that 
it’s not a very good idea to continue your membership, but you may be able to 
distance yourself from that in some way or other. I’m sympathetic to Sacro because I 
think one can do a lot of intelligent, helpful things with offenders to discourage re-
offending. 11 
Judge M thought there were advantages in attending conferences for himself and for 
others, too: 
I liked to hear what people had as ideas of reform. I also liked the people; I liked to 
see it from a different point of view. I didn’t like all of the people I met because I 
thought some of them had a very monocular vision about things and were really only 
interested in their particular group.  I also thought that, I suppose a few of us did, 
that we were useful by being there and being able to explain practical things to 





Judge C was involved in a wide range of organisations and thought it provided him 
with valuable insight for sentencing practice: 
It brings me into direct contact with what we make orders about and we don’t always 
understand the niceties of it or the problems that are faced by those who are doing it. 
We just blithely say ‘Right, 18 months probation with the following conditions, 
community service or supervised attendance or whatever’. So I was sad that several 
of my colleagues were so annoyed at the inadequacy of the system. Being involved 
in Apex, for me, brought direct contact with the problems and how they could best 
be solved. And so, that’s primarily the benefit. And now, having been involved with 
Apex, I’ve seen the other services they provide which I didn’t know about. […] 
They do a lot of stuff with people who are illiterate and innumerate – many, many 
courses to help them write application letters, do CVs, and stuff like that, you know. 
In a supervision requirement report it will say ‘so and so’s done such and such a 
model, Scotvec model’ or whatever, and you don’t really know the details. So for 
me, knowing these kind of things I found very helpful.  
Further discussion suggested that involvement of this sort not only influenced the 
way he sentenced, it allowed him to ‘shape things’ at other levels: 
Oh yeah. Because I knew for the individual offender, what the social workers were 
suggesting. But I was also able, as it were, to evaluate myself, what a particular guy 
needed, or girl. And I was able to say, before the report was ordered, I want you to 
concentrate on the following, which I know, for example, that Apex can offer, or 
that Sacro can offer. I think they should work more together than they do, because 
they could share costs. It gave me great insight into the actual ways of keeping 
people out of prison, which we’re all being urged to do, of course. Mr […] who was 
then Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons, who I knew, he always used to come to me 
and say ‘What’s going on here?’ And at Apex, I would be able to put my 
pennyworth in and say ‘Look, this has got to be resolved in such and such a place’, 
because you read the reports you get and you wonder why we’re not getting proper 
results from, say, Highland Division, or Southwest Division – we got tables showing 
so many SAO’s but no finishers, or a percentage of finishers which looked to me to 
be inadequate, and then I would have that explained to me. And therefore, I was able 
to go back and use that to my benefit. And then, in other courts, as a part-timer, I 
was able to do that with a much wider range of colleagues, some of whom are still 
very sceptical about the way social work departments provide the courses they’re 
supposed to and very often can’t do it because of a mixture of lack of funding, lack 
of staff and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the individual. And Sacro –  the 
numbers who every year want to go to the SASO conference in Peebles, is 
interesting. There’s always a lot more people who apply to go […] and I think some 
of them just come for the day, some will come for the whole weekend, but they’re 
very enthusiastic and they take part with a wide variety of people in the exercises 
and problems which are set up, and do it very well. And that is interesting because of 
the ivory tower idea which used to persist, and still does with some sheriffs and 
judges – but I’m talking about high court judges as well, not just sheriffs. So it was 
beneficial to me to be involved in Apex as a sheriff, for the benefit of offenders. It 





Judge B had spoken at length about his involvement with a number of organisations 
and I asked him what he thought were the benefits: 
Well, the benefit is that you do encounter people who are concerned with dealing on 
a day to day basis with those who’ve been convicted of crime, or are involved in 
crime, including, to some extent the victims, because the victims were also in the 
SASD [now SASO]. So…and partly because you don’t want to go in ignorant, you 
tend to read up something about it and you meet people from Sacro or from Howard 
League, wherever it may be. And you listen to the lecturers and they talk about this 
and you began to realise there’s a whole epidemiology about crime that you’ve not 
been aware of before, because your interest in the criminal ends the moment you 
convict him- did he do it or did he not? That’s the thing we’re quite good at, with the 
assistance of juries. But how to dispose of it, we don’t know very well at all. So, 
bodies like SASD etc., yes they do teach you. Even SAMH, the mental health 
charity tells you. You realise from the information that they put out how many 
people go into prison because they’ve got a mental health problem, rather than a 
wickedness or evil problem. So, association with all these things is very important.  
Judge B further explained that having ‘a dimension’ – a broader outlook – held the 
possibility for change among judges: 
Where you have a judge who, partly for personal reasons, partly because of political 
experience etc. etc. has got a dimension […] you felt there were things that could be 
done. […] Even so, you’ll still find that they [other judges] don’t want anything 
new; they want to stick to traditional remedies, even though they don’t work. I mean, 
somebody has defined madness as being constantly doing the same thing in the same 
way and expecting a different result, and that’s what we do in the courts.  We 
constantly- and indeed the legislature too - we constantly provide the same remedies. 
Or worse, stronger ones to deal with the situation; they don’t work and we go on and 
do more. So if two years won’t deter, then they give you three years, won’t deter and 
they give you five years and it still doesn’t deter. 
For Judge B, his involvement in these organisations allowed him the opportunity to 
‘influence the general thing’: 
I’d become aware when you read the papers, and you read the statistics […] - there 
are government statistics like the crime survey on the one hand or the reported crime 
things on the another, which I would always be aware of and you’ve always access 
to them because they’re printed in the paper. You’ve also got access to analysis by 
people like Sacro who compare the rate of imprisonment per 100,000 of the 
population with Finland and Denmark and Germany and France and Portugal etc. 
etc. So you get some idea of what’s going on. Also, because I was a member of the 
International Bar Association, and was an opening speaker at two of their events and 
I attended many of their conferences; well, you could attend any one of 4 to7 hours 
on a particular day so you went to two or three and usually they were on crime and 
punishment. So you did get insights into what’s happening in the rest of the world. 
These were important influences, and indeed in the light of them I actually had to 





with the judges in Northern Ireland, and some judges from England and the Scottish 
judges. And also we had seminars where it’s just been the Scottish judges, and 
because of my political work …and Law Officer etc. background, I sometimes 
addressed them. So you do get a chance to influence the general thing. 
I asked him: influence it in what way? 
Well you could argue in favour of not having the highest prison population in 
Western Europe, which I had argued in favour of a lot, but it just hasn’t made much 
difference, because we still have - or pretty well.    
Judge E spoke at length about his membership of SASO and I asked him how he 
thought it influenced his practice. His answer indicated a broad range of perceived 
benefits, including a force for moderation: 
I think it did, yeah [influence his practice]. When it came to severity of sentence or 
the like, I learned from SASD [now SASO] that it didn’t necessarily improve a 
regime to have a practice of severe sentencing - that it might be counter-productive. 
So it came back to treating people as individual cases. Yes, if you treat the populace 
harshly, you will find a harsh populace. And that’s what you’ve got to be careful 
about. And that’s the problem with guidelines: you can’t lay down a general rule. 
[…] I think it might shape how you actually put things into court in the start. Again, 
coming back to this question of trying to be reasonable and explain what you’re 
doing and treating people with respect and fairness. It all comes back to that. Those 
are some of the things I learned from SASD: if you treat people fairly and give them 
human respect then that will reflect how the public sees sentencing as well. Whereas, 
if you treat them harshly; well, it creates good headlines but the public perception 
will be of harshness and to create harshness is to create problems generally, for 
society generally. In the same way as if you – say you have brutal sentencing, you’re 
likely to have a brutal society. And people just accept brutality as the norm. […] I 
remember I used to go to […] SASO and you used to get some interesting 
information from their meetings. For instance, I remember going once and 
somebody produced figures about a course in Germany and it was revealed that the 
harsher the court, the higher the rate of re-offending compared to a more lenient 
court, where offending stayed down. So that was part of my thinking as well – not to 
be too harsh if there was an alternative.  
I was a member of the Glasgow branch. I used to go once a month. I think you got a 
feel for how the others involved saw sentencing. And you also got good information 
sometimes about how, say, community service actually worked. And meeting some 
of the people involved in that – community service – and you saw how some of them 
tripped up when they were working outside and got supervised more strictly and 
seeing how that worked and seeing that the supervisors really were quite strict, you 
began to appreciate that they were really working at it. And the same with dealings 
with Sacro – accommodation and things like that - and seeing again the chap who 
ran Sacro in Glasgow, he had a record himself, and knew what he was dealing with. 
Yeah, he was impressive and you got the feeling that if you could get an offender 
into something like that, he’d get some of the support that he needed and hopefully it 





Judge D provided an important insight into the additional benefits for judges of 
forums where they could listen and absorb information without necessarily having to 
publicly comment – with important implications for judicial independence: 
SASO is a different matter because that’s a kind of broad church, a forum where lots 
of people get together, you could absorb all sorts of ideas without saying you agree 
with them. But you’re much more aware of what’s going on, so it really is an 
opportunity to meet people and hear what their perspectives are. 
Notwithstanding these positive accounts of involvement in organisations and broad 
reflections on the benefits to judges and others, Judge B provided insight of a 
different kind: a habitus less open to outside influence and about suspicion of that 
‘influence’: 
I would say different judges have different experiences, so an example. For all kinds 
of reasons that were personal and otherwise, I was heavily involved in things outside 
the court. So I would, you know, I would address Sacro and Apex, I would visit the 
prisons […] I had a lot of things […]. And, by the way, some judges criticised me 
for that. They say you should, you know, not be involved in any of these things at 
all, because you’re subject to influences there, you see. […] But even so, there were 
some whispers saying ‘keep out of these things’. But why they imagined you 
become free from prejudice by giving a lecture at Sacro but you don’t by standing at 
the bar of the New Club talking to your Tory colleagues, is another matter.12  
In this discussion about influences on judicial dispositions, I have pragmatically 
situated the judges in their sentencing context as penal actors. However, their career 
histories and judicial roles mean they are also legal actors with legal sensibilities. It 
is therefore possible to read into these accounts of engagement with penal research 
and criminal justice organisations a more complex appraisal of the motivations 
involved. Tracing the history of inter-disciplinary socio-legal scholarship, Tomlins 
(2000:963) observes that in the post-war period social sciences such as sociology and 
political science were increasingly demonstrating their ability to compete with law in 
the struggle to define social problems and to offer solutions.13 During this period, 
legal scholarship had been ‘traipsing from door to door, looking for methodological 
refuge’ (Rubin, 1997: 521) and part of law’s success in re-establishing itself as a 
‘discourse of state expertise and governance’ was the appropriation of the social 





Kalman (quoted in Tomlins, 2000:964) believes that the law and society inter-
disciplinary impulse is part of law’s ‘restless search to justify its authority’. Adopting 
Tomlins’ (2000) typology of the two fields of encounter in inter-disciplinary 
research, it is possible to argue that judges’ engagement with criminological and 
other social science research enables them to move beyond the first field (a ‘modality 
of rule’) and enter the second field of encounter: a modality of self-explanation or 
legitimation. This new form of engagement allows them to explain and legitimate 
their power and authority to their wider audiences: government, policy advisors, 
criminal justice ‘stakeholders’ and the public – perhaps even criminological 
researchers. As Melossi (2008) notes, criminology is a social science which has 
always been closely linked with the question of political legitimation, and this natural 
affinity may explain some of the enthusiasm as well as the suspicion suggested by 
the judges’ accounts given here.  
Conclusion 
As Bourdieu intended it, habitus is a pivotal concept which links the past and the 
present through dispositions and attitudes already acquired in the field, and through 
adaptations to new encounters. Importantly, however, habitus carries the genesis of 
cultural change only if practitioners have the capacity to reflect on some of the 
conditions which structure practice in a given field, and thus constrain them in 
practice. In these accounts of their early years of legal training and judging, of 
models of judicial conduct and of their conceptions of crime, the criminal and 
criminal justice, we can begin to trace some of those conditions of practice as well as 
the formation and consolidation of judicial dispositions in response to the 
circumstances they encounter. We can also begin to see ways in which some judges 
recognise factors which operate to shape and constrain their practice.  
The accounts of involvement in outside organisations and of their access to 
information and research provide insight about certain aspects of the judicial habitus 
which are little known, particularly relating to the formation of dispositions and 
sensibilities. This points to some of the ways in which research, information and 





moderation and severity, and the implementation of community penalties - is 
received and evaluated by judges, and how it may influence practice. Not only does 
this underscore the continuing importance of judicial involvement in organisations 
such as Apex and Sacro who do ‘intelligent, helpful things’ with offenders, it also 
highlights the need to consider the nature and form of judicial engagement – 
questions about access, involvement, membership, dissemination of research and 
information. In particular, it suggests the extra value of organisations such as SASO 
who provide a forum for discussion and debate in an environment where judges can 
‘absorb all sorts of ideas’ without necessarily having to publicly agree or disagree 
with them. Further, these accounts suggest some of the ways in which information 
gleaned from these and other sources is used to inform conversation and debate with 
government and policy advisors, and with judicial colleagues. Finally, in relation to 
questions about the transmission of penal culture, these accounts support the 
conception of the judge as both the receiver and bearer of cultural values, and 
suggest the reflexive judge as a key vector of penal change.  
In Chapter 7, I continue this enquiry about judicial frameworks of meaning in penal 
practice and consider the relevance of the ‘master narrative’ of judicial independence 
for trial and sentencing processes. I briefly re-appraise several dimensions of 
sentencing practice in light of recent findings in neuroscience, and explore the 
concept of sentencing as a signifying process.  
 
                                                 
1 These images of guilt and innocence, subject and society, individual responsibility, neutrality and 
independence also form the basis of legal reasoning in criminal law, and have the same capacity to 
generate understandings. As Lacey (2007: 195) observes, these are ‘discrete objects of criminal justice 
knowledge’ which merit close examination. 
2 Occasionally one comes across very direct lines of criminological influence on judicial thinking, 
such as the Plenary Address given by Rt. Hon. Dame Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand (Elias, 
2005) entitled ‘Criminology in the Age of Talk-back’, which draws extensively on work by a number 
of contemporary criminologists.  
3 I wondered if the book to which he referred was Beckett, K. (1997) Making Crime Pay: The Politics 
of Law and Order in the Contemporary United States. 
4 Apex (Scotland) is an organisation that works with ex-offenders and young people and adults at risk, 
and aims to help equip them with the necessary skills to change their behaviour and lead fulfilling 
lives. 





                                                                                                                                          
6 Drakeford and Vanstone (2000) also draw attention to the Orwellian-sounding language of the 
‘gateway’ approach and to the Labour government’s pursuit of social policy objectives through 
criminal justice against the evidence which suggested that criminal justice objectives are better 
achieved through social policy means.   
7 The 218 Centre was established in Glasgow in August 2003 with the aim of providing a range of 
services for women in the criminal justice system. The Centre provides a day service and supported 
accommodation. In addition to prescribing facilities, it offers support - residential or daily - for 
detoxification. See Scottish Government (2006) ‘Evaluation of the 218 Centre’.  
8 McIvor (2009) explains that although the Drug Court Sheriffs were not operating explicitly within a 
model of therapeutic jurisprudence, a key focus was on creating supportive conditions through which 
participants could attempt to reform their drug habits, with the recognition that drug misuse is a 
relapsing condition. Research on procedural justice suggests this innovative approach may have 
important implications for the perceived legitimacy – and hence effectiveness – of the programme.  
9 Nicholson summarises the principal findings of criminology as follows: no form of sentence is any 
more or less successful than another in preventing recidivism. 
10 The Judiciary of Scotland website contains the following statement: 
‘Judges should have no involvement in political activity other than exercising their right to vote. On 
appointment, any ties with a political party or organisation must be severed, and caution has to be 
taken to avoid the creation of a perception of bias in any other way. Justices of the Peace and part-time 
fee paid judges are free to have party political involvement, but must nevertheless ensure that this has 
no effect upon their independence when acting in their judicial role.’ 
11 Sacro (Scotland) provides a range of direct criminal justice services aimed at reducing conflict and 
offending and promoting safe and cohesive communities. Services include restorative justice and 
reparation, community mediation and work with schools.   
12 The New Club was established in 1787 and is a private club in the New Town in Edinburgh. 
Membership is private, open to men only and is believed to contain many establishment figures 
including judges.  
13 Some interesting parallels - and distinctions - could be drawn between the development of judicial 
and police authority over the power of ‘legitimate naming’. See Loader and Mulcahy (2001) regarding 






Chapter 7 The master narrative: judicial independence 
Introduction 
In this chapter I continue the approach adopted in the two preceding chapters, 
exploring some of the frameworks of meaning and sensibilities which contribute to 
‘judicial culture’, and here broadening the inquiry to sentencing practice. In the first 
section, I consider the ‘master narrative’ - judicial independence - and its relevance 
to sentencing. In the second and third sections I consider the various judicial role 
conceptions, punishment orientations and normative commitments articulated by 
judges and which are suggested by their stories of practice to explore several key 
dimensions of sentencing practice; discretion, rationality, intuition, emotions and 
collegiality. In the final section, I consider the idea of sentencing as a ‘signifying 
practice’ in the context of the central tension for criminal justice which is inscribed 
in the judicial role: the ‘social question’.  
 
Section1: Judicial independence: the master narrative 
It is easy to adopt an attitude of scepticism or even suspicion towards the concept of 
judicial independence.1 Despite extensive critique, this is a concept still characterised 
by opacity, defying conceptual precision (Stevens, 1999) and empirical analysis, and 
thus easily characterised as ‘a grab-bag of vague but salutary qualities’ (Tiede, 
2006:160). More critically, legal realist and critical legal scholars identify it as a 
reified account of the judicial role, with mythologizing and legitimising functions, 
and giving the appearance of some transcendental basis for judicial decisions. Legal 
scholars are critical of the worshipful tone and ‘rhetorical effluvience’ (sic) which 
accompanies its use (Cross, 2003) and of its trumping ‘say no more’ quality when 
employed in opposition to almost any judicial reform (Malleson, 1997).  
Feeley and Rubin (2000) observe that political scientists in the US academy (wherein 
most studies of judicial behaviour take place) are inclined to adopt a view from afar, 
regarding all judicial behaviour as driven by attitudes and beliefs, and thus paying 





Legal scholars, on the other hand, are inclined to issue prescriptions about the correct 
doctrinal positions which should be taken regarding these doctrines. The 
consequence of these dual stances is that little attention is paid to the understandings 
and meanings judges bring to bear on those doctrines – the doctrines that judges 
actually employ in practice. For Rubin and Feeley (2000), this is to treat judicial 
beliefs and legal doctrines as mutually exclusive categories, and represents 
something of a methodological gap. 
A similar gap can be observed in criminological scholarship. Although the concept is 
usefully discussed in its constitutional ‘trumping’ function in relation to sentencing 
policy, reform and innovation (Ashworth, 1995; Tata and Hutton, 2003), it is 
elsewhere dismissed with little examination as merely the ‘potent myth’ of a 
hegemonic judiciary (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007: 105). What appears relatively 
unexplored in criminal justice research is the question of the independence and 
impartiality of the individual judge, the subjective meanings of the concept, and its 
role in the sentencing process.  
Krygier (2008: 45) observes that there are many reasons for the avoidance of close 
sociological exploration of legal doctrines – ‘too normative, too legal, too political, 
too formal, too disconnected from life’ – but asserts that where these doctrines matter 
legally and politically, they matter socially, too. This ‘sociological innocence’ about 
legal doctrines is all the more striking since legal doctrines such as the rule of law 
and judicial independence are classically regarded as offering protection against the 
arbitrary use of power - a central social concern (Krygier, 2008: 45). However, the 
greater challenge for a social science approach to judicial independence (one aimed 
at social explanation as opposed to doctrinal understanding) is the ‘macro-micro 
problem’ which arises: the difficulty in developing explanatory accounts which link 
individual and collective behaviour (Rubin, 1997: 556). In advocating greater social 
explanation of the doctrine, Rubin (1997: 558) points to the potential: 
 
Since law is both a set of norms and a system of meaning, an account of the 
decision-maker's relationship to the organization that is phrased in these terms is 
likely to be particularly useful. None of this will resolve the normative debates that 
animate legal scholarship. What it might do, however, is to provide a rich empirical 






More pointedly in relation to criminal justice, Lacey (2007:195) notes that legal 
doctrines are ‘discrete objects of criminal justice knowledge’ which merit close 
examination, and are equally important for criminal justice as the rest of the process: 
Once we have conceived criminal justice as an integrated process with certain 
complex functions, it almost amounts to bad faith to place so much emphasis on 
these doctrinal values at one stage of the process while virtually ignoring them at the 
other 
                                                                                                      (Lacey, 1987: 222) 
Judicial Independence and Sentencing 
MacCormick (1992:5) provides the understanding that if law is imagined as a 
normative order, ‘institution-concepts’ such as judicial independence are useful ways 
of organising legal thought and understanding and provide the basis for knowledge 
claims about law and its processes. As a juridical and ethical commitment to which 
judges and governments attach importance, and perhaps carrying greater significance 
than Fielding’s (2011) conception of judicial ‘workplace narratives’, judicial 
independence can be regarded as the central organising principle of the judicial role 
and of the habitus. As the master narrative, it is a thread which runs through many 
conversations with the judges, and particularly the topics discussed in this chapter: 
the exercise of discretion, judicial role conceptions, and the management of 
emotions. Before these substantive discussions, I first consider what the judges say 
directly about the operation of the judicial independence and the implications for 
criminal justice practice.  
Judge C outlined the first meaning of judicial independence which relates to the 
independence of the institution and the separation of powers: 
Well, on one level it meant a great deal because many of my colleagues would be on 
their high horse about being called ‘colleague’ or what was the other one.[…].. 
‘stakeholder’! Ho, ho, that used to drive my colleagues berserk. And it annoyed me a 
bit, too, because, you know, the office is an independent office. And especially if it 
came from government. It seemed civil servants, and about half the MSPs were 
completely oblivious to the separation of powers. And from that dignified point of 
view we would say ‘Do you realise that.....?’ I had a colleague in [X Sheriff Court] 
who had a huge fight with his local councillors, before whom he had to appear to 





Others spoke about threats to judicial independence as a result of administrative 
interference, workload pressure, career structure, and complaints: cumulatively, these 
were described by one judge as ‘the loss of independence by 1,000 cuts’ and by 
another as ‘executive creep’. Not without controversy, many considered that 
government interference with judicial discretion also represented a threat to judicial 
independence. Judge B, a former High Court judge, provided useful insight about 
some of the ‘checks and balances’ which he believed protected judicial 
independence. These, it appeared, were informal as well as formal means: communal 
dining, and the Appeal Court: 
And the other thing is that this whole system is full of checks and balances, all the 
time, because of the way the judges live in a kind of enclosed environment for the 
most part. On the whole, judges don’t go into pubs…they meet for lunch every day 
together, used to almost always eat altogether. In fact they still do nowadays in 
Scotland; they all meet in the one dining room. And, of course, the Appeal Court is 
reviewing what you’re doing, so there’s a lot of checks and balances, and that I 
suppose is one of the guarantees of judicial independence.  
In relation to the second form of independence – the independence or impartiality of 
the individual judge - Judge H was most direct: 
The secret of it all is being independent. I do think it’s the most important thing. 
Being independent of someone – apart from the Appeal Court – who can come to 
you and say ‘That decision you gave today was ridiculous’.  
Judge M observed that it was important to have a judiciary ‘that’s not frightened of 
anything’ and Judge B expressed this in a similar way: 
I suppose it’s to know that you are, in a sense, untouchable in terms of what you do, 
provided you don’t misbehave. Then…you should try to make something of your 
independence, and not be unduly influenced by what is thought to be the public 
mood which, as I say, is a very doubtful concept indeed. 
But Judge B believed that recent changes to the composition of the judiciary in terms 
of age carried significant implications: 
The result is that the bench has become younger, and to that extent, slightly less 
experienced and slightly less above the battle, if you like, just because older people 





The traditions of the institution 
Much has been written about the extent to which the power of law, and particularly 
criminal law, relies on elements of performance, imagination and symbolism. Rieke 
(1991:43) makes the seemingly unassailable point that despite the aura of mystery 
created by judges’ robes, raised benches, wigs and pomp, judges ‘do not at once 
acquire extraordinary powers of reasoning and molt their humanity’ simply through 
the act of being ‘elevated’ to the bench. For Kahn (2006a), the performativity 
element of the judicial role is directed at stabilising the position of law in a ‘highly 
contested symbolic field’.2 This competition is fought out in the realm of the 
imagination, and the law brings two resources to the debate: a conception of law as 
the product of the sovereign will – its democratic basis - and as the product of reason. 
A key element in the construction and the maintenance of this ‘legal imaginary’ is 
the personification of these traditions in the person of the judge. This requires the 
transformation of the individual judge and the suppression of their individual 
subjectivity: in Judge C’s phrase, the ability to situate him or herself ‘above the 
battle’. However, as Kahn (2006a: 4) observes, even if no one ‘fully believes’ this 
legal fiction, it still has some force: 
But everyone sort of believes. We believe it as a background assumption that 
sustains the rule of law. The suppression of the individual subjectivity of the judge is 
central to the judicial performance: the court, not the judge, speaks; the decision is 
always spoken in the name of the law, which appears to us as the will of the 
sovereign people.  
The legal realists’ critique of these normative claims – that they represent some kind 
of transcendental nonsense and that far from having any democratic basis, law is 
entirely in the service of politics – fails to capture or explain the extent to which legal 
actors believe themselves to be constrained by law. Narrative has a role to play in 
explaining this middle ground between the formalism of law and naked individual or 
group preferences, capturing the idea of integrity or ethos in practice and placing it in 
the context of a shared community of commitments (Garver, 2004; Kahn, 2006b). 
Capturing some of these ideas about judicial independence in practice, Judge A 





I wasn’t physically doing it: it happened. It was just a feeling; this just happened 
automatically. You realised this was totally….I have to behave in a totally judicial 
manner. 
Judge B spoke at length of the effect on judges of the traditions of the institution. He 
returned to the subject of an earlier conversation about the effect of background on 
subsequent judicial conduct in order to illustrate what he perceived as the 
transformative effect of office:  
I talked earlier about people who couldn’t keep an open mind or people. Well, one of 
the most remarkable judges was a man I ultimately came to admire, having disliked 
him intensely – Lord […]. He came from the traditional background. His ancestors 
were on the bench. He himself went to […] school and went to Oxford, I think, and 
then to Edinburgh. And he acted invariably for the NCB (National Coal Board) 
rather for the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers). But when he went on the 
bench, to my astonishment he was an excellent, absolutely excellent judge. And… 
and totally fair. 
He continued: 
And once you get up there, the great thing - they said this of the American Supreme 
Court too - is that it doesn’t matter in one sense who you appoint: the traditions of 
the institution can be so powerful that it changes you. It makes you independent. 
Another thing which I’ve often said - and I don’t know how much support there is 
for it - is that when we go on the bench, we wear a wig and a gown, and a special 
gown and a special wig and a different gown for criminal cases etc. And the purpose 
of that is not to frighten the punter or to impress the public. The purpose of that is to 
remind you who you are, to remind you that you’re not just [full name] earning so 
much, and looking to a pension, and with his background. That you’re there, you’re 
exercising a great power on behalf of the people through the state etc. So that’s why 
I still advocate the wearing of wigs and gowns, for it helps to remind you who you 
are. So the institution is very important, and the whole tradition. 
In later parts of this chapter I discuss some of the strategies which judges adopt to 
manage their emotions and other challenges of the work. These stories suggest the 
idea of a neutral state of mind which judges purposefully enter in order to perform 
their independent role. Taken together with the accounts here about judges’ beliefs in 
independence and their ability to situate themselves ‘above the battle’, this points to 
a strong ‘enabling’ role for the concept of independence and impartiality. To a 
significant degree, however, acceptance of these stories relies on an attitude of faith 
or trust in the individual judge as well as in the institution. Berman (2001:120) makes 





… only by taking the judges’ belief seriously will we become aware of the 
possibility that the belief itself might function as a constraint on judicial discretion. 
Thus, judges who believe in legal principle and repeatedly tell themselves and the 
world a story about both the non-ideological nature of their work and the substantial 
constraints on their discretion may, in fact, be more constrained in their decision-
making, regardless of whether or not a critic can ‘prove’ that such constraints are 
illusory.  
Section 2: Sentencing in Practice 
Introduction 
In Section 1 above, I noted the ‘sociological innocence’ about the concept of judicial 
independence which exists in relation to criminal justice practice. In relation to the 
first use of this concept (the independence of the institution), Lacey (2008) observes 
that the nature and extent of judicial insularity is an important institutional variable in 
the analysis of ways in which systems of criminal justice respond to calls for 
increased penal severity. She also notes the attachment of the UK judiciary to a 
strong ‘Olympian’ version of judicial independence, and the implications for judicial 
power and authority. These observations raise important issues about the separation 
of powers and the susceptibility of the judiciary to external influences from 
government, media or public sources which I do not directly address in this thesis. 
However, the concept of judicial independence also has relevance for the routine 
practice of criminal justice and in this section I consider dimensions of sentencing 
practice for the insight they provide about the operation of the judicial habitus and 
judicial culture. In particular, I consider several accounts which challenge the 
conventional understanding of judicial independence as ‘distance’. 
The occupational life of judges – their experience of the work, the routine tasks, and 
the challenges and demands of office – is a relatively unknown world. Several recent 
studies examine work-related stress in the judiciary, mostly in the USA (Eells and 
Showalter, 1994; Chase and Hora, 2000; Bremer, 2003; Chamberlain and Miller, 
2009); others have explored emotional and routine aspects of judicial work (Anleu 
and Mack, 2005; Cowan and Hitchings, 2007; Mack and Anleu, 2007; Scarduzio, 





sentencing task itself, however, or even more broadly to the judge’s role in criminal 
justice.  
In this section I explore aspects of sentencing as an occupational task and some of 
the cultural influences and pressures to which they are subject in daily practice, 
particularly those which can be considered emanating from within the judicial 
habitus. By focusing on these cultural dimensions of practice, I do not attempt to 
invoke a free standing concept of judicial culture, or to disregard the broader field of 
forces and interests within which judges operate and which contribute to penal 
practice and outcomes. As Garland (2006: 437) observes, there is a complex range of 
forces which shape penality: 
Economic interests, political projects, intra-group dynamics, dominant ideologies, 
professional claims, experienced insecurities, psycho-dynamic processes - all of 
these are implicated in the emergence of that cultural formation.  
Discretionary sentencing: a structured paradox 
Notwithstanding seemingly global trends towards the diminution of sentencing 
discretion (Franko Aas, 2005; Tombs, 2008), sentencing law and practice in Scotland 
is still characterised by high levels of judicial discretion.3 Plans to introduce 
sentencing guidelines are still extant but to date, Scotland has not experienced the 
major sentencing reforms seen in other jurisdictions. This is due at least in part to the 
ability of the judiciary to ‘head off’ what they perceive as unwarranted interference 
in sentencing policy and practice (Tata, 2010).  
Sentencing discretion has long attracted critique because of its associations with 
indeterminacy and disparity. Frankel (1973: 5-8) described the US system as 
‘terrifying and intolerable’ and seemingly ‘subject to no law at all’. Writing before 
the introduction of sentencing guidelines, Tonry (2002) characterised the English 
system as ‘lawless’, and Hutton (2003) has likened the Scottish system to a form of 
khadi justice for which there is no rational justification. However, any impression of 
wide and unconstrained judicial freedom may be illusory and many scholars 





also inherently patterned and ordered (Black, 1976; Baumgartner, 1995; Hawkins, 
1995; Tata and Hutton, 1998; Hutton, 2006; Tata, 2007).  
In practical terms, this ordering is most likely achieved by ‘a dense fabric of 
customary norms, training and informal sanctions’ (Rubin, 1996: 1299).4 Hutton 
(2006) draws more explicitly on the operation of the judicial habitus to explain this 
phenomenon, drawing attention to social factors such as judges’ shared education, 
training and experience which promote homogeneity of judicial disposition. The 
extent to which the judicial habitus promotes agency, or mostly operates to induce 
conformity is centrally important to the question of penal change. Ex facie, 
sentencing is a highly agentic task, but the systemic impetus to produce a more 
‘patterned, ordered, and rule-governed’ activity (Tata, 2007: 430) may restrict the 
scope for agency and for change.  
Imprisonment levels and the judiciary  
Sentencing discretion is central to several current debates about penality in Scotland. 
Much has been written about the ‘swarming circumstances’ (Garland, 2001) which 
shape and influence penal policy and practice, and more recently, operate as the 
drivers of penal populism. Central to these concerns is the size of the prison 
population, in which judges are both directly and tangentially implicated. One 
influential reading of the crisis, drawing heavily on the hegemonic model of the 
judicial habitus, considers that sentencing is ‘the crux of the crisis’ (Cavadino and 
Dignan, 2007: 101). The seemingly inescapable logic of rising imprisonment levels – 
greater numbers of people being sent to prison for longer periods of time (Millie and 
Hough, 2003) – leads some commentators to the conclusion that it is the result of 
increased judicial punitiveness. Tonry (2004:65) concludes that the (English) 
judiciary was ‘at the heart of the problem’, indulging a ‘judicial taste for punishment’ 
and displaying ‘a deeper stain of moralistic self-righteousness and punitiveness 
towards deviance and deviants’ than in other countries, apart from the USA.5 
 
Commentators in Scotland provide more nuanced explanations of the penal crisis in 





and shifting significance of statutory changes, operational practices of other criminal 
justice agencies (bail breaches, early release, parole) as well as changes in the 
‘counting’ of the prison population. Tombs and Piacentini (2010: 239), for example, 
find explanations for the increased rates of imprisonment in an interplay of factors 
including a more punitive climate of political and media opinion, changes in patterns 
of offending, judicial perceptions of changes in patterns of offending, changes in 
criminal justice practices and procedures, and legislative and policy changes that 
have encouraged an upward drift in sentencing tariffs. Ashworth (quoted in Downes, 
2011) is forthright in his observation that levels of determinate sentences in the UK – 
for which judges are directly responsible – have leveled off or even fallen slightly. 
He concludes that the drivers of prison rates are indeterminate sentences, breach and 
recall numbers for which governments are responsible, but sentencers are not.  
 
A complex picture of judicial motivation therefore emerges from the literature in 
Scotland, though our knowledge of this is still partial and little researched. 
Armstrong (2009) identifies a set of seemingly contrary judicial impulses: 
 
[…] the significant increases in the prison population in Scotland over the past 
decade have been accompanied by increased use of community-based penalties. This 
and other practices suggest, in contrast to Lacey’s primary argument, that higher 
imprisonment rates are not driven solely by greater punitivism (a complicated 
concept in any case), but also by ameliorative impulses – such as using alternatives 
to prison – as well. 
Sentencing as a discretionary practice 
In light of other findings that judges across the world intensely value ‘ownership’ of 
their discretionary powers (Ashworth, 1995a; Tata, 1998), it is unsurprising to 
observe that the judges interviewed here demonstrated a similar attachment. Judge C 
extolled the virtue of judicial discretion in the context of the Drug Court and the 
ability to give offenders repeated chances: 
 
That’s the great thing about Scots law: the office of Sheriff is such that our 






Judge M made the broad case for judicial discretion, dependent on a high level of 
trust: 
 
I think myself that if somebody’s made a Sheriff, they should be trusted, broadly 
speaking, to get things right. […] But you can’t make somebody a Sheriff and say 
‘Do what you like for the next 30 years’. Which is, to one way of looking at it, what 
happens. 
Judge L spoke for several judges in identifying the scope for creativity as one of the 
key advantages of sentencing discretion. He recalled in detail several cases in which 
he was able to exploit this potential: in one case, for example, sentencing a major oil 
company in a case involving an explosion in which 4 people were killed and others 
maimed for life. Knowing that the victims’ claims for damages in the civil courts 
were likely to encounter delays of 3-5 years, he imposed a swingeing financial 
penalty and ordered the company to pay high levels of compensation to each injured 
person within 14 days, failing which the company’s bank accounts would be frozen. 
He also recalled working in a jurisdiction where, at one stage, there were no funds 
available from central and local government for community service penalties, so in 
relevant cases he made it a condition of probation to do specified work in the 
community. Other judges cited ways of using the deferred sentence option to give an 
offender the opportunity to make recompense to the victim or to the community, to 
gain a key skill with support from a named organisation or to write letters or essays 
reflecting on the harm they caused. In relation to offenders suffering mental health 
problems, or drug and alcohol addictions, Judge C welcomed the flexibility to create 
‘packages of punishment’ to help them stay in the community and avoid the 
‘revolving door’ syndrome. 
 
Weaver et al (2012) describe desistance from offending as a process involving a 
complex interplay of factors: internal factors such as the conscious decision to 
change behaviour as well as structural factors such as employment opportunities or 
relationships. The accounts of many judges suggested awareness of both these key 
elements, with widespread endorsement of the work of organisations such as Sacro 
and Apex in providing accommodation and helping with employment, and the need 





expressed the view that their discretion allowed them to give offenders repeated 
chances where necessary. Judge L explained this in terms of human fallibility: 
People are fallible. You put people on probation hoping they won’t offend again. 
Very often they will offend again. You have to give them more than one chance. 
You’ve always got to have exceptions, got to be flexible when you’re dealing with 
human beings. You try to be understanding of human nature – that people can make 
mistakes despite their best endeavours. They can try but fail, keep trying and keep 
failing. But if they keep trying you’ve got to give them credit for keeping on trying. 
People make mistakes and do daft things. You’ve got to allow for that.  
Judge C explained how he used his discretion to give the offender repeated chances:  
 
Firstly, I used to use probation as a starter and I used to mark the papers and say ‘I’m 
marking the papers so that if you breach this, you’ll go to jail, do you understand?’ 
But then of course, when it came round, and they came back to the sentencing 
sheriff, if it was me, I would always think again, depending on the reports, because 
they weren’t always the bad guys, you know. Sometimes they’d done well, but 
something had happened: the girlfriend gave up on them, or the granny died, some 
factor you couldn’t ignore, and I would say ‘Right’! - rage, rage, rage – ‘you’ve got 
one final chance. I’m going to extend your probation period by 6 or 9 months and 
I’m going to impose a fine just to demonstrate that the breach is not regarded as 
nothing’. But you’d impose the fine at £50, and allow them to pay it at 50 pence a 
week, because they were living on absolutely minimal benefits and otherwise they’d 
just go and shoplift or something like that.  
All of these things go through your mind but you’re trying to steer a course which 
may ultimately make a real difference to them. Now, that especially came with the 
Drug Court and with the DTTOs [Drug Treatment and Testing Orders], but with the 
CSOs [Community Service Orders], that was a great introduction when it was 
formally introduced. I used to want these guys to use it. I would say to them: 
‘You’ve got this order, you’ve got a year, if you breach it you’ll have to go to prison. 
It’s a direct alternative to prison and I will be the guy to deal with you’. Again, 
however, I got to the stage where even though I’d given that warning, circumstances 
were never the same and I would always give them another chance. So sometimes 
they had a third chance, just desperately trying, especially if they hadn’t been to 
prison[…] Oh, I was known for saying ‘Right, you’ve got your final, final, final 
chance’ [laughs]. 
Discretion: the challenge of judgement 
Further discussion about sentencing practice suggested that the discretionary 
framework presented some personal challenges as well as advantages. When asked 
about the qualities required for judging, Judge M was quick to identify the virtues:  





Confidence was a recurring theme in judges’ conversation about the qualities of a 
good judge, Judge B believing that it helped to be ‘almost brashly self-confident’. 
Several linked confidence with decisiveness and were critical of others who were 
indecisive and could not cope with the workload. Judge L, for example, recalled a 
colleague who had a ‘windscreen-wiper’ mentality: ‘on the one hand … on the other 
hand…’ Judge H’s account of his own practice hinted at some difficulty in this area 
but he thought lack of confidence could be, if not quite a virtue, some corrective to 
instinct: 
I’m not a brilliant person, you see, like some of these very clever people. They 
always had the confidence, the advantage. I was always more inclined to think I 
might be wrong. I never really got to the definite stage in anything. When you’ve 
had cases like I’ve had, where you were absolutely convinced, but you were quite 
wrong … that was a great lesson for me. Instinct can be terribly wrong.  
Judge J, an academic lawyer as well as judge, expressed a similar lack of confidence 
in his own judgement: 
As a lawyer, one of my lacks is a lack of confidence. Some people have great 
confidence in their decisions. Even if my judgement is right, I don’t have confidence 
in it. In most cases, I probably found unnecessary difficulties. I probably have an 
inordinate admiration for people who are very intelligent and you see it in some of 
the lawyers who are very good. I was a bit bemused by them. I thought they made 
these submissions in the court and they’re all so confident they’re right. I just didn’t 
have confidence that what I was doing was right. But as a judge, you have to make 
the decision.  
He explained that when sentencing, he tried to overcome his anxiety by reasoning 
with himself in the following way: 
If you make a decision, you have a 50% chance of getting it right. But in fact, until 
you’re appealed you have a 100% chance of being right, because that’s the decision.  
Judge M articulated the daily challenges of having to be decisive: 
Oh, it’s very bad for you. You have to keep … well, you have to keep making your 
mind up, and that’s bad enough for you. You have to make your mind up about 
something, heaven knows how often every day. Some people can do it more easily 
than others. Some people found aspects of the job very, very wearing, like writing 
judgments, which is really to do with making your mind up. Some, I think, found it 
very affecting in that they were having a pretty big impression on the life of people 






Sentencing as judgement 
The nature of the sentencing task itself is commonly evaluated along the time-
honoured distinction between art and science (Tata, 2007). The legal-rational 
tradition, suspicious of discretion and intuition, and emphasising its indeterminacy, 
depict it as an art - hence lacking in rationality, certainty and coherence. The new 
penology perceives a trend towards (pseudo) science, consistent with the diminutions 
in discretionary power observed in many jurisdictions, and forming the basis of 
moves towards more structured forms of sentencing such as guidelines and 
mandatory penalties. As Tata (2007) observes, these polarised accounts – art or 
science - tend to draw their evidence from official policy discourses, leading to ‘top-
down’ assumptions of change. In particular, they pay limited attention to the agency 
of penal actors such as judges. Tata’s concept of sentencing as craftwork usefully 
challenges many of the customary oppositions routinely employed in discussion 
about sentencing, such as rules versus discretion, reason versus emotion, offence 
versus offender, and intuition versus analysis, and captures their dynamic inter-
relationship in the field of practice. As Tata observes: ‘These qualities co-exist 
dynamically, are synergistic, and inhabit each other’ (2007: 427).  
What is suggested by Tata’s account of sentencing as craftwork is a more rounded 
concept of sentencing: as a form of practical judgement entailing a range of 
cognitive abilities, and as a ‘hybrid faculty’ which balances rational, perceptual and 
emotional capacities (Thiele, 2006: ix). It is relevant to note that recent research in 
cognitive neuroscience provides some evidence to support this understanding of 
human judgement, as well as providing empirical vindication of many philosophical 
accounts through the ages. Drawing on Thiele’s (2006) discussion of the significance 
of developments in neuroscience for the understanding of human judgement, I point 
to some of the scope for extending our knowledge of sentencing as judicial work.  
Rules and discretion: a ‘matter of judgement’ 
The interplay of rules and discretion was apparent in the judges’ conversation about 





task they encountered, with the phrases ‘very worrying’ and ‘very anxious’ recurring 
in conversation and often volunteered by them. Judge H reported that the anxiety of 
sentencing difficult cases often led to him waking at night, having seen a way 
through a case calling the next day, and ‘rushing to write it down, in case you forgot 
it, like a dream’.   
Not all judges expressed anxiety about sentencing, and Judge F spoke for a small 
number when he expressed the view that it was important to leave cases behind: 
I didn’t go home and worry about it. I think it’s important for any Sheriff, once a 
case is finished with, to just accept it as finished with. If you’ve made a mistake – 
unless it’s a mistake by sentencing too leniently – it can be corrected on appeal. If 
you haven’t made a mistake, you shouldn’t be worrying about it. 
For those others, at least some of the difficulty appeared to lie in the complex mix of 
rules, ‘facts’ and discretion involved. Some of those troubled by the indeterminacy of 
the task appeared to employ a range of strategies to help deal with the uncertainty. 
Judge J, for example, who had earlier outlined his statistical reasoning for decision-
making, also employed an arithmetical approach to sentencing in an attempt to 
impose some rationality on the process: 
You look at the crime first: that merits such and such. Then there are pluses and 
minuses for good behaviour in the past or a genuine job on Monday or something 
like that…. 
He employed what he called another ‘systems method’ when assessing the reliability 
and credibility of witnesses in trials; 
I used to put in the margin, when I’m writing down the witnesses’ evidence, Alpha, 
Beta, Gamma, Delta for their credibility. I did worry about this a little – it’s a very 
vulnerable judgement. I adjusted my Alpha Beta assessment as the trial went along.  
When I asked Judge D, a former High Court judge, about his approach to sentencing, 
he provided at first this brisk account of his own ‘ordered approach’: 
It’s a glimpse of the obvious. Starting off perhaps with, first of all, what kind of case 
it is. What kind of crime is it that I have to pass sentence on? Now, that will take me 
a certain distance down the road. The next thing, I suppose, would be what is the 
involvement of the individual accused that I’m dealing with? Because, obviously, 
people can differ very much in the extent to which they’re involved. And then, when 





were, apart from degree of involvement as far as actual commission of the crime is 
concerned. That would lead me into other areas such as the attitude, post facto, to the 
offending. The question of the plea of guilty, the significance of that. And then, 
another dimension, are the circumstances of the accused, including, of course, any 
rules I have to follow, such as don’t imprison unless there is no alternative because 
the case is of a certain sort. And that is how I would proceed. That’s simply applying 
an ordered approach to the accumulation of information I’ve got in front of me. 
I then asked him if he considered any part of sentencing a difficult task, and this 
query produced a much less secure response: 
The whole exercise is difficult, because you know very well that .....well, for a start 
you’re working on the basis of what’s been served up to you, or you have probed, 
and got. But you never know if you’ve got everything that needs to be known, let 
alone with quite the accurate focus. You also know that if you’ve taken a particular 
decision, that someone else in your precise position, with precisely that amount of 
information, might reach a different result. It’s…. it’s not, as you know, a precise 
thing with a precise answer. And you know just how easy it is for things to be 
misunderstood, whether it’s by the press, the public, the accused, or anyone else, or 
the victims. But you just have to do the best you can. It’s just........... I never enjoyed 
sentencing, I must say. I always found it a very, very difficult task indeed.  
I invited him to tell me a bit more about why sentencing was difficult, compared to 
other areas of judicial work: 
Because it is so much a matter of judgement. Because it is so much the opposite of 
there being a clear.......um, reasoned ... in the sense of, you can reason yourself to a 
precise answer, with many legal issues or matters of fact. But when you’ve got facts 
which are.....some are quite distinct, others not quite so distinct, it’s....it’s still very 
much an open matter as to what the right answer is. It’s just difficult. And it’s.....it 
can be.........at times it can be an extremely, extremely anxious process and quite 
necessary often to take the opportunity of thinking about things overnight. But no, 
no. It’s not easy. Nobody’s ever said it’s easy. If they do, there’s something wrong.  
Some clue to the difficulty and discomfort expressed about sentencing by so many of 
the judges can be found in the intrinsic nature of sentencing as a form of judgement. 
Thiele (2006:11) notes the many commonalities between ethico-moral judgements 
(such as sentencing) and other forms of decision-making, but insists that there is one 
key distinction: unlike other forms of judgements, moral and political judgements are 
never ‘uncontestably right or wrong’. The difficulty with this form of judgement 
arises, therefore, not simply from the broad and diverse range of variables to be taken 
into account but from the multi-dimensionality of moral and political life itself and 





Rationality, intuition and discretion 
The counterposing of rationality and judgement in Judge D’s account above – 
judgement as the opposite of reasoning – hints at the operation of some of the 
complex cognitive faculties involved in practical judgement, such as emotion and 
perception, which make sentencing a difficult task. But the sharp distinction between 
judgement and rationality underplays the role of rationality itself in judgement, and 
the role of emotion in rationality. In this way, the distinction invokes the binary 
oppositions which Tata (2007) complains have the effect of limiting scholarly and 
policy sentencing imaginations.  
Thiele (2006: 150) outlines the broader and integrative conception of judgement 
which is suggested by cognitive research. This involves a complex synthesis of 
conscious and unconscious activities: 
Rationality contributes to justice in the form of analysis, calculation, logical 
consistency, extrapolative forecasting, and retrospective reconstruction. Tacit 
knowledge and skills precede and ground these rational operations while exceeding 
their purview. Most complex human activities, including practical judgement, 
bespeak the interaction of conscious and unconscious efforts.  
Thiele’s reference here to ‘tacit knowledge and skills’ includes those elements of 
practical judgement in sentencing which operate at a sub-conscious or unconscious 
level, and which are closely linked to discretionary decision-making. For some 
sentencing scholars, discretion is the Trojan horse of sentencing, providing scope for 
judicial bias (or ‘extra-legal influences’) and thus providing a gateway for disparity 
and inconsistency.6 On this reading, discretionary decision-making proceeds on the 
basis of ‘hunch’ or instinct, is sometimes equated with capriciousness, and capable of 
rationalisation only in post hoc manner. The logic of this argument is that greater 
‘rationality’ and systemisation requires to be introduced into sentencing by way of 
guidelines or other structuring means.  
Hutton’s (2006: 168) account contains some elements of the realist critique of 
intuition and discretion as the basis of judgement: 
Most routine sentencing decisions have to be made quickly with little time for 





‘know’ what the right decision is, call this ‘instinctive synthesis […] or whatever 
you like. If required to justify this decision, post facto arguments can be constructed.  
Thiele (2006) directs the reader to cognitive research findings, as well as the 
philosophical arguments which foreshadowed them, which suggest that good 
judgement is not a fully deliberate, methodical and reasoned process but is 
necessarily grounded in unconscious capacities and certain affective states such as 
emotion, empathy and imagination. On this basis, moral judgement is accomplished 
by an integrative process of intuitive capacities and our more deliberative and 
reflective aptitudes. Moreover, it is arguable that some intuitive knowledge, 
including biases in the neutral sense of beliefs or orientations, precedes all judgement 
and forms the basis for critical reflection.  
This argument is not directed at minimizing the importance of reason and analysis in 
good judgement, or suggesting that free rein should be given to judicial intuition in 
the form of unfettered discretion. As Thiele (2006: 142) observes, intuition is fallible 
and certainly problematic when used without reference to context or experience. 
However, there are strong arguments for strengthening the reasoning skills of 
decision-makers, and for ‘educating’ intuition so as to minimise the play of intuitive 
biases. Moreover, the realm of the habitus remains centrally important since all 
intuitions are shaped through ‘active participation in socio-cultural environments’ 
(Thiele, 2006: 136).  
Affective states: emotion and imagination 
As well as displaying suspicion of intuition in judgement, the ‘sovereign self’ or 
positivist model of judging which I outlined in Chapter 2 embodies Kantian wariness 
about the intrusion of emotion into rationality, and is a key element in the 
mythological constitution of the judge. Moreover, as Tata (2007) notes, the new 
penology also counterposes reason and emotion as binary opposites in their critique 
of reforms which aim to rationalise sentencing.  
As suggested above, this strict demarcation between reason and emotion is somewhat 
contradicted by research which indicates that emotions and other affective states are 





of rationality. Thiele (2006: 166) sums up the inter-connectedness of these 
capacities: 
…rational judgement in moral and political affairs simply cannot arise in the 
absence of emotion. Affect gets reason off the ground and subsequently drives its 
operations. If we are to improve human judgement, there is no alternative but to 
grapple with the rich, multi-layered, typically clandestine, occasionally deleterious, 
generally beneficial, and always vital interaction between reason and emotion.  
Thus, neuroscience points not only to ways in which affective states precede and 
induce certain dispositions, behaviour and judgements, but also to the benefits of 
‘negative’ as well as ‘positive’ emotions, and more generally of the role of emotions 
in producing ‘empathetic impartiality’ (Thiele, 2006). Nussbaum (1995, quoted in 
Thiele 2006: 187) captures the role of emotions in practical judgement when she 
observes that contemporary judges 
…who deny themselves the influence of emotion deny themselves ways of seeing 
the world that seem essential to seeing it completely…. Sympathetic emotion that is 
tethered to the evidence, institutionally constrained in appropriate ways, and free 
from reference to one’s own situation appears to be not only acceptable but actually 
essential to public judgement…[I]n order to be fully rational, judges must also be 
capable of fancy and sympathy. They must educate not only their technical 
capacities but also their capacity for humanity. In the absence of that capacity, their 
impartiality will be obtuse and their justice blind.  
These studies have the potential to provide greater insight about sentencing as an 
occupational task – how it is experienced and performed, articulated and defended. 
One issue which arises immediately from the judicial accounts given above is the 
frequently expressed of lack of confidence by judges in their judgement, and in the 
anxiety expressed about the task of sentencing. Perhaps counter-intuitively, there is 
some evidence from cognitive science that optimism is ‘not an optimal state of mind’ 
for decision-makers and that some level of anxiety facilitates good judgement 
(Thiele, 2006: 180). Moreover, psychological studies point to the ‘overconfidence 
effect’ which leads some individuals to have an exaggerated estimation of their 
capacity for sound judgement.  
The relational dynamics of the interviews seemed to be particularly significant in 
these discussions about sentencing and anxiety. Many of the judges’ statements 





punctuated by ‘sharing’ or ‘knowing’ comments such as ‘You know what I mean’ or 
‘You know this yourself’, or sometimes drawing on our shared knowledge of 
particularly difficult cases. Several stated that they had not admitted to this anxiety 
elsewhere. Although the insights above suggest that lack of confidence about judging 
and the anxiety it tends to provoke may be integral facets of the task, greater 
recognition of this dimension of sentencing in judicial training may facilitate greater 
openness and discussion about the challenges of the task, and direct attention to 
equipping judges with strategies for coping with these demands.  
Emotions and judging 
However important emotions may be in the exercise of good judgement, the control 
of personal displays of emotion remains central to conceptions of good judging. The 
judiciary shares with other professions a cultural and normative expectation of 
‘disinterestedness’ on the part of its principal actors (Parsons, quoted in Anleu and 
Mack, 2005: 599), but the heightened cultural meanings and associations of 
neutrality and independence which are carried with our conceptions of the judge may 
place a greater onus on the management of judicial emotions.7  
The judges themselves were quick to acknowledge the presence of emotion in 
sentencing practice and gave detailed examples of situations and strategies employed 
to manage its effects. Judge L condensed his advice in the statement that one should 
never sentence if ‘tired, emotional or hungry’. Many judges stated they sometimes 
deferred sentence to the following day, or simply took themselves off the bench in 
cases of particular difficulty. Judge C was typical of many in this account of going 
off the bench:  
Sometimes you are affected by it, you know. I have been affected by even the 
prosecutor’s account of what’s happened to certain people in rape, or attempted rape, 
or any sexual offending, especially to children. But you’ve got to take a very 
common sense view of it and I think the vast majority of us are well aware of the 
need to take time. You know, if you get a particularly harrowing case […] I go off 
the bench frequently, to not make an instant and perhaps angry judgement for a start, 
and secondly, to check up, particularly in the case of photographing, pictures of 
children and stuff like that, which – well, I know you’ve seen this kind of thing – are 
absolutely gross and upsetting. That has the effect of making you want to look only 
at a few, only enough to give you the flavour, but that… I’ve always gone off for 





Court guidelines in respect of penalty. But that’s so you have an idea of views. The 
benefit is to give you time - if you’re angry, which frequently you can be. Or if 
you’re genuinely upset because of the distress in people you see in court. And we all 
have feelings, obviously. And so you go off. Well, I go off anyway, and I know my 
colleagues have done that as well: (a) to have a cup of coffee and not immediately 
think about it and then (b) to check up on the most fair way of dealing with it. 
Judge B explained why he sometimes took advantage of an adjournment before 
sentencing:  
…sometimes, if the whole atmosphere was very charged, which it could be, 
sometimes it was highly desirable to get off the bench and come back the following 
day. Sometimes, obviously, if it was a murder case…there’s obviously cases 
involving children, or sometimes where… you get some kind of battle breaks out 
which results in the death of one member of a family and the conviction for murder 
of a member of the other family- the Capulets etc. So, if you get this kind of battle- 
two families are destroyed by the thing -that can be very, very moving when this, all 
this comes out. And it’s also extremely common, as you know, in the High Court, 
when there are situations like that: two families involved, the accused’s family, 
friends and the victim’s family and friends, for them to be in the court. And there’s a 
lot of public reaction there. Now, as you know, there can be shouts of ‘No, no, no..’ 
…etc. So, there’s a lot to be said for just getting out of that atmosphere before you 
pronounce sentence, because every sentence should always be done with 
deliberation, rather than as a response partly influenced by the public mood. 
Judge B told this story of a difficult case which exemplified the need to ‘get away 
from the scene for a while’: 
It was a neighbour’s dispute really, but the chap from upstairs, who was causing a lot 
of the problem, came downstairs to the other household, and he was stabbed to death 
by somebody in that house, the knife allegedly having been supplied to the stabber 
by a girl who was about sixteen. And…there was no doubt about it, that the man, the 
stepfather as it were, or the …the lover of this girl’s mother, that he did the stabbing. 
But there was evidence that the girl supplied him with the knife. And…well, there 
was a whole background to the thing, and…often a judge knows things he shouldn’t 
know. So, for example, I learned, presumably through the clerk of court, I was told 
the case is probably going to settle, and the prosecution have said they’ll take a plea 
of not guilty from the girl, if the guy pleads guilty to murder. Well, that didn’t 
happen. And then the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder against them both. 
So, then you get a sixteen year old girl convicted of murder, for what she may have 
done, given him the knife for whatever reason, and didn’t do the stabbing but 
convicted of murder. And everybody was destroyed. There were…there were two 
families destroyed there, by this thing. […] Anyway, the end result, I was left with 
no possibility but to impose sentences of life upon each of them. So that’s…. that 
was a very, very moving occasion indeed, very difficult and very difficult to handle, 
because I thought there was a good deal of injustice being done there. But there we 
are. […] And the way [to deal with it] is to get away from the scene for a while; 





Sentencing as a solitary practice 
Our conception of sentencing as the solitary burden of the individual judge is 
qualified by some awareness of the extent to which the sentencing task is shaped by 
earlier processes and collaboratively performed with other criminal justice actors 
(Shapland, 1987; Hutton, 2006; Tata, 2007). Nonetheless, sentencing is experienced 
by the judges themselves as a solitary exercise in ways which provide useful insight 
about judicial independence. Several judges cited the intrinsic loneliness of judicial 
work as a challenging factor, stemming largely from the need to take independent 
decisions. Judge M explained the nature of the problem: 
I think you’re probably more lonely than you realise. […] You don’t really talk to 
anyone. You’re taking big decisions, but not really talking to anyone about them. 
You’re constantly trying to resolve things that are not easily capable of resolution. I 
would guess the…the kind of…level of breakdown, health or whatever, is not all 
that high, actually, of the judges, as far as we know, but there may be coping 
strategies that you’re adopting that you don’t know about. I remember going to a 
lecture by a psychiatrist and he said that in any organisation, the first thing that 
people that belong to it did was to make arrangements for their own self-protection. 
For Judge E, loneliness took the form of loss of camaraderie and a sense of being 
imprisoned: 
You can’t go out with the boys; you are restricted in what you can do and what you 
can be seen to be doing. In some ways I think that’s why I wanted a change from 
Glasgow [Sheriff Court]. One sunny day I looked out of this window where I was 
imprisoned and thought that when I was a Fiscal I used to be able to go and visit 
Stranraer or Dumfries on a day like this. Also, if we were doing a murder enquiry or 
something, I’d put a bottle of whisky on the table and say to the cops who were with 
me ‘When we solve it, that’s when we open it’. So you had all that camaraderie and 
then suddenly you’re on your own. In […] Sheriff Court I had a piano keyboard 
fitted in my chambers and I used to play that. 
Judge M returned to the question of judicial isolation to impart what he called ‘the 
most important thing’ he thought he could tell me - the importance of always having 
‘a little bit of ice in your heart’: 
I think it was the sense of isolation. […] It’s not a thing that you’re particularly well 
prepared for […]…in fact, this is probably the most important thing that I could say 
to you. You are in a unique position. You’re being asked to do something that other 
people could do, but in this particular case they are not being asked to do it - you are 
being asked to do it, only you can do it, and you can’t get help from anyone, and the 





reason or another uncomfortable because you’re not … among friends, or anything 
like that. Not among hostile people necessarily, but I think there has to be a sense of 
isolation there….You know they say that writers have always got a little bit of ice in 
their heart? […] To be uninvolved and emotionally uninvolved and…not unduly 
swayed by inappropriate things. I suppose…to be neutral. 
It was evident from the accounts of several judges that these cultural meanings and 
associations in relation to the judicial role were central to their own self-image, in 
ways that had an impact not only on their performance of the role but on their 
management of the personal challenges and demands of the work. So, for example, 
when reflecting on the challenges of judicial work, they judged their own 
performance and conduct against the idealised ‘sovereign self’ model of judging, 
invoking it as an aspirational rather than necessarily representative role model. In an 
earlier conversation, Judge M expressed it this way:  
… to operate properly as a Sheriff, you have to have the self-image of nobility, 
competency, mental robustness… independence, the ability to make up your own 
mind…  
In later interviews Judge M spoke at greater length about the personal challenges of 
being a judge and the danger that judges’ perceptions of what they should ‘look like’ 
to the public would prevent them obtaining help. Several judges mentioned a 
proposal that judges should have access to pastoral and support services, and one 
spoke further about the ‘hurdle’ of self-image :8 
I think it’s now being acknowledged that there may be certain instances in which 
sheriffs or other judges may need help from… stress and strain manifesting itself 
through ill health, drinking, that kind of thing. And I think that must be a good thing. 
[…] But it would have to get over this hurdle of the judges’ self -image. They’d have 
to think that they could get help without acknowledging that they weren’t up to 
doing the job. That would be the great difficulty. […] I’m really talking more about 
how I would have seen it myself; other people may feel quite differently. But…you 
learn a kind of a self-confidence if you do it, do the job, and if you start having 
doubts about your ability to do it… Now, the paradox there of course is that if you 
do need help, you aren’t actually […] a person who should be doing the job, ideally. 
You may be getting along alright, so any idea of a person happy about accepting 
help, indicating that they were vaguely weak … I think it could be got round by 
doing it in a skilful and sensible kind of way. 
I then asked him: Do you think there’s anything positive to be gained by more 





Now…. that’s an absolutely huge question, though you put it very briefly and 
charmingly.  But…the idea of the ideal judge is pretty much like the idea of what 
God would be like, isn’t it …strict but kind. And …I don’t see how you could have a 
model that was any different, really. You would have to have something that you 
aspired to. […] I mean, within that bubble, people have reputations obviously, 
judges are thought to be […] you know, one thing or the other, one thing one day … 
all these criticisms you hear of sheriffs. Now, whether they’re true or not, I don’t 
know, because if you ever look at who are supposed to be the heaviest sentencers, 
they almost always turn out not to be, because they’ve got a perception that they are. 
So I don’t know, but I think you would have to have…an ideal for the judges; not 
that they’re fallible, because if they weren’t you wouldn’t need an appeal court. That 
they are reliable. Maybe that’s the best word. 
This discussion suggests that the idea of seeking help runs into difficulty with 
judges’ public and self-image, and has implications for judicial training and 
provision for pastoral and support services. However, it is also possible to speculate 
that a younger generation of judges may have less attachment to a strong formalist 
self-image and hence less difficulty with admitting some temporary lack of 
‘reliability’.  
Section 3 Sentencing as a collegiate practice 
The rules of occupational morality and justice, however, are as imperative as the 
others. They force the individual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his 
own, to make concessions, to consent to compromises, to take into account interests 
higher than his own.  
                                                                                                          (Durkheim, 1967) 
Studies which situate the judge as part of the court community and explain 
sentencing as a collaborative task provide useful insight about the extra-judicial 
forces and influences which shape sentencing practice; but less about the ‘rules of 
occupational morality and justice’ internal to the judicial habitus. For Rubin (1997: 
556), the institutional character of the judiciary is obscured because of the ‘macro-
micro’ problem which arises. On the one hand, the institutional features of the 
judiciary are apparent: the judiciary possesses ‘collective norms, a hierarchy, an 
internal structure regulating workload, a boundary controlling information flow, and 
all the other institutional attributes’ And yet, the institution also comprises a group of 
‘semi-independent, discretionary decision-makers’, whose functioning is also shaped 





of addressing both levels of action. Bourdieu’s (1977) conception of agents as 
‘virtuosos’ who rely on a ‘sense of the game’ rather than rules and principles 
captures this aspect of judicial decision-making, particularly in the way it requires a 
finely-honed understanding of the norms and values of other group members.   
Without some explanation at the level of the habitus which connects both these levels 
of social action, the structured paradox of sentencing – its relatively patterned nature 
in a wide discretionary framework - would be puzzling. At a broad level, therefore, it 
is acknowledged in sentencing research that a range of informal norms, pressures and 
influences must operate in sentencing practice to produce this patterned effect (Tata 
and Hutton, 1998; Hutton, 2006; Tata, 2007). Little is known, however, about the 
specific practices which contribute to this effect, though some obvious means of 
transmitting these norms will be found in legal education and experience, and 
judicial training. Obtaining greater information about these practices has the potential 
to provide a fuller account of judicial decision-making. 
Given the broad parameters of sentencing discretion, informal discussion between 
judges about sentencing tariffs is a predictable means of attempting to control 
disparity and inconsistency, and the existence of some inter-judge discussion is 
shared tacit knowledge among criminal justice practitioners. Nicholson (1981) 
provides a brief mention of the practice, and Hutton (1995) cites the practice as 
evidence of the lack of rationality in sentencing, on the basis that information about 
these informal practices is anecdotal and the arrangements are unlikely to be 
standardized, shared by all local judges, or used in any systematic manner. There is 
some institutional inhibition against formal or public recognition of the process, quite 
apart from the unsystematic nature of the practice noted by Hutton (1995) above. 
This reticence lies in the concept of judicial independence, according to which the 
individual judge bears sole responsibility for the decision and should not be subject 
to influence or pressure from any external source. The practice of consultation or 
collaboration therefore appears to be in some conflict with the principle of 





Judge M articulated some of these tensions, drawing a distinction between discussion 
with fellow judges, which he considered acceptable, and debate, which he thought 
unfair. He expressly disavowed the term ‘collegiate’ to describe the practice: 
I think what you would normally do is try and tell the person the facts but not tell 
them what you’re thinking of doing, and see what they would say. Then you might 
say ‘Oh, that’s what I was thinking of’ […] but you’d be pretty careful not to debate 
it because that would be kind of unfair. I think your colleagues that you liked and 
respected, you would take advice from, but there would be no question of any 
collegiate kind of approach. 
The concept of collegiality to which Judge M refers is more usually employed to 
describe the collaborative and sometimes strategic ‘team-model’ approach to judicial 
decision-making which occurs on multi-judge benches of the US appeal courts, 
especially in relation to so-called ‘hot-button’ issues. Indeed, among the ‘steadying 
factors’ which the legal realist Llewellyn (1951:26) identified as serving to counter 
the arbitrary exercise of discretionary power on the US appellate bench was this 
process of judicial interaction which served ‘to smooth the unevenness of individual 
temper’.  
The most detailed analysis of collegiality in the US is that of Edwards (1998:1645) 
who defined the concept this way:   
… a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right, and that, 
as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in an atmosphere 
of civility and respect. Collegiality is a process that helps to create the conditions for 
principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered. 
Specifically, it is my contention that collegiality plays an important part in 
mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of 
differing perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen to, and 
ultimately influence one another in constructive and  law-abiding ways.  
The practice of inter-judge discussion in Scotland is not directly analogous to this 
purposeful consensus-seeking exercise, but there are other aspects of the practice 
which are captured by the idea of collegiality and which provide insight about the 
workings of the judiciary as an occupational small group. Levine and Moreland 
(1994: 306) provide a useful definition of a ‘small group’ for this purpose: a group of 
individuals who ‘interact on a regular basis, have affective ties with one another, 





Capturing some of this sense of interdependence, one judge observed that the 
isolation of the sentencing task meant he was ‘lonely, but not in the sense of the 
person on the desert island’. Discussion with colleagues about sentencing was 
mentioned by most judges as a source of support and guidance. Judge D was 
circumspect but acknowledged the practice of ‘having a word’: 
[…] if you’re sitting as a judge in Inverness, you’ll be entirely alone. I mean, you 
have no other judge sitting with you. But if you’re sitting in Glasgow, then you’ll 
have other judges sitting there. I can imagine that a judge sitting there might have a 
word with one of his colleagues if he was bothered about how to handle something; 
or perhaps he was even wondering what sentence to pass…These things, these 
conversations do take place. And if he was really in a difficulty -  because after all in 
one sense we don’t have quite the same time pressures in the High Court -  he might 
have said ‘Well, I’m going to defer sentence for a week, or a day or overnight so as 
to think about it, talk to somebody else’. 
Judge B was unfazed by the prospect of being told he’d ‘got it all wrong’. Indeed, he 
positively welcomed it: 
I don’t think for myself that my own self-confidence would be impaired by going 
and speaking to colleagues whose opinion I valued and them telling me that I’d got it 
all wrong. Ok, fine, that’s what I go for to hear. And it would influence me. 
For Judge C, the small size of the Scottish jurisdiction worked in favour of this 
practice: 
I’ve known so many Sheriffs that whichever Sheriff Court I was in, I would go up to 
one and say ‘Look, I need to talk to you about this’ and never, ever had a problem 
with having an open and detailed discussion with someone I felt I could speak to. So 
I just feel that the whole situation in a country of our size has worked well.  
Judge M spoke about the benefits of being given a ‘steer’ by disinterested colleagues: 
And of course, there’s plenty of colleagues you can speak to, and they’ve no interest 
whatsoever in the case, no technical interest in the case, so they gave you truly 
disinterested advice, and…a steer. Because sometimes you can make a big mistake; 
you can find you’re wildly excessive or wildly lenient, as it were. But you don’t 
want to be like that, because the law says that you know, if you deliver an unduly 
lenient sentence, or an unduly severe one, then that’s a miscarriage of justice, which 
is the last thing you want to do. So, if you can find other ways of balancing and 





The ability to commune 
Woods (1998) identifies elite spatiality – the ability to commune and perform key 
functions in spaces with restricted access – as an important feature of the ability of 
powerful individuals to exercise power. The importance of having opportunities and 
locations to commune was evident in the judges’ accounts of practice. Judge B 
narrated a long and detailed story about a case in which a farmer had set up shotguns 
on farm premises which had been repeatedly vandalised and set on fire. Two young 
men entered the premises unlawfully and triggered the shotguns; one was seriously 
injured. The farmer was convicted by the jury of two charges of attempted murder, 
despite the judge’s pointed attempt to steer them in the direction of lesser charges. 
Before sentencing, Judge B ‘went up to the lunch room’: 
Well, that was a most interesting case because the guy was a decent sort of guy, he 
was about 45 or 50, and I felt that…well, that I wouldn’t have returned a conviction 
of attempted murder. And so, my directions to the jury reflected that and in effect I 
was saying, you know, there is another offence called assault to the danger of life…. 
[…]. However, despite my best efforts, if you like, the jury unanimously convicted 
him of two charges of attempted murder; both the guys. So, I gave him seven years. 
Now, one reason why I gave him seven years […] was I went up to the lunch room. 
There was five or six judges, and I’m saying ‘well here’s the story, you know the 
story because it was well reported’. Someone says five years, someone says seven 
years, someone says nine years, someone says 12 years; do it by two cases or give 
him 10 years on each, all this kind of stuff. But…the average was much higher…and 
I guess I’m still thinking that the better conviction would have been assault to the 
danger of life, but felt I couldn’t go below seven, so I gave seven; whereupon I was 
castigated in the press [for leniency]……  
Judge A gave this account of a case before him which involved possession of a 
firearm and ammunition. Being unsure about the appropriate sentence, he went up to 
the judges’ Common Room: 
[…] it was prison, I thought, it had to be done. It was ammunition, for God’s sake. 
So, I went up to the Common Room and quite a few people agreed with that. Then I 
spoke to [Sheriff X] who is not a bleeding heart, and he said: ‘Look, […], what was 
involved here? No question this guy was ever going to use this. Ok, he was holding 
it illicitly and was going to perhaps sell it which would have been also illicit. But he 
put it in a place where nobody could possibly get it. Isn’t it just too mechanical, too 
routine, to say he must do 6 months?’ And most of the people in the Common Room 
had said that [6 months] to me… [laughs]. But if I’d got that advice from, say 
[Sheriff  X with a reputation for leniency] I would have said ‘Oh well, that’s 
interesting’, but to get that advice from [Sheriff X]! So, as I say, you don’t follow all 





advices. And ultimately I decided 300 hours CS or something, and waited for the 
Crown Appeal [against sentence]….  
Another location featured in Judge B’s account of the first time he sat as a judge at 
the High Court in Glasgow. He started this story with a reference to the Sentencing 
Information System (SIS)9, viewing it a source of guidance comparable to 
consultation with fellow judges:    
Well, I found it a useful guide, in the same way as I could sit in the lunch room and 
say to the guys, what do you think? What would you give? What would you give?  
He then narrated a story about a set of circumstances – and yet another location - in 
which it was ‘legitimate’ to consult other judges: 
But my most interesting experience […] was the very first time I ever sat as a judge 
at the criminal court in Glasgow. In those days, the judges used to stay in the 
Western Club and there’d be maybe five [judges] there. And right very early on -
we’d all meet for a drink you see, and some would have dinner, some would not - 
and we all meet for a drink, and it was perfectly usual to talk briefly about the case 
you were in, or whatever it was. And it was perfectly legitimate to do what I did and 
say, ‘Well look, gentlemen, this is the first case I’ve ever had of this particular kind, 
and it’s fairly unusual and here are the circumstances. He’s pled guilty and I’ve 
adjourned until tomorrow morning for passing sentence. What would you give?’ 
You see, and you know, three years, four years, five years, six years, seven years 
were suggested; that was actually what happened. So…that was legitimate, and I 
think I would settle for five in those circumstances, as it were. 
‘When a judge sits down to decide…..’ 
 Edwards’ (1998, above) defined the concept of judicial collegiality in the US as a 
process that is geared towards a common interest in ‘getting the law right’. In the Scottish 
context, it is possible to substitute for ‘the law’, the shared interest of the judiciary in 
reducing sentencing disparity and promoting consistency. However, Judge B’s 
account suggests that for the individual judge in the High Court this is a very singular 
business, focused on ascertaining the ‘going rate’: 
……when a judge sits down to decide what’s the appropriate sentence for this crime, 
he doesn’t just pluck a figure from the air. First of all, he realises that he’s got an 
Appeal Court, so he’s got to think in terms of what will happen. He also is bound 
nowadays to think in terms of what the public may think. But most of all, he wants 
to know what the current going rate is. And the current going rate is not derived 
from some wonderful intellectual prayerful exercise; there’s no inspiration. You just 





However, the drive to ascertain the ‘going rate’ may have unintended inflationary 
consequences as far as sentencing tariffs are concerned. Judge B made this point 
while explaining the legislative change which he believed had contributed to the 
effect of driving the judge towards the middle ground: 
Until the 1990s, I think it was, you could appeal against a sentence on the ground it 
was excessive, but the prosecution had no appeal. The prosecution was given the 
right of appeal on the ground that it was unduly lenient- and that’s a very elastic 
phrase. So that - the consciousness when you’re sitting as a judge that there’s an 
Appeal Court which has got the right to review your sentence either way - tends to 
drive you towards the sort of middle ground. And, you know, the middle ground 
plus. […] It’s not going to be excessive if it’s 10% above the average, it’s not going 
to be unduly lenient if it’s 10% above the average. So find the average and add 10%. 
That soon raises the average. So, too much machinery for reviewing the exercise 
of…what’s the word you use? Discretion? Discretion in a sense hardly comes into it.  
Discretion is to.... to try to avoid being overturned on appeal if you care about these 
things.  
Judge B also drew attention to the ways in which the need for consistency limited the 
scope for moderation on the part of the individual judge:   
I mean, you remember the late Lord Stott ? […] He would have been very lenient 
and he was quite knowledgeable about penology – he didn’t believe in prisons. But I 
remember him saying to me, ‘You know, there’s nothing, nothing I can do about it. 
There’s no point in my being known as the lenient judge if all my judgements are 
being challenged’. He said: ‘I really have to do what the other judges do. I can’t step 
out of line’. And he was right about that. […] He said you can’t have people saying 
‘let’s get the case before Lord Stott, because he’ll give us less’. 
Judge F’s account suggests a similar awareness of the need for consistency in the 
Sheriff Court, but his qualification ‘if I wanted to be consistent’ and the assertion of 
autonomy in the final decision points to some difference in emphasis: 
Well, I would [consult colleagues] if I had the opportunity and […] if I wanted to be 
consistent. Because consistency – I think I’ve already said that – is important, and if 
I thought that there was a risk that I might be going out on a limb, far distant from 
what is consistent, then I might discuss that with others. But if what I was told was 
not along the lines that I was thinking, then it’s me who makes the decision. 
Spigelman (2008) observes that judicial collegiality or consultation serves the further 
pragmatic function of ensuring that a body of collective wisdom and experience is 





It was partly for consistency, it was partly because a lot of people naturally came to 
the High Court really ignorant of what the tariff was, of what the practice was, of 
what was usual. So they had to ask around. 
Collegiality and Judicial Independence 
As Malleson (1997:664) notes in relation to judicial training, the idea of collective 
judicial behaviour aimed at achieving consistency or standardisation is also at odds 
with the principle of autonomy. She points to the strong individualism which is 
embedded in our understanding of judicial independence and which informs debates 
about judges’ discretionary power. This is perceived in a negative light when 
accompanied by suspicion about political or other influences on the judge’s 
individualism, but more favourably where activism and creativity are considered 
appropriate uses of judicial discretion. 
Malleson (1997:665) suggests that the largely homogenous social basis of the UK 
judiciary to date means that a strong culture of individualism has been 
accommodated without much loss of systemic coherence. The effect of greater 
diversity, however, may be to erode the ‘informal and individualistic culture of a 
club’ which characterises the judiciary at present: 
The larger and more diverse a group becomes, the less individualism can be 
accommodated if it is seeking to maintain, or in the case of the judiciary, increase, 
the level of consistency in its behaviour.   
This is a problem if, as Malleson believes, judicial independence is founded upon 
independence of mind, and it presents a challenge for training, policy and practice to 
achieve some balance between individualism and consistency.  
As far as the practice of informal consultation is concerned, greater judicial diversity 
has the potential to enhance the cross-fertilisation of views, in possibly unexpected 
ways. Peresie’s study (2005), for example, suggests that the presence of a female 
judge influences the voting of male judges on US multi-member benches. Moreover, 
to the extent that the judges’ accounts narrated above suggest that effective 
consultation depends on networks, opportunity and location, the following questions 
should also be asked: who seeks out whom, where and why? There may be a need to 





networks and locations.11 There may also be a case for providing judges with more 
opportunities to discuss cases (Kirby, 2004).  
Being ‘unlucky in your judge’ 
The practice of inter-judge consultation on the ‘going-rate’ is an informal means of 
structuring professional judgement in a discretionary decision-making framework, 
and almost certainly contributes to the patterned form of sentencing in Scotland. In 
this context, judicial collegiality can be regarded as part of ‘an evolving group 
interaction’ (Rieke, 1991:41) which reduces the chance of being ‘unlucky in your 
judge’ (Waldron, 2008:186):  
… lucky or unlucky because the best explanation for the resulting disparity has to do 
with the judge who happened to be assigned to decide the case. One might get lucky 
or unlucky in one’s judge.  
 
Waldron (1998:186) observes that although luck plays a part in many areas of our 
lives, the possibility of chance in judicial outcomes is troubling. This is because we 
value predictability, non-arbitrariness and fairness in the law. To reduce the chance 
of judicial lottery, the ideal judge would be ‘a little more collegially convergent with 
what she took her brother and sister judges to be doing’. However, rejecting the 
extreme scepticism of some legal realists who portray all judicial decision-making as 
essentially irrational, Waldron (1998:209) believes it is not possible to entirely 
eliminate disparity from the decision-making of individual judges other than by 
radical means:  
I am not imagining that the reasoning of the judge who sentenced P differs from the 
reasoning of the judge who sentenced Q, because the first judge ate something for 
breakfast that the second judge didn’t or because some random neuron fired in the 
first judge’s brain that didn’t fire in the brain of the second judge or because the two 
judges belong to different political parties. There is no element of the irrational here. 
There are just two people in robes — each in her own way a competent moral 
reasoner — each reasoning as best she can about the issue that the law (and 
morality) requires her to address. But as long as they reason separately, there is 
likely to be something of a lottery involved for the defendants. The only way to 
eliminate the unfairness associated with this lottery is to somehow yoke the two 
judges to the same standards of gravity-of-offenses, either by requiring a single 
judge or panel of judges to pass on all sentences, or by binding them with 





It is possible to displace this question of disparity and the possibility of unfairness 
with the language of individualised justice. Tata (2007) draws attention to some of 
the ways the ideals of tariff consistency and individualised sentencing are balanced 
in practice, as distinct from the way they are formally counter-posed in sentencing 
debate. Judge M’s rationalisation of the process, and the potential for unfairness 
treads some of this middle ground based on the ‘appropriateness’ of the sentence 
according to the individual circumstances: 
I don’t think that in terms that there can be a right sentence, for all sorts of reasons, 
and that is quite an interesting point when you consider law reform. But if you don’t 
really get a right sentence, only one that’s appropriate, then consistency, to me, 
doesn’t seem to matter terribly much, as long as it’s in the approximate kind of area, 
and the discretion of the Sheriff is set pretty wide, subject to be corrected by the 
Appeal Court. […] Now, that might mean that if you did something you’d be fined 
£600 in one place and £400 in another. But by the time you teased out about all the 
other things – about how much a person earns, how many children he’s got, has he 
done it before, whether he said he was sorry - it might be that in a certain court you 
could find a pattern of sentences that were heavier than another court, but I wouldn’t 
necessarily think that mattered terribly much. I kind of take a sort of broader axe 
approach to it, partly on the basis, as I said before, it’s not something that’s going to 
happen to everybody, every day. But if you’re fined £600 a day when somebody else 
is fined £200 a day for the same thing, I can see, yes, you would get fed up with that. 
Section 4: Sentencing as a signifying practice 
Introduction 
Garland’s (1990: 256) description of sentencing as ‘a signifying practice of some 
importance’ follows from his foundational argument that punishment is a cultural 
practice which constitutes and produces local and general knowledge through its 
processes, discourse and rhetoric.12 This broader argument in turn derives from 
cultural studies such as Geertz (1983) and Williams (1981) which explained culture 
itself as a signifying system – a means of explaining, communicating and 
reproducing a social order through an articulation of representations, identities and 
values. For Williams (1971) this is both an active and selective process through 
which the dominant culture organises what is often a quite disparate set of meanings.  
 
The origins of the idea of penal practice as a form of social signification provide 





ways of configuring social meaning upon which judges draw in sentencing, but also 
highlights the limited potential of this ‘proxy model of culture’ (Rock, 1998) to 
achieve social effects in the broader scale of social forces. 
The signifying function of sentencing 
Many social and penal commentators today acknowledge the Durkheimian message 
that penal practices such as sentencing serve expressive and demonstrative purposes 
beyond their instrumental objectives (Erikson, 1966; Bourdieu, 1987; Garland, 1990; 
Mathiesen, 1994; Rock, 1998; Henham, 2000; Smith, 2008). Garland (1990: 68) 
describes the performative and didactic dimension of sentencing: 
In witnessing the penal ritual - whether directly or through second-hand reports - 
citizens are led to experience for themselves the emotional drama of crime and its 
resolution in punishment. It is a social occasion which simultaneously structures 
individual sentiment and gives it cathartic release.... As well as 'getting things done' 
with respect to crime control, penal rituals are concerned to manipulate symbolic 
forms as a means of educating and reassuring their public audiences.  
 
The ‘signifying’ element of the penal process can therefore be read into many of the 
routines, symbols and rituals of daily practices. It also has a specific application in 
relation to several dimensions of the judge’s task in sentencing. These different 
aspects can be distinguished from each other as follows: (a) the passing of sentence 
itself which authorises, legitimises and activates the sanction to follow (b) the 
message communicated by the particular form of sentence chosen (such as the length 
of imprisonment, or the selection of a community sentence over a custodial one); (c) 
the reasons given by the judge for the sentence (this is a statutory requirement in a 
limited number of cases); and (d) any additional remarks which the sentencing judge 
may choose to make (usually in extempore form). 13 
In sentencing, therefore, the judge performs one of the more public and declaratory 
functions of penal practice, and this role is necessarily bound up with the symbolic 
and expressive function of the criminal court. Perhaps to a greater extent than other 
actors in the criminal justice field, the figure of the judge is invested with a weighty 
cultural and historical significance. This is represented in judicial iconography, 





proxemics and rituals of the court and judicial attire.14 The ‘staging’ of criminal 
justice and the judicial role is similarly well-documented (see for example Frank, 
1940; Erikson, 1966; Carlen, 1976; Rock, 1993, 1998) and is evident to even the 
casual observer of daily court practice.15  
The generative dimension of sentencing practice suggested by this account entails an 
active role for judges in communicating and shaping some of our cultural 
sensibilities and values. The emerging literature in the field suggests the importance 
of this insight to such diverse areas as international criminal justice and human rights 
(Henham, 2000; 2009; Savelsberg, 2010), sentencing rallies in China (Trevaskes, 
2004), domestic violence (Merry, 1990; 1992), the sentencing of street art crime 
(Young, 2012), and Japanese sentencing practice (Herber, 2009).16 Savelsberg’s 
(2010:34) account of the operation of international criminal courts is particularly 
useful here, demonstrating that criminal justice is consistent with a ‘semiotic model 
of social life’ in the way it draws upon ‘images, symbols, totems, myths, stories’ and 
contributes to the formation of a collective memory of ‘evil’. In this way, criminal 
justice is ‘a speech act in which society talks to itself about its moral identity’. 
However, the operation of international criminal courts also reminds us of the 
importance in criminal justice of forces other than cultural, such as power relations 
and institutional contexts: as Savelsberg (2010: 95) observes, legal institutions can 
(and do) constrain the powerful Further, lest we regard the court’s signifying 
function as a benign cultural process, Merry’s studies of domestic violence show that 
the production of cultural meanings about violence and domestic relations is only 
achieved by the courts through ‘force and the threat of force’ (1992: 211).17  
A number of caveats seem necessary to this discussion of sentencing as a signifying 
practice. Firstly, in the absence of much research on the reception of, and responses 
to, sentencing messages, the likely impact of this form of communication on the 
various intended (and unintended) audiences should not be overstated. It is perhaps 
reasonable to assume, along with other punishment practices, that it contributes in a 
‘small but significant way’ to the broad formation of cultural life (Garland, 1990: 





orchestrated message’ but rather a varied assemblage of rhetorics and practices 
(Garland, 1990: 275).  
The empirical basis of the ‘signifying’ element of sentencing 
Most research in this field focuses on the final stage of the sentencing process – the 
judge’s sentencing remarks - to gain insight about judicial attitudes in relation to 
specific categories of crimes or offenders, as outlined above. Less researched areas 
include judicial sentencing remarks as a genre,18 the reception of messages by the 
intended audiences, and the question of the broader judicial intentions and 
motivations in the making of sentencing statements.19  
Several commentators point to the difficulties of exploring the meaning and reach of 
this ‘transmission mechanism’ (Hudson, 2005). Rock (1998: 598) believes the 
signifying premise to be ‘intuitively persuasive’ but highlights the fragile empirical 
basis of the neo-Durkheimian understanding in light of several key features of the 
criminal justice process: the high attrition rates of cases prior to court, the backstage 
processes of case negotiation, and the reconstruction of the case when it reaches 
court. Mathiesen (1994) notes that it is unrealistic to expect all the choices between 
sanctions or levels of punishment to be recognised by the recipient of messages since 
these differences may be slight. Taken together, these features suggest that the 
cultural meanings of those few cases which do reach court may be altered and 
obscured by the processes of criminal justice.20 
Garland (1990:257) provides a detailed account of the ways in which meaning is 
communicated through sentencing – through particular conceptions and vocabularies 
of criminals, criminality, motive and conduct which feed back into wider society and 
conventional wisdom – but is careful to note that these theoretical arguments ‘outrun 
the available data’ (1990:251). He points to some inherent methodological problems 
with research in this area: the ‘unavoidable imprecision […] the difficulties of 
accurate measurement, the lack of reliable data, and the impossibility of isolating 
penal variables from other attitude-forming forces’ (Garland, 1990:250). Inevitably, 
he notes, attempts to trace some of these wider effects of penality will often rely on 





devising grounded analysis or other research methods to explore how those larger 
boundaries of penality are shaped and sustained, but observes that we know very 
little about the effects on the recipients of the cultural messages or of the ‘logic-in-
use’ of the sentencers approach. In the meantime, he considers it important to 
ascertain how social and symbolic processes such as these are activated, and how the 
‘activating agents’ - judges and others - make sense of what they do.  
I consider this last aspect of sentencing practice through the judges’ accounts, in 
relation to two of the dimensions identified on page 34 above: the message 
communicated by the particular form of sentence chosen; and any additional remarks 
which the sentencing judge may choose to make. What is being ‘signified’ by the 
choice of sentence? What form of messages do judges consider it important or 
effective to communicate, and to whom? And why do some judges appear to be 
reluctant signifiers?  
What is being signified by the choice of sentence? 
Garland (1990) provides several broad examples of ways in which the selection by a 
judge of a particular sentence conveys a symbolic message. For example, the 
selection of imprisonment itself is a severe censure, and the length of the sentence 
conveys an additional message about the relative seriousness which the crime is 
viewed. Other messages of censure may be conveyed by the selection of an 
unusually severe or lenient sentence. Sentences, of course, emanate from individual 
judges whose dispositions influence their choice of sentence within the permitted 
ranges, and the general reading above of the symbolic messages being carried in 
sentencing cannot capture any of this specificity. In Chapter 6, I explored some of 
the representations of crime, the criminal and criminal justice processes which the 
judges employed to explain their work and experience – the ‘larger frames of 
signification’ (Geertz, 1983). In this section I explore some of the sensibilities about 
forms of punishment which are suggested by their accounts, and the meanings and 






If punishment is a practice which seems morally wrong and needs defending (Duff 
and Garland, 2004), the judicial role in sentencing suggests some necessary 
equivalence in terms of answerability. Ethnomethodology provides an additional 
point of reference for judges’ narrative accounts of sentencing by introducing the 
concept of accountability as the foundation of human interaction. As Czarniawska 
(2004:4) notes, people spend their lives ‘planning, commenting upon, and justifying 
what they and others do’ and this aspect of human communication may have 
particular resonance for retired ‘professional punishers’ (Garland, 1990). Cover’s 
famous observation that the judicial conscience is ‘an artful dodger’ (1975: 201) 
alerts us to the processes of rationalisation that are likely to occur in retrospective 
accounts, and Atkinson (1997: 341) issues this caution: 
Autobiographical accounts and self-revelations are as conventional and as artful as 
any other mode of representation. We sell short ourselves and the possibility of 
systematic social analysis if we implicitly assume that autobiographical accounts or 
narratives of personal experience grant us untrammelled access to a realm of 
hyperauthenticity.  
Rehabilitation 
The orthodox view that the rehabilitative ideal was either dead or defunct prevailed 
for some time (see Feeley and Simon, 1992; Bauman, 2000b).21 Although there was 
recognition that rehabilitative programmes still continued to operate in programmes 
in prison for ‘high risk’ offenders, and that most of the ‘technologies, powers and 
knowledges’ of penal welfarism were still in place (Garland, 2001: 170), the 
consensus seemed to be that rehabilitation had suffered a spectacular fall from grace 
and was no longer a guiding principle of practitioners or policy-makers. This now 
seems a mis-reading of the situation and in particular of the core values of 
practitioners and policy elites. In particular, these appear now to have been 
characterised by some greater on-going commitment to the rehabilitative ideal and to 
the overarching penal-welfarism approach than was first thought (Ward and Maruna, 
2007; Robinson, 2008). In the face of other political, cultural and economic changes 





subject to adaptation and change and rehabilitation may have survived principally by 
‘re-marketing’ itself in ways which were capable of alignment with the ‘new 
punitiveness’ of this era (Robinson, 2008) and with new preoccupations about risk 
and public protection (McNeill and Batchelor, 2004). McNeill and Whyte (2007) 
suggest that rehabilitation in Scotland was in a state of hibernation throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. However, reflecting its long history as a ‘parallel and partner 
profession’ within criminal justice practice - and in contrast to the position in 
England & Wales – rehabilitation remains an important ideal in Scottish penal 
practice, albeit now more usually employed as a way of progressing the twin goals of 
reducing reoffending and increasing social inclusion (Robinson and McNeill, 2004). 
Halliday et al (2009) observe that the institutional arrangements as well as the 
practice of welfarism in Scottish criminal justice require sentencing judges to enlist 
and employ social work expertise in many cases. 
 
The broader context of penal transformation and continuity in Scotland is usefully 
explored in McAra (2005). In particular, the discussion there of continuities in penal 
welfarism, particularly the social work model aimed at the re-integration of offenders 
in the community rather than the use of prison, raises the interesting question of the 
role of the judiciary. This is relevant to the continuity of ethos, since the practice 
would require some on-going judicial commitment to the ethos and values of the 
model – or, at least, could not have continued in the face of judicial opposition.  
 
Foucault (1977:14) observes that the new ‘distancing’ of justice from the act of 
punishment itself is accompanied by a ‘theoretical disavowal’ on the part of judges, 
who declare that they are motivated not by a desire to punish but to ‘correct’ or 
‘cure’. This sceptical reading of judicial motivation could find some ostensible 
support in the articulation of several accounts about punishment here, particularly 
those which stress their rehabilitative rather than punitive orientations. However, the 
judges’ fuller accounts of practice and their interest in organisations concerned with 
the rehabilitation or ‘resettlement’ of ex-prisoners could also suggest more than a 
notional commitment to the concept. Judge L’s account was a trenchant defence of 






Unless you want the criminal justice system to be a system for locking people up, 
what are you trying to do? Why do you want the punishment to fit the criminal 
rather than fit the crime? Is it purely about punishment? If not, what then is the 
purpose? It’s not about deterrence – let’s forget that. You’re trying to rehabilitate 
them. People can be rehabilitated if you get them at the right time and in the right 
way. There is a danger, if you are too severe, that you drive them over the edge and 
you put rehabilitation beyond them, and then that’s it. You’ve pruned too hard.  
Judge D stated that his commitment to keeping people out of custody formed while 
studying jurisprudence: 
I think it probably started in university, in jurisprudence, the whole academic aspect 
of punishment, the various purposes of it. And in particular, not just the punitive 
element, the restorative element. And that hit home to me. We had a very good 
lecturer, I liked him a lot and talked to him a lot about it. And it always stuck with 
me. 
Judge A identified some of the policy ambivalence about rehabilitation in his early 
years as a Sheriff but appeared not to have wavered in his own commitment: 
I think towards the beginning of my time there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm for 
the welfare approach, the feeling that criminal justice could do any good; that 
nothing really works. I was never an adherent of that. I’m not sure I always did the 
right thing, though. For example, in my day Borstal was still in existence and I think 
more modern studies have indicated that Borstal wasn’t a terrific success – though it 
started about 1914 and lasted well into my time. And therefore, if advised that this 
would be a reforming influence, I tended to adopt it. I think probably I was 
excessively non- accepting of the idea that punishment should be retributive. 
Judge L expressed the frustration of several judges when he observed that although 
they knew the rehabilitative approach did sometimes work, they only saw the failures 
– the ones who came back to court. Judge C said that ‘without a doubt’ his over-
riding commitment was to rehabilitation and in his time as a Sheriff he had felt 
supported in this by a number of other Sheriffs – ‘a body of people who felt the same 
way as I do’.  
Rehabilitation: the challenge to judicial ‘disengagement’ 
Bourdieu (1987:830) describes independence as the quintessential judicial attitude 
which operates as the ‘entry ticket’ into the field: it is ‘the internalized manifestation 





disengagement is suggested by these judges’ accounts of rehabilitative practices and 
changes in the course of their careers. Two judges were involved in the operation of 
Drug Courts; this involvement, as narrated in Judge C’s account in earlier chapters, 
represented a marked change in the conventional judicial role, challenging the usual 
‘distance’ of office and in their relationship with the accused. In the later part of his 
career as a Sheriff, Judge M identified a major change in the relationship between 
judge and offender. This involved ‘hearing’ the accused’s voice: 
But latterly, when things like drugs treatment testing orders came in- which I 
thought was an absolutely exceptionally good thing - you were in a totally different 
relationship with the accused, and that’s a kind of high point. Well, you talked to 
them for one thing. Quite often you’re sending someone down and you have no idea 
what their voice sounded like […] They appear, plead guilty and they’ve got 
solicitors, as you know, they just sit there looking either pleased or worried, and the 
solicitor speaks for them.  
I asked him what he thought was gained by having the opportunity to talk to the 
accused directly, and his reply suggested this lay in gaining real insight about an 
offender’s circumstances: 
The first thing that was gained was that they [offenders] felt someone was taking an 
interest in what they were doing and…that’s not just my experience, other Sheriffs 
have told me as well. Also, it’s actually quite interesting to find how they thought. I 
remember someone telling me about shoplifting and how tedious it was to have to do 
it once the buzz had gone. And other people told me about things like if you’re 
involved in heroin - this one person was. In a matter of six weeks you can have lost 
your house, your spouse, your job, and you can actually hurtle down into a person 
living on the streets. And that’s why I liked DTTOs, because apart from the actual 
business of physically trying to get the person to reduce their drug intake and their 
criminality - and it was the criminality we were meant to focus on, not the drug 
taking, really - in Edinburgh there was a very good general support system that 
realised that, in the first place of people taking drugs it might be to mask something 
else and if you take the mask away you have to deal with the underlying thing. And 
the second thing was that they understood that people in that situation had other 
needs like finance and housing, possibly getting back to work, all these kind of 
things. And I thought the Edinburgh one was very well thought out and that was my 
impression of it.  
Within the limits of courts procedures, several judges spoke of wanting to ‘keep tabs 
on the situation’ of an individual offender by using the deferred sentence option. 
Judge E explained the benefits: 
Well, if you were deferring sentence, that gave you the chance to see if the accused 





of trouble but do something positive. You could keep a tab on somebody and keep 
them coming back either monthly or 2 monthly or whatever. It was good having that 
kind of discretion. It allowed you to keep tabs on that kind of situation. 
Several others indicated they would like to become more involved in the ongoing 
management and review of cases.22 Judge M would have liked this aspect of the role 
to be further developed: 
 
It seemed to me it was much better for everybody. In fact I got to the stage where I 
began to wonder if we should do something like the French do and have a judge who 
is in charge of the person carrying out their sentence. I think it’s probably called a 
juge des peines 23 in France and it’s not necessarily the sentencing judge, though 
there’s no reason in Scotland why it shouldn’t be: simply to see the person and see 
how they’re getting on. You’ve always got to allow for being fooled and taken in 
because to an extent you’re dealing with rascals. But to an awful extent you’re 
dealing with people who have got in a helpless kind of mess. And it was a constant 
theme that, you know: ‘Thank goodness someone’s interested in me even though 
I’ve done this’. 
These accounts of judges talking directly to the offender and gaining real insight 
about the problems they faced appear to represent a challenge to the concept of 
judicial independence as ‘distance’ from the accused. I consider this aspect further in 
relation to imprisonment.  
Sentencing to Imprisonment 
In his discussion about the civilization of punishment, Garland (1990: 236) draws 
attention to the least developed dimension of this transformation of sensibilities: 
sympathy for offenders and the improvement of penal conditions. This neglect is the 
result of the ways in which punishment is organised so as to minimise and disguise 
the violence entailed in its routine practice. Sarat and Kearns (1995:242) also draw 
attention to the forces which conspire to protect judges from the violence of their role 
when they observe that the distance between thought and action is both ‘a blessing 
and a difficulty’ - it is a necessary part of politics when dealing with ‘pain’ and 
death. Law (in the form of the judicial role) must therefore be at the centre of 
punishment – it is needed for the ‘domesticating’ of violence. Sarat and Kearns 
(1995: 236) usefully suggest that sentencing requires a ‘structure of social 






A sceptical reading of this ‘structure of social cooperation’ would find some support 
in many of the judges’ accounts of sentencing practice: in descriptions of their 
coping mechanisms, their attempts to control displays of emotion, in the informal 
practice of collegiality, and in the concept of judicial independence where it means 
distance and disengagement. Accounts of practice, however, suggest that other 
readings are also possible.  
 
Continuing his earlier discussion about extending the judicial role, Judge M’s 
expressed his discomfort at ‘washing his hands’ of the offender once he’d sentenced 
him to imprisonment: 
 
…. passing a sentence of imprisonment, you have no idea what’s going to happen to 
the person after that. Apart from the fact they’re going to prison and […]. It’s 
atrocious. Also, […] getting back to the idea of the judge supervising the sentence to 
some extent, I thought there was something kind of bad about sending someone to 
prison and then washing your hands of it. […] You take this huge decision and you 
don’t even have to put it in writing while you’re doing it […]. But you don’t know 
how they’re going to get on, how they’re going to behave in prison and the thing that 
struck me as very odd […]. I thought judges should be involved in that. I thought if 
they send someone to prison they should be involved in how their sentence was 
served. Speak to them. […] Well, say what on earth are you doing, you know? 
 
As Judge M continued this account, he had in mind a role for the judge in visiting the 
accused in prison, or having the accused come to see them for some kind of review, 
possibly with a view to reduction of sentence if good progress was being made. He 
mused on the strangeness of the sentencing act from the offender’s point of view: 
 
You could even say to them, you know, what’s going on here? I sent you to prison 
and now you’re fighting with the staff! […] I wonder if there’s something we’ve 
missed here, because if you’re in the dock, and someone you’ve never met listens to 
stuff about you, takes a couple of years out your life and never sees you again, 
it’s….it’s bizarre if you look at it, in that kind of way. 
In similar vein, Judge D spoke of the artificiality of the act of sentencing: 
One of the fundamental difficulties in a way about a judge is that a judge makes up 
his mind what is the right sentence. He has no control of, or knowledge of, what 
happens afterwards. He knows perfectly well that it could be that this prisoner would 
benefit very much from having a course to deal with anger management or 
something of this sort. But he has no – well, he had no - control over whether the 





way, an artificial exercise. You push someone across a particular line and they 
simply disappear from view.  
These accounts present a challenge to conventional understandings of judicial 
independence where that is founded upon the judge occupying a position of distance 
and disengagement in relation to the offender and their sentence. They also suggest 
that the powerful norms of social avoidance which Garland (2010) observes in 
relation to punishment may be attenuated in unexpected ways.  
However, there may be limits to the extent to which the distance between judge and 
offender should be breached. Wald (1995) believes that institutional arrangements 
and doctrines such as judicial independence matter: they can either ‘invite restraint’ 
or ‘ease the path to violence’ and excess. In her discussion of sentencing as a 
legitimated form of state violence, Wald (a US judge) states that she favours 
arrangements and doctrines that require judges to ‘confront the pain their decisions 
authorize, condone or ignore’ and criticises constitutional doctrines and practices 
which distance the judge from their responsibility by means of abstraction or 
depersonalisation (Wald, 1995:82).24 Enabling judges to review and monitor 
sentences and to visit offenders in prison may be the sort of arrangements or 
practices that would meet Wald’s objection to ‘distancing’ practices. So also might 
the continuing involvement of judges in organisations and training events which 
inform them about the pains of imprisonment and other central issues and debates 
concerning punishment. This involvement may come at a price, however.  
In a conversation about the occupational stresses entailed in judging, Judge M spoke 
about judges ‘making arrangements for their own self-protection’: 
How do people [judges] cope? I would guess by not always knowing the full 
consequences of what they’re doing. Well, probably not wanting to know. If you 
send someone to prison you don’t want to know what happens to their family, unless 
you happen to be a Christian. […].You talk to families and you hear horror stories 
about the effect on people simply in terms of things like simply travelling to the 
prison to see the prisoner, things like that. I suppose what I’m saying is that I don’t 
think that judges have always been educated about the full consequences of what 






Some further insight about the complexity of the relations of distance and 
engagement was gained from the accounts of two particular judges who, after 
retirement from the bench, were appointed to the Parole Board. This work, they 
explained, took them closer to the circumstances and consequences of serious crime 
– providing them with extensive knowledge about the effect of crime on both the 
offender and the victim. To this extent, the work can be regarded as achieving the 
sort of confrontation with the consequences of judicial decisions of which Wald 
(1995) approves. Strikingly, however, both judges reflected that one effect of this 
intense familiarity with the circumstances of serious crime was to make them 
reconsider their previously strong rehabilitative orientation. One commented that he 
was had been ‘excessively non-accepting of the idea that punishment should be 
retributive’. This raises the question whether judicial distance, the abstraction and 
depersonalisation which Wald condemns, may in fact serve a moderating function on 
judicial sensibilities. This moderating function may be compromised by greater 
involvement or lesser distance.  
Sentencing Remarks 
Sentencing remarks mark the end stage of the judicial role in sentencing, and can be 
distinguished from the reasons which a judge may also have given for the sentence. 
Sentencing remarks are optional and in the lower courts most usually take the form 
of extemporized remarks.25 Garland (1990:54) notes the generative potential of 
sentencing statements; not only do they express sentiments, they also seek to 
‘transform and re-shape them’. This may be slow ideological work but can, over 
time, change sensibilities; some examples would be seatbelt laws, drink driving, 
racism and other ‘hate crimes’.  
Rock (1998:589) observes that the language sometimes employed by judges at this 
stage of the sentencing process is ‘allusive, denunciatory and didactic’. Moreover, 
the formulaic character of sentencing remarks is widely observed, and this 
observation may be more applicable where the judge is simply expressing or 
affirming public sensibilities, rather than seeking to transform them. The routinized 






Nine-tenths of culture is the work of reproduction. Culture and cultural practice 
largely consist of the transmission and reproduction of collective meanings, values, 
classifications and perceptions, undertaken for purposes of socializing the young, 
binding individuals to groups and motivating meaningful action. Culture is about 
communicating, coordinating and controlling conduct in the interest of collective 
action and social order.  
                                                                                                  (Garland, 2012: 421-2) 
Sentencing remarks: audiences 
Symbolism and rhetoric are paramount in the signifying endeavour, and the imagined 
audience and its particular features are likely to influence the signifying practice 
adopted (Garland, 1990). Melossi (2008:6) follows Durkheim in understanding the 
primary purpose of the penal system as ‘controlling society more than the criminals, 
who should actually be regarded as the useful ‘bearers’ of such control’. This latent 
function is evident in some of the language used by the judges in conversation: 
‘signal sentences’ were employed in particular areas to send out deterrent messages 
about local issues, and there was mention of the need to send out ‘signals’ to ‘the 
accused and all his pals’ about criminal behaviour, and the dangers of sending out 
‘the wrong signals’. However, the relevance of the public as a real or imagined 
audience for judges’ sentencing was presented by the judges as a question of 
intractable difficulty. Some correspondence between sentencing and public attitudes 
was recognised as important for the legitimacy of the system, but most judges 
articulated the problem of divining the ‘public mood’. Judge B expressed a common 
view when he said that he didn’t attach too much importance to the idea of ‘public 
mood’ since it could distort judgement. In any case, as Judge F commented, it was 
sometimes incumbent on the judge to take an ‘individual’ view even if the public 
might think it was an outrage. Judge L was unfazed by mail from the public telling 
him he was ‘absolutely useless’ and another thought that judges should simply ‘try 






There was significant ambivalence about the judge’s signifying role. Judge E gave 
the more straightforward example of a situation where, as a ‘floating Sheriff’ 
covering a number of geographical areas, he had to bring in ‘views from outside’: 
 
… people in the different areas looked at things differently, […] call it a local view; 
in-bred sexual abuse in whole families, for example - it was part of the culture, you 
could almost say. And this is where the state says ‘this is what is going to happen’. 
And there you had to say ‘This is totally wrong’ and to be heard condemning it, and 
passing a severe sentence. It was something you couldn’t allow to be carried on, the 
belief that it was alright. 
Like most of his colleagues, Judge M was generally reluctant to make strong 
signifying statements: ‘Once you start pontificating about the state of society’, he 
said, ‘I think you’re kind of overestimating what your duties are.’ However, there 
were some situations where he felt there was arguably some duty to do so: 
… often you felt, especially if you had sympathy with the accused, you felt if only 
other people who are dabbling in drugs could know that this is the kind of thing that 
might happen, then they might be deterred. And because you’re in that, I suppose in 
a uniquely privileged situation, you can comment on it. It may be arguable that we 
should, otherwise it’s a sort of ‘treason of the clerks’ situation, you know, turning 
your face away from something. It’s difficult, that. 
In the context of the courtroom trial i.e. at the moment of sentence, the selection and 
imposition of sentence seems most obviously directed first at the offender; he or she 
is, after all, ‘first in line to be ‘taught a lesson’ by punishment’ (Garland, 1990: 260). 
There may be some expectation that this ‘lesson’ includes a moral message from the 
judge; von Hirsch (1993), for example, suggests that although a penal sanction might 
by itself ensure compliance, it should be accompanied by censure and disapproval for 
the offender’s moral education.  
 
Among the judges interviewed, there seemed to be a strong aversion to making any 
of what Bourdieu (1997) calls ‘normative utterances’ directly to the offender. There 
were numerous disparaging remarks about judicial ‘pontificating’, ‘moralising’, or 
‘hysterical output’ and Judge M expressed it this way: 
 
I wasn’t a great one for saying ‘You’re an unmitigated rogue’. I never thought there 
was a place for that. […] I don’t think it’s any of my business; not really my thing. 





Judge E gave this account of his own practice in relation to sentencing remarks to the 
offender:  
I felt that you should never speak down to an accused. I never tried to lecture an 
accused. I always tried to treat them with respect. So whether you’re sentencing in 
open court or not, you always treat them as a person and try to be reasonable. […] I 
never tried to bring him down. If it was a serious offence, I’d say so. And if I felt a 
general warning should be given I’d indicate that future cases would be dealt with in 
this way. But I’d never try to lecture them on the evils of it. If it was a bad case I’d 
say so, and sometimes when you’re addressing the accused like that, you’d get him 
nodding. And you’d feel at least someone’s listening.[…]  I’ve been in courts where 
Sheriffs have shouted ‘Take your hands out your pockets!’ or ‘Why are you 
laughing?’ But so often it’s nervous laughter, and there’s no need to hammer into 
them. They know they’re in trouble. Going back to Lord [X] and some judges who 
gave sermons in their sentences: there’s no point in that because the accused isn’t 
going to listen. He’s not going to write it down and put it up in his cell.  
Another judge spoke of always trying to say something encouraging to the offender: 
‘something a friend would say’. In a telling remark, Judge M said that he preferred to 
speak to the offender rather than speak about the offender. 
The reluctant signifiers 
The reluctance to make strong signifying messages, especially to the offender, may 
be the logical conclusion of the difficulty which many judges expressed about the 
sentencing decision itself; if they are not confident about the ‘rightness’ of the 
sentence itself, the correctness of the message will be similarly uncertain. The 
reluctance to signify may therefore be integral to the nature of sentencing as a form 
of ethico-moral judgement which is necessarily indeterminate. Thiele (2006: 12) 
sums up the difficulty this way: 
There is no trump card to be found in this game. No one account, no single story can 
capture the full import of moral and political life or settle, once and for all, the 
rightness or wrongness of its components. A plurality of narratives compete for our 
allegiance. To judge well in the face of this inherent contextuality and essential 
contestability requires moral and political acumen and courage.  
Czarniawska (2004:49) notes the ‘logic of representation’ in account giving: not only 
are narratives ‘well rehearsed and crafted in a legitimate logic’, they are likely to 
have been carefully selected to present the narrator in a good light. This may be 





accountability suggested by that task. However, building on the other views 
expressed by these judges about sentencing practice, these accounts suggest several 
key characteristics of their sentencing sensibilities: an attempt to be empathetic and 
to be non-judgemental. These features may be strongly correlated and Thiele’s 
observation (2006: 199) provides important insight about practical wisdom as well as 
the importance of managing emotions: 
Emotions leave us vulnerable to prejudice and projection. Under the influence of 
negative emotions, in particular, the exercise of judgement may deteriorate into a 
habit of hasty censure. Eagerness to blame is not practical wisdom. The good judge 
is not judgemental. Still, the remedy for an overly judgemental disposition is not the 
squelching of emotion, negative or otherwise. Quite the opposite. The cultivation of 
empathy is required.  
The ‘penal equation’ 
In Chapter 6, I considered some of the ways in which the judges’ accounts were 
characterised by a tendency to inclusion rather than exclusion in relation to the 
offender. However, the inclusionary or exclusionary orientation represents only part 
of Melossi’s typology. The second part relates to a conception of social order: in the 
case of the inclusionary model, an understanding of social order as sometimes fairly 
or rationally contested; or in the case of the exclusionary model, as a given 
establishment norm. The distinction between these understandings of social order has 
a number of implications for this discussion of sentencing as a signifying practice.  
Norrie (2005:42) notes that all legal forms represent  
‘the imposition of one moral and political narrative about how people ought to 
behave, dressed in a language of formality and universality that has to be constantly 
safeguarded against alternative moral and political possibilities.  
Viewed this way, judges play a central role in patrolling the borders of normative 
debate: 
Judges [and academic lawyers], in the name of legal subjectivity and formal 
rationality, operate as the border patrollers of this moral-political discourse. Its 
fictive character is revealed by the constant need to repair the boundaries against the 
corruptive invasion of alternative moral-political accounts – of legitimate and 





As Norrie (2005: 42) explains, one of the ways in which the criminal law seeks to 
achieve the necessary degree of normative closure about these and other debates is 
through concepts rooted in a juridical individual endowed with free will. These 
concepts marginalize questions of ‘social excuse’ and can have the effect of closing 
down discussion of the social, political and moral contexts of crime. And yet, as 
Norrie (2005:90) notes, there are two sides to the question of criminal responsibility: 
Just deserts from one side is social injustice from another, and we feel the pull of 
both arguments. There are always two sides to the question of criminal 
responsibility. It is not that law is wrong to identify individual agency as important 
to moral responsibility. […..] The problem for law, for criminal justice, for the penal 
equation, is that it is one-sided in its treatment of people being in control. There is a 
double, linked exclusion here: of the social conditions of selfhood, and the structural 
conflicts which inform those conditions.  
These concepts of individual responsibility and formal rationality, which can operate 
as modes of repression and exclusion, represent another set of contradictions since 
they also form the basis of the liberal conception of law as the sphere of freedom 
(Norrie, 2000; 2005). Thus for more than 200 years, liberal law has delivered 
criminal justice through what Norrie (2005:5) calls ‘the penal equation’: ‘crime plus 
responsibility equals punishment’.26 He explains this more fully (2005:75): 
Crime requires punishment as retribution and deterrence, and criminal justice 
qualifies individuals as deserving of the state’s legitimate sanctions. It is this sense 
of justice, responsibility and desert, justifying social control through punishment 
[…] 
The construction of personal responsibility by the criminal law in this way, and the 
corresponding neglect of social contextual factors, means there is only a limited role 
for substantive or social justice in criminal justice processes.27 In an important sense, 
also, these tensions and ambivalences are inscribed in the role of the judge, and the 
performance of their role in criminal justice entails a degree of shifting between the 
poles of individualism and social control. Norrie (1993: 57) states it in this way: 
The judicial role is situated at a point of conflict between a logic of individual 
justice, which has its modern roots in liberal legal and political theory, and a logic of 
social control and public policy as viewed by the judges from their particular 





The sentencing stage of criminal justice represents a distinct shift in both process and 
outlook for penal agents. The earlier stages of criminal prosecution and trial rest on 
values of due process, formal legal rationality and individual responsibility, but the 
sentencing process marks a shift towards values of differentiation, evaluation and 
discretion. Whether this shift entails the ‘blunt denial’ of the social character of 
crime (Zedner, 2004: 174) or simply its marginalisation, there is a sense in which the 
sentencing stage occasions the ‘setting loose’ of the contradictions of law, and the 
introduction of ‘politically safe’ judicial discretion to manage it (Norrie, 1993).  
The ‘social question’ 
Sentencing brings the individual judge, particularly those sitting in the lower courts 
where the ‘social services’ function in criminal law is greater, into close proximity 
with the ‘social question’ - the social structuring of the criminal population (Norrie, 
1993:220). For the reflexive judge, able to reflect on some of the contradictions they 
face and on the limitations as well as some of the possibilities of their role, this 
presents an unresolvable tension. There was some awareness in judges’ conversation 
of the general critique that the processes of criminal justice individualise the social 
problems integral to penality and neglect their structural determinants. In her public 
speeches, Chief Justice Elias (Elias, 2005) draws on insights from criminology and 
other social science research to explicitly acknowledge and engage with the ‘social 
question’. She observes, however, that in the meantime, judges are left with the 
criminal justice system - the bluntest form of social control.  
Judge F’s response to the social question is emblematic of another judicial response; 
to acknowledge its existence but to resolutely exclude it from the judicial ambit in 
sentencing. In the course of our meetings, I noticed some reluctance to engage with 
topics which strayed into social contexts of sentencing, and several conversations 
along these lines stalled. Here, for example, I asked him about the extent to which 
the criminal court concerns itself with the circumstances of the offender: 
I expected in social enquiry reports to learn about the background of the person. 
Where there was a report, that would give an indication of where the person is 
going……. why he’s got into the situation he is in. [Long pause] Well, that’s it. 





In our last meeting, I detected some resolve on his part to make his position about 
this issue clear. At the end of the interview, I asked him if his career as a Sheriff had 
provided him with any useful insights about the place of crime in society. He 
provided the following extended response: 
No particularly helpful insights, no. Not so that I can say ‘Well, I know he’s got here 
this way, and the way to deal with him is so and so’. No. That really is the point; that 
every wrongdoer, every person wrongfully arrested, every person wrongfully 
charged, every person in a civil action, is different. And I regard the consequences of 
that as being interesting. […] I’m a lawyer, and I apply the law. And I apply the law 
to changing situations. But each situation is the one in front of me. […]  
I don’t know if one gets that kind of insight. That is the interesting thing; that what 
has been done has been done on this particular occasion. What is to be done requires 
assistance from social workers if it’s sufficiently serious, to give guidance as to why 
it’s happened, and what may prevent it in future. […] I mean, you see patterns of 
why someone might be carrying a knife; you see patterns of why someone might be 
getting drunk; you see patterns of why someone driving less carefully than they 
ought to be. But you’re not dealing with a pattern; you’re dealing with an individual. 
[…]  
Let’s put it this way. If I were to start writing an autobiography, and I’m not writing 
an autobiography, and I’m not going to start writing an autobiography. But if I did, 
among the things I would no doubt try to get together are issues of patterns and 
society, and how these things have developed, and how these things have changed. 
But you don’t deal with individuals on the basis of such patterns. Now that’s not to 
say that one ignores the social consequences, because we’ve been into this at length. 
The social consequences are vital. The patterns within society have to be understood. 
But you don’t analyse them in the rough and tumble of the summary criminal court.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to dispel some of the ‘sociological innocence’ (Krygier, 
2008:45) about the core concept of judicial independence. This doctrine invites 
criminological suspicion because of its oblique nature and its mythologizing and 
legitimising functions. These latter qualities mark the concept out as the master 
narrative of the judiciary, and listening to judges’ accounts of its use in penal 
practice provides valuable insight about its on- going meaning and relevance. Some 
new insight is gained about the importance of the traditions of independence for 
some judges, about the operation of discretion in practice, and about the nature of 
independent judgement itself. In particular, these insights support a view of 





emotions and open up some space for considering more closely the occupational 
challenges and demands of judging – and the implications of strategies employed to 
deal with those challenges. 
One of those strategies is the informal practice of inter-judge discussion about 
sentencing. This practice provides useful insight about the operation of the habitus, 
shaping norms and facilitating inter-dependency. It can be regarded as a strategy to 
help the individual judge deal with the indeterminacy of the discretionary sentencing 
task, but which also helps to promote consistency and reduce disparity. There is 
some possible conflict with the idea that the individual judge should be taking 
decisions independently of others. It also raises practical questions about networks, 
opportunity and location. 
The cultural dimension of sentencing becomes apparent when sentencing is 
conceived as a signifying process (Garland, 1990). Sentencing provides an active 
role for judges in communicating and shaping cultural sensibilities, and outcomes 
necessarily reflect, in some way, the dispositions of individual judges. In this 
context, the reluctance of some judges to signify raises interesting questions about 
the unresolvable tension which the ‘social question’ presents to the reflexive judge: 
the extent to which social problems can be re-balanced within the framework of 
criminal justice. 
 
                                                 
1 In relation to criminal justice it is useful to distinguish two meanings in the use of the concept 
judicial independence. First, in constitutional debates and in the higher courts, it is used as a corollary 
of the doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of law. If the judiciary is to uphold the rule of law, 
it must be a separate branch of government and not placed under any undue influence, control or 
pressure from the others (Stevens, 1999, MacCormick, 2006, Beatson, 2008). In the case of the 
individual judge, this is assured by security of tenure and fiscal independence and by conventions 
relating to impartiality – the absence of ‘fear or favour’. This aspect of judicial independence is the 
most significant for senior members of the judiciary sitting in Court of Appeal, whose primary 
function is the checking and balancing the power of the other branches (Malleson: 1997, 666). The 
appearance of impartiality can be brought into question when judges engage in public debate or 
comment on politically controversial matters. The risk is that judges become ‘just another player in 
the political process with policy preferences’ (Beatson, 2008:5). 
The second use is in relation to those courts that have the daily business of crime as their principal 
function. Here, independence is used less in relation to the separation of powers but more in relation 
to the impartiality or neutrality of the individual judge. This reflects the ‘social service’ function of 





                                                                                                                                          
and Mack: 2005), sometimes requiring the management of emotions. This could perhaps usefully be 
described as independence in the sense of both affect and effect i.e. as a coping strategy deliberately 
adopted to allow the necessary psychic distance; and as a concept which has a rhetorical or 
legitimating effect where appearances might demand one (to buttress the daily operational demands 
and compromises).  
2 Kahn (2006b) gives the examples of markets, law and war and the corollaries of market participants, 
rights bearers and combatants as some of these competing forces. In relation to criminal law, the 
competing symbolic forces would include broad conceptions of justice, morality and victimhood.  
3 In Scotland, this discretion is subject to appeal, to some statutory limits (except in the High Court) 
and to guideline judgements and notes from the Appeal Court.  
4  Rubin (1996) prefers the terminology of supervision and policy-making to explain the control of 
discretionary decision-making.  
5 At the explanatory level, an attitudinal change on the part of the judiciary towards greater 
punitiveness, over a period of time, would be difficult to empirically evaluate or measure. It is 
interesting to note that much more appears to be known about public punitiveness than judicial 
punitiveness. 
6 The findings of some socio-legal studies challenge the assumption that discretion in law always 
leads to inconsistency or that that the two concepts are related in a simple or direct way. See Campbell 
(1999) and Stranieri et al (2000).  
7 This alludes to our faith in the judge as a neutral, depoliticized expert and the sense in which judges 
‘model neutrality for us all’ (Kennedy, 1997: 2).  
8 I was unable to find any information about this proposed service.  
9 See Tata (1998); Hutton (2003) for discussion.  
10 The nature and extent of consultation about the ‘going rate’ will depend on several factors, one of 
which is the jurisdiction of the court. In the High Court, the threshold question of imprisonment or 
community sentence is seldom in question and judges are more likely to be sentencing ‘for the crime’ 
rather than for the individual. As several judges observed, judges there tend to think in terms of years. 
Reflecting the greater social services function, the exercise of sentencing discretion in the Sheriff 
Court tends to take place over broader terrain, and is likely therefore to influence the nature of 
consultation.  
11 It is relevant to note here that the New Club in Edinburgh, membership of which reportedly includes 
a sizeable number of High Court judges, remains a gentlemen only club, albeit with a number of 
‘Lady Associates’.  
12 Even more broadly, Mathiesen (1994: 221) suggests that the entire criminal justice system can be 
regarded as ‘a large machine having the purpose of communicating this message [deterrence and 
moral education] to the people’.  
13 In a general sense these are overlapping categories, so that the message sought to be conveyed by 
punishing a serious crime by a lengthy custodial sentence will be reflected in each of these stages, 
albeit in subtly altered ways. However, the judges’ accounts to follow suggest that questions of 
audience and circumstances affect the rhetorical content of signifying remarks at different stages, so 
some distinctions may be drawn where relevant.  
14 See Chase and Thong (2012) for a recent study of the impact of courtroom rituals and settings.  
15 Lucien’s (2010) account of the loss of judicial authority through a decline in the staging tradition 
may be overstated.  
16 See also Bouhours and Daly (2007); McCarthy (1995); Steffensmeier et al (1998); Erez (1999); 
Jeffries and Bond (2010).  
17 Garland (2009) makes a related point in his review of Smith’s Punishment and Culture (2008) when 





                                                                                                                                          
dimensions of penal practice over equally relevant (and inter-connected) aspects of power and control. 
As Garland (citing Western, 2007) observes, punishment ‘shapes life chances, distributes power and 
reinforces racial divisions’ (2009:266). The emphasis in this thesis is on cultural dimensions of the 
judicial role but I make no claims for the hegemony of the cultural over material lines of power which 
also structure the judicial role.  
18 The only significant study of sentencing remarks as a genre appears to be that of Robertshaw 
(2004). This study approaches the subject from the point of view of legal semiotics and traces both the 
historical development and contemporary use of the form. 
19 There is a growing body of scholarship which explores broad issues of public opinion and attitudes 
to sentencing, although this is not usually directed towards the reception of specific sentencing 
messages. See Gelb (2006); Roberts (2002; 2003b; 2004); Roberts et al (2009); Stalans (2002); Tufts 
et al (2002). 
20 Even this is an incomplete account of the problems of researching the signifying and 
communicating aspects of sentencing, since it leaves out the role of the media. Mathiesen (1994) notes 
some of the ‘filtration’ and ‘focusing’ effects of media reporting of sentencing. 
21 Ward and Maruna (2007) note that there is little precision or clarity about what constitutes 
‘rehabilitation’ in theory or in practice, although the two principal models in use are the medical 
version of rehabilitation  in which the offender is regarded as the passive recipient of the service, and 
a social psychological version in which the offender is a more active subject. 
22 There are proposals in Scotland to introduce some element of judicial review into the management 
of community based penalties. See McIvor (2011).  
23 In France, the enforcement judge (JAP) is a judge of the Special Court of First Instance, and 
monitors the progress of the offender inside and outside of prison. The post was created in 1958 in an 
effort to individualize the sentence.  
24 Wald (1995) develops this discussion by arguing that by wiping out discretion, sentencing 
guidelines are part of the new development of the jurisprudence of law’s violence that ‘profoundly 
distances the judge from the violent consequences of the sentence’. 
25 Sentencing statements are occasionally made more widely available in high profile cases or where 
there is thought to be a particularly important matter of public interest. The Scottish Judiciary now 
employs a Head of Judicial Communications to manage these and other media communications.  
26 Halliday and Karpik (1997) note that legal liberalism is a narrower concept than the broad political 
understanding of liberalism; it is closely tied to the rule of law and is not to be confused with political 
or social democracy. Importantly, Halliday and Karpik note the limitations of this legal commitment 
and draw attention to the collective failure of lawyers (necessarily including judges) to use the law to 
challenge the rise of Nazism. To this list could be added Slavery (Cover, 1975) and apartheid 
(Dyzenhaus, 1998).  
27 There are broad debates about the extent to which criminal justice can contribute to social justice 
(von Hirsch, 1993) and whether law and criminal justice can do political work openly (Hudson, 1995; 





Chapter 8  Conclusion 
A society is a something in process – in process of becoming. It always has within it, 
as ours does, seeds of dissension. And it always has within it forces making for 
moderation and mutual accommodation. The question is – the relevant question – is 
whether the courts have a significant contribution to make in pushing […] society in 
the direction of moderation – not by themselves; of course they can’t save us by 
themselves; but in combination with other institutions. Once the question is put that 
way, the answer, it seems to me, has to be yes. 
                                                                                                            HLA Hart (1956) 
This thesis demonstrates that valuable insights about criminal justice policy, 
sentencing practice and penal change can be gained from listening to the reflective 
accounts of retired judicial practitioners. The voices of the judiciary are rarely heard 
outside the courts in which they sit, limited as they are by the doctrines and 
conventions of judicial independence and neutrality. The ability of serving judges to 
engage in public debate or to express opinions on issues which might bring their 
impartiality into question is similarly restricted. All this stands in significant contrast 
to almost all other penal actors, and in this thesis I make a contribution to our 
knowledge of a particular dimension of penal practice which Hall et al (1978) 
identified some time ago, but about which we still know very little: the ‘internal 
organisation’ of the judicial world. This is the realm of judicial culture, a concept 
which has gained surprisingly little foothold in judicial scholarship and which I 
theorise and develop in Chapter 2. 
By adopting a biographical narrative research approach, grounding interviews in the 
careers and experience of a group of retired judges, I provide insight about the 
changing conditions of judging in Scotland and more broadly, about the judicial role 
in sentencing and penal practice. It is perhaps inevitable that assumptions are made 
about a group of actors whose inner organisation and practices little is known. Yet 
one key message which can be taken from the recent history of sentencing reform in 
the UK is that knowledge of judicial culture is an important precursor of reform since 
change will need to take place at the level of the habitus if it is to be fully effective. 
The capacity of judges to reflect on their own practice and about the conditions 





force in that process and for any prospect of social change. I conclude that the 
Scottish example provides grounds for optimism about the reflexive judge.  
In this final chapter, I pull together the key themes and debates which are explored in 
this thesis. I outline the principal insights and contributions made in respect of these 
aims under three headings as follows. Section 1 discusses the advantages of narrative 
research for the study of judicial lives and work. Section 2 considers the insights 
about judicial culture and penal change. Section 3 evaluates the potential of the 
reflexive judge and the judicial habitus. I conclude with some observations about 
judicial independence, the dissemination of this research and the possible direction of 
future research.  
Section 1 Narrative research and the study of judicial lives 
Using narrative research to study the judicial role in criminal justice represents a 
break with conventional qualitative sentencing research. In contrast to the usual 
structured or semi-structured format of interviews, conducted with the aim of 
obtaining perspectives on specific criminal justice issues, the narrative approach to 
interviewing adopted here entails an open-ended, conversational encounter. There is, 
to my knowledge, no existing narrative study of the judiciary in Scotland, or indeed 
elsewhere, and its contribution is underscored by the scarcity of social science and 
criminological research about judicial work and by the very limited range of judicial 
biographical or autobiographical work available. In this context, the accounts of 
retired judges about the experience of judging provide an important contribution to 
our understanding of this dimension of Scottish penal practice. 
The narrative interviews produced deeply contextual accounts with insight about the 
changing conditions of judging in recent Scottish penal history. Narrative interviews 
are a way of mapping ‘local knowledge’ of a particular world or field of practice, but 
they also have the capacity to connect with societal narratives and allow broader 
understandings about social life (Andrews, 2008). As a means by which members of 
a group affirm their identity, the stories judges provide about their field of practice 
are constructed from the collective memory of the group and institution, taking us 





circulation here were other stories told more hesitantly (such as about judicial 
independence and judicial conduct), the tellers being unsure if there was any ‘other 
support’ for their views. In this way, the narrative interview can be regarded not only 
as a site for the distribution of ‘legitimate’ organisational stories, but also as a space 
for the production of new understandings about some of the canonical narratives of 
the institution. This allows connections to be made with some of the broader 
imperatives and concerns of criminal justice.    
Told from the perspective of retirement, and reflecting the autobiographical function 
which narratives serve, some of these stories carry a sense of the way in which 
narratives allow people to ‘tidy things up’ (Sandelowski, 1991) as they seek 
coherence in the process of life review (Freeman, 1993; Riessman, 2004). This 
dimension was evident throughout the research process, from the enthusiasm with 
which some ‘took up’ my project (and attempted to steer it), to the resolve which 
permeated many accounts – the sense of ‘getting things off their chest’. Several 
useful insights were gained from this sense of insistence, such as Judge M‘s 
reflection about the need for some degree of judicial isolation – the importance of 
always having ‘a little bit of ice in your heart’. Other pressing issues included the 
enduring ‘deep attitude’ about crime – perceived as a form of disdain; frustration 
about the limited scope of criminal justice to achieve change; and about the 
challenges of sentencing.  
A predisposition to tell stories at particular biographical and historical moments 
(Polanyi, 1983; Sandelowski, 1991) may also explain the candour which many 
displayed when reflecting on their former lives, colleagues and experiences and their 
sometimes spontaneous statements about their perceived shortcomings as judges, 
their lack of confidence and anxiety about sentencing.  
‘Homologies of position’ 
The choice of a narrative interview approach was significantly influenced by my 
experience as a prosecutor. Most obviously, the existence of a network of former 
colleagues and friends eased access to an occupational group which some researchers 





position as some kind of legal ‘insider’, though the complex dynamics implied in this 
relationship called for critical reflection on my part about the relations of distance 
and engagement between researcher and researched. As Bourdieu (1999) suggests, 
research relationships purposefully built around certain ‘homologies of position’ can 
be the basis of ‘real affinities’ in the relationship, and this social proximity and 
familiarity certainly facilitated the conversational and open-ended nature of the 
interviews. That said, there was some lingering ambiguity about the precise nature of 
my ‘insider’ status in view of other hierarchies of legal status and because of my new 
position as a researcher. I believe this uncertainty produced some valuable distance 
and tension in the research relationship. Whereas Bourdieu (1999) appears to 
privilege this research relationship, believing that it brings the relationship as close as 
possible to its ‘ideal limit’, I concluded that it brought with it another set of tensions 
and dilemmas relating to the particular degrees of trust and distance which were 
appropriate in the circumstances. These ethical quandaries require to be addressed in 
the specific context they arise.   
Unavoidably, the interpretation of personal accounts always carries with it the risk of 
offence or misunderstanding (Josselson, 2004:20) and I conclude that Ricoeur’s ‘rule 
of sincerity’ (Ricoeur, 2000:6) provides an ethical basis for the conduct of the 
research relationship itself. This entails an obligation of personal authenticity, and 
amid the complexity of relationships built on trust, serves to remind the researcher of 
the need to be as straightforward as possible when explaining their research 
intentions.  
Several qualifications should be made in this discussion about narrative research. 
Firstly, not all participants were comfortable with the open structure of the 
interviews, and it is therefore important for the narrative researcher to be aware of 
this possibility and to be responsive where it occurs. In several interviews where I 
sensed the participant’s unease, I adopted a more structured format in order to keep 
the conversation flowing. Secondly, narrative data tends to consist of long, extended 
stories and explanations and this produces the interpretive dilemma of whether to 
preserve the integrity of these lengthy accounts by keeping them whole or whether, 





problem is exacerbated if some of the interview data is in a more structured format, 
such as shorter responses to direct questions. The compromise I reached was to both 
thematise and keep whole certain stories and accounts as appeared to fit the topic 
under discussion.  
The strength of the narrative approach for studying judicial lives 
The strength of the narrative approach for exploring the judicial world can be 
summarised in two key elements. Firstly, the biographical orientation of interviews 
provided rich, contextual insight about this relatively unknown area of penal practice. 
The personal stories about early legal careers and their experiences as judges suggest 
some of the ways in which the individual judge’s life history is entangled with the 
institutional narratives of their profession. In the case of the judiciary, these 
canonical narratives are primarily about independence and impartiality. This 
highlights the on-going function of narratives, even in retirement, in building and 
maintaining cultural identity. This demonstrates the work of the habitus, building and 
shaping the durable dispositions of the individual and of the collective group. 
Importantly, however, those dispositions suggest some capacity for reflexivity and 
hence for change.  
The personal narrative accounts provided here thus draw on the collective memory of 
the judiciary as an institution to allow useful insight about experiential aspects of 
judicial culture often hidden from view – dimensions such as the ‘emotional life’ of 
the organisation (Gabriel, 2000) and the personal challenges of the role. However, 
neither the individual nor the organisational accounts are offered here in a 
‘totalizing’ sense, as if suggesting a wholly coherent or integrated system of judicial 
behaviour and disposition. They are offered instead for their indicative and 
persuasive power. As Thiele (2006) argues, narratives make an important 
contribution to ethico-political life by serving as a key source of ‘mediated 
experience’: they are informative and heighten perceptions of other worlds. This, 
rather than any conclusiveness, is the strength of the narrative approach:  
Unlike conceptual arguments, narratives do not wield deductive power. They exhibit 
and clarify rather than decisively demonstrate. But they are not, for that reason, any 





                                                                                                         Thiele (2006:287) 
The second key strength of the narrative approach for studying the occupational life 
of the judiciary is its natural affinity with the study of cultures. As Bruner (2004) 
observes, one important way of understanding a culture is through its repertoire of 
‘legitimate stories’. One of the principal contributions of this thesis is to develop the 
concept of judicial culture as a distinct field of penal inquiry. I discuss some of the 
insights gained in this thesis about judicial culture in the section to follow.  
Section 2 Judicial culture 
In Chapter 2, I proposed that judicial culture could usefully be a distinct field of 
inquiry in penality. Drawing on insights from the sociology of punishment I outlined 
the key features of a more fully cultural approach to the judicial role in criminal 
justice. This approach recognises the judiciary as a complex organisation grounded 
in cultural values, whose practices reflect conflict and compromise as well as 
homogeneity of attitudes and settled practices. As with the study of other 
occupational penal cultures, the study of judicial culture is also interested in the 
unsettling of fields of practice that has occurred alongside recent transformational 
shifts and continuities in penality.  
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of theory of practice and habitus, field and capital 
provides an important adjunct to the study of judicial culture. In its broad challenge 
to inherited categories of thought, this framework renders the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
problematic’ (Reay, 2004:437) and challenges reified accounts of the judicial role. I 
introduced the concept of the reflexive judge as an important vector of penal change 
– an actor capable of reflecting on some of the conditions of their own possibility and 
on the taken for granted categories of thought and perception integral to the field of 
penality. I argued that reflexivity of this sort could be the genesis of change and 
transformation of the judicial habitus. 
Conditions of judging 
Narrative inquiry facilitates the exploration of judicial culture: the distinct 





shared (or separately held) meanings and understandings which may be less visible 
or known to ‘outsiders’. In particular, the biographical orientation of the interviews 
helps to capture changing sensibilities over the course of their careers as well as 
more settled practices and dispositions. This ‘long view’ allows unique insight about 
sensibilities which may be in a state of flux or which may even have changed. This 
sense of contingency is central to questions of penal change and reform.  
The narrative interviews conducted in this project provide important ‘local 
knowledge’ (Geertz, 1983) about the social and political conditions of judging in this 
recent period of Scottish penal history. The relevance of family background to later 
judicial careers was explored in the context of what the young lawyers ‘brought to 
the Bar’. Background and income appeared to play a role in the type of work which 
might be offered to new lawyers –‘acted invariably for the NCB rather than the 
NUM’ was one wry distinction offered – but all the judges expressed the view that 
these social factors were not relevant to the ability of an individual ultimately to be a 
fair judge, even sometimes confounding their own expectations and assumptions 
about several individuals. These views are in line with the core institutional narrative 
about judicial diversity: the social legitimacy argument that the judiciary should 
reflect society but not represent particular groups or partisan values. Although many 
judges believed that significantly greater diversity had been achieved over the course 
of their careers, the limited evidence which is available does not appear to support 
this degree of optimism. The lack of research about the composition of the judiciary 
is a major obstacle to proper debate of this issue. 
Changing sensibilities 
The early career experiences of these young lawyers proved influential in other ways, 
shaping attitudes about appropriate judicial conduct and providing models of 
behaviour which they adopted or rejected when becoming judges themselves in due 
course. Among the key judicial virtues these judges identified were courtesy (though 
not exclusively); being even-tempered and good-natured, kind, sensitive and 
understanding, fair, even having a sense of humour so long as this was not directed at 





(Czarniawska, 2004:49), a striking feature of this study was the strong characteristic 
of some judges’ sentencing sensibilities. This suggested an inclusionary and 
empathetic attitude towards offenders, a marked orientation towards rehabilitation 
rather than retribution, and perhaps paradoxically for a judge, an attempt to be non-
judgemental. Comparisons of judicial sensibilities across time are not easily made, 
and as Nelken (2010: 49) observes, this general endeavour (the comparison of ‘ideas, 
values, aspirations and mentalities’) is already engaging at the extreme end of 
cultural enquiry. However, these accounts may provide some clue to the largely 
unexplored question about the role of the judiciary in the continuity of a penal 
welfare ethos in Scotland, particularly the social work model aimed at the re-
integration of offenders in the community rather than the use of prison. The ‘long 
view’ which biographical accounts facilitate provided additional insight about 
changes in judicial conduct over the course of their careers: as Judge D observed, 
there was now ‘no room for the eccentrics’.  
An important factor in this transformation of the habitus over time appears to be the 
resolve of individuals not to follow a pattern of conduct which they had observed, 
and disparaged, in their early years. The adoption of a different set of values was 
particularly striking regarding the judge’s relationship with the offender: in Judge 
M’s telling phrase, it became important to talk to the offender rather than about him. 
In these accounts, it is possible to detect a profound questioning of conventions about 
the appropriate level of judicial distance from, and engagement with, the offender. 
The involvement of judges in new forms of justice such as Drug Courts, restorative 
justice and mediation raises similar core issues about the judicial role and about 
judicial independence in particular. Of central importance here is that there was 
evidence of openness to new forms of justice, confounding Bourdieu’s (1987:831) 
assumption that the ‘entry ticket’ for judges into the juridical field is the acceptance 
of the ‘universalizing attitude’ that conflicts can only be resolved juridically. 
Several other important insights were gained from these accounts of early 
experience. The importance of training for judges today was emphasised by stories 
about these judges having received no training before taking up appointment; indeed, 





the seemingly prosaic ‘14 steps’ of judging was telling for what it revealed about the 
pre-occupations of the novice judge and about the routines of court practice. Stories 
about gaining experience of criminal work through the Poor’s Roll were important in 
several ways. Firstly, they heighten awareness about the potential for unfairness to 
the accused and other court users - candidly admitted by most. Secondly, the stories 
suggested some more of what Judge B called the ‘deep social attitude’ towards 
crime. Further, there is some prescient insight about public access to high quality, 
free legal representation at a time of severe curtailment of these services. Finally, the 
stories provide insight about the form which judicial training could take, raising 
questions about promoting consistency in judicial standards of conduct but allowing 
individualism, about allowing judges to observe colleagues at work, and providing 
support for mentoring arrangements.   
Occupational culture 
Insight was gained about some of the informal practices of the judiciary, including 
discussions between judges about sentencing tariffs and ascertaining the ‘going rate’. 
Although helping to reduce the chance of being ‘unlucky in your judge’ (Waldron, 
1998) and thus promoting consistency, this practice also raises questions about the 
ways in which dispositions are shaped and influenced, the conflict between 
interdependence and independence, and practical questions about its ad hoc and 
situational nature. Accounts of isolation and anxiety raise questions about pastoral 
care of judges and the tension this creates for their public and self-image.    
Judicial culture and penal reform 
Understanding judicial culture is particularly important for penal change. The history 
of sentencing reform in the UK points to the use of adaptive strategies by the 
judiciary to legislation deemed by them to be unnecessary or undesirable (see 
Ashworth, 1995; also Hutton and Tata, 2010 regarding resistance to innovation and 
reform). Ashworth (1995) characterises this practice of resisting legislative change 
and slowing its implementation as a ‘drag co-efficient’ on the process. The necessary 
conditions for effective change in sentencing practice almost certainly, therefore, 





As analysts of courts and judges in authoritarian and transitional regimes observe, the 
mere empowerment of judges in formal or statutory terms (through appointment 
procedures and role designations which promote institutional independence) does not 
by itself produce judges who are defenders of democratic values. For this to occur, 
judges must acquire a range of occupational attributes including a measure of 
distance (the basis of judicial independence) and some connection to communitarian 
and societal values. Informal practices and broader cultural influences therefore have 
a determinative impact on the formation and shape of judicial qualities (Solomon, 
2007). Knowledge and insight of these cultural practices and influences is therefore 
central to the task of imagining or promoting change, and requires understanding of 
the history and practice of the judiciary as an occupational group.  
Section 3 The reflexive judge  
Judicial narratives: ‘Agent-based visions’ 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, using actors’ subjective accounts to understand the penal 
world raises key questions about agency and structure, and the weight to be attached 
to judicial discourse about penal practice. Some criticism of subjectivism persists in 
the analyses of scholars such as Wacquant (2011) who are critical of ‘agent-based 
visions’ which lead only to ‘internalist’ solutions rather than structural visions and 
institutional remedies.1 Wacquant asserts the analytical importance of ‘organizational 
hardware’ over ‘mental software’ to achieve solutions and employs a ‘big-picture’ 
view of penality to remind us that criminal justice is ‘a core capacity designed not to 
stem offending but to manage urban marginality, stage political sovereignty and 
achieve legitimacy in the eyes of citizens’ (2011:446-7).  
Wacquant’s structural analysis of the function of criminal justice is important for its 
insistence on the material realities and effects of penal practices, and for the 
connections he makes between those practices and broad changes in the structure and 
politics of society. However, this critique ties judges almost exclusively to what 
Williams (1983) calls the ‘state instrumentality’ aspect of their role. This is a 
negative conception of law and judicial power and comes close to misunderstanding 





The instrumental judge: faith and suspicion 
I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that suspicion of the sentencing judge plays an 
important part in criminological scholarship, alerting us to the duality of the role in 
criminal justice and to some of the contradictions and ambiguity of the power to 
punish. This is reflected in the combined interpretive position which I adopted, based 
on the hermeneutics of faith and suspicion. This allows some of the complexity of 
the judicial role in criminal justice to be considered: questions about motivation, 
sensibilities and interests. There may, for example, be good reason to be sceptical 
about the inclusionary and empathetic attitudes towards offenders expressed by many 
of the judges in this research; this sits oddly with the awareness of judges that 
punishment practices represent a blunt form of social control, are largely ineffective 
and can cause harm. Yet, as Garland (1992) observes, the expression of humanitarian 
and compassionate sentiments by judges (or other penal actors) should not be too 
readily dismissed as mere rhetoric or ideology designed to legitimise the exercise of 
their power: sensibilities can produce real changes in penal practice which reduce 
suffering and lessen harm.  
A similar observation can be made about judicial independence. A critical 
interpretation of this doctrine represents it, importantly, as a cultural practice which 
sustains legal institutions and which allows agents to control or deny the 
indeterminacy of its parameters and practices. These are practices which are 
‘invented, defended and renewed’ in their routine performance (Wald, 1995: 137).  
Yet one of the tasks of scholarship is to explore those explanations and strategies of 
renewal and to keep open the questions of how actors frame the meanings and values 
they bring to bear in practice (Wald, 1995). It is relevant, therefore, to acknowledge 
that doctrines such as judicial independence may have important meanings and 
effects for practitioners which evade empirical evaluation (Berman, 2003). These 
meanings include the beliefs of some judges here that the ‘traditions’ of the 
institution (wigs, gowns and raised benches) can have a transformative effect on the 
judges themselves, strengthening their sense of independence. In this way, too, 
ethnographic studies which rely on subjective accounts of actors can be as relevant a 





Too much suspicion? 
Discretionary power is distrusted partly because it is ‘instinctive’ and therefore 
considered irrational or even capricious. There is a broad debate about the nature of 
discretionary power in sentencing which I have only touched upon in this thesis, but 
which involves some of the questions about faith and suspicion of judgement that I 
have outlined in Chapter 7. I have drawn attention to some of the developments in 
cognitive science which challenge the basis of this suspicion in so far as it relates to 
its perceived irrationality. This research supports a more rounded conception of 
judgement which recognises the interconnectedness of rationality, intuition and 
emotions. Moreover, there is a cautionary tale in Tamanaha’s (2010) observation that 
the end-point of realist suspicion about judgement is often a retreat to legal 
formalism and a ‘ratcheting up’ of its demands towards mechanical and/or rule-
bound sentencing frameworks.2 
One further consequence of the focus on suspicion of judging is that quieter aspects 
of judgement are overlooked: questions about leniency, tolerance and moderation 
and about faith (or trust) in judgement. Liebling (2001: 47) questions this general 
oversight when she wonders: 
Why are we not fascinated by the under-use as well as the over-use of power in real social 
practices? To what extent do we really understand the complexities of using authority […]?  
New visions: shifting boundaries of the judicial role 
Glimpses of some shifting role boundaries are gained from the accounts of judges in 
this study, particularly in relation to the Sheriff Courts where the ‘social services’ 
function is greater than in the High Court. Some of the complexities of changing 
judicial authority have recently been questioned, beyond Cover’s general urging of 
judges to stop ‘circumscribing the nomos’ and to ’invite new worlds’ (1983: 68). 
Stevens (2002) traces some practical and psychological transformations in the 
English judiciary, and Henham (2009) argues that the judiciary is now so distanced 
from the ‘arm of the state’ that its role in sentencing is open for re-negotiation. 
Henham speculates that if judges were able to operate beyond retributive justice 





framework. Dzur and Mirchandani (2007), looking at the development of different 
criminal justice models such as the Drug Court with their emphasis on debate and 
participation, point to the additional role the judiciary could play in fostering and 
being responsive to deliberations of this kind (though they question whether current 
configurations of the judicial role would allow this involvement). Sarat and Kearns 
(1995) are less optimistic about the place of judges in the building and maintenance 
of a tolerant society and alternative normative possibilities. The price to be paid for 
the judge’s capacity to punish is, they believe, a disposition ‘hostile to the visions of 
other normative orders’ (1995: 249).  
These critiques suggest that exclusive emphasis on the instrumental and negative 
power of the sentencing judge is increasingly in need of re-appraisal. Although 
judges cannot enter the sphere of political choices or directly express any opinion on 
the balances and compromises of the ‘penal equation’, this narrative study provides 
grounds for optimism that judicial dispositions may be more open to alternative 
visions and ‘new worlds’ than the hegemonic model of judging would imply.  
The reflexive judge and the judicial habitus 
This approach brings the ‘reflexive judge’ to the foreground of the discussion and 
brings into sharp relief Wacquant’s (2011: 446) relegation of ‘mental software’ 
issues - ‘textual’ matters of sensibility and disposition – to secondary importance.3 
The concept of habitus is still sometimes interpreted in a deterministic, structural 
way which allows little room for agency or change at the level of the habitus. This 
interpretation attaches more importance to position than disposition, and imagines 
practitioners to be caught in a continuous loop of unconscious and largely 
unreflexive practice. However, as I argued in Chapter 4, it is possible to observe in 
Bourdieu’s later work The Weight of the World (1999) a clear resolution in favour of 
the reflexive participant who is capable of reflecting on the objective conditions of 
their practice. This is significant because it provides strong grounds for re-imagining 
the habitus as a locus for change.  
Importantly, however, habitus carries the genesis of cultural change only if 





practice in a given field, and thus constrain them. In these accounts of their early 
years of legal training and judging, of models of judicial conduct and of their 
conceptions of crime, the criminal and criminal justice, we can begin to trace some 
of those conditions of practice as well as the formation and consolidation of judicial 
dispositions in response to the circumstances they encounter. We can also begin to 
see ways in which some judges recognise factors which operate to shape and 
constrain their practice. 
Some of the factors which might limit judicial agency and thus the scope for change 
include relational patterns of gender and class, their role in punishment, the tendency 
to adopt reified concepts of law and the judicial role, the reluctance to signify, and 
the limited scope for pursuing any form of social justice. In the accounts given there 
was some evidence of capacity and willingness to reflect on those apparently 
‘invisible relational patterns operating behind the backs of agents’ (Wacquant, 2007) 
and on some of the ‘unthought categories of thought’ in the field of penality – such 
as the normative framework of criminal justice, judicial independence, the juridical 
monopoly on the resolution of disputes, and on the ‘social question’.  
These are some of the ‘gains’ of subjective accounts of penality – interpretive 
accounts of strategies, discourses and of actual activities in the field of practice. As 
Valverde (2010:120) observes, these are practices that need to be described in their 
specificity so that we know ‘enough about what is actually going on’. Enquiry of this 
type helps us distinguish ‘one battle from another’ (Valverde, 2010) - and to 
understand why, in Judge B’s words, it is thought necessary for the judge to be 
‘above the battle’.4  
The reflexive judge: some implications 
I conclude this chapter with some brief observations about the implications of this 
research, and indications for future research. I have argued in this thesis for an 
understanding of the judicial habitus that does not imply a conceptual straightjacket 
but allows the possibility (though not inevitability) of judicial reflexivity, diversity of 
disposition and some openness to ‘new worlds’. I have also suggested that one 





capacity of practitioners to engage in reflexivity about the social context of 
sentencing. Some passing recognition of this quality can be found in the criteria for 
judicial appointment in Scotland which include ‘understanding of people and 
society’ (Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, 2013), and in judicial training 
programmes which include guidance and information about ‘social context’.5 
Acknowledging the role of sentencing in the normative ordering of social life and the 
need for democratic deliberation about penality, it may be thought important to 
facilitate the participation of the judiciary in this debate at some level which does not 
compromise their independence – or at least, for their training to provide multiple 
perspectives on that ordering. Providing alternative perspectives on social relations 
serves to challenge the partiality and relative blindness of dominant elites: 
Those in structurally superior positions not only take their experience, preferences, 
and opinions to be general, uncontroversial, ordinary, and even an expression of 
suffering or disadvantage … but also have the power to represent these as general 
norms.  
                                                                                                        (Young, 1996:116) 
Judges and criminology 
Keating (1993) has described the ‘closing off’ institutional response to social inquiry 
whereby elites in a given field operate in ways which limit access and circumscribe 
social research. Although this may reflect the recent history of sentencing research in 
other jurisdictions, this study suggests a different response in Scotland. Many of the 
judges spoke at length about what they gained from their attendance at conferences 
and involvement in penal reform organisations, and the usefulness of this 
information for their work in criminal justice. It may be, as I suggested in Chapter 6, 
that the judiciary’s use of research has a strategic element insofar as it allows them to 
explain and legitimate their authority to wider audiences, and it may also suggest the 
use of research to re-negotiate and re-legitimate practices that might otherwise be 
transformed by policy (McNeill, 2004; see also Tata, 2000; Tata and Hutton, 2003). 
The likely mix of motivations in play does not, however, detract from the persuasive 






Judicial independence constrains the extent to which judges can participate in the 
type of civic events or debates that might foster critical reflexivity, and this points to 
the need to provide a range of opportunities for them to engage with research and 
public deliberation about penal matters. The insight from several judges that 
attendance at conferences such as those of SASO allowed them to ‘absorb all sorts of 
ideas without saying you agree with them’ underscores the continuing importance of 
strong organisational capacity to provide forum of this sort. It also points to the 
importance of strong academic institutional capacity to provide input to judicial 
training programmes to allow the dissemination of research findings and new 
theoretical insights in settings where judges can actively debate and discuss.  
  
Norrie (2005) notes the ‘iron grip’ of the penal equation on policy and debate 
throughout the 20th century, despite attempts of penal reformers to move the debate 
beyond these ‘tired rationales’ and notwithstanding recent incursions into more 
relational forms of justice such as restorative justice and drug courts, which remain 
on the periphery of criminal justice. The openness of  judges in this study to consider 
alternative forms of resolving criminal justice disputes suggest that judges may be a 
source of untapped potential not only in seeking solutions to existing problems but 
also in re-imagining the future.  
Judicial Independence 
My final observation is that judicial independence is a troubled and misunderstood 
‘master narrative’. This key organising principle is central to the legitimacy of the 
sentencing judge in both its ‘state instrumentality’ dimension and its ‘impartial 
adjudicator’ aspect. Notwithstanding the ‘Olympian’ (Lacey, 2008) version of 
judicial independence often invoked by judges in the UK to ward off perceived 
government interference in judicial discretion, this study highlights other uses of the 
concept in daily practice, ways which enable judges to perform their various routine 
functions. This role conception is still mindful of the need for judges to maintain 
‘distance’ from their audiences but increasingly questions the nature and scope of 





little understood and there is scope for further research to explore the ways in which 
this master narrative, embodied deep in the habitus, is explained and enacted in 
practice, and adapts to new ways of performing justice.  
Legislative reforms such as sentencing guidelines are inclined to push the judiciary 
into one of its ‘mythological hideouts’ (Stevens, 2002: 137): the strong, idealized 
‘sovereign self’ version of judicial independence. The tendency of criminological 
scholarship to reproduce somewhat one-dimensional explanations and portrayals of 
judicial work in criminal justice increasingly runs the danger of making judges 
appear victims of their own mythology. The study of judicial culture offers potential 
for capturing some of the greater complexity and diversity of the role, thereby 





                                                 
 
1 These remarks were made by way of response to questions raised by Loader and Sparks (2010) 
about the production and circulation of criminological knowledge.  
2 A similar observation can be made in the UK where several commentators who sought to expose the 
intrusion of the political in the judiciary concluded that a ‘return’ to formalism and ‘politics-free’ 
judging is the solution (Griffith, 1997; Rozenberg, 1997). The irony may be that the reader is already 
persuaded by their accounts that this is no longer a realistic prospect. 
3 There is an important difference in emphasis here between Wacquant, who appears to be privileging 
structural accounts of penality, and his mentor Bourdieu who understood the relationship between 
structure and agency as one of ‘mutual constitution and correspondence’ (Wacquant, 2007) and who 
insisted that neither account provides a sufficient explanation of social action in itself. 
 
4 Indeed, Valverde (2010:118) uses the example of judicial independence as a governing practice that 
requires to be specified in its own right – not as a secondary, ‘on the surface’ issue, or as Wacquant 
(2011: 445) suggests, one of the ‘smaller, more technical issues’. 
5 This criteria of ‘understanding of people and society’ is found under the rubric ‘Personal and 
Judicial Qualities’. The other qualities include integrity, independence of mind and moral courage, 
fairness and impartiality, commonsense, responsible attitude and sound temperament, courtesy and 
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